How did U.S. foreign policy shape and impact Central America during the Cold War era? Текст научной статьи по специальности «Политологические науки»

Самойловский А.Л. Как внешняя политика США формировала Центральную Америку и влияла на нее в эпоху холодной войны?

3 марта 2024 10:00 // 2024-1(38)

Наука. Общество. Оборона. 2024. Т. 12. № 1. С. 9-9.

Nauka. Obsestvo. Oborona. 2024. Vol. 12, no. 1. P. 9-9.

УДК: 327.2 + 327.8(73:728)

DOI: 10.24412/2311-1763-2024-1-9-9

Поступила в редакцию: 20.01.2024 г. Опубликована: 04.03.2024 г. Submitted: January 20, 2024 Published online: March 4, 2024

Для цитирования: Samoylovskiy A.L. How did U.S. foreign policy shape and impact Central America during the Cold War era? // Наука. Общество. Оборона. 2024. Т. 12, №1(38). С. 9-9.

https://doi.org/10.24412/2311-1763-2024-1-9-9.

For citation: Samoylovskiy A.L. How did U.S. foreign policy shape and impact Central America during the Cold War era? -Nauka. Obsestvo. Oborona = Science. Society. Defense. Moscow. 2024;12(1):9-9. (In Eng.).

https://doi.org/10.24412/2311-1763-2024-1-9-9.

Благодарности: Статья подготовлена при научном руководстве и поддержке педагога по академическому английскому языку (ENG103 International Program) Johannes Godfried Maria Kirkels.

Acknowledgements: The article was prepared with the scientific guidance and support of an academic English tutor (ENG103 International Program) Johannes Godfried Maria Kirkels.

Конфликт интересов: О конфликте интересов, связанном с этой статьей, не сообщалось. Conflict of Interest: No conflict of interest related to this article has been reported.

© 2024 Автор(ы). Статья в открытом доступе по лицензии Creative Commons (CC BY). https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ © 2024 by Author(s). This is an open access article under the Creative Commons Attribution International License (CC BY)

WORKS OF YOUNG SCIENTISTS

Review

HOW DID U.S. FOREIGN POLICY SHAPE AND IMPACT CENTRAL AMERICA DURING THE COLD WAR ERA?

Andrey L. Samoylovskiy 1

1 Stamford International University, Hua Hin, Thailand,

ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0004-1463-0537, е-mail: [email protected]

Abstract:

This study examines the complex and diverse effects of U.S. foreign policy on Central America during the Cold War period, specifically concentrating on Guatemala and Nicaragua. The study investigates the historical events, documents, and academic literature related to U.S. operations in the region using a multidisciplinar^ approach. The research conducts a detailed analysis of the many motives and techniques utilized by the United States, such as containment measures against Soviet influence and strategic geopolitical considerations. The 1954 Guatemalan coup, orchestrated by the CIA, and the Nicaraguan revolution of 1961, characterized by the rise of the Sandinistas and subsequent Contra war, are significant examples that highlights the complex intricacies of U.S. interventionism. By contextualizing these events within broader historical frameworks and geopolitical realities, the research elucidates the complexities of Cold War-era relations between the United States and Central America. The methodology employed in this research involves a multidisciplinary approach, drawing on scholarly literature, primary documents, and academic databases. The geographical scope of the study encompasses Guatemala and Nicaragua, while the chronological focus spans from the early 19th century to the late 20th century, with a particular emphasis on events during the Cold War era. The demographic scope encompasses the populations of these countries and the various social and political actors involved in U.S. interventionism. Sources selected for this research include scholarly books, articles, and written materials providing historical context and analysis of Cold War-era interventions in Central America. Primary documents such as doctrines, CIA records, and official reports are also utilized to validate and contextualize historical narratives. Academic databases such as JSTOR, Cyberleninka, Cambridge.org, and ResearchGate serve as valuable resources for accessing a diverse range of scholarly literature on the topic. Consequently, the research also examines the enduring consequences of these actions, such as the establishment of authoritarian governance, violations of human rights, and socioeconomic inequalities. This research enhances the comprehension of the complex dynamics of U.S. involvement in Central America during the Cold War era by offering a thorough analysis of historical events and their lasting consequences. It provides understanding to the region's tumult history and influences future perspectives on international relations and foreign policy. The 1954 Guatemalan coup and the Nicaraguan Contra conflict resulted in political instability, human rights abuses, and economic disaster. These events fostered anti-American sentiments and exacerbated social inequality. Despite reconciliation efforts and economic aid, Central American nations continue to grapple with the aftermath. Recognizing historical injustices and prioritizing socioeconomic progress are vital for a more stable and equitable future. Overall, examining Cold War-era interventions underscores the need for diplomatic resolutions and addressing root causes of instability to promote lasting peace and development in Central America. This study contributes to the understanding of the complex dynamics of U.S. involvement in Central American events during the Cold War era, offering a thorough analysis of historical events and their long-term implications that provide insight into the region's turbulent history that affects the future prospects of international relations and foreign policy in the world. For example, the coup d'état in Guatemala in 1954 and the conflict with the Nicaraguan Contras led to political instability, human rights abuses and economic disaster. These events contributed to the growth of anti-American sentiment and the exacerbation of social inequality. Research methods include the study and analysis of literature and academic data, regulatory frameworks, primary documents such as doctrines, CIA records and official reports on the official websites of the U.S. Departments, written materials containing historical context, and analysis of Cold War-era interventions in Central America. Conclusion: During the Cold War, the United States had a substantial impact on Central America through two key factors: its attempts to reduce Soviet influence and its strategic considerations related to geopolitics and the economy. The repercussions experienced by Central American nations, specifically Guatemala and Nicaragua, were significant and complex. The 1954 Guatemalan coup and the Nicaraguan revolution of 1961 resulted in significant political turmoil, widespread violence, and enduring consequences throughout the region. The interventions incited anti-American sentiments, intensified economic inequality, and contributed to social instability. Following the coup in Guatemala, the aftermath of the coup saw the rise of authoritarian regimes supported by the United States, leading to decades of political instability and human rights abuses. The subsequent recognition and expression of regret by the U.S. administration for its involvement in supporting dictatorships highlighted the enduring influence of Cold War-era operations on Guatemala's path. In Nicaragua, the Contra conflict and the subsequent election transition were a time of political and economic turmoil. The enduring impact of U.S. interventionism had a significant influence on the governance, economics, and society of the country in the years that followed. Nicaragua persisted in confronting the enduring consequences of warfare and underdevelopment, despite endeavors aimed at reconciliation and economic aid. It is important to analyze and extract valuable knowledge from the experiences and consequences of Cold War involvement in Central America when considering the future. Highlighting the significance of inclusive government, socioeconomic advancement, and diplomatic resolutions instead of military interventions arises as a prudent approach. The international community can have a significant impact on promoting the development of strong and equitable societies in Central America by addressing the underlying causes of instability and inequality. In conclusion, the examination of U.S. foreign policy in Central America during the Cold War era offers unique perspectives on the intricacies of global affairs and the lasting consequences of past occurrences. Through the recognition of historical injustices and the pursuit of a more inclusive and fair future, society can strive to construct a superior future for Central America and its people.

Keywords: Geopolitical issues, U.S. foreign policy, United States of America, Central America, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Cold War, Central American coups, functions of the international community

INTRODUCTION

Background

The Cold War, a geopolitical and ideological struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union, profoundly influenced global affairs from the aftermath of World War II until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Central America, a region comprising seven countries - Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama - found itself caught in the crossfire of this superpower rivalry.

Time Period

The Cold War era officially began after World War II and extended until the early 1990s. Notable events include the Truman Doctrine of 1947, the Cuban Revolution of 1959, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Specific to Central America, the 1950s through the 1980s witnessed intense political and social upheavals, with various countries experiencing conflicts, coups, special operations, and revolutions.

Geography

Central America, with its narrow isthmus connecting North and South America, held strategic importance for both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The Panama Canal, a vital waterway linking the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, was of particular significance. Controlling the canal allowed for faster maritime transit and military mobilization, making it a key geopolitical asset during the Cold War.

Main Participants

The primary participants in Central America during this period included the United States, the Soviet Union, and various local governments. The U.S. sought to contain the spread of communism, while the Soviet Union aimed to expand its influence in the Western Hemisphere.

Ideologies

Central to the Cold War was the ideological clash between capitalism and communism. The U.S., as a leader of the capitalist bloc, sought to prevent the spread of communism globally, often employing military, economic, and political means to achieve this goal. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union aimed to foster socialist and communist movements worldwide as part of its ideological struggle against the capitalist West.

Policies

Key U.S. policies during the Cold War included the Truman Doctrine, which provided economic and military aid to countries resisting communism, the Marshall Plan, a massive economic assistance program for the reconstruction of post-war Europe. The U.S. also supported different regional rebel and military groups, such as anti-Sandinista group - Contras, to counter Soviet influence.

Understanding this background is essential for delving into the intricacies of how U.S. foreign policy shaped and impacted Central America during the Cold War. The geopolitical significance of the region, coupled with the ideological struggle between superpowers, set the stage for a complex period that left a lasting impact on the countries of Central America.

Objectives

This report has a number of objectives aimed at uncovering the complexities of US foreign policy in Cold War-era Central America. The focus is on examining historical context, the extent of US influence, understanding power dynamics and regional relationships, and assessing the effectiveness of containment strategies.

1. Explore the History of the Cold War in Central America:

The first objective of this report is to provide a comprehensive overview of the historical context of the Cold War in Central America. This includes examining key events, such as, the rise of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, Guatemalan Coup d'etat and other regional conflicts that unfolded during the 1950s to the 1990s. By delving into the historical timeline, readers will gain a nuanced understanding of the complex dynamics that shaped the region during this period.

2. Investigate the Influence of the U.S. on Central America:

A crucial aspect of this report is to analyze ways in which U.S. foreign policy influenced Central America. This includes exploring diplomatic, economic, and military interventions, such as the support for anti-Sandinista Contras, the establishment of military alliances, and the implementation of doctrines like the Truman Doctrine. By investigating these interventions, research aims to uncover the motivations, strategies, and consequences of U.S. involvement in the region.

3. Understand Power Dynamics and Regional Relationships:

This report aims to investigate power dynamics that emerged within the geopolitical landscape of Central America, particularly in relation to the global superpowers. Analyzing how regional governments, rebel groups, and local populations responded to external influences will provide insights into the complexities of Cold War geopolitics.

