CC BY
1
DOI https://doi.org/10.18551/rjoas.2021-03.01
HOW DOES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LEVERAGE ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE: A SURVEY WITH SUGGESTIONS AND NOTES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Mohammed Almashhadani
Department of industrial Engineering, University of Houston, Houston, Texas,
United States of America E-mail: malmashhadani@uh.edu
ABSTRACT
In this research, internal control mechanisms (ICM) and organizational performance are surveyed and also focus on the corporate governance system (CGS) reality and other internal control mechanisms' roots in the history. The paper offers the background of the origin of CGS and its mechanisms. Such a system emerged for a long time ago where mistakenly some scholars, researchers and other academic staff in the universities and institutions that it appeared at the beginning of the twentieth century. Therefore, this research aims at introducing some valuable information that will probably be as a guide for several parties such as academics, scholars and both current and potential investors. In addition, the current research suggest a solution for the clear gap in the previous studies that have dealt with the relation between ICM and organizational performance based on a survey in the studies that have been done in the previously in the literature review. Furthermore, there will be an explanation of the main theories in this regard.
KEY WORDS
Origin of corporate governance, organizational performance, theories.
Corporate governance has recently become as a well-discussed and debatable matter among companies, stockholders, and other stakeholders (Alabdullah, Yahya & Ramayah, 2014; Alabdullah, Alfadhl et al., 2014; Alfadhl et al, 2013). Yet, the arguments over what shape "good corporate governance" often lacks frame, making it difficult for stockholders and stakeholders as well to have a deductive debate about how to improve corporate profitability. Corporate governance is important in all countries of the world due to its impact on societies and economies of different countries (e.g., Alabdullah, 2020; Ahmed, Alabdullah et al., 2020; Alabdullah, 2019; Alabdullah, 2020; Alabdullah, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2017, 2018; Alabdullah, Laadjal, Ries, & Al-Asadi, 2018; Alabdullah & Alasadi). This importance has increased despite noticeable differences in the cultures of countries and differences in the goals of businesses. The efficiency and fairness of the market requires a corporate governance system, because this will lead to economic growth and financial stability (Alabdullah, 2020; Alabdullah, et al., 2019; Alabdullah, Ries, & Thottoli, 2019; Alabdullah, et al., 2018; Alabdullah, et al., 2018; Alabdullah, et al., 2016; Srivastava and Kathuria, 2020; Alabdullah, Yahya, & Ramayah, 2014b).
The economic crises of 1997-1998 that appeared across East Asian countries and the 2007 financial crisis are like the Corona pandemic that spread across the world and affected economic development in all countries of the world (Alabdullah, et al., 2020). In all global financial crises, we see that there is a declining of foreign capital, while foreign capital is very important, but it was certainly not the reason of the financial crises. Foreign capital has entered the developed and developing countries for important reasons, one of which is profit stimulation. But the lack of growth, as well as the risks of weak corporate governance and lower profitability, led to the withdrawal of foreign investors.
The internal control mechanisms (ICM) and corporate governance system practice in the majority organizations have grown remarkably and its importance has been highlighted. The logical for global attention in CGS and other ICM is that they underpin an organizational operating framework. Thus, CGS practice is significant to be implemented for different
parties including shareholders being committed to applying the mechanisms of corporate governance system (CGS) because this might refers to an effective controlling a company's activities when transparency mechanisms are applied. Hence, via applying the mechanisms of CG in companies, this decision might absolutely influence the investors' investment linked decisions, from a hand, and on a performance on the other (Hebble & Ramaswamy, 2005; Brennan & Solomon, 2008).
Bankruptcy and subsequent collapse of large and famous companies like Enron and Adolphia has made several parties to be aware of companies that are featured in being sound CGS. Moreover, when information is available, this makes decisions to be evaluated on a daily basis by shareholders, further to the evaluation by investors, as it confirmed by the field of CG and other disciplines (Mensi, Tiwari & Yoon, 2017; Ahmed et al., 2020; Ahmed, Amran, & Islam, 2018; Ahmed, et al., 2018; Ahmed et al., 2019; Zarrouk, 2014; Ahmed & Aumran, 2019; Ahmed, Islam, & Amran, 2019; Asmild et al., 2019; Ahmed et al., 2018; Ahmed, Islam, Zuqibeh, & Alabdullah, 2014; Alexakis et al., 2019; Ahmed, Islam, & Alabdullah, 2014; Ahmed, & Zuqibeh, 2013).
