HEIDEGGER’S CRITIQUE OF HUSSERL
IN HIS BLACK NOTEBOOKS

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In Heidegger und der Mythos der jüdischen Weltverschwörung (2014), Peter Trawny claims that in his Black Notebooks (2014/15) Martin Heidegger is guilty of «ontological-historical anti-Semitism» (seinsgeschichtlicher Antisemitismus). There can be no doubt that Heidegger describes «the Jews» as «a kind of humanity» that lives by «the principle of race», displays «empty rationality and calculative capacity», and employs «the machinations of world Jewry» to propagate a «homeless» and «worldless» way of life accompanied by «ahistorical» and «atemporal» thinking — as «a people» that took advantage of «the metaphysics of the West», «especially in its modern development», to pursue «the uprooting of all being(s) from Being» as its «world-historical task». The question is whether in his narrative Heidegger assigns a relevant or pivotal role to his former mentor, colleague, and friend, Edmund Husserl, the founder of the phenomenological movement and a Jewish convert to Christianity, because he seems to suggest that there is a connection between Husserl’s Jewishness and his philosophy, as well as that his break with him was the result of the latter’s failure to deal with Being in terms of time or history. This paper investigates whether Heidegger’s remarks and Trawny’s reflections have any significant implications for an understanding of the philosophical relationship between Husserl and Heidegger. It finds that Trawny makes a strong case that a number of Heidegger’s statements in his Black Notebooks reveal him to be generally guilty of «ontological-historical

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anti-Semitism», but that he does not present a convincing case that in these texts Heidegger’s critique of Husserl specifically is motivated by «ontological-historical anti-Semitism».

Key words: Heidegger, Husserl, Black Notebooks, Trawny, ontological-historical anti-Semitism, phenomenology, Being.

ХАЙДЕГГЕРОВСКАЯ КРИТИКА ГУССРЕЛЯ В «ЧЕРНЫХ ТЕТРАДЯХ»

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INTRODUCTION:
HEIDEGGER, NATIONAL SOCIALISM, AND HUSSERL

Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) was one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century. He was the assistant of the founder of the phenomenological

Yet Heidegger presents one of the greatest paradoxes in the history of philosophy. On the one hand, he is famous for Being and Time (1927), a fundamental analysis of human being (Dasein) in terms of the existential structures of its relation to Being (Sein), first and foremost, temporality, and, by implication, historicity. Guided not only by Husserl, with his exhortation to go «to the things themselves» («zu den Sachen selbst»),¹ but also by Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911), with his emphasis on experience, life, and history, Heidegger applies phenomenology to life to sketch a hermeneutics of human existence in its entire historicity. The work develops the argument that finitude, authentically grasped and resolutely lived, leads not to nihilism but to a special kind of «carefulness» (Sorge as the Sein of Dasein),² and articulates the position that a human life has no other meaning than that which the particular individual, «thrown» into the world and among others, «projects» on to it (Dasein as geworfener Entwurf).³ For all its talk of authentic existence, however, Being and Time does not provide any answer to the question: What should I do? Thus it leaves Dasein's horizon wide open for its own determination of meaning.

On the other hand, Heidegger is infamous for his involvement with National Socialism. He joined the N.S.D.A.P. on May 1, 1933, as party member #3125894, at a crucial juncture in German, European, and world history. He served as a very activist rector and even «Führer-Rektor» of the renowned University of Freiburg from 1933 to 1934,⁴ delivering his hortatory rector's address, «The Self-Assertion of the German University» («Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität»),⁵ on May 27, 1933. One of

¹ Cf. Husserl, Hua XIX/1, 10. References to the works of Husserl are henceforth by volume and page of his Gesammelte Werke or Husserliana (Hua). See the References at the end of the paper.
⁵ Cf. GA 16, 107–117.
his best students later remarked that by the end of the speech «one did not know whether one should read the Pre-Socratics or march with the Storm Troopers». Bestowing early respectability on the fledgling regime of the new Chancellor Adolf Hitler (named by President Paul von Hindenburg on January 30, 1933), Heidegger declared to the students (October, 1933): «Let not doctrinal propositions and “ideas” be the rules of your Being. The Führer himself and alone is the present and future German reality and its law. […] Heil Hitler!» For various reasons, mainly and mostly political and professional, Heidegger resigned as rector of the university after a year in office. His later claims to the contrary notwithstanding, it is hard to maintain the thesis that he was active in the opposition to the regime of the Third Reich (1933–1945).

Despite the fact that he had to submit to de-Nazification procedures by Allied, German, and academic authorities after the Second World War, which led first to his forced retirement without permission to teach and finally to his emeritus status with permission to teach (with a kind of nervous breakdown in between), the exact extent of Heidegger’s involvement with National Socialism did not emerge until long after his death. During his lifetime, he was able to sustain the self-serving story according to which he had been an innocent, naïve dreamer who had gotten romantically involved in politics way over his head, but not a convinced Nazi.

In his signature «Letter on Humanism» (1947), Heidegger deftly, even aggressively, deflected an open invitation to face up to and to come to grips with the Third Reich and his association with it, stubbornly refusing to rethink within a humanistic horizon what it meant to be human after the Second World War and the mass murder of innumerable combatants and civilians by Germany and its allies.

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7 GA 16, 184–185: «Nicht Lehrsätze und “Ideen” seien die Regeln Eures Seins. Der Führer selbst und allein ist die heutige und künftige deutsche Wirklichkeit und ihr Gesetz. […] Heil Hitler!» Unless otherwise noted, all translations in this paper are my own.
8 Heidegger was Rector from April 21, 1933, to April 27, 1934. Cf. Ott, 1988, 131–246, and Thomä, 2013, 552, 554.
12 Cf. GA 9, 313–364. The letter was composed in 1945, first published with «Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit»
It did not help that Heidegger proposed an analogy between what Germans had done to their victims during the war and what some Allies did to some Germans after the war (1948), compared industrialized agriculture to the production of corpses in the gas chambers and extermination camps (1949), and suggested that the innumerable people who had «died» in the annihilation camps had not died (1949).

In his *Introduction to Metaphysics* (1953 [lectures from 1935]), Heidegger even seemed to suggest that the tragedy of National Socialism was not that it had failed, but rather that it had never been tried, at least not by those who understood «the inner truth and greatness of this movement» («die innere Wahrheit und Größe dieser Bewegung»).

In public Heidegger never expressed regret or remorse in regard to his involvement with National Socialism. In private he did so only very rarely, for example, in a few letters to his former colleague Karl Jaspers and his former lover Hannah Arendt. He was not only unapologetic, but he also tried to portray himself as an ardent but prudent critic of the regime, for example, in his revisionist, posthumously released, interview with the German news magazine *Der Spiegel* (1966).

In his *Black Notebooks*, a kind of intellectual-philosophical diaries that he began before the Third Reich and continued after it, Heidegger occasionally but indirectly expresses his growing disappointment and mounting disillusionment with some of the realities of the regime. Yet he provides no criticism of the ideals of National Socialism as he wished to understand it. Also, nowhere in the *Black Notebooks* does Heidegger question the anti-Semitic theories or practices of National Socialism.

After Heidegger’s death, scholars gradually uncovered more and more evidence

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16 Cf. Heidegger, 1953/1987, 213: «[…] what is peddled about nowadays as the philosophy of National Socialism […] has not the least to do with the inner truth and greatness of this movement […]». See the explanation of the context of this quotation in the introduction by Fried and Polt, xv–xvii.
17 It is reported that Heidegger did once describe his rectorship and his related engagement for the regime as «the greatest stupidity of his life» («die größte Dummheit seines Lebens»). Cf. Petzet, 1983, 43.
20 Cf., e.g., GA 95, 408–409.
of the depth and extent of his involvement with National Socialism. In 1987, Victor Farías caused a sensation with the publication of *Heidegger and National Socialism*, a book that represented a major contribution to the topic and generated a great deal of controversy.\(^{21}\) In 1988, Hugo Ott revealed, among other things, Heidegger’s chronic careerism with his critical study *Heidegger: On the Way to His Biography*.\(^{22}\) In 2005, Emmanuel Faye went so far as to argue, in *Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy*,\(^{23}\) that Heidegger’s involvement with National Socialism was profound enough to discredit his philosophy entirely, a position that was, however, swiftly and strongly contradicted by a team of Heidegger scholars.\(^{24}\) Yet, in *My Life in Germany Before and After 1933* (composed in 1940), Heidegger’s former student Karl Löwith had already pointed out that at their last encounter, in Rome in 1936, Heidegger agreed with him «without reservation» that «his taking the side of [National Socialism] lay in the essence of his philosophy».\(^{25}\)

