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25UDC 327+332.122+338.49
A.S. Kovalenko, M.O. Morgunova, V.V. Gribkovskaia1
INFRASTRUCTURAL SYNERGY OF THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
Abstract. In this paper, we would like to draw your attention to the necessity of looking for infrastructural synergy of the Northern Sea Route (NSR). By that we mean an integrated development of the sea and in-land transport routes, transport hubs, supporting infrastructure, and also the necessity of these for the Arctic region's socio-economic development. Thus, we pay much attention to the existing and the upcoming transport and infrastructure projects, international cooperation, and Arctic and non-Arctic countries' strategy directions related to the NSR. We conclude by discussing the meaning of the synergetic development of the NSR based on the existing challenges and opportunities.
Keywords: Northern Sea Route, North Eastern Passage, Arctic, infrastructure, transportation, transit, project, hub, synergy, international cooperation.
А.С. Коваленко, М.О. Моргунова, В.В. Грибковская2
ИНФРАСТРУКТУРНАЯ СИНЕРГИЯ СЕВЕРНОГО МОРСКОГО ПУТИ В МЕЖДУНАРОДНОМ КОНТЕКСТЕ
Аннотация. В этой статье мы хотели бы обратить ваше внимание на необходимость поиска инфраструктурной синергии Северного морского пути (СМП). Под этим мы подразумеваем комплексное освоение морских и наземных транспортных маршрутов, узлов, вспомогательной инфраструктуры, а также их необходимость для социально-экономического развития Арктического региона. Таким образом, мы уделяем большое внимание существующим и планируемым проектам в области транспорта и инфраструктуры, международному сотрудничеству и направлениям стратегий арктических и неарктических стран, связанным с СМП. Рассматривается также значение синергетического развития СМП с учетом существующих проблем и возможностей.
Ключевые слова: Северный морской путь, Северо-Восточный проход, Арктика, инфраструктура, транспорт, транзит, проект, хаб, синергия, международное сотрудничество.
Introduction
Arctic is one of the last frontiers rich in natural resources and attractive for geopolitical and geoeconomic interests of many countries, thus deriving much attention worldwide. As a rule, Arctic energy resources' potential is seen as a key driver of the region's development. However, the most critical element is transport and logistics infrastructure. Traditionally, the infrastructure of
the Arctic region includes sea routes, ports, in-land routes, as well as supporting infrastructure [1].
In the paper we focus on the Northern Sea Route (NSR) - a sea route along the Russian Arctic Ocean coast, and also partly on the North East Passage (NEP) - the extended Arctic sea route from Europe to the Pacific Ocean along the Arctic Ocean coasts of Norway and Russia.
Nowadays the importance of the NSR goes beyond national borders and attracts more and
1 Alina S. Kovalenko - Gubkin Russian State University of Oil and Gas (NRU), PhD student; Molde University College -Specialized University in Logistics, MSc in Logistics, e-mail: [email protected];
Maria O. Morgunova - Joint Institute for High Temperatures of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Junior Researcher, PhD in Economics, e-mail: [email protected];
Victoria Gribkovskaia - Sintef OCEAN, Research Scientist, PhD in Economics, e-mail: [email protected].
2 Алина Сергеевна Коваленко - Российский государственный университет (НИУ) нефти и газа им. И.М. Губкина, аспирант; Университетский колледж Молде - специализированный логистический университет, магистр в области логистики, e-mail: [email protected];
Мария Олеговна Моргунова - Объединенный институт высоких температур РАН, младший научный сотрудник, к.э.н., e-mail: [email protected];
Виктория Валерьевна Грибковская - Sintef OCEAN, научный сотрудник, к.э.н., e-mail: [email protected].
more international attention. The background of the NSR development is in its geopolitical significance, unexploited oil and natural gas resources, and the potential for international transcontinental shipping.
There is a considerable amount of policies, regulations, strategies and other official documents with regard to the NSR published by the circumpolar countries. However, the challenges are diverse: the absence of internationally recognized legal regulation, no common view on the placement of transport hubs, low pace and somehow uncoordinated international cooperation. These challenges are the evidence of no complex view on the NSR development in an international context.
There is no coordinated NSR infrastructure development or a comprehensive NSR development plan in Russia either. Not minimizing the importance of infrastructure for the Arctic region's development, the infrastructure itself should not be the target, particularly in the Arctic. The «infrastructural synergy» implies that the focus should not lie only in a one-directional investment flow, or on a one-sided view on Arctic region's development, but rather on a complex integrated international development of the sea and in-land transport routes and a synergetic socio-economic effect.