LITERATURE REVIEW
The Evolution of CG System. Generally, in the world business especially in management field of there is commonly held viewpoint an obvious appreciating of the mechanisms of corporate governance system. Hence, a debate has been increasingly appeared on the subject of corporate governance by several parties such as scholars and academicians and other beneficial parties.
Overall, globally in the present business and specifically in the accounting field, there is a extensively held opinion and an obvious consideration of the mechanisms of corporate governance (CG). Hence, there is much argument on the subject of CG among several of the stakeholders such as academicians and members of community in the worldwide. Nonetheless, presently there is no singular and no unique meaning that explains exactly the concept of corporate governance can be considered. Thus, there is certain misunderstanding regarding the concept of corporate governance (Brickley & Zimmerman, 2010). Nevertheless, the modern definition of corporate governance issued by the OECD (OECD, April 1999) that has offered this understanding of corporate governance: "corporate governance is the system by which business corporations are directed and controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different participants in the corporation, such as, the board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders, and spells out the rules and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs" (Hebble & Ramaswamy, 2005).
Also, corporate governance could be read in the current literature. For instance as explained by Cadbury (1992), corporate governance is a tool that aims to direct and control for companies as defined.
Facts, Issues and notions about CG. From a historical point of view, the vast argument about corporate governance was in 1602 in the Netherlands, at that time, the directors insisted in the viewpoint that company's must keep on its work and as a consequence a profitability must ensue. The Mississippi firm in France faced problems and failure in 1970 prepared the action to go down the road of corporate governance as confirmed by Morck & Steier (2005). Also in America as mentioned by Russ et al. (2006) that corporate governance arose in Canal firms that considered as one of the earliest firms. Yet, there is another school and stream of thought such as (Denis, 2001; Farinha, 2003; Bai et al., 2004) which believe that corporate governance may start from the time of Adam Smith' thesis that written over 300 hundred years ago in his book: "The Wealth of Nations". He supposed that a executive of someone else's wealth cannot be predicted to control the works with a care that can be considered as an owner himself, thus, there should be a dire need for robust tool to control the works that will solve any struggle between the executives and the shareholders.
In addition, as demonstrated by Brennan & Solomon (2008) that in 1932, Berle and Means believed there is a requirement, for getting there to be monitored on any possible gap
between the management and the shareholders to protect with a management's unsuitable work like the incorrect utilize firm's resources of the aims of taking feature at the cost of the interest of the shareholders. Berle and Means in 1932 emphasizes the debate by understanding that companies' managers might not focus on principal' welfares and instead as explained by Bai et al. (2004) might only care their interests only. Yuka (2010) showed that the notion of Berle and Means argumentations that have been there is a demand for governance's center in companies and detachment between ownership control moreover, the major of the management theories understood that it is the management's responsibility toward the companies not to just care the owners, but to also care the benefit for other stakeholders as explained by Junsen & Meckling (1976). without efficient system of corporate governance, there will be probable for corruption from a administrative perspective that may damage a company's reputation, like the situation of account auditing firm Enron, which is considered as a 7th largest firm in America (Luo, 2005). Nonetheless, struggle could arise between owners and executives because of the separation role of ownership and control that might cause problems of agency as mentioned by Collins & Huang (2011). Thus, the collapse of big firms like Enron was the beginning of the implementation of corporate governance that inclusive reforms like Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX).
Agency Theory and CG. The adaption of agency theory was based on economics and business in order to illustrate the attitude of different government actors. However, the notion of the management and the stockholder is just captured in a some mode when debated in light of realm of economics and sometimes business. Several studies such as legal ones focused on the notion of agency theory before other field such as economics and political science (Ahmed et al, 2020; Alabdullah et al, 2019; Alabdullah et al, 2020). Agency theory refers to the link which arises between parties: management and the principals in based on the notion of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and the works in same line such as studies (Jensen, 2004; Bang and Jensen, 2004). Agency theory has clear impact on corporate governance as mentioned by Roberts et al., 2006). This notion has been supported by Bashman & Smith (2001) and Tirale (2010) by saying that the diffused academic thought on corporate governance is because ofthe spread studies that belive agency theory concentrates on the conflict of separation matter between a company's managers and its ownership.