Heidegger’s turn to National Socialism also had a forceful impact on his relationship with Husserl. He had dedicated *Being and Time* to him «in reverence and friendship» (1927).\(^{26}\) For various personal and professional reasons, however, these thinkers gradually drifted very far apart as soon as Heidegger succeeded Husserl at Freiburg (1928).\(^{27}\) Yet, even after they had essentially ended their philosophical relationship, they still had occasional social contact. For example, Husserl invited Heidegger to his home for a «philosopher’s tea» on June 22, 1930, and for the fiftieth anniversary of his own doctorate on January 23, 1933 (one week before Hindenburg named Hitler chancellor), and Heidegger accepted both invitations.\(^{28}\) Toward the middle of 1933, however, not only philosophical differences but also political divisions had presented themselves, as Husserl witnessed Heidegger’s emerging National Socialism

and increasing anti-Semitism. 29 On April 6, 1933, Husserl, with all «non-Arian» civil servants of the state of Baden, was «vacated» («beurlaubt») from his university position by decree A7642 of the regional Reichskommissar; on April 14, he was notified that on the basis of the decree he had been «transferred» into the status of an «enforced leave of absence». 30 Husserl called this decree and the Reich-wide measure of April 7, 1933, the Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service (Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtenstatus), «the greatest personal injury of [his] life». 31 Still, by decree A8500 the regional Ministry of Culture in Karlsruhe cancelled («with reservations») the earlier decree with respect to Husserl on April 28; by decree A18814 the cancellation was confirmed on July 20; and Heidegger, who had become Rector of the University of Freiburg on April 21 (and, as indicated above, had joined the N.S.D.A.P. on May 1), signed the cancellation on July 28. 32 Yet, on January 15, 1936, Husserl was finally and irrevocably stripped of his permission to teach (Lehrbefugnis or venia legendi), effective retroactively to December 31, 1935. 33 These and related developments, accompanied by Husserl’s bouts of self-doubts and Heidegger’s lack of solidarity, 34 brought the final end to what Husserl would bitterly recall as «this supposed philosophical friendship between souls». 35 There can be no doubt that Husserl saw a direct correlation between the rise of Heidegger’s commitment to National Socialism and anti-Semitism, on the one hand, and the decline and fall of his own relationship with him, on the other. 36 After he

31 Cf. Husserl, Letter to Gustav Albrecht, July 1, 1933, in BW IX, 92: «[…] daß ich das neue Beamten-Gesetz und dann die Beurlaubung als größte Kränkung meines Lebens empfunden habe.»
stepped down as Rector in 1934, Heidegger continued his membership in the N.S.D.A.P. and his association with National Socialist intellectuals, for example, by serving on the Committee for the Philosophy of Law (or Right) in the Academy for German Law (Ausschuß für Rechtsphilosophie der Akademie für Deutsches Recht), which played the role of an official consulting body for the composition of the Nuremberg Laws of 1935. At the end, pleading illness, Heidegger declined to attend Husserl’s funeral on April 29, 1938, a failure for which he later apologized to Husserl’s widow.

In his recent book Heidegger and the Myth of the Jewish World Conspiracy (2014), Peter Trawny claims that in his Black Notebooks (2014/15) Heidegger is guilty of «ontological-historical anti-Semitism» (seinsgeschichtlicher Antisemitismus), and that therefore one must raise the question whether and to what extent his philosophy is «tainted» or «contaminated» by this anti-Semitism. The dilemma, then, is this: Can one find a mean between (1) the extreme of dismissing the greatness of Heidegger’s philosophy because of the truth of his involvement with National Socialism, and (2) the extreme of discounting the truth of his involvement with National Socialism because of the greatness of his philosophy? In particular, how can Trawny’s thesis about Heidegger’s ontological-historical anti-Semitism help answer this question? A tenable attempt at an answer to this question must include an inquiry into the connection between Heidegger’s brand of National Socialism and his peculiar kind of anti-Semitism, on the one hand, and his philosophical criticism of Husserl, on the other.

1. HEIDEGGER, TRAWNY, AND «THE MYTH OF THE JEWISH WORLD-CONSPIRACY»

In the volumes of his Complete Edition (Gesamtausgabe) that he arranged to be held back until the end, namely, the Black Notebooks (Schwarze Hefte), Heidegger repeatedly

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37 Hans Frank, Julius Streicher, Carl Schmitt, and Alfred Rosenberg also sat on the committee.
40 In the English translation of Trawny’s book, Andrew Mitchell renders this terminology as «Being-Historical Anti-Semitism». Yet this way of expressing the phenomenon at issue seems unnecessarily awkward. In any case, Trawny’s charge is that Heidegger is guilty of anti-Semitism with respect to the history of Being or that his interpretation of the history of Being is anti-Semitic.
expresses anti-Semitic sentiments. The four volumes of the *Black Notebooks* that have been published thus far, in 2014–15 as volumes 94–97 of the edition,\(^4^1\) have reopened the heated debate about the philosophical value of Heidegger’s entire legacy.\(^4^2\)

The observation that Heidegger’s anti-Semitic remarks make up only a small fraction of the content (c. 6 pages of approximately c. 1,500) of the *Black Notebooks* of volumes 94–97 of the *Complete Edition* is valid. The argument that therefore these remarks can be discounted, or that they are thus philosophically insignificant, is not sound. It is not about their relative quantity but about their absolute quality. Thus it is understandable, and in a sense even commendable, that the editor of the *Black Notebooks*, Peter Trawny, has followed up his work on them with a critical examination, *Heidegger and the Myth of the Jewish World Conspiracy* (*Heidegger und der Mythos der jüdischen Weltverschwörung*) (2014), in which he charges Heidegger with «ontological-historical anti-Semitism» (*seinsgeschichtlicher Antisemitismus*).

In the introduction to his book, Trawny points out that, although it has been generally accepted that Heidegger was a thinker who associated himself with National Socialism and all that it involves, including anti-Semitism, it has not been generally accepted that Heidegger is guilty of anti-Semitism. He cites skeptics who claim: «Heidegger was engaged in National Socialism […] but he was not an anti-Semite.»\(^4^3\) Given that Heidegger made a number of anti-Semitic statements in places other than, as well as long before, the *Black Notebooks*, this may seem like an odd claim in any case. In his early correspondence with his future wife Elfride, for example, Heidegger already complains during the First World War: «The Jewification of our culture and universities is terrifying indeed, and I think that the German race should exert as much inner strength as possible to get to the top.»\(^4^4\) This remark was not a slip of the pen on Heidegger’s part, as a related remark, in another letter to Elfride, now his wife, shortly

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\(^4^1\) The *Complete Edition* will ultimately encompass 102 volumes, so that further volumes of the *Black Notebooks* are planned. Thus this paper takes into account only the *Black Notebooks* that have been published in volumes 94–97 of the *Complete Edition* but not those that will appear in volumes 98 ff.

\(^4^2\) Cf. the list of items and events at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_Notebooks.

\(^4^3\) Cf. Trawny, 2014, 11.

\(^4^4\) Cf. Heidegger, Letter to Elfride Petri, October 18, 1916, in Heidegger, 2005, 51: «Die Verjudung unserer Kultur u. Universitäten ist allerdings schreckerregend u. ich meine die deutsche Rasse sollte noch soviel innere Kraft aufbringen um in die Höhe zu kommen.» But he adds: «Allerdings das Kapital!» Thus he seems to imply that the Jews have «the capital» to get «to the top».

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after the war shows: «Manesse [?]–Hölderlin is so grotesque that one can only laugh — whether we ever again get out of this contamination and get to an original freshness and earthiness of life — sometimes one would really like to become a spiritual anti-Semite.» Yet Heidegger’s early Judenangst is not restricted to the academy and culture, for he also writes to his wife again shortly after the war: «Here [in Meßkirch] one talks a lot about the fact that the Jews are buying up so much cattle from the villages that then there will not be any meat for sale in the winter. [...] Everything is flooded with Jews and pushers.» Also, having succeeded Husserl at Freiburg in 1928, Heidegger writes to Hannah Arendt in the winter of 1932/1933: «By the way, today I am just as much an anti-Semite in university matters as I was 10 years ago and in Marburg [...]». Moreover, in his last encounter with Karl Jaspers, in Heidelberg on June 6, 1933, Heidegger contradicts his colleague’s dismissal of «the nonsense of the [Protocols of the] Elders of Zion» and asserts: «There is indeed a dangerous international network of [the] Jews.» Finally, as Rector of the University of Freiburg in late 1933, Heidegger not only denounces his former student Eduard Baumgarten for having been «everything but a National Socialist» in Freiburg, but also defames him for having had «active contacts» in Göttingen with «the Jew [Eduard] Fraenkel», who had been fired from Freiburg under the National Socialist Civil Service Legislation.

