JURISPRUDENCE
УДК 343.85
HOLISTICS OF CRIMINAL KNOWLEDGE
Komisarchuk R.
Associate Professor, Candidate of Law, Associate Professor of the Department of Criminalistics of the National University "Odessa Law Academy"
Abstract
The article identifies some components of the epistemological principles of criminalistics, as the doctrine of criminalistic knowledge, on the basis of which it is possible to develop a set of scientifically based practical recommendations for improving the effectiveness of criminalistic science based on the analytical paradigm.
In criminalistics, the problems of general theory (the doctrine of knowledge) are not revealed, but without this criminology risks disappearing as a science. Epistemology can combine the essence of natural, humanitarian and cognitive complexes associated with various past and present criminalistics practices and form a technology for combating crime - criminalistic technology. After all, one of its constituent elements is holistics.
The subject of this research is relevant for the further development of forensic scientific knowledge and for forensic investigative, prosecutorial and expert practice.
Keywords: general theory of criminalistics, epistemological bases of criminalistics, doctrine of criminalistic technology, concept of criminalistic knowledge, holistics of knowledge.
Introduction. With the help of criminalistics, humanity declares its claim to solve the issues of detection, investigation and prevention of criminal offenses (crimes and misdemeanors) consciously, intelligently and rationally. Therefore, the issues of criminalistic knowledge remain relevant for criminalists, that is, organically related to their cognitive intentions in law enforcement activities.
Therefore, the purpose of the article is to identify the epistemological principles of the formation of criminalistic knowledge, and for this purpose it is necessary to define them and indicate their integrity.
The more criminalists have thought about the problem of criminalistic knowledge and criminalistic cognition, the more empirical material has been accumulated on the practice of combating crime, the more misunderstandings and complications arise. And this continuous reflection of criminalistics is a general condition of criminalistic thinking [1-6].
So, on this base the next question raises: what is the starting point for criminologists' reflections on the problems of criminalistic knowledge and criminalistic cognition? We believe that the starting point of these reflections is their lively, actual perception of reality. After all, we are talking primarily about natural and direct experience, "flair" of law enforcement officers, which they experience in the process of carrying out their law enforcement activities, and especially during the detection, investigation and prevention of criminal offenses. And no matter how scientists glorify different concepts, terms, etc., and no matter how much they abstract them from sensuality, they will always be accompanied by figurative representations. In addition, the surrounding environment, and even more so if it is a criminogenic environment - this is the representation of a particular person (law enforcement officer) - this is the truth that has power for every living person who knows because only a person can reduce it to reflexive-abstract consciousness, and if he really does, then a
criminalistic view of things is born in him which causes the infinity of criminalistic knowledge.
"In many individual psychological subjects, regardless of their empirical characteristics, there is something identical and experienced (a priori), so that they form the object of knowledge in the same way and recognize it. [7, p. 287] " Therefore, "perhaps we still reflect something more than purely material things and processes, and constructively operate in the ideal-informational plan with something greater than the semantic products of our purely human subjectivity!"[7, pp. 357358].
V.F. Petrenko proceeds from the idea that «knowledge is not a reflection" of reality, but is constructed by the subject on the basis of experience of interaction with the world and depends on the motivation of the subject of cognition, language of description, operational means, etc, which is ultimately determined by the culture of society and the personal characteristics of the subject of knowledge, his "picture of the world» [8, p. 82]. Therefore, in the study of criminalistics, it is equally important to combine empirical, rational, intuitive, deductive cognition and rely on grammar, psychology, logic and other cognitive sciences.
Like any branch of scientific knowledge -criminalistics does not recognize the absolute stability of any knowledge, but its vocation is to form new criminalistic knowledge for the formation of a "criminalistic consciousness" in law enforcement officers who fight against crime. Therefore, the rational knowledge is given a leading place in criminalistic knowledge. All the provisions of criminalistics must receive empirical confirmation, theoretical evidence. That is why the features of academic criminalistics meet many analytical criteria.
The epistemology of criminalistics makes it possible to pay attention to how criminalistics shapes the technology of combating crime, acquires, forms and
verifies criminalistic knowledge, which is subsequently offered to law enforcement officers - the subjects of search and cognitive activity in criminal proceedings.
Therefore, the interpretation of the features and manifestations of criminalistics experience should follow the analytical way, not by descriptions that expand the factual basis. It is necessary to move to analytics, which directly operates with the parameters that determine the specifics of the subject under study, namely - to consider its structure, content and meaning.
First of all, it is necessary to outline the range of concepts that determine the specifics of the subject and object of criminalistic knowledge. In other words, it is necessary to navigate to which conceptual field the definition of specificity and essence of criminalistics belongs, which forms the technology of combating crime - criminalistic technology. But, to do this, it is necessary to find out what is criminalistic knowledge, to provide its definition.
The answer to this question will allow us to show the main features of the analytical paradigm of criminalistics, which make up its methodological core (analysis (different types of analysis, intuition, logic, language, interpretation of ways of thinking (criminalistic consciousness), synthesis,
phenomenology, reflexivity, etc.) After all, the topic of analytical criminology echoes the problem of epistemology, because the researcher-criminalist is interested in the conceptual, logical-methodological, procedural aspect of criminalistic knowledge. Analytics is rich in methodological reflection, and not only operational or subject-theoretical. And with the help of analytical methodology we want to show that modern criminalistics should study an adequate cognitive system - criminalistics technology and operate with meaningful and relevant statements, linking them to appropriate and logically acceptable considerations, that is, it can definetly act as a basic science and educational discipline for all criminal law disciplines.which has a significant heuristic and educational potential. Because everything that a criminalist scientist touches and contacts is illuminated by the light of his knowledge. Everything is included in the context of the conscious life of a criminalist, through knowledge and thanks to knowledge.