CONCLUSION
Based on what has been argued in the literature review such as Chen et al. (2009), that shows the capacity of corporate governance to shorten agency cost and this combatible with viewpoint says that the improved of corporate governanace, the firm performance and the value of the company is also improved (Ahmedet al, 2020; Ahmed et al., 2019; Ahmed et al., 2018; Alabdullah, et al., 2014; Alabdullah, et al., 2018; Ahmed, Islam, bin Amran, & Alabdullah, 2018; Ahmed, Islam, bin Amran, & Alabdullah, 2018; Abushammala, et al. 2015). Several studies in the literature have published over the last three decades and tested the firm performance and firm value as well. in spite of the reality that literature has been undertaken in ways in different parties of the whole world, these studies confirm the idea that corporate governance is a vital and positive related with company performance. For example, in regard with the board of director's size, several studies such as Adams & Mehran, 2003, 2005; Bhagat & Black, 2001; ; Fauzi & Locke, 2012; Abor & Biekpe, 2007b; Alnaif, 2014;Belkhir, 2009; Berger et al., 1997; Dwivedi & Jain, 2005, Grove et al., 2011; Jaafar & El-Shawa, 2009; Tornyeva & Wereko, 2012; Jackling & Johl, 2009; Kajola, 2008) found that such a variable has a positive link with the size of the board of directors. On the other hand, other studies found that the relation is negative as for example, Adnane et al., 2011; Amran & Ahmad, 2009; Eisenberg et al., 1998; Grove et al., 2011; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Jensen, 1993; Samuel, 2013; Klein, 1998; Mashayekhi & Bazaz, 2008; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Rashid et al., 2010; Mak & Kusnadi, 2005; Kumar & Singh, 2013; O'Connell & Cramer, 2010; Yermack, 1996. Also, no relationship could be found with other wave of previous studies, such as: Chaghadari, 2011, Bhagat & Black, 2002;; Al-Hawary, 2011;
Ehikioya, 2009; Sueyoshi et al., 2010; Topak, 2011; Vo & Nguyen, 2014; Yoshikawa & Phan, 2003. Previous work in the Previous works dealt also with the Independence of the Board and the result show that there is a positive link between this variable and performance, for example; Al-Hawary, 2011; Abor & Biekpe, 2007b; Bhagat & Black, 2001; Balasubramanian et al., 2009; Mashayekhi & Bazaz, 2008;Jackling & Johl, 2009; Toledo, 2010; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Kumar & Singh, 2013; O'Connell & Cramer, 2010; Vo & Nguyen, 2014; Tornyeva & Wereko, 2012; Zheka, 2006. Likewise other studies result were the link is negative like studies done by (Bhagat & Black, 2001; Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Klein, 1998; Yermack, 1996; Vo & Nguyen, 2014). Another variable was represented by CEO duality and also the previous studies tested its link with firm performance and the result was positive as argued by Al-Hawary, 2011; Abor & Biekpe, 2007b; Grove et al., 2011; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Toledo, 2010; Balasubramanian et al., 2009; Kajola, 2008; Tornyeva & Wereko, 2012. Nonetheless, it was found as a negative result by other studies such as (Chaghadari, 2011; Bai et al., 2004; Amran & Ahmad, 2009; Rechner & Dalton, 1991; Jackling & Johl, 2009; Yermack, 1996; Zheka, 2006). Another wave in the literature investigated managerial ownership in this link and revealed that a positive link such as Alabdullah etal, 2020; Abor & Biekpe, 2007b; Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 2002; Sanders, 1999; Friend & Lang, 1988; Ahmed et al, 2019; Al-Khouri, 2005; Kumar & Singh, 2013; Hiraki et al., 2003; Berger et al., 1997; Bai et al., 2004; Kren & Kerr, 1997; Fosberg, 2004; Fauzi & Locke, 2012; Klein, 1998; Jaafar & El-Shawa, 2009; Vafeas & Theodorou, 1998. While others found a negative link like what have been done by Acharya & Bisin, 2009; Al-Khouri, 2005; Baert & Vennet, 2009.