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49 Despite disclaimers by his defenders (he did write a letter in defense of Fraenkel on July 12, 1933 [cf. GA 16, 140–141]), it is very highly likely that Heidegger’s denunciation of Baumgarten is genuine. Cf. Ott, 1988, 183–184, and Heidegger & Jaspers, 1990, 168–172, where Jaspers mentions the case (February 6, 1949) and Heidegger does not contradict him (June 22, 1949). Heidegger’s act played a key role in Jaspers’s Letter of Assessment (December 22, 1945) on Heidegger’s case to the Settlement Commission of the University of Freiburg. Cf. Ott, 1988, 315–317, especially 316. In his Letter of Assessment, Jaspers states that «in the 1920s, Heidegger was not an anti-Semite», suggests that he «became, at least in certain contexts, an anti-Semite in 1933», and points out the occasional-opportunistic character of his anti-Semitism. Given Heidegger’s earlier anti-Semitic utterances to others, and given that Heidegger and Jaspers became acquainted in the spring of 1920 (at Husserl’s house) and were close personally and philosophically until around 1933, it is more likely that Heidegger concealed his anti-Semitism.
For his part, Trawny aims to subject the thesis *that Heidegger was not an anti-Semitic* to a special kind of revision. For this purpose, he first distinguishes some of the characteristic features of anti-Semitism:

*Anti-Semitic* was and is what is affectively and/or administratively directed against Jews on the basis of rumors, prejudices, and pseudo-scientific (race-theoretical or racist) sources, and leads to a) defamation, to b) a general picture of «the enemy», to c) isolation (by means of occupational prohibitions, ghettos, or camps), to d) expulsion or emigration, to e) destruction by means of pogroms, mass executions, or destruction camps. *Today*, in addition, what is supposed to characterize the Jews as «the Jews» is to be designated as *anti-Semitic.*

Trawny first establishes that Heidegger makes anti-Semitic statements in his *Black Notebooks*. For example, describing «the end of the history of the great beginning of the Western human being» and the «transformation» of its «guardianship over Being» into «the claim of a re-presentation of being in its machination-like un-essence» as a «struggle» for «groundedness», Heidegger says this:

And perhaps in this «struggle», in which aimlessness itself is struggled over and which therefore can only be the caricature of a «struggle», the greater groundlessness, which is bound to nothing, and which makes use of everything (Jewry), will «emerge victorious». But the real victory, the victory of history over that which lacks history, will be won only there where that which is groundless excludes itself because it does not risk Being but rather always only reckons with being and posits its calculations as what is actual.

He adds for good measure this:

One of the most hidden forms of the *gigantic*, and perhaps the oldest, is the tough skillfulness of calculating and pushing and mixing together in which the worldlessness of Jewry is grounded.

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51 GA 95, 96–97: «Und vielleicht "siegt" in diesem "Kampf", in dem um die Ziellosigkeit schlechthin gekämpft wird und der daher nur das Zerrbild des "Kampfes" sein kann, die größere Bodenlosigkeit, die an nichts gebunden, alles sich dienstbar macht (das Judentum). Aber der eigentliche Sieg, der Sieg der Geschichte über das Geschichtslose, wird nur dort errungen, wo das Bodenlose sich selbst ausschließt, weil es das Seyn nicht wagt, sondern immer nur mit dem Seienden rechnet und seine Berechnungen als das Wirkliche setzt.»
52 GA 95, 97: «Eine der verstecktesten Gestalten des Riesigen und vielleicht die älteste ist die zähe Geschicklichkeit des Rechnens und Schiebens und Durcheinandermischens, wodurch die Weltlosigkeit des Judentums gegründet wird.»
And finally also this:

World Jewry, incited by the emigrants who were allowed to leave Germany, is everywhere incomprehensible, and, with all its expansion of power, does not need to participate in acts of war, whereas we have no other alternative but to sacrifice the best blood of the best of our people.\(^{53}\)

Thus Heidegger’s anti-Semitism in the *Black Notebooks* is beyond question.\(^{54}\) Having laid this foundation, Trawny then charges Heidegger not with *vulgar National Socialist anti-Semitism* but with what he calls «ontological-historical anti-Semitism»:\(^{55}\)

Our view of Heidegger obtains a new facet, unknown until now: Along a certain section of his path, the philosopher opened his thinking up to an anti-Semitism that can more exactly be designated as *ontological-historical anti-Semitism*. As will be seen, there seems to be no doubt about this. Everything depends, however, on clarifying what is to be understood by the concept of «ontological-historical anti-Semitism». The first intention of the following considerations is to develop a sensibility for this concept.\(^{56}\)

Trawny explains what he means by *ontological-historical anti-Semitism* mainly and mostly in the chapter entitled «Types of ontological-historical anti-Semitism».\(^{57}\) There he connects generic anti-Semitism with specifically Heideggerian anti-Semitism:

*Anti-Semitism* is the focal point of its different forms. With respect to Heidegger, there are found in the *Black Notebooks* three remarks that lead one to infer three different, inherently coherent, types of *ontological-historical anti-Semitism*. The concept of ontological-historical anti-Semitism should not at all suggest that we are dealing with an especially elaborate or refined anti-Semitism. Basically, Heidegger referred to definite, generally known forms. Yet he interpreted them philosophically, that is, ontologically-historically.\(^{58}\)

Trawny claims that «the three types of this anti-Semitism», that is, Heidegger’s ontological-historical anti-Semitism, emerge in the following three sets of remarks from

\(^{53}\) GA 96, 262: «Das Weltjudentum, aufgestachelt durch die aus Deutschland hinausgelassenen Emigranten, ist überall unfaßbar und braucht sich bei aller Machtentfaltung nirgends an kriegerischen Handlungen zu beteiligen, wogegen uns nur bleibt, das beste Blut der Besten des eigenen Volkes zu opfern.»

\(^{54}\) Cf. also GA 95, 161, 325, and GA 96, 133 («das internationale Judentum»).

\(^{55}\) This decision is consistent with the position that Heidegger does not embrace biological racism, though he seems to endorse «intellectual» or «spiritual racism» (GA 94, 142–143, 189, 191), analogously to his distinction between «vulgar National Socialism» and «intellectual» or «spiritual National Socialism» («der geistige Nationalsozialismus») (GA 94, 135).

\(^{56}\) Cf. Trawny, 2014, 11.


the Black Notebooks (with enhanced context for better understanding):

[1] For the same reason [a gross ignorance of the essence of Being and its being beyond power and impotence], however, every «pacifism» and every «liberalism» are also not in a position to penetrate into the area of essential decisions, because they only rise to the level of counter-play against genuine and artificial warriordom. The reason for the temporary increase in the power of Jewry, however, lies in the fact that the metaphysics of the West, especially in its modern development, provided the starting place for the spreading of an otherwise empty rationality and calculative capacity, which in this way lodged itself in the «spirit» without being able to grasp the hidden areas of decision on its own. The more original and initial the future decisions and questions become, the more inaccessible they remain to this «race». (Thus Husserl’s move to phenomenological observation, which involves distancing oneself against psychological explanation and historical accounting of opinions, is of lasting importance — and yet nowhere does it reach into the areas of essential decisions, but rather presupposes everywhere the historical tradition of philosophy; the necessary consequence shows itself at once in the change of course into Neo-Kantian transcendental philosophy, a change of course that in the end made unavoidable a progression into Hegelianism in the formal sense. My «attack» against Husserl is not directed against him alone and not at all essential — the attack goes against the omission of the question of Being, that is, against the essence of metaphysics as such, on the basis of which the machination of being is able to determine history. The attack grounds a historical moment of the highest decision between the priority of what is and the grounding of the truth of Being.)