4. Evaluate the consequences of Containment policy:

The pursuit of containment against Soviet influence was a central principle of U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. This report seeks to evaluate the success and failures of this containment strategy in Central America. Did it achieve its intended goals, or did it inadvertently contribute to regional instability and conflict? By examining the outcomes, research aims to assess the effectiveness of containment as a part in shaping U.S. foreign policy in the region.

In addressing these objectives, this report aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of how U.S. foreign policy significantly shaped and impacted Central America during the Cold War era.

5. Understand the Historical Context:

This research endeavors to analyze the historical context of the critical occurrences in Central America throughout the Cold War, with a specific emphasis on the pre-war political, economic, and social conditions. This analysis offers valuable perspectives on the ways in which resource control, geopolitical strategies, and ideological supremacy influenced American influence in the region. In order to facilitate a nuanced comprehension of the significance and consequences of the events under examination, the objective is to present an exhaustive summary of the historical, economical and geographical background. The historical backdrop provides an essential basis for examining the consequences of American intervention in the area.

Methodology

This research utilizes a multidisciplinary approach to investigate the impact of U.S. foreign policy on Central America during the Cold War era. The technique comprises the following components:

This study heavily relies on academic books, papers, and other written sources to gain a thorough grasp of historical events, policy choices, and their consequences in Central America. These sources provide the basis for the analysis, giving valuable information about the ideological, political, and economic elements that influence U.S. interventionism in the region.

This research incorporates primary materials, such as copies of relevant doctrines, CIA documents, and other government records, in addition to secondary sources. The study seeks to verify and provide a framework for historical accounts by analyzing these papers. It intends to reveal the underlying reasons and tactics behind U.S. foreign policy efforts in Central America.

Academic databases and digital libraries, like JSTOR, are widely used to efficiently gather and analyze data. These databases contain a large collection of academic works on topics such as international relations, history, and political science. In addition, a variety of academic articles and research papers are accessed through digital libraries such as Cyberleninka, Cambridge.org, and ResearchGate. This broadens the study by incorporating perspectives from many fields.

This research aims to provide a detailed picture of how U.S. foreign policy influenced and affected Central America throughout the Cold War era by incorporating various methodological approaches. The project aims to provide a thorough and comprehensive analysis of historical events and their long-lasting effects in the region by using literature review, document analysis, and digital resources.

Scope and limitations

This research project delves into the impact of U.S. foreign policy on Central America during the Cold War era, with a particular focus on Guatemala and Nicaragua. The following parameters have been established to guide the study:

The research examines events occurring from the early 19th century to the late 1980s. This extended timeframe allows for a comprehensive analysis of historical antecedents, including the Monroe Doctrine, banana wars, and other early manifestations of U.S. interventionism, which set the stage for later Cold War-era policies in the region.

The study concentrates on the countries of Guatemala and Nicaragua as case studies. These countries were significantly influenced by U.S. interventions, specifically the Guatemalan Coup in 1954 and the Nicaraguan revolution in 1961, which

involved support for contra groups. By analyzing these specific cases, the research aims to uncover broader patterns of U.S. involvement and its impact on Central American nations.

The research explores the motives behind U.S. actions in Central America during the Cold War, including covert operations, military interventions, and economic policies. Special attention will be given to understanding how these actions shaped the political, social, and economic landscapes of Guatemala and Nicaragua. In addition to examining Cold War-era interventions, the research considers earlier events such as the Banana Wars and the implementation of the Monroe Doctrine. By contextualizing Cold War-era interventions within this broader historical framework, the study seeks to identify long-term patterns and trends in U.S. policy towards Central America.

This research focuses on comprehending the fundamental motivations behind the acts taken by the United States in Central America over the course of history. The study seeks to break down the reasoning behind U.S. operations and their long-lasting effects on the region by examining the ideological, economic, and geopolitical aspects that shape U.S. foreign policy.

The study seeks to clarify the long-lasting effects of past events on the region by placing them in a larger context of geopolitical and economic frameworks. It also acknowledges the necessity of further investigation into present-day realities and the current condition of these nations.

While this research project provides valuable insights into the historical roots of U.S. intervention in Central America and its impact during the Cold War era, it is important to acknowledge its limitations:

The study selectively examines specific events and policies, which may not encompass the entirety of U.S. interventions in Central America over the examined period.

The analysis is guided by a specific interpretive framework centered on U.S. motives and actions, potentially overlooking alternative perspectives and historical contexts that could provide additional insights into the complexities of Central America's history.

The research focuses primarily on historical events and their long-term effects on the region, with limited analysis of contemporary developments or the current socio-political and economic realities of Central American countries. As such, the study may not fully capture the complexities of present-day challenges and opportunities in the region.

BACKGROUND AND MOTIVES OF US

In order to comprehensively understand the dynamics of U.S. foreign policy in Central America during the Cold War era, it is imperative to delve into the historical context that laid the groundwork for these events.

Monroe Doctrine

The Monroe Doctrine, a foreign policy doctrine developed by US President James Monroe in 1823, aimed to guarantee stability and order in Latin America [36]. Many European nations withdrew from the region during the 19th century, permitting the United States to increase its sphere of influence, despite the fact that it was initially unenforceable. During a dispute with Great Britain in 1895 regarding a disputed boundary between British Guiana and Venezuela, Richard Olney, the secretary of state under President Grover Cleveland, unveiled his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. Olney conveyed the unmistakable concept that the United States presently possesses quasi-sovereign authority on this continent and that its fiat is enforceable law on the specific areas where it performs its intervention [14].

Monroe initially introduced the doctrine in his seventh annual address to Congress in 1823, wherein he argued for the maintenance of distinct spheres of influence between the New World and the Old World [5, 14]. The United States would acknowledge the sovereignty of the Spanish colonies and refrain from meddling in the internal affairs of established European colonies.

The doctrine of non-interference and multilateralism was redefined in 1898 and endorsed by the US in 1933 under Franklin D. Roosevelt. This aggressive interpretation was used to establish the US economic empire in the Caribbean, particularly during the 1898 Spanish-Cuban conflict. The doctrine's influence on policy during the presidency of William McKinley was further questioned in the twenty-first century [14].

Roosevelt Corollary

During the early twentieth century, the United States engaged in periodic interventions in Latin American countries to safeguard its economic interests, often resorting to military force or coercion. The Roosevelt Corollary of 1904 emerged following the Venezuelan crisis of 1902 - 1903, where European powers imposed a naval blockade on Venezuela. "Berlin felt it necessary to present a formal ultimatum to Castro first, but if this was rejected, as the European Powers expected it would be, they would seize Venezuelan warships as a first step" [30]. This corollary asserted America's right to intervene in the economic affairs of Caribbean and Central American nations to prevent European intervention. The Roosevelt Corollary of 1904 authorized U.S. intervention in Latin America to protect its economic interests, particularly in cases of debt default or threats to American businesses [47]. The Venezuelan crisis of 1902 - 1903, marked by European naval blockade, prompted the corollary's development. President Wilson's administration further exemplified this policy through military interventions in various Latin American countries, including Mexico, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, Panama, and Nicaragua. These interventions aimed to install favorable governments and secure advantageous treaties for the United States [3]. The Roosevelt Corollary and subsequent U.S. military interventions in Latin America during the early twentieth century underscored America's assertive stance in protecting its economic interests and preventing European influence in the region. However, these actions also generated significant hostility towards the United States among Latin American nations, shaping complex diplomatic relations in the hemisphere.

Panama Canal

The Panama Canal, an artificial waterway spanning 82 kilometers (51 miles) in Panama, was crucial for global trade, linking the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Its origins trace back to 1534 when Charles V of Spain initiated explorations for a passage through the Americas [4]. In the beginning of 20th century, "the US acquired property from the French Canal Company for 40 million dollars - the largest financial transaction then by the US Government" [6].

Initially led by John Findley Wallace, dissatisfaction and bureaucratic hurdles led to his resignation in 1905. Theodore P. Shonts and later John Frank Stevens took charge, with Stevens, in particular, bypassing bureaucratic obstacles to expedite progress. Major George Washington Goethals of the United States Army ultimately supervised the project's completion in 1914, when the Panama Railroad steamship SS Ancon recorded the first commercial lockage from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean and opened the port to world shipping [6].

The canal not only facilitated global trade but also served as a symbol of American naval power. American companies, notably the United Fruit Company, furthered economic interests in the region by financing agricultural ventures [50].

Post-World War II, tensions between Panama and the United States escalated over control of the canal zone, leading to protests and military intervention. Despite these challenges, the Panama Canal remained vital for U.S. economic, political, and military interests, underlining its strategic significance in global affairs. "As LaFeber points out, toward the end of the nineteen fifties the Cold War dipped into the Third World and Panama was bound to become a tension point" [20].

Banana Wars

During the era of the "Banana Republics" in early twentieth-century Latin America, the United States conducted a series of interventions known as the "Banana Wars" to safeguard its business interests. Beginning after the Treaty of Paris (1898) following the Spanish-American War, this period saw regime changes influenced by the U.S., including the occupation of Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Cuba's eventual independence. Lasting from 1898 to the early 1930s, these wars reflected America's assertive and imperialistic foreign policy, characterized by military occupation and interventions in Central America and the Caribbean Basin. These actions persisted until the initiation of the Good Neighbor Policy in 1934, marking a significant chapter in U.S. foreign relations in the region [27].

The Good Neighbor Policy

The Good Neighbor Policy, initiated by President Franklin Roosevelt, aimed to establish non-interventionist relations with Latin America, emphasizing cooperation and trade. While rooted in President Herbert Hoover's ideals against interventionism, the policy faced resistance from some Latin American governments. Despite its initial goals of fostering mutual trade agreements and restoring U.S. influence in the region, disagreements persisted. Eventually, the United States shifted towards a more interventionist role, departing from the principles of the Good Neighbor Policy. This evolution marked a significant change in U.S. foreign policy, transitioning to a global role often described as the "world's policeman" [34].

The Truman Doctrine and "Containment" Policy

The Cold War era witnessed U.S. intervention in Latin American regime change, characterized by the support of U.S.-sponsored coups that ousted left-leaning governments and installed right-wing military juntas or authoritarian regimes. In line with Truman's principles, this action sought to restrain the global growth of the USSR. The Truman Doctrine, unveiled in 1947, prioritized providing assistance to nations facing the danger of Moscow, ultimately resulting in the establishment of NATO in 1949 and signifying the commencement of the Cold War [42].

The Soviet Union reacted to containment by actively spreading communist ideology worldwide, which in turn led to the formulation of the containment policy by diplomat George F. Kennan in 1946: "in these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies" [54]. Kennan's examination of Stalin's 1946 address, emphasizing Soviet intentions, emphasized the perceived danger. The ensuing NSC 68 advocated for assertive measures against Soviet allies, prompting the United States to pursue regime change. The document titled "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," which played a crucial role during the Cold War, supported the idea of allocating more funds towards military expenses and providing assistance.