For example, the investigative task force goes to the scene of incidence/crime - this fact becomes an element of the content of their actual consciousness, and they know about it. But the content of the scene of incidence /crime is unknown, it is for them unawareness equal to non-existence.
So everything is connected with knowledge, but what is knowledge?
The fact is that when trying to analyze knowledge, we must already know, be in knowledge, that is, there is the situation called "cognitive isolation": everything we are dealing with appears in the form of knowledge. Awareness - at least partial or intuitive - of the closeness of the cognitive situation generates a "thirst" for reality as such, which has not yet been included in any case materials, criminal proceedings (Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigation), assessments, conclusions, etc. What happens when the
representatives of the investigative task force at the scene of incidence/ crime, or the parties and participants in the criminal proceedings argue among themselves (there are conflicts at the stage of pre-trial investigation and trial of criminal proceedings) regarding certain events, phenomena, facts, objects, material evidence, etc., then, as a rule, do not realize that they, as parties or participants in criminal proceedings, do not speak from the "reality" or "from the essence of the case (proceedings)", but only from the degree of their knowledge, understanding, skills, confronting the latter with someone's knowledge and ideas. The competition comes, in fact, with its own shadow, because ours and someone else's ideas are just ideas that, in a sense, can be likened to a shadow that is far from realities. What will be the object (subject) of perception depends on how the criminalist will present it in his own imagination and how he will then compare the object (subject) with the idea, and his assessment and position with the presented object (subject).
If knowledge is really so total in man's relation to reality, then it is nothing more than a form of manifestation being for consciousness and within consciousness. It is the formal boundlessness of knowledge that testifies to its universality, to the possibility of being a form for anything.
Thus, the first thing we can say about criminalistic knowledge can be formulated as follows: criminalistics knowledge is a form of representation, representation of being for consciousness or in the consciousness of a criminalistics scientist.
The definition of this characteristic of criminalistic knowledge as the initial one, can also be reached by other reasoning. We will proceed from an intuitive understanding of what consciousness is and what being is; in this case consciousness and being somehow interact with each other. If this is so, then there is a moment of identity between them: in some ways they are compared, coincide with each other. The identity of consciousness and being in the form in which it is present in consciousness is knowledge. It is this moment of the identity of consciousness and being in knowledge that becomes the condition of the effectiveness of consciousness, the condition of the ability for consciousness to influence reality. And if this influence is systemic and it is brought to automatism - it determines manufacturability.
Criminalistics, forming the means for combating crime used in criminalistic activities, through the translation of various branch scientific knowledge, requires multidimensional knowledge on the scale of crime prevention technology, and, accordingly, as a holistic theory and practice.
Hence, forensic technology is the study of the formation and implementation of criminalistic knowledge in the fight against crime, on the basis of which it is possible to develop a set of scientifically based practical recommendations for improving the effectiveness of criminalists in detecting, investigating and preventing crimes.
This doctrine should be considered through the individual unique process of thinking of criminalists (their "criminalistic consciousness"), which raises the
problem of forming and translating of practical and theoretical knowledge, which is extremely relevant. Its solution is related to updating methods of working with knowledge that should be "grown" in the field of criminalistics practice. But without changing the principles of working with knowledge in practice, the problem of reproduction in society of the values of theoretical knowledge and theoretical thinking in society can not be solved. However, this can be done only with the help of thinking through the formation of consciousness, through the formation of their own scientific knowledge - criminalistic knowledge, which by its nature is active, because the criminalistic thinking of the subjects of investigation is included directly in the activities for the detection, investigation and prevention of criminal offenses.
Thinking is applies to life in society. In thinking, the mind uses patterns (images). A sample is a chain of images or an algorithm of actions, according to which we act in a particular situation, which forms the corresponding technology of activity.
Thus, one of the means of forming and implementing of technology is thinking. According to criminalistic technology - criminalistic thinking. After all, the science of thinking is an important part of knowledge that allows us to understand how various destructive programs are formed in our subconscious, which in various fields of activity form technologies. This problem is related to the fact that it is necessary to decipher the activities of how knowledge is arranged and how this knowledge "lives" in practice; what exactly is the process of thinking itself, and not of any type, but, specifically theoretical, how this process is arranged when it is carried out not in the field of science, but in the field of practice; how and in what forms can the latest versions of theoretical developments be transmitted to pupils (students) and practitioners.
Thus, the activity interpretation of the selected components and the ability to describe and explane them in a single configuration-is a non-trivial criminal-istic task.
Questions of the active nature of criminalistic knowledge have not been studied, but it is quite obvious that the needs of practice in the scientific data of psychology are initially determined by the fact that the entire process of investigating crimes is characterized by saturation and high intensity of interpersonal contacts, interaction, increased conflict, etc.
Thus, the scientific support of the practice of combating crime for its optimal organization and effective implementation can and should be based on an interdisciplinary basis.
The investigator, while investigating any category of crimes, acts in a problem situation, for the solution of which he has no ready-made patterns of behavior and reflection of reality and in the solution of which he is clearly personally interested. It is obvious that the investigative situation itself is comprehended, is created by the investigator, as well as by any subject, on the basis of structures, "patterns" of situations that form the basis of his professional and life experience. It is important that the form of representation of these
"acquired" patterns is active, since it is determined by a certain action (event), that is, they include a reflection of the "experienced" event unfolded in time.