[2] The fact that in the age of machination race is elevated to the express and especially established «principle» of history (or only of Historie) is not the arbitrary invention of «doctrinaires», but rather a consequence of the power of machination, which must force what is, according to all its areas, into the planned calculation. By means of the thought of race, «life» is brought into the form of breedability that represents a kind of calculation. The Jews, with their emphatically calculating talent, have already been «living» for the

59 GA 96, 46–47: «Aus demselben Grunde aber ist auch jeder ”Pazifismus” und jeder ”Liberalismus” außerstande, in den Bezirk wesentlicher Entscheidungen vorzudringen, weil er es nur zum Gegenspiel gegen das echte und unechte Kriegertum bringt. Die zeitweilige Machstiegerung des Judentums aber hat darin ihren Grund, daß die Metaphysik des Abendlandes, zumal in ihrer neuzeitlichen Entfaltung, die Ansatzstelle bot für das Sichbreitmachen einer sonst leeren Rationalität und Rechenfähigkeit, die sich auf solchem Wege eine Unterkunft im ”Geist” verschaffte, ohne die verborgenen Entscheidungsbezirke von sich aus je fassen zu können. Je ursprünglicher und anfälliger die künftigen Entscheidungen und Fragen werden, umso unzugänglicher bleiben sie dieser ”Rasse”. (So ist Husserls Schritt zur phänomenologischen Betrachtung unter Absetzung gegen die psychologische Erklärung und historische Verrechnung von Meinungen von bleibender Wichtigkeit — und dennoch reicht sie nirgends in die Bezirke wesentlicher Entscheidungen, setzt vielmehr die historische Überlieferung der Philosophie überall voraus; die notwendige Folge zeigt sich alsbald im Einschwenken in die neukantische Transzendentalphilosophie, das schließlich einen Fortgang zum Hegelianismus im formalen Sinne unvermeidlich machte. Mein ”Angriff” gegen Husserl ist nicht gegen ihn allein gerichtet und überhaupt unwesentlich — der Angriff geht gegen das Versäumnis der Seinsfrage, d.h. gegen das Wesen der Metaphysik als solcher, auf deren Grund die Machenschaft des Seienden die Geschichte zu bestimmen vermag. Der Angriff gründet einen geschichtlichen Augenblick der höchsten Entscheidung zwischen dem Vorrang des Seienden und der Gründung der Wahrheit des Seyns.)

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longest time according to the principle of race, which is also why they most strongly resist the unrestricted application of the principle. The establishment of racial breeding does not stem from «life» itself, but rather from the overpowering of life by means of machination. What this machination pursues with such planning is a complete de-racing of peoples by means of the harnessing of them into the establishment of all that is, built the same and cut the same. Along with the de-racing goes an alienation of peoples from themselves — the loss of history — that is, the loss of the areas of decision next to Being. And thus are buried the only possibilities that peoples of their own primordial historical power bring themselves to unity in their counter-agility: for example, the concept that knows and the passion for sense-reflection with the depth and breadth of the uncanny [...].

[3] Why do we recognize so late that in truth England is and can be without a Western attitude? Because only in the future will we comprehend that England began to set up the modern world, but modernity, according to its essence, is directed toward the unleashing of the machination of the entire globe. The thought of an understanding with England in the sense of a distribution of the «rights» of the imperialisms also does not get at the essence of the historical process that England is now playing out within Americanism and Bolshevism, and that means, at the same time, within world Jewry too. The question about the role of world Jewry is not a racial one, but rather the metaphysical question about the kind of humanity that, without any restraints whatsoever, can take over the uprooting of all that is from Being as a world-historical «task».

Clearly Heidegger’s remarks here are (1) anti-Semitic and (2) «philosophical» (lucus a non lucendo, as Husserl would say) in the sense that they are different in kind from the usual...
biological, racial, vulgar anti-Semitism that one finds in National Socialism as conceived, preached, and practiced by Hitler, Rosenberg, Streicher, et al. Evidently, Heidegger did not share their primitive anti-Semitism. The special-specific character of Heidegger’s remarks is highlighted by the fact that he too does also make numerous other remarks that must be categorized as anti-Semitic but in a sense different from the ontologically-historically anti-Semitic sense that Trawny describes.

With respect to passages 1–3 above, however, one wonders whether it is more accurate to speak of «three types» (as Trawny does) or rather of three aspects of Heidegger’s ontological-historical anti-Semitism. Here a quotation from a different chapter, «The ontological-historical anti-Semitism», clarifies what Trawny means by the ontological-historical anti-Semitism that he attributes to Heidegger:

> The ontological-historical anti-Semitism [Der seinsgeschichtliche Antisemitismus] consists in the fact that Heidegger believes this: The Jews, who live «according to the principle of race» [nach dem Rasseprinzip], make, in the «unconditionality» of «machination» [in der «Unbedingtheit» der «Machenschaft»], this «brutalitas of Being» [diese «brutalitas des Seins»], precisely the interpretation of themselves founded on this «principle of race» [Rasseprinzip], which gives them the task of pursuing, «without any restraints whatsoever» [«schlechthin ungebunden»], «the uprooting of being» [die «Entwurzelung des Seienden»] for the purpose and goal of the «expansion» of their «power» [ihre «Machtentfaltung»]. «World Jewry» [Das «Weltjudentum»] must have appeared to him as a people [ein Volk] or as the group of a people [die Gruppe eines Volkes], who or which, with the greatest self-concentration [in höchster Selbstkonzentration], pursued no other goal than the undermining of all other peoples [die Zersetzung aller anderen Völker]: a «race» [«Rasse»] that deliberately [bewusst] pursues «the de-racing of peoples» [die «Entrassung der Völker»].

Thus Trawny argues, and, it seems, convincingly, that Heidegger’s remarks in the Black Notebooks are fraught not only with anti-Semitism generally but also with ontological-historical anti-Semitism specifically. The undeniable merits of Trawny’s book are that it clearly identifies the problem of ontological-historical anti-Semitism in Heidegger’s Black Notebooks and that it provides an accurate term for the phenomenon.

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63 Cf. the representative sampling of such remarks in Thomä, 2013, 116–117.


No reasonable person would think that Trawny’s case is weakened by the fact that Heidegger himself does not speak of «ontological-historical anti-Semitism». There is also no evidence that Heidegger thinks of himself as being anti-Semitic in any «unfair» sense.

2. TRAWNY ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HUSSERL AND HEIDEGGER

Trawny emphasizes Heidegger’s prominent mention of Husserl in the context of his own anti-Semitic statements. He also devotes an entire chapter, «Heidegger and Husserl», to the relationship between these two philosophers. Thus he seems to suggest that there is a substantive connection between Heidegger’s special anti-Semitism and his material critique of Husserl. Therefore the natural question is whether and to what extent Trawny’s analysis of Heidegger’s ontological-historical anti-Semitism casts any light on the philosophical relationship between him and Husserl. Just another way of posing the question is thus: Does Trawny show that Heidegger’s ontological-historical anti-Semitism is relevant to his philosophical critique of Husserl’s phenomenology? Or does he suggest, perhaps inadvertently, that, because it is not, one has less reason to think that Heidegger is guilty, as charged, of ontological-historical anti-Semitism?

There is a need for a very careful reading here. The passage in which Heidegger refers to Husserl in connection with his own ontological-historical anti-Semitism has already been cited, but it deserves closer scrutiny. Properly understood, the passage is a whole that consists of two parts that are in turn conjoined by one transitional but pivotal word. First, Heidegger sets the stage with a series of remarks of a general nature:

For the same reason [a gross ignorance of the essence of Being and its being beyond power and impotence], however, every «pacifism» and every «liberalism» are also not in a position to penetrate into the area of essential decisions, because they only rise to the level of counter-play against genuine and artificial warriordom. The reason for the temporary increase in the power of Jewry, however, lies in the fact that the metaphysics of the West, especially in its modern development, provided the starting place for the spreading of an otherwise empty rationality and calculative capacity, which in this way lodged itself in the «spirit» without being able to grasp the hidden areas of decision on

its own. The more original and initial the future decisions and questions become, the more inaccessible they remain to this «race».67

Then, as if to illustrate what he has said about «Jewry», Heidegger applies it, in parentheses, to Husserl, whom he does not name as a Jew, but whom every informed reader will immediately recognize as a Jewish convert to Lutheran Christianity (1886):68

[1b] (Thus Husserl’s move to phenomenological observation, which involves distancing oneself against psychological explanation and historical accounting of opinions, is of lasting importance — and yet nowhere does it reach into the areas of essential decisions, but rather presupposes everywhere the historical tradition of philosophy; the necessary consequence shows itself at once in the change of course into Neo-Kantian transcendental philosophy, a change of course that in the end made unavoidable a progression into Hegelianism in the formal sense. My «attack» against Husserl is not directed against him alone and not at all essential — the attack goes against the omission of the question of Being, that is, against the essence of metaphysics as such, on the basis of which the machination of being is able to determine history. The attack grounds a historical moment of the highest decision between the priority of what is and the grounding of the truth of Being.)69

Thus Heidegger cites Husserl as an example of a thinker whose thinking does not reach into «the areas of essential decisions». At first sight, then, Heidegger might seem to be arguing, straight-forwardly and syllogistically, (1) that all Jews are «incapable of penetrating into the areas of essential decisions and thus omit the question of Being», (2) that Husserl was a Jew, and (3) that therefore he was «incapable of penetrating into the areas of essential decisions and thus omitted the question of Being». On the other hand, it is a legitimate question whether this is a case of an anti-Semitic thinker making a prejudice-based judgment about a Jewish thinker, or a case of one, non-Jewish, thinker critically pointing out the supposed substantive shortcomings of another, Jewish, thinker. It should go without saying that Husserl did not regard himself as a Jewish philosopher;70

67 Cf. again GA 96, 46.
69 Cf. again GA 96, 46–47.
and that it does not exactly speak for Heidegger that he regards him as such here.