All these works by the previous works found in inconsistent findings therefore the present work proposes a resolution unlike what have been done in the previous works to testing the link between CG and the firm performance from another viewpoint. In that, there must be works investigating this link by considering both financial and non-financial indicators as measurements for the firm performance and firm value rather than only taking financial indicators as mainstream in the literature has done as stated above and likewise for other previous works in the literature.
REFERENCES
1. Abushammala, S. N., Alabdullah, T. T. Y., & Ahmed, E. R. (2015). Causal Relationship between Market Growth and Economic Growth. Comparison Study. European Journal of Business and Management 7(33).
2. Ahmed, E. R., Abdul Rahim, N. F., Alabdullah, T. T. Y & Thottoli, M. M. (2019). An Examination of Social Media Role in Entrepreneurial Intention among Accounting Students: A SEM Study. Journal of Modern Accounting and Auditing, 15(12).
3. Ahmed, E. R., Aiffin, K. H. B., Alabdullah, T. T. Y., & Zuqebah, A. (2016). Zakat and Accounting Valuation Model. Journal of Reviews on Global Economics, 5, 16-24.
4. Ahmed, E. R., Alabdullah, T. T. Y & Shaharudin, M. S. (2020). Approaches to Control Mechanisms and Their Implications for Companies' Profitability: a Study in UAE. Journal of accounting Science, Vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 11-20.
5. Ahmed, E. R., Alabdullah, T. T. Y., Thottoli, M. M., & Maryanti, E. (2020). Does Corporate Governance Predict Firm Profitability? An Empirical Study in Oman. The International Journal of Accounting and Business Society, 28(1), 127-143.
6. Ahmed, E. R., Alabdullah, T. Y., Islam, M. A., & Asmar, M. (2014) "Sukuk Legitimacy: A New Measurement Based on Content Analysis" 16th Malaysian Finance Association Conference in Sasana Kijang Central Bank of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, June 4-6, 2014.
7. Ahmed, E. R., Islam, M. A., and Alabdullah, T. T. Y. (2018). The moderating role of Shariah supervisory board on sukuk pricing benchmark. International Journal of Excellence in Islamic Banking and Finance 6.
8. Ahmed, E. R., Islam, M. A., Alabdullah, T. T. Y., & bin Amran, A. (2018). Proposed the pricing model as an alternative Islamic benchmark. Benchmarking: An International Journal, Vol. 25 No. 8, pp. 2892-2912.
9. Ahmed, E. R., Islam, M. A., Alabdullah, T. T. Y., & Amran, A. B. (2019). A qualitative analysis on the determinants of legitimacy of sukuk. Journal of Islamic Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 10 No. 3, pp. 342-368.
10. Ahmed, E. R., Islam, A., & Amran, A. B. (2019). Examining the legitimacy of Sukuk structure via Shariah pronouncements. Journal of Islamic Marketing, Vol. 10 No. 4, pp. 1151-1166.
11. Ahmed, E. R., Islam, M. A., & Alabdullah, T. T. Y. (2014). Islamic sukuk: Pricing mechanism and rating. Journal of Asian Scientific Research, 4(11), 640.
12. Ahmed, E. R., Islam, A., Zuqibeh, A., & Alabdullah, T. T. Y. (2014). Risks management in Islamic financial instruments. Advances in Environmental Biology, 402-406.
13. Ahmed, E. R., Alabdullah, T. T. Y., Shaharudin, M. S., & Putri, E. (2020). Further Evidence on the Link between Firm's Control Mechanisms and Firm Financial Performance: Sultanate of Oman. Journal of Governance and Integrity, 4(1), 1-6.
14. Ahmed, E. R., Alabdullah, T. T. Y., Amran, A., & Yahya, S. B. (2018). Indebtedness Theory and Shariah Boards: A Theoretical Approach. Global Business and Management Research, 10(1), 127-134.
15. Alabdullah, T. T. Y. (2020). Management accounting insight via a new perspective on the risk management - companies' profitability relationship. International Journal of Intelligent Enterprise, 7(4), in press.
16. Alabdullah, T. T. Y. (2019). Management Accounting and Service Companies' Performance: Research in Emerging Economies, Australasian Accounting, Business and Finance Journal, 13(4), 2019, 100-118. doi:10.14453/aabfj.v13i4.8.