However, the parameters of effectivness and structure are not mutually exclusive concepts, but are necessarily present simultaneously in any cognitive, regulatory, or communicative mental formation. The most important property of these representative structures is mediation, which is used to solve different problems and at different stages, at different moments of solving for one problem all sorts of different and polymodal schemes.
Traditionally, in psychology, the most powerful representational mechanism is verbal mediation [9; 10].
Rethinking of the situation initially given in sensory-figurative plan in the verbal utterance describing it allows us to place it in consciousness as an element of a developed hierarchical structure of comprehensive texts, descriptions, plots, or rather, even simply refer it to one or another class of such descriptions. This, of course, impoverishes the memorable situation, but it allows you to keep it in a form that captures its most important aspects, ignoring everything insignificant. And remembering this situation, we fill it again with sensory content, transfer it to a similar plan, but this content will no longer be specifically experienced, but also generalized, "removed" from our individual dictionaries of generalized images, actions, relationships. And, it is not necessary that we "retell" the event in order to tell someone else about it. We have to do this first of all in order to "tell" about it to another "I", which we will eventually become. So, in order to preserve this text describing a memorable event, it also needs be recorded through a system of connections in the same hierarchical categorical structure of semantic space, the most important properties of which are one-moment significance, visibility - that is structure in its purest form. That is, the event is always structural, but structural formations, paradoxically, are not alien to the action.
Thus, the basis of the experience of practice is a set of generalized images of situations. A person, remembering an event from his life, actually replaces it with a generalized active formation that more or less corresponds to it. Psycholinguistic works describe the patterns of verbal mediation used by a person to tell about an event that has been occured. Representation of a real event for the use of accumulated experience in practice occurs through its correlation with categorical structures that form a semantic space not of verbal meanings, but of active patterns built on the basis of subjective forms of representation [11, p. 176-182].
Very often it turns out that the scheme of the situation underlying its presentation in the subject form is not only simpler and more effective, but also sufficient to adequately resolve this situation. In understanding the program of his future activities, it is enough for an investigator to understand that his activities (or, any subject!) requires him to "a certain algorithm", and not to realize that the objective conditions have developed in such a way that his function, as a unit of the law enforcement system, is to exercise a certain influence on the designated area of work. To put it more precisely,
the second understanding will be implicitly included in a simpler and more compact preliminary formulation.
This raises the question of how two such different forms of worldview mediation, such as object and subjective, can be combined in individual consciousness. This is where one of the most interesting features of the process of knowledge formation lies, and, if to look more broadly, the ability to adapt to the world around us, to solve life's problems.
Specific to man is not so-called verbal thinking, which is considered as the highest mental function [12, pp. 5-361]. Human thinking has been formed as a cognitive and regulatory side that generates new cognitive and behavioral structures in the course of human interaction with the world.
B.F. Lomov [13] identifies three fundamental aspects, subsystems of mental activity: cognitive, regulatory and communicative.
In most modern works on the psychology of thinking the main attention is devoted to the first two aspects, while communicative one is reflected either in the analysis of the mechanisms of verbal mediation mechanisms, or in the study of patterns of joint problem solving. The sphere of its influence should also be supplemented by studying the participation of communicative, subjectively represented structures in the process of constructing the image of the Universe and, in general, the formation of subjective experience. This should be carried out in accordance with the most important methodological principle of the unity of human mental activity, formulated by SL Rubinstein [14; 15], most clearly implemented in the study of practical thinking.
Scientific (theoretical) thinking is only a tool (means) built into a powerful technology of practical thinking, in the "features" of which the fundamental properties of "human thinking in general", aimed at ensuring human interaction with the universe, are most fully expressed.
B.M. Teplov expresses a very important opinion: "The work of the theoretical mind is mainly focused on the first part of the holistic path of cognition: on the transition from living contemplation to abstract thinking, the (temporary!) withdrawal from practice. The work of practical mind is focused on the second part of this way of cognition: on the transition from abstract thinking to practice, for which the theoretical care is carried out "[16, p. 225].
Thus, those situational generalizations that the practitioner operates with are formed on the basis of the theoretical concepts used by him, but modified, mediated, individualized, adapted to the capabilities and properties of the subject and to the peculiarities of the situation, set out in the language of their own code systems, designed for operational actualization directly in the form of action. This is perfectly confirmed in the activity of the investigator, for the content of practical thinking of which generalizations are by no means visual and effective.
Practical thinking can operate with complex theoretical constructions, but disguised in a special shell, included in special representational structures, the form of actualization of which is a specific action of the subject in a particular situation. One of the forms of such structures is "subject" generalizations, in which, for example,
complex criminal procedural relations are presented in simple language of forms of subject-subject interaction. We observe a similar "compression" in metaphorical thinking, "in the process of which the emotional and evaluative properties of the object that are involved ..." [17, pp. 29-32]. And for the stage of primary vision is characterized by the identification of the subjective properties of what is perceived.
An important regularity in the construction of generalizations, and in general, the processes of presentation and representation, which is well observed in modern cognitive psychology, is their meditation and mutual meditation. This applies not only to cognitive formations, but also to the mental process as a whole, in which these cognitive formations act as the material, the elements that it operates with, and as the results that it generates. This is manifested in such phenomena as the "loading" of data in the sensory form of the elements of the situation of operational thinking with the conceptual content in the activities of the subject studied by V.N. Pushkin [18, pp. 106-120], and, conversely, as we have already noted, according to the results of A. Einstein's introspection, the concepts included in the content of theoretical thinking appear to him not in the form of words but in figurative, emotionally colored form of moving, dynamic elements [19, p. 172].
