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Rashidov R.R.
Associate Professor, Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in Political Sciences, Uzbekistan
INTERNAL POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT AND POWER STRUGGLE AT THE END OF THE 20TH CENTURY IN AFGHANISTAN
Abstract. Following the withdrawal of former Soviet troops from Afghan territory (1989) and the crisis of the Afghanistan Peoples Democratic Party regime (1992), civil wars between the mujahedeen in Afghanistan escalated (1992-1996). The absence of a central government, the control of local areas by "field commanders" and the direct implementation of the functions of the supreme power by these individuals on the ground have led to a complete crisis of the state in Afghanistan. During this period, disagreements between the country's mujahedeen escalated into an all-out war, which lasted until the Taliban seized power and led to the complete collapse of the centralized state system in Afghanistan and the emergence of "state-like political structures" in some areas.
Keywords: political disagreement, internal situation, "tanzim", "Taliban" movement, external influence, power struggle, religious factor, mujahedeen, "shura ".
Looking at the internal political situation in Afghanistan at the end of the twentieth century, the government of the mujahedeen failed to establish peace and stability, there are constant clashes between their various military-political structures, and the country is practically divided into many small autonomous units. It is worth noting that such unrest in Afghanistan is one of the factors that ensured the success of the Taliban, who have turned into a new political force in the country in their quest for power.
Another noteworthy aspect of the Taliban's successful movement across the country is that first, their representatives arrive in the capital, Kabul, to meet with Burkhaniddin Rabbani and state that their main goal is to fight Gulbuddin Khikmatyar and several small military groups like him, who are in opposition to Rabbani's government. As a result, Rabbani fully trusts them and even instructs the leaders of wealthy mujahedeen in the south of the country to support the Taliban in every possible way.1
The Taliban's actions are tactical in nature, they undermine the Rabbani government and use him to achieve their goals. In turn, Rabbani believes in the Taliban, and it is clear that the basis of this belief is the
desire of the Taliban to strike at the forces of Hikmatyar and get rid of him.
On November 5, 1994, the Taliban captured the ancient capital of Afghanistan, Kandahar, and at the end of November the provinces of Helmand and Zabul, Ghazni in January 1995, and Herat, an important strategic city in the northwest, on September 5, 1995.2
The small number of Taliban in the first military operation reached 3,000 during the conquest of Kandahar, but by early 1995 it had grown to over 10,000.3
While the Taliban struggled to occupy Afghan territory, their actions were directly controlled by Pakistan. The movement's efforts to create a "true Islamic state" with the Koran in one hand and a Kalashnikov assault rifle in the other are led by Pakistan's leading inter-agency intelligence (InterServices Intelligence - ISI) - responsible for the supply of weapons, the Society of Islamic Scholars ("Jamiat-i ulamo-i islam"), a religious fundamentalist party (led by Fazl ur-Rakhman) that has partnered with the Pakistani government since 1993, ideologically supports the Taliban.4 It should be noted that General Nasrullakh Bobar, Pakistan interior minister and
1 Чингиз П. Афгонестон, асре мужохедин ва баромадан-е толебон (Afghanistan, the era of the Mujahedeen and the emergence of the Taliban). -Техрон: Махде Мино, 1378 (1999). - Б. 26.
2 Dorronsoro, G. Revolution Unending. Afghanistan:
1979 to the Present. - London: Hurst & Co., 2005 -
Р.246-251.
3Sisson,M., Anderson,T. Taliban. The Sage Encyclopedia of Terrorism, 2nd ed.. Ed. Gus Martin. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2011. - Р. 573. 4 Плешов О.В. Движение "Талибан": истоки фундаментализма. Сборник "Афганистан: война и проблемы мира" (Отв. ред. Давыдов А.Д.). ИИИиБВиИВРАН. - М., 1998. - С. 40.
UB
BBSM
B.Bhutto's adviser on Afghanistan, made a significant contribution to the formation of the Taliban as a relatively strong military-political group.5
The Rabbani government, which did not properly assess the potential of the Taliban during its initial efforts, began a series of steps in late 1995 as the Taliban approached the capital, Kabul, seeking rapprochement with their "old" allies, the mujahedeen. In this process, in particular, Iran played a certain mediating role. This is because while Pashtun fundamentalists of Sunni Islam come to power in Afghanistan, Shiites (Hazaras, Ismailis) 6, who are 19% of the country's population, come to power, and it was natural that the Persian-speaking population (mainly Tajiks and Hazaras), who make up almost half of the country's population, would be in great danger.7 Therefore, with the mediation of the Iranian government, an agreement was reached between the two major political forces in Afghanistan - the government of B.Rabbani and G.Hikmatyar, who was in opposition to him and was attacked by the Taliban. Then Hikmatyar again served as prime minister in the government of Rabbani, and his troops entered Kabul on May 5, 1996. However, other political forces of the Mujahedeen did not want to unite with these two leading forces of the Mujahedeen, and the overall political and military situation in the country remained very dangerous.