Trawny leads off his case that Heidegger is guilty of ontological-historical anti-Semitism with the passage in question (first 1 and then 1a and 1b above). It is both a cornerstone and the capstone of his chapter on Heidegger’s ontological-historical anti-Semitism.71 He offers the following interpretation of the passage:

Heidegger connects calculation completely generally with rationality. By doing so, he can classify [einordnen] his former teacher Edmund Husserl into a history in which a «temporary increase in the power of Jewry» condemns the «metaphysics of the West, especially in its modern development», to a lack of decisiveness [Entscheidungslosigkeit]. Heidegger speaks of an «attack» on Husserl that he, however, immediately relativizes [relativiert]. It is «not at all essential». Yet, against the background of the initial classification [Einordnung], the relativization [Relativierung] remains not credible [unglaubwürdig]. Husserl gets written [wird eingeschrieben] into a history of an «empty rationality and calculative capacity» on the basis of his belonging to a «race». One should, of course, not overlook the fact that Heidegger puts this concept in quotation marks; still, however one interprets this, it cannot moderate [abschwächen] anything about the general direction of Heidegger’s thoughts.72

What elevates the passage in question to the status of a linchpin in Trawny’s analysis, however, is the fact that it is the only one in the Black Notebooks of volumes 94–97 of the Complete Edition in which Heidegger mentions Husserl in close proximity to his anti-Semitic remarks generally or to his ontologically-historically anti-Semitic remarks specifically. According to Trawny, then, Heidegger is attacking Husserl’s philosophy by attacking his person (ad hominem), or, more precisely, his membership in a «“race”», making the fact of his Jewishness «responsible» («verantwortlich») for the failure of his phenomenology to reach into «the areas of essential decisions» and «explaining» Husserl’s phenomenology «indirectly in terms of the character of a “race”».73 This would be, and not only according to Trawny, profoundly unphilosophical.

Bracketing Trawny’s specific interpretation, what speaks for the general anti-Semitic

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reading is the fact that, while in this context he does refer to «Neo-Kantian transcendental philosophy» and «Hegelianism in the formal sense» (both these criticisms would require separate analyses), Heidegger mentions by name no other thinker than Husserl. What speaks for the neutral reading is the fact that in other places in the *Black Notebooks* Heidegger often speaks of other thinkers, both Jewish and non-Jewish, whose thinking also did not reach into «the areas of essential decisions» because, according to him, all of them, like Husserl, got so wrapped up in inquires into being(s) that they lost sight of the question of Being.\(^{74}\) To use a metaphor that Heidegger, who spent approximately fifteen years of his life studying and writing in a *Hütte* in the Schwarzwald at Todtnauberg, would have understood, they missed the forest (Being) for the trees (beings).

Yet there is a very fine line here. On the one hand, Heidegger appears to suggest that his critique of Husserl’s phenomenology is primarily philosophical. Indeed, the first thing that he does after mentioning his name is to say something positive about his phenomenological approach to philosophical topics. On the other hand, Heidegger does also seem to adduce Husserl’s philosophy as a specific example of Jewish thinking generally. One could also, but not easily, get the impression that Heidegger regards Husserl as *an unwitting member* of a «Jewish world conspiracy» that sought the deracination of all being(s) from the ground of Being and the de-racing of all peoples from the history of Being. Seldom have two letters spoken so many, or so few, volumes as they do in the word «So» that Heidegger uses to link, logically or not, the two parts of this one passage. But what exactly does this translated word «Thus» signify?\(^{75}\) What is its force? What is its valence? At least, it is evident that Trawny is wrong to impute to Heidegger the view that «the temporary increase in the power of Jewry» is the cause of which the effect is «the inability of modern Western metaphysics» to pose «the decisive question about Being», for Heidegger says the opposite.\(^{76}\) If Trawny is wrong about this basic fact of the case, then he may also be wrong about the connections that Heidegger is making between «the power of Jewry», Western metaphysics, and Husserl’s phenomenology.

\(^{74}\) Cf., e.g., GA 94, 345.

\(^{75}\) Obviously the «So» in question can also be translated as «In this way».

\(^{76}\) Cf. GA 96, 46–47, and Trawny, 2014, 37, 39.
In fact, there is another, completely different, more nuanced, and preeminently tenable, reading of the passage in question, and it is one that runs directly counter to Trawny’s interpretation. One may, namely, understand Heidegger to be saying *expressis verbis* that his «attack» on Husserl had nothing to do with his Jewishness but rather was primarily, if not purely, philosophical in nature. One may, that is, understand Heidegger to be saying that Husserl’s phenomenology represents a case study in «the essence of metaphysics as such», which favors being(s) and forgets Being and is therefore vulnerable to his «attack». On this reading, one should not follow Trawny and dismiss Heidegger’s qualification of his generalization without further ado as «not credible». Because this seems to be the most sensible prima facie reading of the passage in question, one should, on a judicious interpretation, understand Heidegger to be saying precisely this. Thus, due to his ontological-historical anti-Semitism, Heidegger does single out «the Jews», but, despite his ontological-historical anti-Semitism, he does not single out «the Jew Husserl». Indeed, the only reason why Heidegger «singles out» Husserl in this passage is to emphasize that he is *not singling him out*. Therefore there seems to be not only conceivable doubt but also reasonable doubt as to whether Heidegger is using Husserl as a Jewish thinker to advance the ontological-historical anti-Semitic reading of the development of modern Western metaphysics. Finally, it is crucial to register again the fact that there are two parts to Heidegger’s argument in the passage in question, namely, (1) that «the reason for the temporary increase in the power of Jewry» was «the failure of the metaphysics of the West to penetrate into the area of essential decisions», and (2) that Husserl’s phenomenology is part not of «the temporary increase in the power of Jewry» but of «the metaphysics of the West in its modern development». It is evident, then, that, however false and even perverse point (1) may be, Heidegger criticizes Husserl on point (2) not for personal but for philosophical reasons, that is, because he thinks that phenomenology is a philosophical approach that neglects or omits the question of Being in order to investigate beings. In a word, Heidegger’s criticism of Husserl is not that he is Jewish but that he is Western, and he goes out of his way to make this clear by adding a lengthy clarification in parentheses.

To be clear: Heidegger is guilty, as charged by Trawny, of ontological-historical anti-Semitism. And, if he is saying that due to their «(")race(”)» all Jewish thinkers fail to achieve access to «the area of essential decisions», then his saying that due to
other «reasons» some non-Jewish thinkers also fail to do so cannot save him from the charge of ontological-historical anti-Semitism. But does Heidegger say anywhere in the Black Notebooks that have been published thus far that anyone other than he himself has succeeded in achieving access to «the area of essential decisions» with respect to Being? And does he use Husserl’s Jewishness against him in his criticism of his philosophy? Or can it be that in making an apparent exception for Husserl to his generalization about Jews Heidegger is playing the usual National Socialist game of «the exceptional Jew»?77 In light of the importance of the matter, one should in any case avoid the precipitous conclusion that Heidegger mentions Husserl here because of his own anti-Semitism, ontological-historical or other.

3. MISSING LINKS IN TRAWNY’S ANALYSIS OF THE HEIDEGGER-HUSSERL RELATIONSHIP

As corroborative evidence for a more nuanced reading than Trawny’s, one need only take into account two other passages in the Black Notebooks in which Heidegger mentions Husserl, but in which he does not refer to his or anyone else’s being Jewish. These passages are not from volume 96 but from volume 94 of the Complete Edition, so it is possible to overlook their direct relevance to the issue at hand.