The main property of practical thinking is not its "verbality" or "non-verbality", "causality" or "non-causality", etc. and its polymodality, the ability of the subject to use a large number of ways of mediation, representation, in order to fit into the comprehended circle of the widest possible individualized situation in all various aspects of its functioning, to cover, prevent, reflect it in all forms of interaction with the subject, to represent the objects of the situation in all the variety of forms of interaction with them, in all their qualities manifested at the same time.
Such descriptions in many languages of generalization, for all their apparent inconsistency, are the most productive and adaptable to use in various problem situations. It is important that polymodal, mediated individual code systems of the subject (according to NI Zhinkin [20]), which participate in solving the problem situation, contribute to the generation of more adequate solutions to the problem by including in the comprehensible situation objects represented though a larger number of diverse properties that complement and mutually mediate each other through the use of complex mechanisms of reflexive interaction. We are also interested in practical thinking, which by its nature is effective thinking. But we have all reasons to assume that the patterns described above are relevant for this form of thinking.
In book "Fundamentals of Psychology" published in 1935 by S.L. Rubinstein in the section devoted to practical thinking, as if in response to the wonderful idea of L.S. Vygotsky "thought is not expressed, but occurs in words" [12], he formulated the conclusion that "... a characteristic feature of practical thinking is that it is not only thinking in direct connection with the action, but thinking by actions. Action not only determines the specific situation in which thinking occurs, but is also a means of expressing thinking, just as in other cases such a means is speech. But
an action, like words, is not just an external expression of thought. And in verbal thinking, the word is an instrument with which thought is not only formulated but also formed. This applies no less to the action" [21]. Thus, according to S.L. Rubinstein, the thought is also not expressed, but occurs in action.
An action that is assossiated with the transformation of a specific, individual situation, or an act is always a unique, inimitable, unpredictable event. Being spontaneous, unpredictable, the action is mental, and in this guise the action is not yet an activity. An action becomes an activity only when it begins to be purposefully reproduced on the basis of certain means that allow it to be specially organized. Transformative single unique act of action as a real event that has oocured, associated with value self-determination, differs from reproducible processes of activity, when reproduction is possible due to the selection of instruments, means, tools, values, positional characteristics.
Categorical mediation, which is characteristic of specifically human mental functions, as follows from the work of S.L. Rubinstein, may arise not only from verbal mediation, as in the cultural-historical concept of Vygotsky, but also from the mediation of the effective, provided that the actions used are reasonable, socially conditioned, they implicitly represent cultural experience. In accordance with this, we can assume that this pattern can be extended to other forms of representation - from those identified by J. Bruner, in addition to verbal and effective - and on a similar form, as well as to our proposed "emotional-volitional (relationship)", an effective, intersubjective form of reflection of reality.
The most important feature of practical thinking, as a category of a higher level than other, more separate forms of thinking to which we refer scientific is the lack of expression of individual properties, such as verbal or nonverbal, cognitive or effective, subjectivity or objectivity. No, their unity is necessary in the mental activity of the subject of practical thinking, which often requires complex processes of integration of contradictory cognitive formations into a single structure. The subject of scientific thinking is a subject of thinking that has the property of objectivity. The opposite statement that the property of subjectivity is obligatory for the subject of practical thinking is incorrect. It is characterized by the integration of seemingly contradictory features of the worldview. And this is typical not only for practical thinking in its traditional sense, but also for thinking in general, which determines a person's worldview.
We can note that the word "inconsistency" or "contradiction" is often found in arguments about the need for productive thinking to combine different systems of representation, different points of view on one problem and different "properties"of thinking. This idea of a paradoxical combination in one act of worldview contradictory properties, both the object of activity and the active subject has found its reflection by practical workers, for example in the field of development of applied psychological techniques, which are based on extensive experience with managers [22] based on the fact that «a highly developed general ability to manage activities can lead to a manifestation in some extreme situation ... a certain quality that is not manifested in this situation, or, is
weakly manifested, quality, if the latter "does not destroy" the integrity of the personality, which represents a relationship of all its specific qualities.
Therefore, it would be fair to say that the assessment of individual qualities of a person "separately" is fundamentally limited; it cannot give us information about what qualities of a person can manifest in an extreme situation. " What is meant here by "extreme" situations clearly coincides in essence with what in the psychology of thinking is usually called problem situations that require an active productive process of building a new action in an unclear determinitic situation to get out of them. And further: "obviously, different, mutually exclusive qualities are most difficult to integrate. The ability to meet seemingly mutually exclusive requirements is the basis of high efficiency" [23, p. 62].
Thus, we can agree that among the psychological qualities of the investigator, which he possesses (or should possess), there are specific constants that do not depend on any situation. We can further agree that the dynamics of groups (collectives) in which the investigator works, changes the proportions, the ratio of these specific constants every time. But what about when mutually exclusive psychological qualities are found among specific constants? The fact is that the investigator must have a set of mutually complementary qualities-opposites. If we transfer the described patterns to our material, it turns out that the most important property of practical thinking of a successful investigator is the ability to integrate different forms of representation, combine, for example, objective and subjective perception of the situation, not to be a pronounced "imager" or "verbalist" , but to be able to combine in one cognitive concept all possible forms of representation, to build "cognitively rich" forms of representation schemes of selected situations and their behavior in them, which are easily actualized in new situations of investigative activity.