In the paper, we discuss the following issues. First, we give a brief overview on the definition of the NSR, NSR's historical development and the current situation. Second, we focus on the NSR's infrastructure, hubs and projects. Third, we provide the analysis of the goals of selected Arctic and non-Arctic states related to the NSR to underline the importance of coordinated international activities. Finally, we draw conclusions on the importance of a synergetic development of the NSR for Russia and other interested countries, based on the existing challenges and opportunities to be shared.
Northern Sea Route definition
Before considering all of the aspects, it should be noted that the NSR and the NEP are two concepts that often are mixed up in the literature. According to the Russian Law 2012 [2], the NSR
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Fig. 1. NSR, NEP and Suez Canal [5]
refers to the Russian territorial waters between the Novaya Zemlya and the Bering Strait (Fig. 1). The NEP, on the other hand, refers to the route from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean, passing along the Arctic Ocean coasts of Norway and Russia. Thus, the NSR is an integrated part of the NEP (Fig. 1) [3]. Nowadays the route is more often known under its Russian name - the NSR (INSROP, [4]), even though there is no single way but many parallel ways of navigation, also outside the Russian territorial waters and the exclusive economic zone. In this paper, we mainly focus on the NSR and sometimes integrate the NEP concept into it, especially when talking about cooperation with non-Arctic countries.
It is worth mentioning that the NSR has harsh weather conditions for navigation (low temperatures, tides, wind, currents, freezing seas). One of the main challenges is ice and icing, which affects navigation along the NSR during most of the year.
The differences in the sailing distances between Europe and Asia using the NSR instead of the Suez Canal (fig. 1) is one of the main reasons commercial transportation through the NSR is being considered as an option. Shorter sailing distances could mean less lead-time and reduced costs [3]. Thus, both European and Asian countries are interested to explore those opportunities NSR can suggest for global transportation.
NSR in the past
Historically, the interest towards the NSR was supported by geopolitics, which are continuous interest of the circumpolar countries to the Arctic region sovereignty and access to resources, as well as the need of then USSR and now Russia to develop the Russian Arctic.
The official start of the Arctic transport infrastructure development in the USSR is timed to a decision from December 1932 «...to lay finally the Northern Sea Route from the White Sea to the Bering Strait, to equip this way, to keep it in good order and to ensure the safety of navigation along this route» (direct translation from Russian [6]). Driven by this decision, the NSR infrastructure, such as ports, settlements, port stations and around 100 polar stations were constructed.
As for the international cooperation, the start of the international interest for the NSR is devoted to the speech by Gorbachev (Murmansk, 1987) calling for cooperation on the Arctic and international transit possible through the NSR [7]. Later, in the period of growing interest to the Arctic region and Arctic natural resources scientists explored, among others, the possibilities for international geopolitical cooperation in the region, and the prospects for transforming the NSR into an important transport corridor [8].
In 1990s due to the collapse of the USSR, the NSR infrastructure and fleet ownership were changed, where only some remained under governmental control. As a negative consequence, many production sites along the NSR were closed, small ports shut down and fleet decommissioned [6].
Huge oil and natural gas discoveries, including those on the Yamal peninsula, and the onshore fields' development facilitated commercial interests and introduced the International North Sea Route Programme [4, 7]. The INSROP international project from (insert years) was mainly researching the ice-infested shipping lanes of the NSR, but also covered commercial and international shipping, natural environment, ice navigation, and ship technology, military, political, legal, and indigenous cultural issues [9].
NSR today
Nowadays the NSR is considered in many commercial and geopolitical ways - as a new route, and as an alternative to the existing international routes, as a way to facilitate Arctic resources development, and, of course, as a sovereignty and a complex geopolitical issue for the Arctic states. At the moment, the governance of the Arctic shipping looks rather segmented [5]. It consists of several international and national legal regimes and established standards [3, 7].
NSR has started to recover in 1999 with some temporary solutions for oil shipment realized by the Murmansk Shipping Company, later by Ritek energy company and Lukoil oil company, which finally resulted in the opening of the Varandey oil shipping port and terminal in 2008. Atomflot, a Russian nuclear-powered icebreakers company, has reopened the transit voyage of ships in 2009 [6].