In 1950, President Truman issued a mandate to evaluate the country's military policy. This evaluation was directed by Paul Nitze and recommended an assertive approach towards the Soviets. Nitze's perspective, in contrast to that of Kremlin historians, highlighted the Soviet Union's unwavering commitment to achieving worldwide supremacy. The 68th National Security Council session acknowledged the tremendous difficulties and recognized the crucial stakes for the Republic and civilization as a whole. This exhaustive examination elucidates the manner in which U.S. foreign policy influenced and affected Central America throughout the Cold War period. Truman's policy, unlike the Monroe Doctrine and its Roosevelt Corollary, was global in scope, underpinning Cold War initiatives like the $12 billion Marshall Plan for European reconstruction, the creation of NATO, and an unprecedented peacetime military buildup after the Korean War. It guided America's Cold War policies for four decades, from Berlin to Vietnam and Afghanistan [35].

In summary, the historical backdrop described in this chapter functions as an essential framework for analyzing the complexities of American foreign policy in Central America throughout the Cold War period. Through an analysis of interventionist inclinations, starting with the "Banana Wars" of the early twentieth century and progressing through the intricacies of the Panama Canal and the developing Good Neighbor Policy, one can acquire a holistic comprehension of the historical framework that established the foundation for the dynamics of the Cold War. The shift from non-interventionist principles to the assertive position advocated by the Truman Doctrine had a profound effect on Central American countries, resulting in regime changes backed by the United States. The historical context serves to shed light on the incentives, obstacles, and effects of United States interventions in the area.

THE 1954 GUATEMALAN COUP D'ÉTAT

The events surrounding the 1954 Guatemalan coup d'état stand as a pivotal chapter in understanding the profound impact of U.S. foreign policy on Central America during the Cold War era. Examining the intricacies of these evets, including the motivations, strategies, will illuminate the patterns of U.S. intervention in Central America.

Monroe's Doctrine. Theodore Roosevelt espoused the view that the primary beneficiary of Central American production should be the United States. The influence of Monroe's Doctrine was bolstered by the United States via military campaigns in Nicaragua (1912-33) and Haiti (1915-34) [3, 4]. In the context of Guatemala, the employment of military force was unnecessary due to the willingness of multiple dictators to accommodate the economic interests of the United States in return for regime support. Guatemala, known as the "banana republic," was a Central American nation that relied on exporting a single product or commodity, often controlled by foreign-owned companies or industries. Between 1890 and 1920, America became Guatemala's primary trading partner, following the loss of economic and resource control by Britain and Germany. Banana republics have a highly stratified socioeconomic structure, "with a small ruling class that controls access to wealth and resources, and that are politically unstable" [41]. The term originated to describe the exploitation of Central and South American labor and property by American corporations during their development of banana plantations.

United Fruit Company

In response to the spike in global coffee demand during the late 1800s, the Guatemalan government granted plantation proprietors a number of concessions. A legislation was enacted which deprived the indigenous peoples of community-owned land and permitted coffee producers to acquire it. President Manuel Estrada Cabrera (1898-1920) of Guatemala was among a succession of leaders who entered into significant agreements with foreign corporations, including the United Fruit Company. Established in 1899 through the merger of two important U.S. corporations, the resulting corporation possessed considerable territories across Central America and was responsible for the operation of railways, docks, and communications systems in Guatemala [32]. Beginning in the 20th century, it dominated the banana trade in Guatemala and was the largest exporter of bananas in the world. Furthermore, the United States government maintained strong ties with the Guatemalan state of Cabrera, which controlled financial policy and granted several exclusive rights to American corporations. Following Cabrera's overthrow in 1920, the United States dispatched armed forces to uphold a cordial relationship with the newly installed president.

In 1931, wealthy landowners in Guatemala supported Jorge Ubico to prevent a popular uprising following the Great Depression. Substituting vagrancy for debt peonage and endowing landowners with the authority to execute laborers, Ubico's regime emerged as one of the most repressive in the region. Irrespective of his sympathies towards European fascist leaders, Ubico was geopolitically compelled to form an alliance with the United States. As a reaction to multiple peasant uprisings, he executed by mass execution and imprisonment. Political chiefs often sided with conservative landowners, as seen with Rafael Carrera and Manuel Estrada Cabrera. Despite some liberalism concessions and road construction, Jorge Ubico's rule (1930-1944) primarily relied on arch-conservative landed aristocrats, despite some land redistribution and road construction [40]. By 1930, UFC had amassed $215 million in liquid assets and established itself as the preeminent employer and landowner in Guatemala. Ubico extended a new contract to the company, which encompassed substantial advantages such as tax exemption, allocation of 200,000 hectares of state land, and assurance that no competing contract would be awarded to another company. Ubico advocated for a daily wage cap of fifty cents in an effort to deter other businesses from offering higher wages.

Guatemalan Revolution and presidency of Arévalo

In 1944, middle-class citizens and university students in Guatemala led a popular uprising against Ubico's repressive policies, leading to the October Revolution aiming to establish a liberal democracy [23]. Juan José Arévalo, a conservative professor, was elected president, implementing liberalizations in labor codes, medical centers, and education funding. He organized state plantations and imposed a minimum wage to employ landless individuals. Arévalo also imposed criminal liability on unions affiliated with companies employing fewer than 500 individuals. By 1947, unions pressured him to adopt a new labor code, outlawing workplace discrimination. However, Arévalo failed to implement changes in rural labor relations and did not support land reform. Despite Arévalo's anti-communism, the United States viewed him with suspicion, fearing he was under USSR influence. During his presidency, the communist movement experienced a surge in strength due to his influence over the teachers' union and the liberation of party leaders. However, communists continued to face persecution from the state. Concern was further encouraged by Arévalo's support for the Caribbean Legion, which consisted of expatriates and revolutionaries: "No government more than that of Juan Jose Arevalo supported the semi-mythical Caribbean Legion" [15]. The government faced internal opposition, with at least twenty-five revolt attempts during his presidency. A notable example was Francisco Arana's 1949 attempt, which ended in an armed confrontation between Arana's supporters and forces led by Defense Minister Arévalo's Jacobo Ârbenz. Other opponents included conservatives in the armed forces and right-wing politicians during the Ubico dictatorship.

Presidency of Árbenz and land reform

Populist Arbenz emerged victorious in the 1950 open elections. In Guatemala, this event signified the inaugural occurrence of democratically elected leaders transferring authority to one another. Arbenz, who endorsed an independent foreign policy that opposed the policies of the U.S. government, "had legalized Guatemala's Communist party, the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT)" [13]. He had personal connections with some members of the Communist Party (PGT), and some of these members participated in shaping the new president's policies. In Guatemala, Arbenz favored a moderate form of capitalism over communism. In order to accomplish his immediate objectives of emancipating peasants from feudalism and enhancing the rights of workers, the PGT additionally made a commitment to operate in accordance with the regulations that were already in place. Arbenz's agrarian reform bill was the most prominent element of his policy [23, 24]. After consulting with economists from throughout Latin America, Arbenz drafted the law himself. Its fundamental principle was the provision of impoverished laborers with uncultivated land by wealthy landowners, which allowed them to establish profitable farms.

In 1950, the United Fruit Company (UFC) in Guatemala generated a profit twice as large as the government's, controlling Puerto Barrios, the country's only port. With a territory size of 221,862 hectares, the UFC was the most extensive and influential banana producer [18]. However, after 1944, Guatemalan revolutionaries saw UFC as an obstacle to progress due to its association with the Ubico government and discriminatory policies towards indigenous peoples. Arbenz's reforms significantly influenced UFC, including a new labor code allowing employees to strike if wage increases and job security assurances were not met. Despite violating these regulations, UFC viewed itself as a reform target and declined to engage in negotiations. The 1952 incorporation of Decree No. 900 further exacerbated the company's situation, as it only cultivated 15% of its 220,000 hectares land, leaving the remaining areas empty and impacted by the agrarian reform law. Proponents of United Fruit contend that the substantial proportion of the corporation's property that was expropriated by the Arbenz administration constituted discriminatory conduct. According to their argument, UFCO was obligated to maintain a dormant state for the majority of its land as a precautionary measure against natural disasters and Panama disease, which afflicts banana plantations [15, 34]. The Guatemalan Congress endorsed Decree 900, an agrarian reform law introduced by President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, on June 17, 1952. The law redistributed over 224 acres of unused land to local peasants in exchange for government bonds. The law distributed 1,700 estates among 500,000 individuals, constituting about one-sixth of the nation's population.

UFC lobbied the United States government actively. The inability of the Guatemalan government to safeguard the interests of the company was a subject of criticism from several congressmen. In response, the Guatemalan government stated that the company was the main obstacle to the country's progress. The government acquired 200,000 acres (81,000 hectares) of undeveloped land in 1953 for $2.99 per acre ($7.39 per hectare), which was nearly double the amount paid by the company. A subsequent expropriation transpired, culminating in the acquisition of a landmass exceeding 400,000 acres (160,000 hectares). UFC assessed the value of its assets for taxation intentions using this rate. The company was dissatisfied with the loss of land and the level of profit from sales, leading to additional lobbying in Washington, particularly from U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who had close ties to the company. Furthermore, UFC employed Edward Bernays, who oversaw an extensive disinformation campaign spanning several years, depicting the organization as an accomplice of the "communist" regime in Guatemala. With Arbenz election, "Bernays came to Zemurray again to urge a wider, more aggressive and sophisticated campaign against Guatemala" [43, 42, 45]. Bernays was directed to initiate a more extensive press campaign against the Guatemalan regime in April 1951. Arthur Hays Sulzberger, the publisher of the New York Times, was visited by Bernays, who exhorted the publication to report on the escalating dangers of communism. Crede H. Calhoun was tasked with reporting alarmingly on "Reds" in Guatemala in order to cover the Fruit Company's difficulties there. Bernays commended the impartial reporting of Calhoun. Following the 1952 election of Dwight D. Eisenhower as president of the United States, the organization heightened its endeavors. These efforts included commissioning a research report from a firm known for its anti-socialist stance. The Guatemalan government's policies were harshly criticized in a 235-page report authored by this firm. In total, the organization expended more than $500,000 in an effort to persuade American citizens and legislators to support the overthrow of the Guatemalan government [23].