It is the application of the activity approach in modern epistemology to the issue of the translation of forensic thinking in the practice of combating crime will open new opportunities for the further development of the theory of criminalistic theoretical knowledge. Epistemology will allow us to describe thinking in the processes of formation of criminalistic knowledge, communication, action, both in ontologically unique, spontaneously implemented thought processes, and as specially reproduced processes endowed with activity characteristics. That is why from the point of view of epistemology, thinking can be considered in the space of each of these processes separately, taking into account the uniqueness of each of them.
So, the second essential point in certain knowledge can be formed as follows: knowledge arises through the identity of consciousness and being.
When we admit the absence of such an identity, it is no longer a question of knowledge, but about assumptions, erroneous judgments, etc. But one note: we should not forget that we are talking about the identity of consciousness and being from the positions, or from the side of consciousness. Because, again, we can talk about all problems based on the person positions.
If we accept these preliminary characteristics of knowledge, then we can not ignore another essential
features of it. Thus, if knowledge appears as a form of representation of being in consciousness, a form that implies the identity of consciousness and being, then it is logical to assume that knowledge in principle has the ability to identify with any manifestations of being. That is, that knowledge of its internal capabilities is a universal form. Therefore, it should have such components in its structure that would allow it to perform this function. These components must reach universal principles, foundations - the object of knowledge is immanent to the process of knowledge, that is, knowledge and being are simply inseparable.
When considering knowledge through the prism of universality, the question arises about its sources. In relation to individual, specific (partial) knowledge, it is almost always possible to outline the sources of its origin. When asked how we know about something specific, we can say: I read about it in a book, magazine, I heard it, etc. Such answers do not explain the origin of knowledge as such, but they give certainty to it and to our use of knowledge. But there is such knowledge for which such a reference is impossible. This knowledge is of an extremely broader level, for example, about the origin of the world, immortality or mortality of the soul. In such questions, due to the extraordinary expansion of their content, it is impossible to refer to a specific subject and source of knowledge. Because here the source of knowledge must be limited. And it is precisely with a solution of the question that we inevitably face the problem of the nature of knowledge as such. Extremely broad questions are questions that bring the problem to the level of the boundary of being and non-being, and if we turn such questions in the directions of clarifying the origin of knowledge, then the latter also appears on the border of being and non-being and requires us to answer not about the specific content of specific knowledge, but about the nature of knowledge as such.
Let us recall the statement of Socrates: "I know that I know nothing", and now it can appear before us in another perspective - in the perspective of an attempt to identify the fundamental point in criminalistic (intellectual) activity, from which the tracking the process of forming of criminalistic knowledge can begin.
Thus, in the first approximation, different angles of manifestations of knowledge outline it through the same essential feature: knowledge is a form of representation of being in consciousness, in which, first of all, the identity of consciousness and being is fixed, the universality of knowledge and its manifestation in its pure form on the verge of being and non-existence, that is, with an extremely broad formulation of problems of a philosophical nature.
Therefore, the most important problem in the context of globalization, which faces the criminalistics of each individual state, is to choose the strategic direction of its further development. Currently, there are the following main ways: 1) the Anglo-American model of criminalistics; 2) the German model of criminalistics; 3) Soviet (post-Soviet) model of criminalistics.
In the context of globalization, the German and Ukrainian models of criminology have many common features and prospects, which give grounds for their more fruitful mutual cooperation in the interests of defending
criminalistics as an independent complex science and practice developing techniques, methods and means of detecting, investigating and preventing crimes. Therefore, from these positions it is necessary to review the history of domestic crimininalistics in the direction of its convergence with the world vision of criminalistics relations with German criminalistic of the late XIX-early XX century which will provide an opportunity to develop a new concept, a new definition of criminalistics as a technology for combating crime (criminalistic technology) with its subsequent definition as a science, academic discipline, practice.) with its subsequent definition as a science, academic discipline, practice.
If it considers, as we propose, criminalistics as a technology for combating crime (criminalistic technology), it is necessary to change the original paradigm, which should underlie criminalistics research and express its object and subject, system, structure, as a science of technology for fighting against crime (criminalistic technology - the science of techniques, methods, means of combating crime).
The definition of the subject of criminalistics as an expression of the conceptual, accepted scientific paradigm requires a fundamental revision, because it does not correspond to modern ideas about the subject of a separate science, as a form of reflection of reality by a person, as a sphere of knowledge.
It became obvious that thought epistemology is the foundation, the quintessence of criminalistic as a technology, because it covers all its areas: philosophical; theoretical; practical. And the principle of "reflection" needs to be revised in a new way in the structure of mental epistemology, not as a simple "reflection", but both the process and result of interaction - a mechanism of reflection, which is possible in the theory of reflection - an active subject of knowledge, which was absent in works of R.S. Belkin.