The NSR infrastructure consists of nearly 50 ports. The largest ones are Arkhangelsk, Igarka, Dudinka, Dixon, Tiksi, Pevek, Providence, Hatanga and Sabetta [10]. Additionally, there are navigation and communication systems and meteorological stations along the route. The icebreaker fleet also an important part of the NSR. There are currently four functioning nuclear icebreakers in the Russian company FSUE Atomflot [11]. The expected growing cargo traffic via the NSR would require a much larger icebreaker fleet in the years to come. Some new icebreakers are in the design and construction phases planned to be operational in 2020s.
Currently, the NSR is mainly used for shipping of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and oil, as well as other natural resources, such as wood, and also various consumer goods and commodities. Moreover, the NSR can sometimes be the only way to deliver fuel and other supplies to the Russian Arctic coastal settlements (in Chukotka, Taimyr, Yamalo-Nenets autonomous areas) [10].
NSR's current infrastructure and ongoing developments
In-land transport infrastructure in line with the NSR is of high priority for Russia. This is also stated in Russian strategic government
Fig. 2. Overview map of terminals and transportation routes [16]
documents [12]. Infrastructure is a key element to efficient resources development, and it also plays a significant role in Russian Arctic socio-economic development.
Some sporadic projects, which are in most cases connected to the oil and gas industry are insufficiently integrated into the regional infrastructure network. In general, the petroleum industry in the Arctic is highly export-oriented [13], which influences the transport logistics and infrastructure development. Thus, it is hard to argue for the establishment of transport hubs as such to potentially integrate the commercial needs of road, rail, air and even river transport.
In this context, some authors argue [7] that to facilitate modernization and future development of the NSR and the Russian Arctic transport infrastructure, especially in the short- and mid-run, the necessary condition would be to take and manage it as a hub in whole. This, in turn, requires coordinated management strategy of a parallel development of regional and international «soft» and «hard» infrastructure (meaning physical objects and the supporting legal framework.
Nevertheless, the Arctic project potential is huge (up to 150 priority projects until 2030), where about 2/3 are related to the development of Arctic natural resources [13]. Availability of transport infrastructure would significantly decrease project start-up costs, thus increase their economic attractiveness [14].
Some examples of successful infrastructure synergy in the Arctic provide examples on a variety of transportation schemes [15] (Fig. 2). These are the harbour transhipment complex RPK «Nord» and the oil shipment terminal Varandey, ports Sabetta and Dudinka (under development [14]), Bovanenkovo-Sabetta and Obskaya-Bovanenkovo railway, the Yamal-LNG natural gas liquefaction project and the infrastructure of the Yamal Peninsula. Potentially Prirazlomnaya platform has the possibility to be transformed for direct oil shipment (the socalled KUPON system) [14].
Another important issue is that the NSR development is unattainable only with the efforts of Russia and requires international cooperation with the active participation from industry. Step by step, we will look at the key existing and planned projects, as well as national and international goals of some countries concerning the NSR.
Sabetta, Yamal-LNG, Arctic LNG-2 and Northern Latitudinal Route
The most viable options for the further Arctic transport system development are directed towards hydrocarbons transportation from the onshore fields. They may have the tendency to move primarily in the eastern direction due to large undiscovered hydrocarbon resources potential. If we may simplify the oil and natural gas infrastructure in the Arctic region, such as the Sabetta port and terminal, plays a key role in determining the prospects for the NSR development in its initial stage of development.
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Fig. 3. Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG -2projects [18]
Sabetta was built in the Ob Bay in the framework of the international Yamal-LNG project (fig. 3), owned by the Russian company Novatek (50.1%), the French company Total (20%), China's CNPC (20%), and the Silk Road Fund (9.9%). The plant capacity is 16.5 million tons of LNG by 2019 after the launch of the second liquefaction line [17]. The projected volumes of cargo to be shipped along NSR are 17 million tons. Considering the project
scale, it is accompanied by significant volumes of construction materials to be also shipped by the NSR. Besides, the produced LNG volumes would require additional gas carriers' construction with a capacity of about 170,000 m3. Currently Yamal-LNG is the only yet functioning example of a large international project being implemented [6].
The other large project, yet in the planning phase, is Arctic LNG-2 on the other side of the Ob Bay on the Gydan Peninsula (fig. 3). The production plan is 18 million tons of LNG a year by 2023-2025. At present, Arctic LNG-2 belongs to Novatek, but there are ongoing negotiations with the French Total and Chinese partners on a 10% stakes at the project [19].