Operation PBFortune

During the Cold War, the Guatemalan government's confrontations with corporations and the Guatemalan revolution raised concerns for the US government. The Truman administration perceived the Guatemalan government as communist and expressed apprehension about Arévalo's support for the Caribbean Legion [15, 16. To diminish communist influence, the Truman administration used economic and diplomatic methods. In 1951, the US prohibited all arms purchases by Guatemala, following its refusal to supply weapons after 1944. This marked the end of the Truman administration's term.

With the election of Arbenz in 1951 and the issuance of Decree No. 900 in 1952, American concerns regarding the potential influence of communism grew. In 1952, President Anastasio Somoza García of Nicaragua paid a visit to the United States, where he made a commitment to "purify Guatemala" in return for arms supplied by the United States. Truman instructed the CIA to supervise its development despite the absence of immediate support. Thus, this was the beginning of the PBFortune operation. Operating under the cartographical designation 'PB' for Guatemala, the CIA named this project "PBFortune". Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, a fugitive in the Guatemalan Army, was provided with a modest arsenal of armaments by the CIA. He had been in exile in Honduras since negotiating his way out of prison for his failed coup attempt against the Arevalo regime, where he was incarcerated [12]. Castillo Armas was entrusted with $225,000 and weaponry by the CIA on the presumption that he was sufficiently corrupt and autocratic to orchestrate the rebellion. The CIA, UFC, and Somoza planned the Guatemalan rebellion, in collaboration with dictators Rafael Trujillo and Marcos Pérez Jiménez. Despite official approval from PBFortune on September 9, 1952, preparation began before that date. CIA planners compiled a list of "leading Communists" to eliminate in case of an anti-Communist coup. The plan involved the abduction of numerous Guatemalans and the assassination of over 58. In 1952, the CIA implemented a plan to transport agricultural weapons from the UFC to Nicaragua via a cargo ship refitted in New Orleans. However, the strategy was quickly abandoned due to suspicions of Somoza's irresponsibility and the discovery of the plan by the State Department. The operation was terminated by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, and Castillo Armas received CIA support, including a $3,000 monthly stipend and materials for his insurgent forces [8, 9] .

Eisenhower administration

During his successful campaign for the U.S. presidency, Dwight Eisenhower made a firm commitment to not only contain communism but also to roll it back: "the U.S.-supported coup in Guatemala was mostly a result of strong anti-Communist sentiment in the Eisenhower administration" [37]. As McCarthyism gained traction in government circles, Eisenhower appeared more inclined than Truman to employ the CIA to overthrow governments that were unfavorable to the United States. Despite the swift abandonment of PBFortune, the conflict between the United States and Guatemala persisted and intensified, particularly in the aftermath of the legalization of the communist party PGT and its members. Numerous Eisenhower administration officials had close connections to the United Fruit Company, including Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his brother Allen Dulles, the director of the CIA. Allen emphasized the importance of the U.S. restoring freedom of choice to the people, a responsibility forced upon the country by Soviet action. He argued that the U.S. should decide when and how to act against Communism, as it "may be too late" [37]. In collaboration with the law firm Sullivan & Cromwell, the Dulles brothers oversaw a number of transactions on behalf of UFC. Deputy Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith subsequently assumed the position of director of the organization. Anne K. Whitman, Eisenhower's personal assistant, was the spouse of Edmund S. Whitman, the director of public relations for the UFC. Based on these personal connections, it appeared that the Eisenhower administration had a tendency to align UFC's interests with those of the United States' national security and to bolster the desire to overthrow the Guatemalan government.

Operation PBSuccess

Eisenhower authorized the CIA to execute Operation PBSuccess, a planned overthrow of Jacobo rbenz, in August 1953 [8]. The operation received a budget allocation of $2.7 million for "psychological warfare and political actions." The estimated budget for the project was between $5 and $7 million, with more than one hundred CIA operatives participating in the strategic planning. Additionally, dozens of Guatemalan exiles and citizens of adjacent nations participated in the operation. The strategies involved the identification of every member of Ârbenz's government who would perish in the coup d'état. Detailed protocols regarding assassination methodologies and compiled enumerations of coup targets were created. These were the first known assassination guidelines used by the CIA in subsequent operations. The State Department enlisted a group of diplomats, including John Peurifoy, who was appointed ambassador to Guatemala in 1953. William D. Pawley, an affluent diplomat, was also part of the team. Dulles initially considered bringing Pawley back into the new administration, knowing that he would be a strong advocate if given the chance to "express his opinion and exert influence" [21]. Peurifoy, who was also U.S. Ambassador to Greece, was willing to cooperate with the CIA and was dedicated to anti-communism. Despite deteriorating relations with the Guatemalan government, relations with the Guatemalan military improved during his administration.

The CIA operation was directed by the Deputy Director of Plans, Frank Wisner. Wisner selected former U.S. Army colonel Albert Haney, who was in charge of the CIA station in South Korea at the time, to direct the operation. In 1953, a premature coup in Baja Verapaz, Guatemala, sparked a CIA operation that was quickly queried, and many participants apprehended. The failed revolution effort was significantly undermined by the apprehension of multiple CIA agents and allies, leading to a growing dependence on Guatemalan exiles and their anti-democratic allies. Multiple candidates were evaluated as potential coup organizers, including Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes, Juan Cordova Cerna, and Castillo Armas. Fuentes was defeated by Arbenz but was denied due to his association with the Ubico regime and European appearance. Cerna orchestrated a failed coup attempt in Salama before boarding an exile ship that accompanied him to Castillo Armas. However, in 1954, Cema was diagnosed with throat cancer, disqualifying him. Therefore, Castillo Armas was designated to lead the forthcoming rebellion. He had been in exile since the failed coup in 1949 and received a salary from the CIA after the unsuccessful PBFortune operation in 1951 [23, 24, 25].

Conference in Caracas

During the PBSuccess debate, Washington condemned the Guatemalan government and accused Communists of infiltrating it [1]. The State Department requested the Organization of American States to modify the Inter-American Conference agenda, which included a paragraph titled "International Communism's Interference in the American Republics." The Guatemalan government released documents, which were subsequently delivered to opposition leader Castillo Armas. The government used forgery to supplement the information, eroding its credibility. In retaliation, Castillo Armas' allies were arrested in Guatemala, and the "Government of the North" was accused of conspiring to depose Arbenz [9, 11, 14]. The White House denied these allegations, and the American media sided with the administration. The Caracas conference resulted in a triumph for the United States, as it successfully presented tangible perspectives on communism in Latin America, despite the delegates' lack of support from those strongly opposed to communism. The United States discontinued arms shipments to Guatemala in 1951, expanding arms provisions to neighboring Honduras and Nicaragua, and entering into bilateral defense agreements [5]. The embargo on arms shipments to the United States was intensified by the State Department in 1953, effectively prohibiting the Arbenz government from acquiring weaponry from Canada, Germany, and Rhodesia. In 1954, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) circulated a communique from Guatemala's president, Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, detailing the government's struggle against U.S. aggression. Despite Latin American communists and Soviet sympathizers requesting military and political assistance, Soviet leaders were unwilling to offer more than a shipment of outdated Nazi weaponry from Czech fighters during

the Second World War. Despite this, Moscow used the UN to challenge U.S. interventionism in the Western Hemisphere and capitalized on anti-American sentiment in Latin America. Although recommendations for Soviet support were made, they were not convincing enough. Eventually, a shipment of Czechoslovak weapons was arranged, "but otherwise the Soviet approach to the Arbenz government remained cautious" [11, 13]. The shipment of these armaments was portrayed by the CIA as an imminent Soviet invasion of the United States, serving as the CIA's final motivation to initiate the coup.

Operation PBSuccess utilized psychological warfare to convince Guatemalans that Castillo Armas's triumph was assured and to compel Arbenz to retreat [17, 19, 23]. The United States Information Agency (USIA) published hundreds of articles and disseminated tens of thousands of leaflets throughout Latin America long before the invasion, marking the beginning of a propaganda campaign. The US Psychological Strategy Board sanctioned "Psychological Warfare against Individuals" to intimidate loyalists and possible adversaries of the rebellion. The United States began Operation "Hardrock Baker,", the sea blockade of Guatemala. Freighters from France and Britain were halted and occupied by U. S. against the will of international law. The task force was directed to inflict damage upon vessels as a last resort in order to halt their progress. In order to

reach Guatemala, vessels traversing the Panama Canal were detained and inspected. The blatant illegality of the blockade "made it a powerful weapon of intimidation" [9, 10]. In addition to maritime intimidation, one of Castillo Armas's aircraft dropped leaflets over the capital on May 26, imploring individuals to support the organization and fight against communism. The radio program "Voice of Liberation" functioned as the most influential psychological instrument, broadcasting anti-communist propaganda and encouraging its audience to oppose the Arbenz government in favor of the Castillo Armas liberation forces. The program shifted to a twice-daily, two-hour broadcast, initially only audible in Guatemala, but later increased by the CIA, enabling unobstructed reception in the capital.

Castillo's Invasion

The Castillo Armas unit, consisting of 480 men, was divided into four groups of 60-198 men each. On 15 June 1954, they left their bases in Honduras and El Salvador and settled in several cities near the Guatemalan border. The most formidable forces were tasked with storming Puerto Barrios, while others targeted smaller cities like Esquipulas, Jutiapa, and Zacapa, the Guatemalan army's main outpost along the border. However, the invasion strategy faced setbacks when sixty men were apprehended and detained by El Salvadoran police. On June 18, 1954, Castillo Armas initiated an invasion of the frontier, sabotaging telegraph lines and detonating railroads [8]. The US psychological strategy board directed an assault on the Matamoros fortress in central Guatemala, and an American P-47 mercenary-powered military aircraft devastated the city of Chiquimula. Castillo Armas demanded the immediate capitulation of Arbenz, leading to a brief pandemonium in the capital. Despite the destruction of the bridge, Castillo Armas forces were unable to reach their objectives for several days due to a lack of transportation and provisions. The rebels successfully achieved their objectives, but faced a significant obstacle when Guatemalan soldiers ambushed a group of 122 individuals on route to Zacapa [9]. Armed police and dockworkers repelled the forces advancing on Puerto Barrios, causing many insurgents to return to Honduras. Rebel aircraft targeted the capital, causing minimal damage but causing a profound psychological impact. The restricted payload capacity of rebel bombers resulted from their departure from Managua, Nicaragua's administrative center. They attempted to generate loud explosions with a reduced payload by replacing bombs with dynamite or Molotov cocktails. The aircraft targeted squares, ammunition depots, and other prominent structures. On June 22, 1954, the Honduran municipality of San Pedro de Copan was attacked by the Guatemalan Air Force, but diplomatic repercussions were minimal. The Guatemalan army shot down several rebel bombers, prompting Castillo Armas to demand more from the CIA. Eisenhower appointed additional aircraft to aid the rebels. On June 27, 1954, a CIA Lockheed P-38M Lightning aircraft attacked Puerto San José. Chartered by the American corporation WR Grace and corporation Line, the British cargo ship SS Springfjord was struck by napalm explosives while transporting Guatemalan coffee and cotton. The CIA paid one million dollars for this incident [23, 25].

