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Thus, a steady process of politicization and radicalization of Islam and Islamic groupings has been going on in the Russian Federation during the post-Soviet period due to the weakening of the institutions of state power and under a strong influence from abroad. Apart from that, non-traditional Islamic currents have appeared and become institutionalized in the country's territory. This process was aggravated by the weakness and disunity of traditional and official Russian Islam and implementation of separatist projects in certain regions of the country, primarily, in the North Caucasus.
Due to a number of reasons, and objective and subjective factors stable groups of radical Salaphites have appeared in many parts of Russia, which were initially institutionalized in certain North Caucasian republics. Later the ideas of jihad spread practically all over the North Caucasus, and in the past decade prerequisites have emerged for the creation of radical Salaphite groupings in the Volga area, the Urals and West Siberia, as well as in the "Muslim enclaves" of big Russian cities.
"Elitologiya Rossii: Sovremennoye sostoyaniye i perspektivy razvitiya," Moscow, 2013, vol. 1, pp. 481-497.
N. Mamedova,
Head of the Iranian section. Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS IRAN: INTERESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA AND OPPORTUNITIES OF INFLUENCE
For the past decades Iran's interest in the Central Asian countries has changed, however, it has always wished to take the leading positions in the region, changing different forms of influence -ideological, cultural and economic. Inasmuch as the foreign economic ties of the Islamic Republic of Iran were oriented to world markets, its
economic interest in the same-type economy has markedly diminished in recent years. However, the increased sanctions of the West against Iran, a curtailment of economic ties with it to virtual isolation, and reduction of political contacts with western states have resulted in the growing attention of Iran to Central Asian countries. This can be seen and heard in statements of Iranian leaders, and during visits made by high officials of that country. But the possibilities of Iran's economic influence on Central Asia are sharply limited due to the world crisis, which has also touched it, and also because of the sanctions. Economic development has slowed down, plans evolved in 2008-2010 to turn Iran into the regional economic leader by 2020 have become unfeasible, and competitiveness on regional markets has lowered markedly.
What then are Iran's interests and positions in the region at present?
Iran is interested in searching for and finding niches and projects which do not present considerable interest for foreign investments and which will be an important development factor for all Central Asian countries.
Iran does not take an active part in oil and gas extraction in countries of the region where the leading role is played by western and American companies, companies of Russia, and in recent years China has become one of the leading countries among the investors.
But Iran is rather active in such sphere of the fuel-and-energy complex as transportation of oil and gas via its own territory or in participation in collective projects of transporting energy carriers. For example, it has commissioned a terminal of liquefied gas in a port in Turkmenistan. Such cooperation for Iran is a form of escape from international isolation. However, opportunities to take part in such projects are few and far between.
First, Central Asian countries, especially Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, where the positions of foreign capital in the gas-and-oil ranch are strong, cannot but take into account the presence of the regime of sanctions against Iran. Secondly, the desire of the Central Asian countries exporting oil and gas to weaken their dependence on the Russian pipeline system with the help of Iran may result in their dependence on Iran with its complex relations with the West and the Persian Gulf countries.
Oil deliveries from Kazakhstan via Iran (just as Russia and, possibly Turkmenistan) on the SWAP scheme are not regular and not too big (about one million tons).
Practical participation of Iran in the pipeline system of Central Asia is not too great. A gas pipeline has been laid out by Iran to two deposits in Turkmenistan. Iran is definitely interested in transporting its resources through pipelines to regional markets. But in is also interested in participating in international projects of laying out pipelines through its territory, which will ensure certain guarantees to its security, especially in the present situation, which does not exclude military solution to its nuclear program. It seems that Iran is more interested in reducing its isolation, lowering the possibility of a forcible solution of its nuclear program, and raising its security level than in securing its purely economic benefits.
For the countries connected with Iran by pipelines the situation is quite reverse. Iranian gas pipelines to Turkmenistan, Armenia and Turkey are more advantageous to these countries than to Iran. They not only sell gas (like Turkmenistan), or receive gas (like Turkey and Armenia), but they now feel more independent as far as the prices of gas on the market are concerned, especially in their relations with Russia.
Iran is striving to expand its cooperation in the sphere of power production and supply through participation in building power plants, transmitting electric energy, and creating a unified energy system of the region. In this respect Iran's positions can be more solid, because this sphere has not got under sanctions. For the Central Asian countries the problem of energy security is very urgent, especially for the countries with a great potential of hydro-resources, like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The latter urgently needs the supply of electric energy and the completion of construction, including with the help of Iranian companies, of Sangtudinskaya and Shurobskaya power plants on the Vakhsh River, and "Aini" plant on the Zeravshan River. Perhaps, after the commissioning of Rogunskaya power plant the situation will change, but so far it remains crucial, and Iran is quite competitive on this market.
Iran can and does use great interest of Central Asian countries in creating a transport system which would allow them to overcome their isolation from sea routes. This is why Iran offers projects for expanding its road network (highways and railways) and connecting them with neighboring countries, and also for building roads in the latter, for instance, in Afghanistan. Roads have been connected with Turkmenistan. Iran has built a railway line in Afghanistan and elaborated a project connecting a road with Tajikistan through Afghanistan. Iran is building a tunnel connecting Dushanbe, Tajikistan's capital, with the North of the country The Central Asian countries seem to have been interested in these projects offered by Iran on a bilateral basis, and on the basis of agreements with several countries or within the framework of the Organization of Economic Cooperation, since the use of the developed Iranian transport system will give these countries an access to ports of the Persian Gulf.