Another influential megaproject in the Arctic is the Northern Latitudinal Route (NLR) (fig. 4). The NLR is planned to connect the central part of the Russian Arctic region with NSR infrastructure, passing through the Yamal Peninsula. In the Northern latitudinal route project's framework, 707 kilometres of railway is planned to connect the Russian Urals and Western Siberia with the NSR, linking the Northern Railway from Arkhangelsk and the Nadym-Tyumen branch. In addition, a 170-kilometer branch of Bovanenkovo-Sabetta will be constructed at the northernmost tip of the Yamal
Fig. 4. The Northern Latitudinal Route project and infrastructure of Yamal [20]
Peninsula. At the moment, Gazprom operates a 525-kilometer railway between Bovanenkovo and Obskaya stations, which is a key element of the infrastructure for the development of large natural gas fields in the Yamal Peninsula.
The project has been initiated due to the necessity of transport infrastructure to facilitate the Yamal projects owned by Gazprom. Gazprom signed an agreement with the Russian Railways on cooperation in the creation of NLR in 2017 [21]. Port of Arkhangelsk and the Belkomur project The project's goal is to build a deep-water port area 55 km north of Arkhangelsk in the Arkhangelsk seaport by JSC ATIH Arkhangelsk and Chinese Poly International Holding Co [22]. The project is connected with the Belkomur project (White Sea - Komi - Ural), which provides for the building a large railway line Arkhangelsk -Syktyvkar - Solikamsk (Perm).
Belkomur cargo transportation and transshipment in the deepwater port of Arkhangelsk allow optimizing logistics of cargo delivered from the Urals and Siberia. The distance will be reduced to 800 km, thus decreasing delivery costs to the port of shipment [23].
The project will create a more attractive alternative route for export and import freight traffic to Europe, North America and Asia-Pacific region countries (primarily China), also providing large-capacity vessels a new independent sea outlet. The port is to be operating all year round by using icebreakers in the freezing White Sea in winter.
Murmansk Transport Hub project and Port in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky
One of the largest infrastructure projects in the Arctic is the Murmansk Transport Hub. It includes new roads and railways, ports and other facilities on the western shore of the Kola Bay. Murmansk is an important port for oil, coal, metals, and other shipments coming from the European part of Russia. In is a non-freezing port, so it can serve as the NSR's main gateway to Asia.
Murmansk is also under scrutiny with interests for international cooperation. In 2017, Russia discussed a container line with Korea and a creation of two hub ports - one in Murmansk and one in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky [24]. According to the specialists of FSUE Atomflot, the port of Murmansk and the port of Petropavlovsk-
Kamchatsky can potentially serve as hubs not only for general cargo, but also for bulk cargo shipment, since the heavy high-class vessels used to transport gas from Sabetta might not be economically profitable in ice-free water [25].
A memorandum of understanding has been signed between the Japanese transport company Mitsui OSK Lines (MOL) and a Russian state investment agency to develop the Arctic routes end energy projects [26]. Recently MOL was also cooperating with Novatek on Yamal-LNG and conducting a feasibility study on LNG transhipment terminal in Kamchatka.
Arctic Railway and a port of Kirkenes
At present, Europe is developing a project of an Arctic (Corridor Project) Railway construction through an underwater tunnel between Tallinn and Helsinki, and further by railroad to the Arctic Ocean and NEP. This railway will be an alternative transport route for European (but mostly Finnish) import and export, including mineral resources. The project is directed to reach the NEP deep-sea ports (fig. 5). Several Norwegian cities, such as Tromso, Narvik and Kirkenes, competed to become the final point of this railroad from the
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Fig. 5. The Arctic Railway project
Finnland. Murmansk was also considered among the options. In March 2018, it became known that the city of Kirkenes will be the final destination of the projected railway [27].
Since Kirkenes is now participating in the Arctic Railway project, it aims to channel up 10% of the existing container flow between the countries of North-East Asia and the northern Europe. According to the mayor of Kirkenes, Rune Rafaelsen, the new seaport could handle 550 000 containers per year, where the new railway capacity would be 10 trains daily in the southern direction [28]. A new port in the Barents Sea will accept container ships with a length of more than 200 m and carry out transshipment in convoys with a length of 750 m by 2040 [29]. Also, Rune Rafaelsen believes that the port of the city can turn into a hub for transshipment, which will be attractive for transshipment and dispatch of cargoes to Europe of such countries as China, and the railroad will be economically attractive for Russian LNG transport from Sabetta to Europe [28].