Guatemala's Response

The Arbenz government initially planned to arm workers' militias, conscripts, and the Guatemalan army to repel the invasion of Honduras. However, opposition from the armed forces and public knowledge of secret arms acquisitions led to a restriction of weaponry provision to the military. Arbenz believed Castillo Armas could be defeated militarily but also suspected American forces would launch a direct invasion if defeated. He initially decided not to arm civilians, as he lacked a justification. The Guatemalan armed forces commander, Carlos Enrique Diaz, assured Arbenz that the army was capable enough. A group of officers chosen by Diaz was impartial and devoted to Arbenz. The majority of Guatemalan forces stationed in the capital region relocated to Zacapa on June 19. Arbenz declared the invasion a farce but was concerned that Honduras could use it to declare war on Guatemala, prompting an American invasion if Guatemala lost on the border with Honduras. Peasant volunteers supplied the army with weapons and staffed checkpoints to aid the government in military operations. The arms that the rebels had discarded were seized and transferred to the government. Arbenz's supporters made diplomatic efforts to prevent the invasion of Guatemala, but Mexico declined his request for aid, El Salvador only informed Peurifoy of Guatemala's progress, and El Salvador refrained from intervening. The Security Council met on June 20 to discuss a complaint against Guatemala, but the US argued Eisenhower's actions during WWII were evidence of his resistance to imperialism. Nicaragua and Honduras denied responsibility, and only the Soviet Union provided assistance. The proposal to refer this matter to the Organization of American States was vetoed by the Soviet Union and their allies by the United States. In response, the US vetoed Guatemala's proposal for a Security Council investigation, the first time against an ally, despite Britain and France's support. The US warned foreign ministries of withholding support for future endeavors and delayed the Inter-American Peace Committee's fact-finding mission after a military dictatorship was established due to Washington's influence [23, 21, 11].

Arbenz initially believed his forces could dispatch rebels quickly, but a small garrison of 30 soldiers vanquished insurgent forces near Zacapa, strengthening his belief. Colonel Victor M. Leon, on June 21 reassured Arbenz that Castillo Armas would be defeated soon. However, other officials lacked confidence, and Army Chief of Staff Parinello declared the army would not engage in combat. The temporary general secretary of the PGT, Alvarado Monzon, returned to Zacapa to investigate the leaders' doubts, and on June 25, the army was rendered demoralized and stopped all combat. Arbenz dispatched a second investigator and requested the president's resignation. Officers believed defeat was inevitable with rebel support from the United States, placing the responsibility on Arbenz. If Arbenz did not resign, the army would likely reach an agreement with Castillo Armas and accompany him to the capital. Eisenhower allowed Castillo Armas to use more aircraft for aerial assaults during WWII. Although they achieved limited material success due to surplus materials, they had a significant psychological impact. Arbenz learned of Castillo Armas' victory over the Guatemalan garrison in Chiquimula on June 25, coinciding with the army's ultimatum [8]. On June 25, Arbenz assembled political parties, labor unions, and governmental organizations, including Colonel Diaz, to discuss the betrayal of the army in Zacapa and the need for citizens to be armed to defend the nation. The unions pledged to contribute thousands of soldiers, but only hundreds enlisted. The civilian populace, who had previously opposed the Guatemalan revolution, refused to fight due to fear of American intimidation. Diaz withdrew his support for the president and,

with the help of senior army officers, plotted to depose Arbenz. They requested that Peurifoy stop combat in exchange for Arbenz's departure. Arbenz agreed without conditions, transferring his authority to the cabinet ministers, and transferring his authority to the cabinet ministers. Within two months, he was exiled from the nation and fled to Mexico by plane. The civilian populace was averse to fighting against their own army and the invasion. The CIA claimed that no assassination schemes were executed during Operation PBSuccess, but around 120 communists or Arbenz supporters were allowed to leave. The CIA destroyed all documents associated with the program on June 30, 1954 [12, 13].

Results of the Operation

After informing his cabinet of his decision on June 27, 1954, Arbenz departed the presidential palace without opposition, exhausted and anxious to preserve democratic reforms [8]. On September 12, 1954, in response to Castillo Armas's disgrace over the deposed president's continued presence in the capital, Arbenz was granted unrestricted entry into Mexico. Armas demanded a final humiliation of Arbenz and had him strip-searched at the airport. Following a period of seventeen years spent in France, Uruguay, Switzerland, and Cuba, Arbenz led a nomadic existence before eventually returning to Mexico, "where in 1971 he drowned in his bathtub" [8]. Diaz proclaimed via radio that he would be assuming the presidency following the president's resignation, adding that the army would persist in its resistance against the invasion led by Castillo Armas. Colonels José Ángel Sánchez and Elfego Hernán Monzón Aguirre were also constituents of the military junta under his leadership. Diplomatic relations between Diaz and a CIA officer who had spoken with Diaz revealed that Diaz was "inconvenient for American foreign policy"; as a result, Ambassador Peurifoy advised Diaz to tender his resignation over the subsequent two days. Diaz was criticized by Peurifoy for permitting Arbenz to disparage the United States in his resignation address. In the meantime, a colonel was horrified when a U.S.-trained pilot detonated a bomb at the primary ammunition depot of the army. In the aftermath, Colonel Monzón, who supported the interests of the United States more, orchestrated an immediate and nonviolent rebellion that led to the removal of Diaz. Subsequently, Diaz asserted that Peurifoy presented him with a list of communists and commanded their immediate execution. Diaz, nevertheless, declined, which infuriated Peurifoy even more. The negotiations between Castillo Armas and the commanders of the military forces in Zacapa commenced on June 17. The Pact of Las Tunas, which was executed three days later, specified that the army stationed in Zacapa would be transferred to Castillo Armas in return for a universal amnesty. Monzon, a strong anti-communist and advocate for the United States, resisted relinquishing authority to Castillo Armas after Diaz's death. Peurifoy believed the CIA should yield and allow the State Department to negotiate with Guatemala's new government. After Oscar Osorio, the dictator of El Salvador, agreed to hold negotiations in San Salvador, Monzon and Castillo Armas arrived in El Salvador on June 30. On the same day, Wisner issued a directive to all personnel that the agency should vacate the area and allow the insurgents to conduct their operations autonomously [8]. Two more months passed while Peurifoy maneuvered prior to Castillo Armas assuming the presidency. At the White House, he was greeted with a "twenty-one-gun salute" and a state dinner, during which the vice president proposed the following toast: "We in the United States have watched the people of Guatemala record an episode in their history deeply significant to all peoples," said Richard Nixon [52]. On July 7, Colonels Dubois and Cruz Salazar resigned as junta supporters of Monzon. Both received $100,000 in compensation. The United States acknowledged the emerging government on July 13. Castillo Armas faced a coup attempt orchestrated by discontented military recruits, leading to 91 injuries and 29 fatalities. All political parties were prohibited from participating in elections in October. Armas won the election with 99% of the vote, completing his transition to power.

In summary, the investigation into the Guatemalan coup d'état of 1954 offers an in-depth understanding of the intricate ways in which United States foreign policy influenced and affected Central America throughout the Cold War. The secretive operation conducted in Guatemala, known as Operation PBSuccess, served as a symbol of more extensive United States approaches intended to counteract the perceived influence of communism in the area. The complex interdependencies among political, economic, and ideological elements, in conjunction with the explicit participation of the United States in coordinating a change of regime, emphasize the significant ramifications of this historical occurrence. The chapter explores the complexities of the United Fruit Company's economic interests and the geopolitical actions of the Cold War, emphasizing how these factors interacted to determine Guatemala's fate. While examining the complexities of American intervention in Central America, the Guatemalan rebellion presents a significant case study that provides valuable insights into the underlying motivations and far-reaching repercussions that occurred throughout the area.

NICARAGUA 19 JULY 1961 - 25 APRIL 1990

Examination of the significant actions of U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War era can be achieved by delving into the events that transpired in Nicaragua. Observation of the events of 1989 will show the important implications of American foreign policy during this period. Through an analysis of the complex interrelationships that surrounded the Sandinista revolution and the subsequent Contra War, this study aims to analyze the main events of U.S. foreign policy on the sociopolitical field of Nicaragua.

Background

Following the United States' occupation of Nicaragua in 1912 as part of the Banana Wars, the Somoza political dynasty ruled the country from 1937 until their overthrow in 1979 as part of the Nicaraguan Revolution. Anastasio Somoza Debayle ruled over his family, which comprised the last three members: Luis Somoza Debayle, Anastasio Somoza García. During the Somoza family's reign, political inequality and corruption increased, and the United States government, armed forces, and transnational corporations based in the United States provided substantial support. The Somoza family in Nicaragua ruled for four decades, accumulating wealth through corporate bribes, land-grabbing, and foreign aid siphoning, "thus beginning a family dictatorship that was to last almost half a century" [49]. They received US government support and had different leadership styles. By the 1970s, the family owned 23% of Nicaragua's land and had a wealth of approximately $533 million, which accounted for half of Nicaragua's debt and 33% of the country's 1979 GDP [5].

FSLN Uprising

The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) was founded in 1961 by Carlos Fonseca Amador, Silvio Mayorga, Tomás Borge Martínez, and other student activists from the National Autonomous University of Nicaragua (UNAN). The FSLN emerged from the youth wing of the Socialist Party of Nicaragua, an orthodox, Moscow-oriented Communist party. Sandinistas were educated

in the Soviet Union and trained in other Communist countries during their struggle against Somoza [17]. The organization had around twenty members in the 1960s, with support from peasants, anti-Somoza factions, socialist and communist administrations, and the social democratic regime of Venezuela. In the 1970s, a coalition of groups launched military operations against Somoza Debayle's dictatorship. Inspired by Fidel Castro and Che Guevara's campaigns, the FSLN adopted guerrilla tactics. The Rio Coco/Bocay-Raiti campaign was unsuccessful, and the guerrillas were forced to retreat with significant casualties. Fonseca, who was killed in combat in November 1976, disintegrated the FSLN into three factions: Tendencia Proletaria, Tendencia GPP, and Tendencia Tercerista, which advocated for left-wing nationalism and alliance with liberal opposition (Palmer, 1988). The Prolonged People's War Tendency (GPP) and Proletarian Tendency (TP) were two guerrilla groups in Guatemala that favored rural-based warfare. The GPP and TP believed that the time was not ripe for major military actions and rejected extensive cooperation with bourgeois elements. The Terceristas, a third group, believed that opposition to Somoza had become nearly universal and favored exemplary military action to spark popular insurrection. They also advocated for the unity of all opposition forces around a program of social reform and democracy. The Terceristas carried out the October 1977 attacks and built links to moderate opposition through Los Doce. However, by 1978, "the FSLN had neither the political nor military strength to challenge the Somoza regime" [29].