But everything is rater difficult for Iran there. The project of building a railway line along the shore of the Caspian Sea, which Iran is lobbying and which has been supported by Central Asian countries recently, has now been frozen. The latest events connected with the refusal of Turkmenistan from the services of an Iranian company ready to build this railway on the shore of the Caspian Sea make it possible to suppose that the reason for such action was pressure brought to bear on Turkmenistan by other countries. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have shown their interest in the project of a railway line bypassing Iran -from Azerbaijan to Kars, which will give access to the Black Sea.
It can be assumed that Iran's participation in these spectacular projects, which might be advantageous for Iran politically and economically, enhances its interest in greater stability of the region.
The economic influence of Iran on Central Asian countries through foreign trade is not too great due to their one-type economy But at the present time when Iran is faced with the pressing task to increase its non-oil export it can be expected that Iran will expand its foreign economic ties, including at the expense of its military-industrial complex. (The biggest volumes of Iran's foreign trade with Central Asian countries are based on bilateral relations; the Organization of Economic Development accounts only for about five percent of Iranian turnover).
The Caspian problem is a common one for the entire region, and it has different aspects For Iran it is primarily the problem of security, because there are no American or NATO forces at the Turkmen stretch of the Iranian border. Iran's claims to a vast area of the Caspian Sea surface at present have not been caused by economic interests, but most probably are a pretext to drag out a solution of the legal status of the sea and to prevent the presence of the naval forces of third countries there.
Iran is not drawn too deeply in solving the pressing problem of the distribution of trans-border waters. It is rather the problem directly connected with Afghanistan and with Central Asian countries, through the construction of hydrotechnical installations in Tajikistan.
The cultural-ideological aspect of Iran's relations with the Central Asian countries has also been predominant up to the present time. During the past twenty years Iran has been using the common historical and cultural past for broadening its influence in the region. In all countries of the region, including Afghanistan, Iranian cultural centers have been working with the help of the Islamic foundation and the Committee of Imam Khomeini. The idea has been put forward to form an alliance of Iranian-language countries (Iran, Tajikistan, Afghanistan), the leaders of these countries meet within the framework of this virtual alliance, and although there has been no tangible results so far, a certain effect has been achieved. Iran demonstrates its participation in a political regional dialogue, although Tajikistan and Afghanistan hope to receive much more help from the West.
The ideological expansion of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the form of the export of Islamic revolution, which was rather intensive in the first years after the revolution, has petered out. Iran has not undertaken anything to realize this with regard to Central Asia, moreover, the experience in resolving the armed conflict in Tajikistan and maintaining contacts with the Talibs in Afghanistan has shown that Iran did much to play down extremist actions and ensure a calm and quiet situation along its borders. Of course, Iran's influence on the Islamic movements in Central Asian countries is seriously limited, although it emphasizes the need for unity within the framework of the common Muslim umma.
However, there can be another variant, when Iran, ousted from all economic projects and pushed into the corner, may try once again to
use the Islamic factor, supporting movements against the secular regimes of the countries of the region. Besides, already now Iran is actively using its cultural centers to distribute and popularize not only works of its literary classics, but also works by Islamic ideologists, it open religious schools, pays for the study of students from Central Asian countries at universities and madrasahs of Iran. Suffice it to recall Iran's experience of maintaining relations with Islamic Sunni
organizations, for instance, Hamas and IDU.
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However, Central Asia gives an opportunity to Iran to reduce its political isolation. It does not wage a struggle for resources or for border changes. It is not a rival to Russia or China. Iran objectively assesses Kazakhstan's claims to leadership in the region. Its influence on it has been stabilizing, in the main, so far. Its support of Islamic movements has not reached the level of their official government support or the level of confrontation with state power in Central Asian countries.
The low level of economic, military (a military agreement has been signed only with Tajikistan) and political interdependence makes it possible to suppose that in case of a military solution of the Iranian nuclear program, it will not be supported by Central Asian countries. But it should be taken into consideration that Islamic sentiments in the region are very strong, despite the secular character of power in Central Asian countries. It should also be borne in mind that the clan economy characteristic of the regimes of the Central Asian countries and the close ties of their ruling clans with big companies of the United States and Europe also bolster up Islamic opposition sentiments. The potential of social explosion is very high. This is why in case of a military solution of the Iranian nuclear problem, assistance to Iran by voluntary
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Islamic units and through Islamic organizations may well be predicted, despite differences in religious currents, which tend to be forgotten when a Muslim country falls victim to aggression. Besides, there will be another wave of Islamic extremist sentiments.
"Vyzovy bezopasnosti v Tsentralnoi Azii," Moscow, 2013, pp. 102-105.
D. Alexandrov, I. Ippolitov, D. Popov,
Political writers, Russian Institute of Strategic Studies "SOFT POWER" AS AN INSTRUMENT OF AMERICAN POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA: TAJIKISTAN
Tajikistan is unable to claim the role of a principal ally of the American Agency for International Development objectively, due to its insignificant political weight, economic weakness and transport deficiency. Nevertheless, that country has a certain value as a potential seat of instability for the U.S. policy close to the borders of Russia, China and Iran. A coup d'etat and destabilization of the socio-political situation in Tajikistan would be a blow to the security of the aforementioned countries. The republic will become a source of fundamentalism, terrorist activities and drug trafficking.
The crucial role in destabilizing the situation in different countries, which are the objects of interest of the U.S.A., has been assigned to "soft power", affecting the social processes going on there through a foreign-funded network of non-governmental organizations, the media and the Internet, and, as it has vividly been demonstrated, by "color revolutions" in former Soviet republics, and developments in North Asia and the Middle East. A mechanism of this type has been used in Tajikistan.