The Rabbani government was unable to organize the defense of the capital and did not want the population to suffer during the siege, so the Taliban liberated the city without a fight, and the Taliban forces captured Kabul on September 27, 1996.8
The Taliban took over Kabul, in flagrant violation of international law and generally accepted norms of diplomatic immunity, stormed the UN mission, arrested and tortured former President Mukhammad Najibullakh and his brother Akhmad, who had sought refuge there from 1992 to 1996, and killed them in central Kabul, defiantly hung.9
During the active military campaign of the Taliban to invade Afghanistan, a number of opinions were expressed in scientific and expert circles about their goal after coming to power and the fate of the country.
Some argue that the Taliban are the military vanguard in the return of former King M.Zahirshah to the throne, and that the Taliban will hand over power to the former king as soon as he takes over, according to
5The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan./ edited by Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi. - Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University Press, 2009. - Р. 63-64.
6 Gritzner, J.A., Shroder, J.F. Afghanistan. 2nd ed. -New York: Chelsea House, 2007. - Р. 83-84.
7 Коргун В.Г. История Афганистана. XX век. - М.: Крафт+. 2004. - С. 453-455.
8 That sourse.
9 Rodney P. Carlisle. Afghanistan War. - New York: Chelsea House, 2010. - Р. 52.
10 Сикоев Р. Исламский Эмират Афганистан:
тоталитарный режим рубежа XXI века //
East European Scientific Journal #1(65), 2021 21 another point of view, the Taliban does not claim power at all, its goal is to restore order in Afghanistan and transfer power to the legitimate government, which will be formed at the Loya Jirga, a large gathering of Afghan representatives. Proponents of this view say that Taliban alumni lack the experience and skills to run a modern state and that they had to hand over power to exiled Afghan "technocrats" after coming to power.10 However, none of this was justified, and we can also see from the fact that Mullah Mukhammad Umar -"Amir al-Mu'minin" - was declared the "Amir of the Muslims"11, "the leader of the Muslims" on April 3, 1996, at a gathering of more than 1,500 religious scholars from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran in Kandahar, which has been attacking Kabul since late 1995, has shown a desire to establish a completely different statehood when it comes to power. After that, the Taliban occupied the entire country and tried to change the official name of Afghanistan. However, by October 1997, although they had not taken control of the entire country, the Taliban announced the creation of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan12. Thus, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, formed by the Taliban, a military-political group that supports a very radical branch of Islam, was a theocratic state.
Subsequent military operations by the Taliban were aimed at subjugating territories in the north of the country. On the way, they were opposed by forces belonging to the Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan, led by Akhmad Shakh Massoud, Abdul Rashid Dostum and the Hazaras Abdul Karim Khalili.
Although the forces under the command of General A.Dostum, who controlled six northern provinces centered in Mazar-i-Sharif, were the main obstacle to the Taliban movement in the north, during the northern Taliban military operation in May 1997, the forces under the leadership of Dostum split, and his deputy, the Force under the leadership of General Abdul Malik, opposed Dostum's efforts, collaborated with the Taliban and allowed the Taliban to occupy Mazar-i-Sharif. For the Taliban, Malik was only a tool to capture Mazar-i-Sharif. Realizing this, A.Malik suddenly hit the Taliban and managed to free the entire north of Afghanistan from the Taliban, and the Taliban retreated with heavy losses. After that A.Dostum and A.Malik reconciled, and again A.Dostum took control of the northern regions, but their forces were much weaker.13
Общественные науки и современность. РАН. 2003. № 4. - С. 113-114.
11 Dorronsoro, G. Revolution Unending. Afghanistan: 1979 to the Present. - London: Hurst & Co., 2005. - Р. 280.
12 The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan. / edited by Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi. - Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University Press, 2009. - Р. 258.
13 Misdaq,N. Afghanistan: Political Frailty and External Interference. - London and New York: Routledge. 2006. - Р. 185-187.
22 East European Scientific Journal #1(65), 2021
In June 1997, forces led by A.Masood, A.Dostum and A.Khalili joined the United Islamic Alliance for the Salvation of Afghanistan (Jabha-ye Muttahid-e Islomi baroye Nejot-e Afghoneston) or, in scientific sources, the so-called Northern Alliance. However, due to the lack of mutual trust between the members of this alliance, they could not unite their actions against a common enemy, and as a result, by the end of 1998, the northern territories under the control of Dostum -Bamiyan, inhabited by the Hazaras under the control of A.Khalili, passed to the Taliban.14 Thus, before the advance to the north, the Taliban controlled 75% of the country's territory, and after the conquest of the north, 90% of Afghanistan came under their control.15 Although the Taliban occupied the north of the country, they were unable to completely suppress the resistance movement here.