Overthrow of the Somoza regime

The FSLN gained prominence in Nicaraguan media due to an abduction campaign in the 1970s. The Somoza regime used torture, extrajudicial executions, intimidation, and press censorship to repel FSLN attacks. The regime faced global censure, and in 1978, the Boland Amendment by U.S. President Jimmy Carter ended all aid to the regime due to human rights violations. Somoza ceased the state of siege to maintain aid flow. In 1974, the Union for Democratic Liberation (UDEL) was formed, comprising liberal, conservative, and Socialist parties. The alliance was established by Pedro Joaquín Chamorro Cardenal. Chamorro's assassination in 1978 caused societal disorder in Managua, "and the nation erupted in a paroxysm of outrage and spontaneous violence" [29]. This was the beginning of the overthrow of the Somoza regime. A general strike followed, causing 80% of businesses to close in Managua and the provincial capitals of León, Granada, Chinandega, and Matagalpa. On August 22, 1978, the FSLN orchestrated a mass abduction operation, taking 2000 people hostage. Sandinista forces, led by Eden Pastora, stormed the National Palace, requesting financial support, the liberation of prisoners, and resources for propaganda. The FSLN secured a significant victory by agreeing to pay $500,000 and release detainees within two days. Despite receiving material assistance from Venezuela and Panama, Sandinistas continued to face guerrilla warfare and uprisings against the government. Cuba offered supplementary aid in the form of military counsel and weaponry. In 1979, the Organization of American States mediated negotiations between the FSLN and the government. However, the negotiations ended when the Somoza regime refused democratic elections. The FSLN dominated the nation by June 1979, except for the capital. After President Somoza's resignation, the FSLN took control of Managua, transferring government authority to revolutionary movements on 19 July 1979 [39]. The Nationalist Liberal Party was nearing extinction, and Somoza supporters fled to Miami. The revolution ended the economic burden imposed by the Somoza regime on Nicaragua, resulting in severe destruction due to natural disasters and conflict. In 1972, a catastrophic earthquake exacerbated the situation. As of 1979, 600,000 Nicaraguans were homeless and 150,000 were refugees or in exile. The revolution led to significant transformations and reforms, resulting in a diverse economy, with agriculture being the most affected. The Agrarian Reform had a profound effect on the Nicaraguan economy and privatization, guaranteeing property by means of productive labor. The legislation implemented under Sandinista permitted a wide range of property types, such as communal, cooperative, state, and individual property. The tenets of Agrarian Reform mirrored those of the American Revolution, which comprised economic democracy, pluralism, and national unity. Incorporating property into national development plans was the objective of this reform [10].

Contra War

The Reagan administration aimed to isolate the Sandinista regime in Latin America by promoting an anti-communist stance. The Contras, a group of right-wing rebel groups, emerged along the Honduras-Sandinista border between 1980 and 1981. Many were former members of Somoza's National Guard, and despite his exile in Honduras, many continued to hold his beliefs. The Contras were supported and financed by the United States and opposed the Marxist-Sandinista junta that seized power in Nicaragua in 1979. The Nicaraguan Democratic Forces (FDN) was the most significant Contra organization. Throughout the conflict against Nicaragua, Contras used terrorist strategies and committed human rights violations, with many actions carried out methodically [48]. Contra supporters aimed to diminish these violations, with the Reagan administration in the US using a white propaganda campaign to support Contra support. Contras were responsible for over 1,300 terrorist attacks. The NSA was granted authorization to recruit, support, and provide military aid totaling $19 million through the ratification of National Security Decision Directive No. 17 (NSDD-17), which Reagan signed on January 4, 1982. The Reagan Doctrine included projects to provide military aid to opposition movements that opposed communist governments, including the Contras, which were supported by the Soviet Union: "new president's policy of assisting anti-Sandinista forces in 1984 found its logical conclusion in the so-called Reagan Doctrine, the essence of which was to support anti-communist forces around the world" [55]. Commencing hostilities against Nicaraguan civilians in 1982, the Contras, with support from the CIA, executed a substantial attack in 1983. In 1984, the US Congress authorized $24 million in aid to the Contras, a group that had been criticized for their military failures in Nicaragua and lack of public support. The Boland Amendment, ratified in 1982, prohibited US support for the Contras with the intent of toppling the Nicaraguan government but allowed support for alternative objectives. In 1985, Congress ceased funding the Contras after the CIA revealed it had mined Nicaraguan ports and a report by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research substantiated Reagan's claims about Soviet influence in Nicaragua. The amendment was amended in 1984 to prohibit actions by the CIA, Department of Defense, and other US government agencies. On May 1, 1985, President Reagan deemed Nicaragua an extraordinary threat to the US's national security and foreign policy, leading to a national emergency and a trade embargo against the country.

The Sandinista government filed a complaint against the United States in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1984, which was later ruled in 1986. The US was found to have violated international law by supporting the Contras in Nicaragua and engaging in port mining activities. To establish liability for human rights violations, the US needed to demonstrate effective control over the Contra operations. However, the US distributed a guidance titled "Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare" made by CIA, in defiance of humanitarian law, suggesting strategies for justifying civilian murder and employing professional assassins in specific cases [25]. This decision was made in 1986. Overall, "between 1981 and 1990 (fiscal years 1982-90), the U.S. government appropriated a total of $322 million for contra aid" [45]. The Contras were accused of atrocities such as abduction, torture, and execution of noncombatants, rape of women, assaults on residential and noncombatant dwellings, confiscation of property, and torching of peaceful homes in besieged cities. The insurgents' military significance was critical due to the financial and military assistance they received from the United States government from the beginning. The Reagan administration continued supplying the country in secret after Congress prohibited US support. This illegal activity caused the Iran-Contra affair.

Iran-Contras case

A political scandal that erupted during the second term of President Reagan, the Iran-Contra affair involved senior government officials coordinating an illegal trade of weaponry to Iran, a country that was subject to an arms embargo. With the proceeds from the arms sales, the administration intended to finance the Contras, an organization opposed to Sandinism in Nicaragua [11]. Evidently, the arms shipments were a constituent part of a strategic endeavor to obtain the liberation of seven American hostages that Hezbollah, an Islamist militant group associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, had seized from Hezbollah in Lebanon. National Security Council (NSC) employee Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North misappropriated a portion of the revenue generated from the sale of Iranian arms to the Contras, a Nicaraguan socialist regime-opposing anti-Sandinista rebel organization. The inquiry was rendered intricate as a result of the destruction or concealment of considerable quantities of documents that were relevant to this affair. With the support of Congress, President Reagan selected and nominated three members of the Tower Commission; however, he remained unaware of the extensive array of programs that the commission produced. In December 1986, Lawrence Walsh, an independent counsel, was designated to investigate possible criminal activities perpetrated by officials associated with this scheme [11]. In the end, a considerable number of administration officials were indicted, and eleven of them were convicted; a portion of these convictions were subsequently overturned on appeal. The provision of arms to Iran by the United States peaked during the reign of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The Islamic Republic of Iran had procured the overwhelming majority of its American-manufactured weapons as of January 1979. In response, President Jimmy Carter implemented an embargo on the sale of arms to Iran, given the country's dire requirement for spare parts and additional weaponry to bolster its current arsenal. The ineffectiveness of the arms embargo was established on July 21, 1981, when a Senior Interagency Group conducted a covert investigation which revealed that Iran had alternative means of obtaining spare parts and weapons manufactured in the United States [26]. In light of the congressional prohibition on providing additional aid to the Contras, the Reagan administration endeavored to secure military provisions and financial support from private and third-party countries. A cumulative sum of $34 million was obtained from third-party nations between 1984 and 1986, with private contributions amounting to $2.7 million. In 1987, the Tower Commission, established by President Reagan to investigate the National Security Council process and the Iran-contra scandal, estimated that arms sales produced $19.8 million for potential diversion. The joint congressional Iran-contra committee estimated that the last four sales produced $16.1 million, with "the contras only received about from November 1985 to November 1986" [45] (Sobel, 1995, p. 291).

1984 Election

In 1984, Nicaragua held general elections to elect the parliament and president, with an estimated 1.2 million Nicaraguans participating. Daniel Ortega, a member of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), won 67% of the votes. The elections were scheduled for November 4 to establish a legitimate government [53]. The Sandinistas hoped that active participation would discourage FSLN supporters and cease U.S. military intervention. However, the Reagan administration criticized the 1984 referendum as a "Soviet-style sham." The Sandinista government faced increased diplomatic and propaganda efforts, as well as increased military assistance to the Contras. This led to the legitimacy of the new regime expanding beyond Nicaragua's borders, and optimism about the 1984 election's improvement was erased. A trade embargo was implemented in May 1985, followed by illicit "non-lethal" assistance to the Contras. A state of emergency was reinstated in October 1985 [31].

Esquipulas Agreement

Initiated in the mid-1980s, the Esquipulas Peace Agreement sought to bring an end to the protracted military conflicts that had gripped Central America. Based on research conducted between 1983 and 1985 by the Contadora Group, the agreement was named after the city of Esquipulas in Guatemala. The "Esquipulas Process" comprised accords between leaders of state from Central America pertaining to economic collaboration and the nonviolent resolution of conflicts. In 1987, the presidents of Guatemala ratified the Esquipulas II Agreement, which sought to promote national reconciliation by means of the following: cessation of hostilities, democratization, free elections, withdrawal of support for irregular forces, negotiations regarding the control of armaments, and provision of refugee assistance. The Reagan administration directed its attention towards Nicaragua with the intention of impeding the Esquipulas process through strategic manipulation and reinterpretation of the Guatemala accord to restrict its applicability to the Nicaraguan government. This focus was consistent with the notion that the conduct of decision-makers in Managua was crucial to the success of the peace process. Under the leadership of Daniel Ortega, the Nicaraguan government was in the unenviable position of having to bear the consequences of a conflict and Esquipulas II. In spite of the concerted efforts of the Reagan Administration to suppress the Sandinistas and sabotage the peace pact, "Nicaraguan political leadership exhibited a remarkable degree of resiliency, but it has also shown an unexpected willingness to meet its obligations under the accord" [33]. Commencing on March 23, 1988, the Sapoa agreements in Nicaragua served as the catalyst for the reconciliation process. With the conclusion of the Cold War, the Soviet Union reduced its aid to the Sandinistas, which precipitated the economic collapse of Sandinism in 1988. Peace negotiations were an absolute necessity for the Sandinista government, which was obligated to continue the conflict until a favorable resolution was reached. The agreements were drafted with the assistance of then-Secretary-General of the Organization of American States Joao Clemente Baena Soares and Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo [33]. The Nicaraguan conflict may be classified as a strategic proxy battle fought by the Soviet Union and the United States.