Therefore, the classical theory of reflection in criminalistic should be supplemented by cognitive laws inherent in the reflection in the consciousness and activities of criminalists (lawyers, experts, scientists, operational staff, prosecutors, investigators, specialists, judges). After all, their objectivity in criminal proceedings is expressed in knowledge that depends on the subjective / objective, natural / accidental, rational / irrational interpreted on the basis of mental epistemology, which includes the active subject in relation to the knowledge of objects and real reality -legal facts (events, actions, omissions, states) of the past, for example, crimes that are reflected in the material, external world, the consciousness of the person who observes them, becomes a participant, a signatory that is reflected in the traces left on the scene, and, is the basis of forms of trace formation (materially fixed reflection; ideal (intellectual) reflection; cybernetic-informational; non-verbal; hypnotic-reproductive). This determines the ratio of objective and subjective in the reflection and as well as the specifics of the features of cognitive activity of the subject of knowledge, which actively forms this object of knowledge, including knowledge of facts (objective beginning) and their understanding of their legal essence (subjective beginning). Since subjective
cognition introduces elements of its subjectivity into cognitive activity, reconstructs the image of the object (subject), forms an idea of the object (subject) of cognition - this leads to the development of a fundamentally different, new methodology of criminalistic cognition - technology. The term "truth" then can be fully used in relation to the results of cognition, which are built on the reflection of object that exists in the consciousness of the subject who knows and depends on it.
Another part of the knowledge (for example, about the crime) is formed by the subject who recognizes that. In addition, it is necessary to include in this process the speech nature of cognition and certain provisions and views from the brances of other philosophical sciences. This will allow criminalistic, as a technology, to acquire a polystructural character in thought epistemology, and to define it as the basic doctrine of knowledge and the process of cognition in legal science.
We need a new concept that would meet the polystructural nature of modern scientific methodology and the requirements of criminalistic practice, and this requires:
To form a general theory of criminalistics - on the basis of mental epistemology, which defines the poly-structural of criminalistic as a doctrine of criminalistic knowledge.
Define a specific scientific criminalistic concept of reflection as one of the main theories of thought epistemology, defining the complexity and specificity of criminalistic knowledge as a subject of criminalistic analysis in the process of detecting, investigating and preventing crimes, especially those committed in non-obviousness. Criminalistic knowledge - scientific and practical - should be based on theoretical knowledge, which is confirmed by empirical reference to factual data.
It is necessary to proceed from the non-classical concept of science, which is based on the fact that the object is being constructed. Non-classical objective-subjective scheme in which the subject learns an existing object through his activity (12 senses of cognition), where knowledge acts as a result of the subjects ' actions on the object, which is reflected in the surrounding environment depending on the form of reflection. Cognition of the subject is always active in relation to external influences, with varying degrees of adequacy of reflection of the surrounding world through the use of the principles of non-classical and post-non-classical sciences.
Therefore, it is necessary to be based on the philosophy and results of modern research of various individual sciences engaged in knowledge and cognition (Western philosophy of cognition and philosophy of science (history of science, logic, psychology, psychiatry, linguistics, sociology, etc.) and other sciences, for example , - cognitive, expressing non-classical thought epistemology through the study of problems of criminalistic knowledge and cognition, taking into account the results of cognitive activity of each of the sciences This will allow to develop an
expanded doctrine of forensic knowledge, both practical and scientific, and knowledge, the design of which should include the sphere of scientific knowledge and practical cognition.
It is thanks to these features that criminalistic knowledge appears as an essential element of the criminalistic consciousness. But what is consciousness? This is attitude to something through knowledge, reliance on the known, that is knowledge. To have consciousness means to treat something with knowledge. Consciousness is always the awareness of something, not an empty form. This implies the attitude to the subject of comprehension through a certain intellectual formation, such as, for example, an image. With certain simplification we can say that in order to perceive and evaluate something, understand and distinguish from others, it is necessary to create in the mind an image or model of this "something" and compare this model with the realities of our living perception, and the latter - with the image or model. Being conscious for a person means to be able to create intellectual analogues of reality and to be able to operate with them. Accordingly, to teach a person is one of the main tasks of education and training.
Both points in the first definitions of knowledge: knowledge as a representative of existence and knowledge as the initial element of the content of consciousness - are highlighted and recorded in world philosophy. These points can be seen in the epistemological considerations of the Stoics, in the works of Gregory of Nyssa and Augustine the Blessed, in the analysis of the problem of knowledge within Muslim philosophy [24; 25], as well as in modern European philosophy, starting from Descartes and ending with Hegel. This approach is also preserved in modern epistemological and cognitive research [2628].
Having gained an idea of the general limits within which criminalistic knowledge exists, we defined crim-inalistic knowledge as a holistic phenomenon. The term "whole" in English sounds like "hall", and the term "holism" has long received universal recognition in the philosophical tradition in the sense of "integrity" [29, p. 750; 30, p. 371]. Therefore, there is every reason to use this term in the analysis of criminalistic knowledge.
Forensic knowledge, when we consider it as a form of representation of being in the criminalist's mind, appears in its entirety. It appears as a mediator between consciousness and being. On the other hand, consciousness becomes a real and effective factor for itself or for another consciousness precisely through knowledge. The power of consciousness is manifested in its ability to influence reality (through purposeful human actions); without knowledge such influence would be simply impossible. In this respect, "know" and "act" almost merge.
What does the holistics of forensic knowledge give us? First, the dominance of the whole is perhaps the most expressive feature of philosophical thinking, and hence - criminalistic thinking. Therefore, integrity itself does not need to be understood in purely quantitative dementions. To take a thing or a phenomenon as a whole is, rather, to take them in the
most essential dimensions, at their last limit, that is, at the boundary of being and non-being. This is exactly what the whole tradition of classical European philosophizing aspired to: to reach their "intelligent face" through the changing and deceptive surface of things. If we want to be involved in philosophy, we must not reject this tradition. Moreover, only with a holistic approach we have the opportunity to determine (at least in the working version) what a certain thing is, and having defined it as a whole, we can talk about its parts, qualities, functions and so on.