National and international goals around the NSR
In this chapter, we would like to highlight key issues of the Arctic strategies of the Arctic countries and some non-Arctic countries, especially regarding the NSR. We focus on Russia and Norway, as the Arctic countries, which explicitly benefit from the NSR (or, in this case, the NEP) by their geographical location.
Over the past decade, the Arctic has attracted a considerable interest from non-Arctic coastal states located in Asia, such as China, South Korea and Japan. These countries have also been permanent observers in the Arctic Council since 2013. The policies pursued by the Asian states tend to be more oriented towards economic interests rather than security interests [30]. This is again directly connected to the NSR. We focus on China, South Korea and Japan, since they not only declared their interests, but are being more and more involved into the Arctic projects and the NSR.
Russia
For Russia, the NSR transport and logistics infrastructure is one of the critical elements of the development of the Russian Arctic, especially
for extractive industries, which could provide a sustainable cargo flow. Arctic infrastructure is still the main state priority for Russia as well as a prerequisite for the formation of a large export base for, for example, oil and oil products, electric power supply systems. However, considerable investments are needed. Key Russian interests in the NSR are the production and transportation of hydrocarbon and other mineral resources, both for Asian and European markets. Besides that, it is decreasing development costs for future resource projects and selected infrastructure development.
One of the key parameters that is used to trace the activity along the NSR in Russia is shipment volume. By 2024 the aim is to increase it up to 80 mln ton per year, which means it has to increase by 7 times. In 2017 the total shipment volume along the NSR has reached 10.7 mln tons [31]. To compare, the yearly transit through the Suez Canal in 2017 was 1042 mln tons [32]. In fact, it is possible since most likely LNG from Yamal-LNG and Arctic-LNG projects would cover this volume. In addition to LNG, coal is the other potential cargo. In general the transportation flow will be guaranteed by natural resources and raw materials extracted in the Arctic region and the supplies to conduct this extraction and build the necessary infrastructure. Currently oil and natural gas transportation by the NSR is under high priority.
Nevertheless, the international transit is also very important for the NSR development, since the interested parties can bring additional investments and expertize. In general, international carriers are tending to use the NSR, which is lying in the Russian territorial waters, than high north options (see fig. 2). The more northern routes have much heavier ice conditions. Thus, Russia has the opportunity to facilitate international transit in its territorial waters under mutually beneficial conditions. Nevertheless, international transit is not one of the current priorities.
Norway
The renewed Norwegian strategy of 2017, which is called «Norway's Arctic Strategy -between geopolitics and social development» [33] is balancing between business activity and sustainability, including economic, social and environmental sustainability. One of the key directions in this strategy is international cooperation, especially with Russia. With the
application to the NSR Norway has the possibility to utilize the NSR transport potential and develop service and logistical centres on its shore. Some of the Norwegian ports are considered to have strategic placement with regard to the NSR [34].
Since Norway is a considerable player in the international energy markets, the potential reallocation and re-orientation of the major energy flows, potentially via the NSR, creates additional business opportunities in the core area of Norwegian expertize. This can also stimulate investments into for example liquefaction facilities.
To summarize Norwegian interests in the NSR are in facilitating hydrocarbons production and their transportation to Asian markets, new transport and logistic projects, such as the Kirkenes port and it potential in being an Arctic hub.
China
Chinese Arctic strategy includes all the spectrum of interests: economic, environmental, transport, scientific, geopolitical, etc. They are described in the recently published «White Paper» on China's Arctic policy [35]. China aims to «participate in the governance of Arctic» and «commits itself to maintaining» sustainable Arctic [35, p. 4-5]. Besides that, China aims to develop a «Polar Silk Road» (fig. 6), which includes existing and developing routes.
This, of course, will require infrastructure development, shipbuilding, including icebreakers and nuclear icebreakers, and research from all the interested sides. Russia takes important place here as of one the key partners.
Nowadays, China's participation in the NSR development is mainly connected to the current LNG projects and the related infrastructure, railroads and ports, where the NSR's main functions would be to deliver energy resources to the Chinese market. In addition, China considers the NSR as the potential transport corridor for container shipping to Europe.
South Korea
South Korea, with its limited energy resources access, is also interested in investing into Russian Arctic energy projects and LNG shipments to diversify its energy export. Besides, South Korean shipbuilders do already produce a considerable share of the worlds' high-tech vessels with highend equipment, also for the Yamal-LNG project (9 LNG transport ice class vessels) and some other projects. Thus, NSR development stimulate shipbuilding sector, which is highly interesting for South Korea. Other interests include sustainable region development, fishing and transit.