In summary, the examination of the Nicaragua events proves to be an essential component in unraveling the complex structure of the influence of American foreign policy on Central America throughout the Cold War. The political hegemony of the Somoza dynasty in Nicaragua, characterized by corruption and political inequality, provided the foundation for the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) to arise in 1961. As a result, the FSLN rose to prominence, which ultimately contributed to the 1979 overthrow of the Somoza regime. The Sandinista regime that followed encountered economic difficulties and internal strife, which culminated in the contentious Contra War that transpired under the Reagan administration. Atrocities and human rights violations were attributed to the U.S.-backed Contras, which became a central figure in the narrative of the Cold War as a whole. The objective of this chapter is to analyze the intricacies of the Nicaraguan events by examining the relationship between intervention, revolution, and the repercussions of geopolitical maneuvering.

CONSEQUENCES

To understand the role of the United States in shaping the political landscape of Central America, it is worth considering the consequences of interventions in these regions. Examining the long-term effects of these events, will shed light on the human,

economic, and political costs incurred by Central American nations and describe how U.S. foreign policy, while pursuing Cold War objectives, influenced the trajectory of these countries, leaving a legacy that continues to shape their realities.

Guatemalan coup 1954

The 1954 coup had significant political consequences in Guatemala and beyond. Arbenz was deposed with relative ease, in the immediate aftermath of the democratically elected Iranian prime minister being removed from office in 1953. Those involved in both operations during Coup "linked the success in Guatemala with the failure at the Bay of Pigs" [8]. This operation was a failed attempt by the CIA in 1961 to overthrow the Cuban government. After the Guatemalan revolution, American politicians and the media tended to maintain the position that communism posed a threat for decades. Arbenz's assertion that the United States was implicated in the Salame incident was disregarded, and the vast majority of the American press portrayed Castillo Armas' invasion as a decisive triumph over communism. The United States was met with more vehement criticism from the press in Latin America, and the rebellion incited long-lasting anti-American sentiments throughout the region. The Soviet Union endeavored to present the Guatemalan matter to the United Nations Security Council. The Soviet Union almost persuaded US allies, including Britain, to join in this dispute; however, they ultimately refrained.

The objective of Operation PBHistory was to investigate documents originating from the Arbenz government with the intention of retrospectively legitimizing the 1954 rebellion. The CIA specifically sought evidence that Soviet influence extended to Marxists in Guatemala. They maintained the belief that any potentially damaging documents might have survived the swift overthrow of the Arbenz government and could have been subjected to analysis in order to expose Arbenz's purported affiliations with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the CIA held the belief that this would enhance their comprehension of the operations of communist parties in Latin America, an area in which they possessed limited empirical evidence. Even among US allies, the international response to the rebellion was overwhelmingly negative, and the CIA desired to counteract these sentiments against the United States. Beginning the operation on July 4, 1954, four CIA agents, commanded by a specialist in communist party structures, arrived in Guatemala City. A search was conducted in an effort to locate Arbenz's personal possessions, police documents, and the Guatemalan Labor Party headquarters. At that time PBHistory "collects 150,000 Communist-related documents in Guatemala City" [8]. The CIA decided to continue the operation despite the initial failure to uncover Soviet relations. On August 4, a considerably larger contingent comprising personnel from diverse government agencies, including the USIA and the State Department, was assembled. The "Social Research Group" utilized the operational staff as a front. The compiled documents were used in several books, often with CIA covert assistance, to portray the Guatemalan coup and revolution of 1954. These publications favored the CIA, but global and scholarly responses to U.S. policy were abysmal. CIA-funded books also criticized its activities. The primary objective of PBHistory, "a post-coup propaganda campaign to publicize Arbenz's ties to Moscow", remained unfulfilled [22]. The dominant viewpoint among Soviets today is that the coup was an attempt by the United States to maintain economic dominance in Guatemala, specifically over the United Fruit Company, by preventing a democratic revolution.

Eisenhower's administration swiftly allocated millions of dollars to the Guatemalan government as a consequence of the severe corruption that was brought about by Castillo Armas's reliance on the mercenaries and officer corps that ascended to power. In addition, Castillo Armas reversed Arbenz's agrarian reforms, which were deemed a "long step backwards" in comparison to the previous policy by the US embassy. The demise of Castillo Armas occurred in 1957 [8]. Although UFC regained a significant portion of its privileges subsequent to the rebellion, its revenue continued to drop, eventually resulting in bankruptcy and a subsequent merger with another organization. A departure from conservative civil policies in 1960 sparked a sequence of rural disturbances on the left-wing. This precipitated a 36-year civil war in Guatemala between the military government, which was backed by the United States, and left-wing insurgents, who generally enjoyed substantial support from the populace. With a membership of 270,000 individuals, the Guerrilla Army of the Poor was the most sizable of these movements. Both parties committed atrocities against the civilian population during the American Civil War; the US-backed military was responsible for 93% of these violations. The levels of violence peaked during the administrations of Ríos Montt and Lucas García.

United Fruit Company did not profit from the success of the coup. Despite their privileges being restored by Castillo's reforms, UFC were worth less, than before. During the 1960s, United Fruit experienced a period of financial decline and in 1972, it divested its Guatemalan land to the Del Monte corporation. Despite forming United Brands through a merger with Morrell Meats, the merged entity was unable to halt the company's decline. Following a $43.6 million loss and a federal investigation into bribery of the Honduran government, President Eli Black committed suicide in 1975 by shattering his window. Two years later, the company was acquired by real estate developers based in New York. American Financial Corporation subsequently completed the acquisition in 1984 [8].

There were numerous additional violations of human rights, including rape, mass murder, aerial bombardment, and enforced disappearances. The insurgents were repelled in part by the government's use of especially brutal tactics, which contributed to these violations. The perceived opposition to communism following the 1954 coup frequently served as a justification for the violence of the 1980s. A peaceful agreement between the guerrillas and the Guatemalan government, which granted amnesty to combatants from both parties, brought an end to the civil war in 1996. In 1999, Guatemala received an apology from U.S. President Bill Clinton for the atrocities perpetrated by dictatorships supported by the United States [28]. He emphasized the need for the U.S. to stop supporting armed forces and intelligence agencies responsible for the genocide. The truth commission report revealed that the U.S. had provided support to these forces. In 2011, the Guatemalan government and the surviving family of Jacobo Arbenz signed an agreement to restore their legacy and publicly apologize for their role in Arbenz's exile. This involved providing financial compensation to the family. President Alvaro Colom of Guatemala formally apologized to Arbenz's son on October 20, 2011. In the end, as Chilean Socialist leader Oscar Waiss observed, "It is certain that [the United States] has lost more than it gained. It gained a lot of kilometers of territory, it recovered a lot of hectares of bananas. ... But it has lost forever the friendship of the peoples of Latin America and the possibility of being considered ... as a 'good neighbor.'... Latin Americans will not forget Guatemala so easily" [22].

Nicaraguan Revolution 1961

The Nicaraguan revolution of 1961 had profound effects on politics both domestically and internationally. As of 1986, the Contras were confronted with allegations of corruption, violations of human rights, and military incompetence. Early in 1986, the much-

anticipated offensive failed to materialize, and Contra forces engaged primarily in small-scale terrorist activities. In October 1987, however, the Contras launched a successful assault against southern Nicaragua. Then, on December 21, 1987, Contra forces attacked the Zelaya province municipalities of Bonanza, Siuna, and Rosita. Subsequently, violent confrontations followed. The war against the Contras in Nicaragua severely impacted the economy and weakened the Sandinistas' position. The Bush administration allocated $2 billion in non-lethal assistance to the Contras and $9 million to the UNO opposition for the 1990 elections, a five-fold increase from George W. Bush's own campaign. In 1989, the US pledged to uphold the embargo on Nicaragua if she failed to secure electoral victory [7].

Post-US military departure and international pressure to resolve the conflict, the Contras consented to engage in negotiations with the FSNL. The commencement of the Contras' voluntary demobilization was scheduled for early December 1989, and Ortega was among the five presidents of Central American nations involved in this agreement. In February 1990, they selected this date to facilitate free and fair elections in Nicaragua, regardless of the Reagan administration's insistence that the Contras disband. The February 1990 elections were won by Violeta Chamorro and her UNO party by a margin of 55% to 41%. A Univision poll in 1989 revealed that older voters preferred Chamorro over Ortega, while younger voters preferred Ortega. A Greenberg-Lake poll in 1990 found that 61% of young men and 63% of young women believed Ortega deserved reelection, while only 42% of older men and 41% of older women agreed. These results suggest a division between those who supported the old hierarchical family model and those who benefited from the new, more democratic model [24]. The Nicaraguan people's dissatisfaction with the Ortega administration and the White House's threat to keep up the economic embargo against Nicaragua if Violeta Chamorro fails to win the 1989 elections are both potential explanations. Reports of intimidation by the Contras further emerged.

Chamorro was inaugurated on April 25, 1990, which was two months subsequent to the elections. Held in front of a crowd of 20,000 at the Rigoberto Lopez Perez Stadium, the ceremony marked the first time in over fifty years that the opposition assumed power without incident from the incumbent government. Furthermore, it was the inaugural occurrence in which a substantial number of voters participated in free elections that led to a change in government. Chamorro's peaceful reforms stand as a potentially enduring legacy (BBC, 2010). Most significantly, her official proclamation of the war's conclusion laid the groundwork for all of her subsequent policies. She contributed to peace by diminishing the scale and capability of the armed forces, terminating the nationwide recruitment system, and disbanding the military. With only a few weeks remaining until her inauguration, she reduced the army by half. Demobilization involved the dissolution of the Contras, which were supported by the United States, thereby depriving the Sandinistas of any combatants and promoting an exceptionally effective peace. In addition, Chamorro awarded political crimes unconditional amnesty, which restricted the Sandinistas' capacity for demonstrations and facilitated an expeditious transition of governance. Collecting weapons from both parties of the conflict with the assistance of local authorities constituted one method of cooperation with the Contras. She initiated a significant endeavor to procure weaponry in an effort to mitigate the prospect of ongoing violence. All the weapons that she obtained were incinerated in Plaza de la Paz, the central Managua peace square, as an act of symbolic destruction that read "Never Again." Nonetheless, demobilization rendered approximately 70,000 military personnel unemployed. While the majority of draftees returned home, career military personnel experienced significant disruptions to their lives due to employment loss. Promised housing, land, and funds were either not delivered as a result of insufficient resources or appeared to have been distributed capriciously [1].