For the understanding knowledge and cognition, this requirement - to put integrity over particularity - is perhaps the most important, on the one hand, given the universality, the all-encompassing nature of knowledge itself, and on the other - in connection with the inner unity and self-reflection of consciousness (especially this is manifested in thinking): if in the process of perception and awareness each act would remain autonomous and isolated from others, consciousness simply would not exist.
Intention (initial, essential orientation) to the whole is as if keeping the "force field" of consciousness in a state of actual continuity. Due to this, the appearance of any entities in the space of such a field of any essence instantly excites the entire consciousness: there are comparisons, collations, comprehension, ordering, and introduction of the perceived in the context of consciousness. This feature of consciousness - the intention of the whole, plays an extremely important role in the activity of human intellect; to a certain extent it appears as a differentia specifica (distinctive feature) in relation to the latter. Thus, taking the original, the most expressive features of knowledge, we logically come to certain realizations of the need to approach knowledge (as well as consciousness) sub specie totum - from the point of view of integrity. That is, it means to take from knowledge the essential, the main thing. Considering knowledge as a whole, we must approach it from the approach of the unity of its opposite definitions (being and reflection), which forms its original essential connection (representation of being in consciousness). In addition, if we take the subject as a unity of opposites, that is, within its ultimate qualitative limits, then we, in fact, bring the consideration of the subject to the limit of being and non-being; after all, if the opposite, as a subject definiteness, outlines the maximum possible limit, then there is no object outside it; this limit is the last limit, therefore, the limit of being and non-being, the limiting degree of consideration of the subject. Thus, the holistics of criminalistic knowledge is immanent to the requirements of his philosophical research.
Conclusions. These aspects of a holistic approach to knowledge make it possible to focus in more detail on the phenomenological eidetics of knowledge, which involves identifying the internal unity (internal " intelligent appearance") of the subject of the research in the field of our intellectual contemplation using a procedure called "phenomenological era". Phenomenological methodology was not supported at
one time; but predetermined aspects of the holistic nature of knowledge - the consideration of knowledge in the unity of its initial opposites and on the border of being and non-being, which are outlined only through tracking and fixing the content moments of knowledge in the sphere of intellectual contemplation, in the so-called "screen of consciousness" sphere. Phenomenological eidetics implies the dominance of integrity and reflexive transparency in the intellectual image of the subject [31, pp. 68-76; 32, pp. 268-276].
What does this image look like? In the procedure of the "phenomenological epoch" (retention), we focus on only one thing: a certain image of an object that fits into the content of our consciousness. It is there because the object in consciousness is created from the "material" of consciousness itself and its acts, then the image of the object in consciousness becomes transparent for consciousness itself; consciousness covers the subject in its semantic focus in its "reasonable" content and meaning. If we agree that the previous approach to anything as a whole is a condition of our knowledge, we must recognize that phenomenological eidetics (conscious or unconscious) is a condition of obtaining knowledge about any subject. This is all the more so for knowledge, because the latter is undoubtedly formed by consciousness and acquires features characteristic of conscious acts. So, the eidetics of knowledge is a necessary point of its holistic approach.
Also, if we want to consider criminalistic knowledge as a whole, we must include in consideration everything that concerns it: both what seems true and deviations from the truth, as well as what may seem empty reasoning, nonsense, unworthy of attention. All this is included in the internal "mechanics/technology" of the connection of consciousness with being, that is, in the technology of formation (emergence and functioning) of criminalistic knowledge - criminalistic technology. Of course, this approach complicates research, but in term of content and results it is rich, diverse, close to life, to the fullness of the subject, which "lies" between the opposites and represents the different degrees of their combination. Therefore, the holistics of criminalistic knowledge leads us along the line of balancing between the ultimate level of generalization and the attempt to catch something in the sphere of exorbitant entities, between the appeal to the phenomena of knowledge and its eidetics. That is why through the holistics of knowledge there is a dominance of integrity, which creates a certain distance between theory and empiricism. Empiricism always retains a certain amount of irony in relation to the high theory and requirements of a holistic approach, but even with an empirical approach, we relate all our experiences and impressions we have gained to the chosen subject, so we intuitively keep it in mind in the status of a certain integrity.
So, the question of the integrity of knowledge cannot be avoided. Therefore, the holistics of knowledge determines the depth of the structure of knowledge and a clear definition of its constituent elements, levels. These components and requirements of a holistic approach to knowledge must be met in the epistemological study of criminalistic knowledge [33-
35]. In our opinion, epistemology is the general thing that allows to explain the specifics of individual theories of cognition - ontological, psychological, logical [36, p. 32] in criminalistics. Epistemology comprehends knowledge relying on different scientific paradigms.
REFERENCES:
1. Комюарчук Р.В. Суб'ективна опосередкова-нють у практичному кримшалютичному мислент / Р.В. Комюарчук // Право та державне управлшня. № 1., Том 1 2020. С. 298-303.
2. Комюарчук Р.В. Об'екти дослвдження практичного кримшалютичного мислення / Р.В. Комюарчук // Науковий вюник публчного та приватного права. №
1. 2020. С. 267-272.
3. Комюарчук Р.В. Перспективи розвитку кри-мiналiстичного мислення / Р.В. Комюарчук // Держава та регюни. Серiя: «Право». № 1 (67) том 2. 2020. С. 137-142.
4. Комюарчук Р.В. Методи дослвдження кримша-лiстичного мислення в практичнш дiяльностi: перспективи розробки / Р.В. Комiсарчук // Вчет записки Та-врiйського национального унiверситету iменi В. I. Ве-рнадського. Серiя: Юридичнi науки». Том 31 (70) №
2. 2020. С. 9-103.