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Fig. 6. Map of existing and developing routes included in «Polar Silk Road» [36]
NSR, since it is seen as more distance-efficient route than the existing ones, can potentially stimulate South Korean ports development by increasing their operated volumes, thus decreasing some costs. South Korea has already tested some extra-large shipments through NSR to Russia (equipment for Sabetta project [24]). There is also potential for South Korean and Russian cooperation in developing shipping hubs, which are planned to be established at each end of NSR. In general, South Korean interests in the Arctic and the NSR are in access to energy resources, their transportation, increased shipbuilding for NSR and container shipping to Europe.
Japan
Japan is mainly interested in transit via the NSR in the European direction, which is expected to be more efficient than other routes - 40% shorter distance and 20% less fuel use comparing to the Suez Canal. Japan ports are well developed and can serve as the NSR route transfer ports, also providing navigation support along the route. As for now, Japan owns three icebreakers.
Energy resources issues are also open for Japan, since it is dependent on export and after the Fukushima disaster. In the mid-run, LNG is of huge interest for Japan. Besides, Japan is interested in investing into Russian oil fields (agreement with Rosneft energy company in 2015), including vessels supply for their development. Other investment opportunities - into Russian ports and shipbuilding yards - are also huge.
It is worth mentioning that Japan is also interested in fishing in the Arctic seas, since some areas near Japan are not suitable for fishing after the Fukushima. To summarize, Japan is primarily interested in energy resources, transit along NSR and its own ports development, shipbuilding and fishing.
Conclusions
Despite all the ongoing energy and infrastructure projects linked to the NSR there are many challenges. To summarize briefly -these are connected to harsh climate conditions low temperatures, tide, wind, currents, sea ice thus limited navigation time, underdeveloped infrastructure, distanced character of the NSR
infrastructure, general remoteness of the Arctic region, low density of population. Other constraints are weak satellite communications and poor map coverage, very few ports, under-developed salvage and recovery infrastructure, very limited maintenance and repair services along the NSR [3]. Additionally, not sufficient icebreaker fleet and no internationally accepted legal framework.
The review of the current and potential infrastructure development projects around the NSR indicates that there are activities in this area, but limited understanding of where the transhipment facilities should be located. For example, purposes to construct two transhipment hubs with a similar range of services nearby, such as Kirkenes and Murmansk, are unclear from the intensive development point of view. Another example is the NSR importance as a transit route. At the moment, it does not seem that Russia is interested in this while other countries underline it as one of the main business opportunities. Onshore infrastructure along the NSR for international transit is underdeveloped and requires international investments, while Russia is prioritising onshore facilities for natural resources development. Uncoordinated activities again create bottlenecks, where most of infrastructure projects in the Arctic are now at the stage of «concluding agreements on mutual understanding», which implies no real investments.
On one side, all of the current existing Arctic infrastructure projects and planned ones, discussed in the paper, are being challenged by the above-mentioned factors, thus considerably increasing risks and costs. There is no exception for national or international projects. To provide objectivity we need to underline those projects are huge, competing, economically viable and sometimes they can serve multi purposes (thus being synergetic, as mentioned before). On the other side, Arctic region as a whole and NSR in particular promise substantial socio-economic advantages for all the involved parties and countries not only by exploiting natural resources, but benefiting from multiplicative effect (when investment of one dollar in Arctic or NSR infrastructure generate far bigger investments in connected industries).
Thus, the selected infrastructure development, which is now approached in a non-coordinated way
both on national and international level, creates additional bottlenecks by itself and does not allow to fully realize Arctic region and NSR project potential or, how we call it - «infrastructural synergy». This looks even more embarrassing, since the goals of those mostly engaged countries
strongly correlate. Right now, it is about choosing extensive or intensive way to develop NSR. For the infrastructure of NSR and entire NEP, it is necessary to build a joint international strategy and put emphasis on the right development options.
Acknowledgments
SIU project UTF-2016-long-term/10023 «Logistical and environmental management of natural resources development and transportation in the Arctic area (Arctic Logistics)»; OIVT RAN registration number NIOKTR AAAA-A16-116051810068-1. We thank Anastasiia Vysochyna and Cecilie Maria Camitz-Leidland, co-authors a working paper «TRA816 Maritime Transportation».
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