President George H.W. Bush abolished the embargo imposed by Ronald Reagan during the Sandinista regime and pledged to provide economic assistance to the country following Violeta Chamorro's election. Furthermore, the United States repaid Nicaragua's delinquent debts to private institutions, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the IMF. After years of civil war, Chamorro's team had anticipated to receive $1 billion in aid from the United States to assist in the reconstruction of the country. However, during Chamorro's inaugural year as president in 1990, the Bush administration allocated $300 million to the country; the following year, that amount was reduced to $241 million. The aid provided was inadequate to effect substantial progress in Nicaragua on account of the country's distress; furthermore, the renegotiated loans merely exacerbated the debt. The level of American interest in Nicaragua decreased significantly during Chamorro's presidency, to the extent that few members of Congress listened when he visited the United States in April 1991 to request additional economic assistance from Congress. Peace talks having commenced and the Sandinistas no longer presenting a threat, U.S. policymakers were less preoccupied with Nicaragua than with developments in the Middle East. In an effort to improve relations, the Chamorro administration revoked a law mandating compensation in the Nicaragua v. United States case, which was extremely contentious, and withdrew the lawsuit. Five years prior, the United States was found to have contravened international law by sponsoring the Contras, as determined by the International Court. However, the United States declined to recognize this ruling and insisted that the Contras be held liable for reparations [51. Nicaragua's economy was devastated by civil conflict and had been grappling with hyperinflation since 1988, both of which occurred during Chamorro's presidency. Immediately, the Chamorro administration implemented measures to combat inflation. During the entire term of Violeta Chamorro, the economy and society of Nicaragua suffered significantly. With a decline from 60th to 116th place globally in terms of human development, as measured by the Human Development Index, the country became the weakest in the Americas after Haiti between 1990 and 2001, according to UNDP data. Damages totaling $12 billion were incurred and 50,000 lives were lost during the conflict in a region with a 3.5-million-person population and a $2 billion annual gross domestic product. The United States would have incurred losses amounting to $25 trillion and suffered 5 million casualties, which are equivalent figures [53].

In summary, the examination of the effects that resulted from United States foreign policy interventions in Central America throughout the Cold War period offers an insightful consideration on the lasting impact of geopolitical strategy. The region has been profoundly affected by the protracted civil war in Guatemala, and the effects of the Contra War in Nicaragua. By examining the complex consequences that extend beyond national boundaries and decades, this study shows the anti-American sentiments that were sparked by protracted civil unrest in countries, such as Guatemala. An analysis of the economic adversity, instability in politics, and human casualties associated with the Contra War in Nicaragua provides insight on the substantial cost that Central American countries bore as a result of their involvement in Cold War power struggles. The information obtained is crucial in addressing the primary research questioning, providing valuable perspectives on the lasting influence and consequences of U.S. foreign policy on the course of Central America throughout an important historical era.

CONCLUSION

During the Cold War, the United States had a substantial impact on Central America through two key factors: its attempts to reduce Soviet influence and its strategic considerations related to geopolitics and the economy.

The repercussions experienced by Central American nations, specifically Guatemala and Nicaragua, were significant and complex. The 1954 Guatemalan coup and the Nicaraguan revolution of 1961 resulted in significant political turmoil, widespread violence, and enduring consequences throughout the region. The interventions incited anti-American sentiments, intensified economic inequality, and contributed to social instability.

Following the coup in Guatemala, the aftermath of the coup saw the rise of authoritarian regimes supported by the United States, leading to decades of political instability and human rights abuses. The subsequent recognition and expression of regret by the U.S. administration for its involvement in supporting dictatorships highlighted the enduring influence of Cold War-era operations on Guatemala's path.

In Nicaragua, the Contra conflict and the subsequent election transition were a time of political and economic turmoil. The enduring impact of U.S. interventionism had a significant influence on the governance, economics, and society of the country in the years that followed. Nicaragua persisted in confronting the enduring consequences of warfare and underdevelopment, despite endeavors aimed at reconciliation and economic aid.

It is important to analyze and extract valuable knowledge from the experiences and consequences of Cold War involvement in Central America when considering the future. Highlighting the significance of inclusive government, socioeconomic advancement, and diplomatic resolutions instead of military interventions arises as a prudent approach. The international community can have a significant impact on promoting the development of strong and equitable societies in Central America by addressing the underlying causes of instability and inequality.

In conclusion, the examination of U.S. foreign policy in Central America during the Cold War era offers unique perspectives on the intricacies of global affairs and the lasting consequences of past occurrences. Through the recognition of historical injustices and the pursuit of a more inclusive and fair future, society can strive to construct a superior future for Central America and its people.

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Information about the author

Andrey L. Samoylovskiy, Bachelor of BBA and IBM, Stamford International University, Hua Hin, Thailand.

Corresponding author

Andrey L. Samoylovskiy, e-mail: [email protected]

РАБОТЫ МОЛОДЫХ УЧЕНЫХ

Обзорная статья

КАК ВНЕШНЯЯ ПОЛИТИКА США ФОРМИРОВАЛА ЦЕНТРАЛЬНУЮ АМЕРИКУ И ВЛИЯЛА НА НЕЁ В ЭПОХУ ХОЛОДНОЙ ВОЙНЫ?

Самойловский Андрей Леонидович 1

1 Стэмфордский международный университет, г. Хуа Хин, Тайланд,

ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0004-1463-0537, e-mail: [email protected]

Аннотация:

В статье рассматривается сложное и разнообразное воздействие внешней политики США на Центральную Америку в период Холодной войны, в частности, в Гватемале и Никарагуа. Исследуются исторические события, документы и научная литература, связанные с операциями США в регионе. Проводится детальный анализ мотивов и методов, используемых Соединенными Штатами, таких как меры сдерживания советского влияния и стратегические геополитические соображения. Переворот в Гватемале в 1954 году, организованный ЦРУ, и никарагуанская революция 1961 года, характеризующаяся подъемом сандинистов и последующей войной «контрас», являются важными примерами, которые подчеркивают сложные хитросплетения американского интервенционизма. Рассматривая эти события в более широких исторических рамках и геополитических реалиях, исследование проливает свет на сложности отношений между Соединенными Штатами и Центральной Америкой в эпоху Холодной войны. Методология, используемая в исследовании, предполагает междисциплинарный подход, основанный на использовании научной литературы, первичных документов и академических баз данных. Географический охват включает Гватемалу и Никарагуа, в то время как хронологический фокус сосредоточен на периоде с начала XIX века до конца XX века, с особым акцентом на событиях эпохи Холодной войны. Демографический охват составляет население этих стран, а также различных социальных и политических факторов, вовлеченных в интервенционизм США. Источники, выбранные для исследования, включают научные книги, статьи и письменные материалы, содержащие исторический контекст и анализ интервенций эпохи Холодной войны в Центральной Америке. Первичные документы, такие как доктрины, записи ЦРУ и официальные отчеты, также используются для подтверждения и контекстуализации исторических нарративов. Академические базы данных, такие как JSTOR, СуЬе^ептка, Cambridge.org и ResearchGate, служат ценными ресурсами для доступа к разнообразной научной литературе по этой теме. В работе также рассматриваются долгосрочные последствия интервенции США в страны Центральной Америки, такие как установление авторитарного правления, нарушения прав человека и социально-экономическое неравенство. Так, переворот в Гватемале в 1954 году и конфликт с никарагуанскими «контрас» привели к политической нестабильности, нарушениям прав человека и экономической катастрофе. Эти события в свою очередь способствовали росту антиамериканских настроений и обострению социального неравенства. Несмотря на усилия по примирению и экономическую помощь, страны Центральной Америки продолжают бороться с последствиями той политики США до сих пор. Признание исторической несправедливости и приоритетов социально-экономического прогресса имеют жизненно важное значение для более стабильного и справедливого будущего. В целом, изучение интервенций эпохи Холодной войны подчеркивает необходимость дипломатических решений и устранения коренных причин нестабильности для содействия прочного мира и развития как в Центральной Америке, так и других стран, имевших воздействие внешней политики США. Актуальность темы исследования обоснована тем, что, несмотря на множественное количество публикаций по теме, авторы характеризуют геополитические трансформации через проблемы глобализации, цифровизации, информатизации и интеграции мирового хозяйства, религиозных и национальных конфликтов. Без сомнения, эти процессы включены во все области международных отношений, государственной деятельности, экономической и социальной сферы, проблем безопасности, культуры и экологии как отдельных стран, так и стран-союзников. Вместе с тем, в силу геополитического положения огромное воздействие на международные процессы оказывает внешняя политика США и важнейшими ориентирами для нее является латиноамериканское направление. При этом именно во время Холодной войны Соединенные Штаты оказывали существенное влияние на Центральную Америку. Ключевую роль в их политике играли два фактора: стремление ослабить советское влияние и стратегические соображения, связанным с геополитикой и экономикой. При выборе стратегии безопасного международного будущего важно проанализировать и извлечь ценные знания из исторического опыта и последствий Холодной войны в Центральной Америке. Подчеркивание важности инклюзивного правительства, социально-экономического прогресса и дипломатических решений вместо военных интервенций является разумным подходом. Международное сообщество может оказать существенное влияние на развитие сильных и справедливых обществ в Центральной Америке, устраняя глубинные причины нестабильности и неравенства. Признавая историческую несправедливость и стремясь к более инклюзивному и справедливому будущему, общество способно более эффективно подходить к решению проблем построения лучшего и стабильного будущего для Центральной Америки и ее народов, соответственно и для всех стран мира.

Ключевые слова: геополитические проблемы, внешняя политика США, Соединенные Штаты Америки, Центральная Америка, Гватемала, Никарагуа, Холодная война, перевороты в Центральной Америке, функции международных сообществ

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Информация об авторе

Самойловский Андрей Леонидович, бакалавр ВВА и IBM, Стэмфордский международный университет, г. Хуа Хин, Тайланд.

Автор-корреспондент

Самойловский Андрей Леонидович, e-mail: [email protected] Nauka. Obsestvo. Oborona. 2024. Vol. 12, no. 1. P. 9-9.