In the first passage, Heidegger, expressing irritation at the cool reception of his recently published On the Essence of Ground (1929), says with respect to Husserl:

*Hier ist es over with the accounting for «influences» and dependences on Husserl, Dilthey, Kierkegaard, and whatever their names are. Here what should count — if at all — is to get serious about a confrontation with antiquity and with the repeated problem of Being. Instead of that, the prattle obviously mounts up from week to week.*78


Heidegger proceeds to criticize «the idle talk about “philosophy of existence”» («das Gerede über die “Existenzphilosophie”») and those who may be «influenced» by Kierkegaard, Kant, and Hegel, those who «talk like» Hartmann or Cassirer, and those who hold «some rootless and homeless “universal opinion”» («irgendwelche wurzel- und heimatlose “allgemeine Meinung”»). Of all the thinkers who are named in this entry, the only ones who are Jewish are Husserl and Ernst Cassirer (1874–1945). As is well known, significant philosophical differences between Heidegger and Cassirer, especially with respect to their varying interpretations of Kant, emerged at their Davos Dispute (1929).

In the second passage, Heidegger, criticizing what he regards as a series of unsuccessful attempts by the thinkers of the Western metaphysical tradition to recapture the original sense of the question of Being, says with respect to Husserl and Scheler:

[...] It all stayed the same. The phenomenologists (Husserl and Scheler) achieved one thing: they awakened direct questioning — questioning turned toward the things themselves (intuition — essence), that is, something of the attitude of antiquity. But [it remained] rootless and submissive to the 19th century — in its schemata and «problems».

Max Scheler (1874–1928), of course, was the son of a Lutheran father and an Orthodox Jewish mother who turned to Catholicism in his adolescence but in his maturity eschewed Catholicism as well as Jewish-Christianity and embraced humanistic philosophical anthropology. Despite his partial Jewish ancestry, however, Heidegger held him in the highest regard, and, after his death, recalled him as «the strongest philosophical force in modern Germany, nay, in contemporary Europe, and even in contemporary philosophy as such». In this long entry, Heidegger also mentions, in order of appearance, Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Hegel, Nietzsche, Jaspers, Weber, Kant, and Kierkegaard. Given that no one on this list is Jewish, there can be no issue here of an ontologically-historically anti-Semitic interpretation of the history of the question of Being.

79 Cf. GA 94, 32.
83 Cf. GA 94, 48–51.
Being, Jaspers’s Jewish wife Gertrud (née Mayer) notwithstanding.84

In fact, Trawny neglects to weigh adequately these other two passages, in which Heidegger refers to Husserl in connection with specifically and exclusively philosophical concerns, and mentions his name as only one in a series of names of thinkers past and present, very few of whom are Jewish or have Jewish relations. If one argues that in passages 1a and 1b above Heidegger is denying what simply must be true, namely, that his «attack on Husserl» is motivated by ontological-historical anti-Semitism (an expression, again, that Heidegger does not use), then this approach can only rest on a presumption of guilt. No reasonable reader will fail, however, to apply the legal-hermeneutical principle of in dubio pro reo in reading any author, including Heidegger, whom he or she seeks genuinely to understand on their own terms. The accused is granted the benefit of the doubt, or in case of doubt one must find for the accused.

Yet the most serious problem with Trawny’s attempt to establish a connection between Heidegger’s ontological-historical anti-Semitism and his criticism of Husserl is its selectivity. Thus Trawny also neglects to account for Heidegger’s philosophical critique of Husserl in still other places in the Black Notebooks. In a long passage from volume 97 of the Complete Edition, for example, Heidegger writes this about Husserl:

Has he who utters in thought the principle «to the things themselves» already proved himself as the one with a knowledge of the things themselves? No. He can still unsuspectingly commit an oversight in the matter of thinking and by such an oversight act most unsuspectingy against his own principle — still unable to sacrifice the principle too to the thing. The matter of thinking could demand that the principle in essence transform itself.

«That something (what?) shows itself from out of itself» — is not only another formulation of the principle that the description be appropriate to the thing. Already in that turn of phrase is speaking the turning of thinking to Ἀλήθεια as an essential feature of Being itself in the sense of presence. Husserl not only knows nothing about all this; he resists it. One should really just look up the «Afterword» of the seventy-two year old to the Ideas and recognize that there the same is recorded as the Logos-article of 1910 says. Despite this, the Logical Investigations were a stimulus, not the execution, and not the ability to think the experience of Ἀλήθεια from out of the experience of the forgottenness of Being.85

84 In this connection, Gregory Fried once suggested to me that for Heidegger Plato was «the first Jew» (!). I agreed, but we both added that, if this is Heidegger’s way of thinking, then it is laden with questionable prejudices and tendentious presuppositions.

85 GA 97, 442: «Hat sich, wer im Denken das Prinzip “zu den Sachen selbst” ausspricht, der schon als der Sachkundige bewährt? Nein. Er kann sich in der Sache des Denkens noch arg versehen und bei solchem Versehen am ärgsten gegen sein eigenes Prinzip handeln — unvermögend, auch das Prinzip noch der Sache zu opfern. Die
Heidegger draws a harsh conclusion: «By means of a mere principle of this kind (To the things themselves!) one does not yet become one who knows the things themselves.»86

Lest one think that here Heidegger is arguing against Husserl as a Jew, one should note that he continues with general observations about «the genuine teacher» and «learning»:

The genuine teacher does not present propositions and rules. He lets learn. Learning prepares itself to experience, to repeat and to anticipate, what it at first means and has straightaway seen.

Letting learn gives freedom [to learners] for the arrival of the thing; brings [them] into the journeyship among the things.87

Expressing not only a philosophical but also a pedagogical critique of Husserl, Heidegger applies these general observations to the particular case of his former teacher:

In his time between 1890 and 1900, Husserl was, through his Logical Investigations, a teacher, even though the foundation of these investigations still moved completely within the traditional field of the doctrine of consciousness. The fact that here, vis-à-vis all empty and accidental argumentation and historical assertion, he simply risked the step into letting see, remains his historical position. Precisely this [is what] his mere adherents and propagandists do not want to see. The false admiration for his later philosophy makes him look ridiculous and makes of him, against his will, a bungler. Everyone who learns, however, is silent about the teacher.88

In these and such passages, one comes closer to a genuine understanding of Heidegger’s

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86 GA 97, 442: «Durch ein bloßes Prinzip dieser Art (Zu den Sachen selbst!) wird man noch nicht ein Sachkundiger.»

87 GA 97, 442–443: «Der echte Lehrer trägt nicht Sätze und Regeln vor. Er läßt lernen. Das Lernen schickt sich an, zu erfahren, zurück- und vorzunehmen, was es zunächst meint und alsbald gesehen hat.

Lernen-lassen gibt frei für die Ankunft der Sache; bringt in die Wanderschaft inmitten der Sachen. — »

philosophical criticism of Husserl in his *Black Notebooks*. They contain no evidence of anti-Semitism, ontological-historical or other, and they are consistent with what is otherwise known of Heidegger’s philosophical critique of Husserl’s phenomenology.\(^8^9\)

Yet this is not the only evidence from volume 97 of the *Complete Edition* that casts doubt on Trawny’s attempt to arrange passages from Heidegger’s *Black Notebooks* in such a way as to show that his ontological-historical anti-Semitism plays a key role in his philosophical critique of Husserl or vice versa. In another passage, in which he again emphasizes that his critical relationship with Husserl had nothing to do with the latter’s Jewishness, Heidegger writes:

*Husserl.* — Ever since Husserl, from 1930/31, in lectures that were really rather rallies (in Berlin and Frankfurt), publicly took position against me and repudiated my work as un-philosophy (cf. the Afterword to his «Ideas» (1930/31)), I have passed him by. I have never undertaken the slightest thing against Husserl. One lies, saying that I expelled him from the university and forbade [him] access to the library. Husserl had been emeritus, at his own wish, since 1928; since then he never again lectured or gave a seminar; he never used the university library, apart from a few exceptions in the years 1920 ff. What was there to expel? His works were never removed from the department library, as that was required for Jewish authors; just as little was ever a National-Socialist book, for example, [one by] Rosenberg and others, acquired, or, as required and also done in the other departments, was ever a «picture of the Führer» hung. I am saying this not by way of defense, but only as a statement, to which this too belongs, namely, that, between 1933 and 44, I, exactly as earlier, in the same objectivity, pointed out the significance of Husserl’s phenomenology and the necessity of the study of the «Logical Investigations». There was never uttered a word of criticism, which in fact would have been possible and justified and not a crime, neither in the lectures nor in the seminars.\(^9^0\)

\(^{8^9}\) Cf. Thomä, 2013, 35–44.