17. Alabdullah, T. T. Y. (2016a). Agency Theory Perspective: A Quantitative Study of Accounting Performance Measures In Emerging Economies. ICTE Proceedings, New York.
18. Alabdullah, T. T. Y. (2016b). Agency Cost and Management Behavior: The Role of Performance as a Moderator. International Journal of Science and Research (IJSR), 5(1), 1858-1864.
19. Alabdullah, T. T. Y. (2016c). Are Board Size And Ownership Structure Beneficial in Emerging Markets' Firms? Evidence from Jordan. International Journal of Management & Information Systems (IJMIS), 20(3), 87-94.
20. Alabdullah, T. T. Y. (2016d). Corporate Governance from The Perspective of The Past and The Present and The Need to Fill an International Gap. Risk Governance & Control: Financial Markets & Institutions, 6(4).
21. Alabdullah, T. T. Y. (2016e). The Performance of Companies and The Board's Characteristics From the New Perspective of Manipulation Avoidance. Corporate Ownership & Control, 13(4), 279-286.
22. Alabdullah, T. T. Y., Ahmed, E. R. (2019). Board Diversity and Disclosure of Corporate Social Responsibility Link: A Study in Malaysia. Journal of Adv Research in Dynamic & Control System, 11(11).
23. Alabdullah, T. T. Y., Ahmed, E. R., & Muneerali, M. (2019). Effect of Board Size and Duality on Corporate Social Responsibility: What has Improved in Corporate Governance in Asia?. Journal of Accounting Science, 3(2), 121-135.
24. Alabdullah, T. T. Y., Ahmed, E. R., & Nor, M. I. (2019). Do board characteristics provide more enhancements for firm financial performance? A corporate governance perspective. In S. Esposito De Falco, F. Alvino, & A. Kostyuk (Eds.), New challenges in corporate governance: Theory and practice (pp. 89-91). https://doi.org/10.22495/ncpr_25.
25. Alabdullah, T. T. Y. (2018). The relationship between ownership structure and firm financial performance. Benchmarking: An International Journal, 25(1), 319-333.
26. Alabdullah, T. T. Y. (2017). Compensation committee, company board attributes, and company performance: The moderating effect of leadership position. Paper presented at the 2017 Wei International Academic Conference Proceedings, July 24-27, 2017, Business and Economics.
27. Ali, A., & Zarowin, P. (1992). The role of earnings levels and annual earnings-returns studies. Journal of Accounting Research, 32(1), 61-74.
28. Alabdullah, T. T. Y., Alfadhl, M. M. A., Yahya, S., & Rabi, A. M. A. (2014). The Role of Forensic Accounting in Reducing Financial Corruption: A Study in Iraq. International Journal of Business and Management, 9 (1), 26.
29. Alabdullah, T. T. Y., Laadjal, A., Ries, E., & Al-Asadi, Y. A. A. (2018). Board Features and Capital Structure in Emerging Markets. Journal of Advanced Management Science, 6 (2).
30. Alabdullah, T. T. Y., Nor, M. I., & Ahmed, E. R. (2018). The determination of firm performance in emerging nations: Do board size and firm size matter? Management, 5(3), 57-66.
31. Alabdullah, T. T. Y., Ahmed, E. R., and Nor, M. I. (2020). The World Declining Economy And Coronavirus Pandemic: Systems Should Be Continued. Russian Journal of Agricultural and Socio-Economic Sciences 102, 89-96. doi: 10.18551/rjoas.2020-06.11.
32. Alabdullah, T. T. Y & Ahmed, E. R. (2020). Audit Committee Impact on Corporate Profitability in Oman Companies: an Auditing and Management Accounting Perspective. Riset Akuntansi dan Keuangan Indonesia, Vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 121-128.
33. Alabdullah, T. T. Y & Ahmed, E. R. & Abushammala, S. (2020). Growth of Companies: Empirical Study of the Companies Listed in Developing Economies. Journal of accounting Science, Vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 1-10.
34. Alabdullah, T. T. Y., Ahmed, E. R., & Nor, M. I. (2019). Do board characteristics provide more enhancement for firm financial performance? A corporate governance perspective. In S. Esposito De Falco, F. Alvino, & A. Kostyuk (Eds.), New challenges in corporate governance: Theory and practice (pp. 89-91). https://doi.org/10.22495/ncpr_25.