The Taliban declared the Islamic State of Afghanistan, founded by the Mujahedeen in 1992, a swamp of corruption and greed, and set about destroying it and building a state entirely based on "pure" Islamic principles. It is clear that a certain ideological struggle is going on here between the Taliban and the Mujahedeen. Although both sides fought on the basis of Islamic ideology and declared that the state would be governed by Islamic ideology, the Taliban's approach to this ideology was very radical. From this point of view, this period shows that in Afghanistan the struggle was not between completely different ideas and views, as in the struggle between the pro-Soviet PDPA government and the Mujahedeen, but within the framework of the only ideology inherent in Afghan society - Islamic ideology. The mujahedeen, who once dominated communist ideology, could do nothing to oppose the Taliban's idea of going to the "Deobandi" school and gaining the support of religious fundamentalist organizations in Pakistan for power struggles.
During the Taliban era, some changes were made in the sphere of government, and it was determined that only Sharia law should prevail in the life of the state and society. In line with public administration reforms, the Taliban introduced a system of governing the country through "soviets" - and formed three "councils"16 as central government bodies. The highest governing body of the Taliban, the Interim Leadership Council or Supreme Council, was formed and consisted of 10 members, led by the leader of the movement, M.Umar, based in Kandahar, the seat of the Taliban leader. One of the remaining councils, the Kabul Council in the capital, served as the executive branch, while the other was the Military Council, both of which were subordinate to the Supreme Council.17
Summarizing the opinions expressed about the events in Afghanistan at the end of the twentieth century, the internal struggle for power and its negative consequences, we can say the following.
In Afghanistan, which was divided into many small parts at the beginning of the twentieth century, the government of Burkhanuddin Rabbani was de jure the highest power in the country and was eventually ignored, not realizing how the Taliban posed a threat to state power. Disagreements among mujahideen after the 1992 coup in Kabul, lack of mutual trust and power struggles have persisted since the Taliban entered the country's political arena and seized central power.
The political and socio-economic situation in Afghanistan deteriorated after the Taliban came to power. In particular, complete backwardness, aggravation of the situation of the people, complete isolation from the world community had a huge negative impact on the life of the country and threw the country back for several years of development.
At the end of the twentieth century, as in the previous period, the ideological struggle continued between the forces fighting for power. The mujahedeen, who are supported by the pro-Soviet regime of the People's Democratic Party and defeated the communist ideology alien to the Afghan society based on Islamic ideology, did not take any action against the radical views of their fellow Taliban and were defeated on the ideological front.
REFERENCES:
1. Dorronsoro, G. Revolution Unending. Afghanistan: 1979 to the Present. - London: Hurst & Co., 2005. - P. 280.
2. Gritzner, J.A., Shroder, J.F. Afghanistan. 2nd ed. - New York: Chelsea House, 2007. - P. 83-84.
3. Meredith, L.R. The History of Afghanistan.
- London: Greenwood Press, 2007. - P. 123.
4. Misdaq, N. Afghanistan: Political Frailty and External Interference. - London and New York: Routledge. 2006. - P. 185-187.
5. Rodney P. Carlisle. Afghanistan War. - New York: Chelsea House, 2010. - P. 52.
6. Saikal, A. Modern Afghanistan. A History of Struggle and Survival. - New York: I.B.Tauris, 2004.
- P. 229.
7. Sisson, M., Anderson, T. Taliban. The Sage Encyclopedia of Terrorism, 2nd ed.. Ed. Gus Martin. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2011. - P. 573.
8. The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan. / edited by Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi. -Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University Press, 2009. - P. 63-64.
14 Saikal,A. Modern Afghanistan. A History of Struggle and Survival. - New York: I.B.Tauris, 2004. - P. 229.
15 Meredith, L.R. The History of Afghanistan. -London: Greenwood Press, 2007. - P. 123.
16 The word "shura" is derived from the Arabic language and means advice, council. The term should
not be confused with the terms "Soviet government" and "soviets" used in the former Soviet Union, as well
as the term "Soviet" used in Afghanistan in reference to the former Soviet state.
17 Баутин А.А. Процессы политической фрагментации в Афганистане: проблемы и противоречия (1992-2009 гг.). Автореф. дис. на соиск. канд. полит. наук. - Воронеж: Воронежский государственный университет, 2010. - С.15-16.
ив
паям
9. The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan. / edit.by Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi. - Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University Press, 2009. - Р. 258.