5. Комюарчук Р.В. Дяльнюна природа практичного кримшалютичного мислення / Р.В. Комюарчук // Право i сустльство. № 2., ч. 3. 2020. С. 106-112.
6. Комюарчук Р. В., Синкретизм вираження причини та знаку у кримшалютичнш технологи. / Р.В. Комюарчук // Щдприемництво, господарство i право. № 10. 2020. С. 298-303.
7. Миронов В.В., Иванов А.В. Онтология и теория познания: Учебник. Издательство: М.: Гардарики, 2005. 447 с. ISBN: 5-8297-0248-7.
8. Петренко В.Ф. Методологические аспекты исторической психологи (поиск парадигмы) // Сетевой научно-практический журнал «Научный результат». Серия «Педагогика и психология образования». 2014. № 1. С. 82-92.
9. Ахутина Т.В. Нейропсихологический анализ динамической афазии. М: изд-во МГУ, 1975. 144 с.
10. Ахутина Т.В. Порождение речи. Нейролинг-вистический анализ синтаксиса. М.: изд-во МГУ, 1989. 215 с.
11. Слобин Д., Грин Дж. Психолингвистика. М.: Прогресс, 1976. 350 с.
12. Выготский Л.С. Мышление и речь // Собрание сочинений. В 6 т. Т.2. Проблемы общей психологии. М.: Педагогика, 1982. 504 с.
13. Ломов Б.Ф. Методологические и теоретические проблемы психологии. М.: Наука 1984. 444 с.
14. Рубинштейн С.Л. Бытие и сознание. М.: АН СССР, 1957. 328 с.
15. Рубинштейн С.Л. О мышлении и путях его исследования. М.: АН СССР, 1958. 147 с.
16. Теплов Б.М. Ум полководца. // Теплов Б.М. Избр. труды: в 2т. Т. 1. М.: Педагогика, 1985. С. 223305.
17. Русина Н.А. Метафора и ее роль в построении субъективной картины мира // Мышление и субъективный мир. Ярославль: изд-во ЯрГУ, 1991. С. 2933.
18. Пушкин В.Н. Построение ситуативных концептов в структуре мыслительной деятельности // Проблемы общей, возрастной и педагогической психологии. М.: Педагогика, 1978. С. 106-120.
19. Слобин Д., Грин Дж. Психолингвистика. М.: Прогресс, 1976. 350 с.
20. Жинкин Н.И. О кодовых переходах во внутренней речи // Вопросы языкознания. М., 1964. № 6. С. 26-38.
21. Рубинштейн С.Л. Основы психологии. М.: Гос. уч.-пед. изд.-во, 1935. 496 с.
22. Кудряшова Л.Д. Системно-психологическая оценка кадров руководителей и управленческих систем. Кишинев, 1983. 160 с.
23. Кайдалов Д.П., Суименко Е.И. Психология единоначалия и коллегиальности: вопросы взаимодействия руководителя и коллектива. М.: 1979.254 с.
24. Роузентал Ф. Торжество знания. Концепция знания в средневековом исламе. М.: Главная редакция восточной литературы издательства «Наука», 1978. 372 с.
25. Фролова Е.А. Проблема веры и знания в арабской философии. - М.: Наука, 1983. С. 94-109.
26. Хилл Т.И. Современая еория познания. М.: Прогресс, 1965. 533 с.
27. Крымский С.Б. Нучное знание и принципы его трансформации. К.: Наукова думка, 1974. 208 с.
28. Щедровицкий Г.П. Синтез знания: проблемы и методы // На пути к теории научного знания. М.: Наука, 1984. С. 67-109.
29. Фшософський словник / За ред. В.1. Шинка-рука. 2. вид. i доп. К.: Голов. ред. УРЕ, 1986. 800 с.
30. Современная западная философия: словарь-справочник / В.А. Лекторский, В.С. Малахов, В.П. Филатов, В.С. Малахов, В.П. Филатов. Москва : Политиздат, 1991. 414 с. ISBN 5-250-00734-1.
31. Лосев А.Ф. Бытие. Имя. Космос. М.: Мысль, 1993. («Эрос у Платона», «Античный космос и современная наука», «Философия имени», «Вещь и имя»).
32. Лосев А.Ф. Из ранних произведений. М.: Правда, 1990. 656 с., 60 000 экз. («Философия имени», «Музыка как предмет логики», «Диалектика мифа»).
33. Комюарчук Р.В. Ешстемолопчт основи кри-мшалютики / Р.В. Комюарчук // Jurnalul juridic national: teorie §i practica, № 2 (30). Ч. 1, 2018. С. 164167.
34. Комюарчук Р.В. Аналгтична парадигма кри-мшалютично! технологи / Р.В. Комюарчук // Visegrad Journal on Human Rights. № 2. 2018. С. 81-85.
35. Комисарчук Р.В. Криминалистика - технология борьбы с преступностью (криминалистическая технология) / Р.В. Комюарчук // «Legea si Viata». № 8, 2018. С. 47-51.
36. Манхейм К. Структурный анализ эпистемологии: Специализир. информ. по общеакад. прогр. «Человек, наука, общество: комплекс. исслед.» : К XIX Всемир. филос. конгр. / Сокр. пер. и предисл. Е. Я. Додина; Рос. акад. наук, ИНИОН, Всесоюз. межвед. центр наук о человеке при президиуме РАН. — М.: ИНИОН, 1992.