35. Alabdullah, T. T. Y., Ahmed, E. R., & Nor, M. I. (2018). New Ideas from Management, Finance and Accounting Perspective: The Research for A New Link Between A Company's Outcome and Risk Management. 5th International Conference on New Ideas in Management, Economics and Accounting.
36. Alabdullah, T. T. Y. and Ahmed, E. R. (2018). Corporate Governance: To What Extent it is important in the Arab Countries. International Journal of Science and Research 7.
37. Alabdullah, T. T. Y., Yahya, S., Nor, M. I., & Majeed, F. Q. (2016). An Investigation of Corporate Governance from A New Perspective: Examining the Financial Performance of Companies and The Impact of Executive Turnover. Corporate Board: Role, Duties & Composition, 12(1).
38. Alabdullah, T. T. Y., Yahya, S., & Ramayah, T. (2014a). Corporate Governance Development: New or Old Concept? European Journal of Business and Management, 6(7), 312-315.
39. Alabdullah, T. T. Y., Yahya, S., & Ramayah, T. (2014b). Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Jordanian Companies' Financial Performance. Asian Social Science, 10(22), p247.
40. Alfadhl, M. M. A. F., & Alabdullah, T. T. Y. (2013). Determinants of the Managerial Behavior of Agency Cost and its influential extent on Performance: A study in Iraq. International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, 3(6).
41. Bai, C. E., Liu, Q., Lu, J., Song, F. M., & Zhang, J. (2004). Corporate governance and market valuation in China. Journal of Comparative Economics, 32(4), 599-616.
42. Bang Dyhrberg, M., & Langaa Jensen, P. (2004). Organizations in context: proposal for a new theoretical approach in prescriptive accident research. Safety science, 42(10), 961-977.
43. Brennan, N. M., & Solomon, J. (2008). Corporate governance, accountability and mechanisms of accountability: an overview. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 21(7), 885-906.
44. Brickley, J. A., & Zimmerman, J. L. (2010). Corporate governance myths: comments on Armstrong, Guay, and Weber. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 50(2), 235-245.
45. Bushman, R. M., & Smith, A. J. (2001). Financial accounting information and corporate governance. Journal of accounting and Economics, 32(1), 237-333.
46. Cadbury Committee, 1992. Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance. Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance London, Gee.
47. Collins, D., & Huang, H. (2011). Management entrenchment and the cost of equity capital. Journal of Business Research, 64(4), 356-362.
48. De Nicolo, G., Laeven, L., & Ueda, K. (2008). Corporate governance quality: Trends and real effects. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 17(2), 198-228.
49. Denis, D. K. (2001). Twenty-five years of corporate governance research... and counting. Review of financial economics, 10(3), 191-212.
50. Farinha, J. (2003). Corporate governance: a survey of the literature. Universidade do Porto Economia Discussion Paper, 11.
51. Hebble, A., & Ramaswamy, V. (2005). Corporate Governance and Firm Characteristics (The Sarbanes-Oxley Act Of 2002). Journal of Business & Economics Research (JBER), 3(5).
52. Jensen, M. C. (2004). The agency costs of overvalued equity and the current state of corporate finance. European Financial Management, 10(4), 549-565.
53. Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of financial economics, 3(4), 305-360.
54. Luo, Y. (2005). Corporate governance and accountability in multinational enterprises: Concepts and agenda. Journal of International Management, 11(1), 1-18.
55. Morck, R., & Steier, L. (2005). The global history of corporate governance: An introduction. In A history of corporate governance around the world: Family business groups to professional managers (pp. 1-64). University of Chicago Press.
56. Roberts, J., Sanderson, P., Barker, R., & Hendry, J. (2006). In the mirror of the market: The disciplinary effects of company/fund manager meetings. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 31(3), 277-294.
57. Russ, R. W., Previts, G. J., & Coffman, E. N. (2006). The stockholder review committee of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company, 1828-1857: Evidence of changes in financial reporting and corporate governance. The Accounting Historians Journal, 125143.
58. Yuka, K. (2010). Theories and Realities of Asian Corporate Governance: From 'Transplantation'to the Asian Best Practices. Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences, 2 (5), 6883-6895.