Besides taking a clear position against a widespread but unfounded rumor that would circulate for a long time to come,\textsuperscript{91} this passage also clearly does not fit into the picture that Trawny is painting of Heidegger’s ontological-historical anti-Semitism and its alleged impact on his philosophical critique of Husserl’s phenomenology.

One must, of course, concede, as the strange reference to Husserl’s «rallies» («Kundgebungen») in Berlin and other places suggests, that some of Heidegger’s language in these passages can be tasteless. He speaks, for example, of «propaganda» against his own way of thinking and of «a great falsification of history»:

I passed Husserl by; that was a painful necessity. One would have interpreted any other attitude of mine too only as a polite gesture. Whoever speaks of «heinous betrayal», however, does not know that he is only talking revenge and knows nothing of that which happened early: that my own way of thinking was interpreted as defection, that one took refuge in propaganda when my way was not to be stopped otherwise. One is now staging a great falsification of history.\textsuperscript{92}

One must also recognize, however, that Heidegger focuses on the fact that the break between him and Husserl had other, philosophical and professional, reasons, and that it had occurred «long before there was talk of National Socialism and persecution of Jews»:

It seems to me, however, that my essays since «Being and Time» are the most worthy testimony for that which I owe Husserl — that I learned from him and testified for his way by the fact that I did not remain his follower, which I also never was. But precisely this violated the rules of the house, long before there was talk of National Socialism and persecution of Jews. Because the slurs and abuses are still in vogue even in the year 1948, [and] no one takes the pains to judge objectively on the basis of objective knowledge or even to go into my writings and to cite the otherwise much used lectures as testimonies for my thinking, let this be once again noted, not for the public, not as a defense, but rather as a statement. Cf. Teacher.\textsuperscript{93}


\textsuperscript{92} GA 97, 463: «Ich bin an Husserl vorbeigegangen; das war eine schmerzliche Notwendigkeit. Man hätte auch jede andere Haltung von mir nur als höfliche Geste ausgelegt. Wer aber von verabscheuungswürdigem Verrat redet, weiß nicht, daß er nur Rache redet und von dem, was früh geschah, nichts weiß: daß mein eigener Weg des Denkens als Abfall ausgelegt wurde, daß man zur Propaganda die Zuflucht nahm, als mein Weg anders nicht aufzuhalten war. Man inszeniert jetzt eine große Geschichtsfälscherei.»

\textsuperscript{93} GA 97, 463: «Mir scheint aber, daß meine Versuche seit “Sein und Zeit” das würdigste Zeugnis für das sind, was ich Husserl verdanke — daß ich von ihm lernte und für seinen Weg zeugte dadurch, daß ich nicht sein Anhänger blieb, der ich auch nie war. Aber genau dieses verstieß gegen die Hausordnung, lange vor dem, daß von Nationalsozialismus und Judenverfolgung die Rede war. Weil auch noch im Jahre 1948 die Verunglimpfungen und Schmähungen im Schwange sind, niemand sich die Mühe nimmt, sachlich aus Sachkenntnis zu urteilen oder gar auf meine Schriften einzugehen und die sonst viel benutzten Vorlesungen als Zeugnisse meines Denkens
The fact that Husserl understandably weighted their personal and political differences differently from Heidegger does not necessarily support Trawny’s argument that there is a substantive connection between Heidegger’s ontological-historical anti-Semitism and his philosophical critique of Husserl’s phenomenology.

Thus, in arguing that Heidegger’s critique of Husserl in his *Black Notebooks* is motivated by ontological-historical anti-Semitism, Trawny overestimates the weight of one important passage from volume 96 of the *Complete Edition*, but underestimates the weights of several other equally important passages from volumes 94 and 97.94 Only by doing so can Trawny make a connection between Heidegger’s ontological-historical anti-Semitism and his critique of Husserl, and even emphasize the alleged connection, in a way in which Heidegger does not. Indeed, Heidegger appears to want to do the opposite.

Despite the order of Trawny’s presentation of quotations in his chapter on types of ontological-historical anti-Semitism, then, his chapter on Heidegger and Husserl does not strengthen his case that Heidegger is guilty of ontological-historical anti-Semitism. Although Trawny does appeal to the usual tropes in this connection, those pieces of evidence only suffice to establish Heidegger’s «folkish» (*sit venia verbo: »völkisch«*) and academic anti-Semitism, which was already well known and generally acknowledged before the publication of any of the *Black Notebooks*. Thus Heidegger’s earlier statements indicating his «horror» at the «Jewification of our culture and universities», his becoming «a spiritual anti-Semite», his fear that «everything is flooded with Jews and pushers», his being «an anti-Semite in university matters», his belief in «a dangerous international network of [the] Jews», and his defamation of «the Jew Fraenkel» are indefensible and reprehensible, but they do not appear to be directed against Husserl in particular. Yet it is also clear that Trawny does not need to demonstrate that Heidegger is guilty of ontological-historical anti-Semitism in regard to Husserl in order to prove that he is guilty of ontological-historical anti-Semitism in a broader and deeper sense. In any case, there is strong circumstantial evidence that Heidegger’s world-view, which was not cosmopolitan but regional, not to say provincial, was colored by cultural anti-Semitism, which was

then transformed into academic anti-Semitism. In this respect, his philosophy did not overcome his Weltanschauung; rather, his Weltanschauung determined his philosophy. This finding fits into the intellectual landscape of the first decades of the twentieth century, a time during which Husserl attempted to distinguish between philosophy as rigorous science and philosophy as world-view, Jaspers tried to employ psychology and philosophy to understand world-views, and Heidegger was skeptical of the distinction between philosophies and world-views.95

In the end, Trawny’s position on the possibility that Heidegger’s philosophical critique of Husserl is «tainted» by ontological-historical anti-Semitism remains more than a little ambiguous. Hence he concludes the chapter with more questions than answers:

The question remains — who spoke when of «persecution of Jews» [«Judenverfolgung»]? Heidegger, in any case, never speaks of it. Yet, as he recalls the break with Husserl, this word incidentally occurs [cf. GA 97, 54, and Trawny, Heidegger und der Mythos der jüdischen Weltverschwörung, 86]. Why does Heidegger emphasize that the break occurred long before the «talk» of «National Socialism and persecution of the Jews»? Is Heidegger thinking of the time after the war, in which one could speak freely about the «persecution of the Jews» but this freedom was not used to do that? Or is Heidegger thinking of the 1930s? Is he thinking of the anti-Semitic propaganda? Was there «talk» in it of the «persecution of the Jews»? Is Heidegger thinking of secret conversations, of encounters, in which one expressed one’s revulsion at the rumors of the camps? Can these be at all connected with Husserl? When did Heidegger know about the «persecution of the Jews»?96

Therefore, however right Trawny is about Heidegger’s ontological-historical anti-Semitism in general, it is clear that Heidegger’s sparse remarks on Husserl in the published Black Notebooks do not support the view that Heidegger applies his ontological-historical anti-Semitism to the case of Husserl’s phenomenology in particular.

Naturally, one cannot know with absolute, adequate, and apodictic certainty that there is no anti-Semitism or ontological-historical anti-Semitism whatsoever in Heidegger’s critique of Husserl in the Black Notebooks. For it is one thing to argue that Heidegger’s «attack» on Husserl is primarily philosophical in character, and another thing to claim that it is purely philosophical in nature. A remnant of doubt is ineradicable. Yet the fact that Trawny’s suggested reading is not inconceivable does not mean that

it is plausible. Moreover, although Trawny points out that one must get beyond the personal and political dimensions in determining whether «Heidegger’s philosophical rejection of Husserlian phenomenology was contaminated by an ontological-historical anti-Semitism», it does not appear that in his cursory treatment of their relationship he gets into the decisive areas of the philosophical and professional objections that Heidegger raised against Husserl.

Yet Trawny’s relevant chapter has one virtue. For due to the fact that it does not shed very much light on the relationship between Husserl and Heidegger with respect to philosophical topics, positions, and arguments, it practically exhorts the curious reader to reconsider the philosophical relationship between Husserl and Heidegger. So a new understanding of their relationship should replace the average-everyday-vague understanding with which one usually operates and which has been widely accepted. On this understanding, or, more precisely, misunderstanding, the philosophical relationship between Husserl and Heidegger flourished from Husserl’s arrival in Freiburg in the summer of 1916 to their failed attempt to compose together an article on phenomenology for the Encyclopaedia Britannica in the fall of 1927.