10. Баутин А.А. Процессы политической фрагментации в Афганистане: проблемы и противоречия (1992-2009 гг.). Автореф. дис. на соиск. канд. полит.наук. - Воронеж: Воронежский государственный университет, 2010. - С.15-16.
11. Коргун В.Г. История Афганистана. XX век. - М.: Крафт+. 2004. - С. 453-455.
12. МаnnоnоvА.М., АbduUaevN.А., RashidovR.R. Afg'oniston tarixi. O'quv qo'llanma. -Toshkent: "Barkamol fayz media", 2018. - B. 141-142.
East European Scientific Journal #1(65), 2021 23
13. Плешов О.В. Движение "Талибан": истоки фундаментализма. Сборник "Афганистан: война и проблемы мира" (Отв. ред. ДавыдовА.Д.). ИИИиБВиИВРАН. - М., 1998. - С. 40.
14. Рашидов Р.Р. Афгонистонда давлатчилик масаласи: тарих ва хозирги замон. Монография. -Тошкент: "Навруз" нашриёти, 2017. - Б.264.
15. Сикоев Р. Исламский Эмират Афганистан: тоталитарный режим рубежа XXI века // Общественные науки и современность. РАН. 2003. № 4. - С. 113-114.
16. ЧингизП. Афгонестон, асре мужохедин ва баромадан-етолебон (Афгонистон, мужохидлар даври ва толибларнинг пайдо булиши). - Техрон: Махде Мино, 1378 (1999). - Б. 26.
Turyk M. V.,
Postgraduate student
of the Department of Parliamentarism and Political Management, National Academy of Pablic Administration at the President of Ukraine
THE USE OF WORLD EXPERIENCE IN CREATING SUCCESSFUL PARLIAMENTARY COALITIONS
Турик Микола Володимирович,
астрант кафедри парламентаризму та полтичного менеджменту НацюналъноЧ академИ державного управлшня при Прeзидeнтoвi Укра'ти, м. Кшв
ВИКОРИСТАННЯ СВ1ТОВОГО ДОСВ1ДУ СТВОРЕННЯ УСП1ШНИХ ПАРЛАМЕНТСЬКИХ КОАЛЩ1Й
Summary. The main trends and the world experience of creating successful parliamentary coalitions are considered. The problems that arise in parliamentary-governmental coalitions in Ukraine are analyzed. The main attention is paid to the analysis of world experience in the creation of coalitions. Special nuances are considered, which must be taken into account when creating stability in the coalition. The ways of increasing the efficiency of the activity of state bodies and interaction of the legislative and executive branches of power of Ukraine are suggested.
Анотащя. У статп розглядаються основш тенденци та свгтовий досвщ створення устшних парламентських коалщш. Проаналiзовано проблеми, яш виникають в парламентсько-урядових коалщях в Укрш'ш Основну увагу придшено аналiзу свггового досввду при створенш коалщш. Розглядаються особливi нюанси, якi необхiдно врахувати при створенш стаб№носп в коалiцii. Запропоновано шляхи шдвищення ефективностi дiяльностi державних оргашв та взаeмодii' законодавчоi' i виконавчоi' гiлок влади Украши.
Key words: coalition, parliamentary coalition, coalition government, the creation of a coalition
Ключовi слова: коалщя, парламентсъка коалщя, коалщйний уряд, створення коалщи
Постановка проблеми. На сучасному еташ державотворення в Укра!ш виникла нагальна потреба удосконалення полiтичноi системи суспiльства, за рахунок змiцнення конституцiйного ладу, поглиблення демократичних основ державного управлшня, становлення iнститутiв громадянського суспiльства, змщнення нацiональноi безпеки i пiдвищення мiжнародного авторитету держави.
Створення та управлшня коалщи - це клоттка справа, оскшьки одна з найбiльших проблем для коалщшних урядiв е iх нестабiльнiсть. Як показуе практика рiзних кран, комбiнацiя рiзних чинникiв, таких як, наближення парламентських виборiв,
спад популярносл уряду, зростання тиску опозици неминуче викликае напругу мiж партнерами по коалщи, якою б стабшьною вона не здавалася.
Напруга в коалщи призводить до неефективноi дiяльностi уряду та парламенту, до тривалих дискусiй в парламентi щодо законодавчих актiв, неможливостi зiбрати бiльшiсть голоав на пiдтримку деяких урядових законопроекпв. А iнодi i до поразки уряду i необхiдностi формування новоi коалщи.
Однак «коалщшний уряд» не завжди «нестаб№ний уряд». Незважаючи на ва ризики, коaлiцiйнi уряди можуть бути дуже успiшними. Досвiд краш з парламентськими системами