CONCLUSION: FROM TRAWNY’S BOOK
TO ANOTHER LOOK AT HEIDEGGER’S CRITIQUE OF HUSSERL

In Heidegger and the Myth of the Jewish World Conspiracy, Peter Trawny succeeds in making a compelling case that Heidegger is guilty of a kind of anti-Semitism that he, Trawny, accurately labels «ontological-historical anti-Semitism». Yet he fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Heidegger’s ontological-historical anti-Semitism is the reason for, or is even substantively connected to, his philosophical critique of Husserl’s phenomenology. To the contrary, although Trawny leads off his elucidation of Heidegger’s ontological-historical anti-Semitism with the only passage of the Black Notebooks of volumes 94–97 of the Complete Edition in which Heidegger mentions Husserl in the context of his own anti-Semitic remarks, in that very passage Heidegger goes out of his

way to make clear that his «attack» on Husserl is based on his conviction that his former mentor, like many other thinkers who are named elsewhere, both Jewish and non-Jewish, got lost in inquiries into being(s) and did not find his (or their) way to the question of Being. There is only one passage in these Black Notebooks that mentions Husserl and "Jewry" ("Judentum") in close proximity to one another, it is not suited to play the role of «the smoking gun», and Trawny's book does not contain a single example of an anti-Semitic remark of any kind by Heidegger against Husserl himself or his philosophy from any other time before, during, or after their relationship.

Yet the real problem with Heidegger’s mention of Husserl in the only passage in these Black Notebooks in which he names him in close proximity to remarks that can be construed as ontologically-historically anti-Semitic in Trawny’s stipulated sense, namely, the two-part passage on pages 46–47 of volume 96 of the Complete Edition, is actually one that Trawny does not address. It is the problem of indeterminacy due to over-determinacy. It is evident, namely, from the many and different contexts of these Black Notebooks that Heidegger posits a number of overlapping as well as underlapping factors that have allegedly led philosophers to neglect the question of Being in favor of their inquiries into being(s). Such factors include, but are not limited to, whether they have taken one or some or all of the following approaches to the question: (1) «Jewish», (2) «Platonic», (3) «Christian», (4) «Western», (5) «metaphysical», (6) «modern», and (7) «essentialist». Whatever these designations are supposed to mean (and this is not the place to reconstitute their precise meanings from the Black Notebooks), this is a long and tall list of supposed philosophical shortcomings to overcome. According to Heidegger, of course, Husserl shares all of them. Heidegger was willing, however, to listen to and learn from Husserl until sometime between the first edition of the Logical Investigations (1900/1901) and the Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy (1913). In the Black Notebooks, Heidegger once again makes clear that, on top of everything else, Husserl’s turn from philosophy as descriptive psychology to philosophy as transcendental phenomenology, accompanied by a rigorously scientific insistence on the method of reduction and eidetic intuition, meant that he could no longer follow him who had, in his own eyes, forsaken «the things themselves» in favor of thoughts of the things themselves as such (noemata). Yet this departure of the student from the way of the teacher has been known and understood for a long time, and it has never been connected with anti-
Semitism, ontological-historical or other, on Heidegger’s part.

In the end, one is left wondering: Given that Heidegger thinks that he has so much to criticize Husserl for, why does he even mention his name in the vicinity of any of his own anti-Semitic remarks? Heidegger says that it is because he is emphasizing that his critique is strictly philosophical and has nothing to do with the Jewish question, whereas Trawny seeks to exploit the sheer proximity of the mention in order to bolster his case for Heidegger’s ontological-historical anti-Semitism. While Heidegger’s double denial is forceful, there remains a conceivable doubt that one can exploit by an uncharitable reading. The indeterminacy about whether Heidegger’s critique of Husserl in these Black Notebooks is purely, or rather only primarily, philosophical in nature, rests on the over-determinacy of his criticisms. Yet one of the most effective ways to weaken a strong argument is to overstate it. Thus Trawny may have weakened his case for Heidegger’s ontological-historical anti-Semitism by overstating it with respect to Husserl. He shows that Heidegger is guilty of anti-Semitism generally and of ontological-historical anti-Semitism specifically, but just not with respect to Husserl individually. By emphasizing the one and only passage that suggests his reading, however, Trawny distracts the readers of the Black Notebooks from other, equally important, passages, which support a different interpretation.

In his chapter on the relationship between Heidegger and Husserl, Trawny also says that one must get beyond the personal and political dimensions of their relationship, but he does not get into the decisive philosophical and professional areas of their differences. To sketch just three leitmotifs, one should begin with (1) Heidegger’s critique of Husserl’s emphasis on the primacy of the theoretical, proceed through (2) his rejection of Husserl’s fixation on consciousness (Bewusstsein) as constituting Being and his adoption of his own focus on Dasein as disclosing Being (Sein or Seyn), and end with (3) his position that Husserl’s phenomenological reduction yields only the essences

99 Cf. again GA 96, 46–47, and GA 97, 462–463.
of thoughts (noemata) as «given» in eidetic intuitions but not «the things themselves» as they present themselves in their Being.\(^{103}\) In the end, Trawny’s analysis of the relationship between Heidegger and Husserl adds little to our philosophical understanding of it.

Yet, in light of the shortcomings of Trawny’s account, one is left wondering whether Husserl and Heidegger were ever personally and philosophically really that close in the first place.\(^{104}\) In fact, already in early 1917, barely a year after Husserl’s arrival in Freiburg as Heinrich Rickert’s successor in 1916,\(^ {105}\) Heidegger reports to his wife Elfride that he cannot accept Husserl’s phenomenology as a «finality» because in terms of its «approach» and its «goal» «it is […] too narrow and [too] bloodless», whereas «life is too rich and too great», so that someone who is «only a logician» in search of «the absolute» cannot find «the liberating way» to «a shaping of relativities».\(^ {106}\) Also, in 1919 Heidegger writes to Elfride that, although «with many more horizons and problems» he is «above and beyond [Husserl]», he has chosen «cooperation» with him because «personal» considerations are less important than «scientific» — and «practical» — ones.\(^ {107}\) At the beginning of 1920, moreover, Heidegger describes to Elfride how they are «on the way to a genuine, simple, and elementary grasping of life» together, but how he is «separated» by «worlds» from Husserl with a «great contrast» between them, and that therefore he must, «solely in order to preserve us materially», find a way to get along with him «without violent conflict».\(^ {108}\) These statements, combined with his later account of his way into phenomenology, indicate that long before the years 1927–1931 Heidegger was critical of Husserl’s phenomenology, and that his critique was due to a considerable extent to his rejection of his mentor’s turn from phenomenology understood as descriptive

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\(^{103}\)Cf. Husserl, 1976, §§ 63–127, and Heidegger, 1969/2007, 74–82. Heidegger’s account of his way into phenomenology makes it clear that he was intrigued by the questions that the Logical Investigations raised but he did not think that the Ideas I provided the answers. To the contrary, he suggests that the move from the earlier work to the later represents not progress toward but regress away from «the things themselves». Cf. Pöggeler, 1963/1983, 67–80.

\(^{104}\)See Heffernan, 2016. The following paragraph sketches some of the evidence from that study.


\(^{106}\)Cf. Heidegger, Letter to Elfride Heidegger, Pentecost Sunday (May 27), 1917, in Heidegger, 2005, 57. Martin Heidegger and Elfride Petri were married on March 21, 1917.


psychology in the *Logical Investigations* (1900/1901) to phenomenology redefined as transcendental idealism in the *Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy* (1913). Already by 1923, Heidegger was writing to Jaspers that Husserl «has become completely unglued […] if he was ever “in one piece” […] he is speaking in such trivialities that one must pity him». Also in 1923, Heidegger tells Löwith that he has «burned and destroyed» Husserl’s *Ideas* in his seminar, as well as that, looking back to the *Logical Investigations*, he has come to «the conviction that Husserl was never a philosopher, not even for one second of his life [Huss(erl) war nie auch nur eine Sekunde seines Lebens Philosoph]». At work on *Being and Time* in the spring of 1926, Heidegger reports to Jaspers that Husserl «finds the whole thing disconcerting and “no longer accommodates” it in the usual phenomenology», from which Heidegger concludes that he is «de facto already further away» from Husserl than he himself thought. In the winter of 1926, Heidegger writes to Jaspers that, if *Being and Time* is «written “against someone”, then against Husserl», adding that Husserl «also saw that immediately» but «from the beginning stuck to the positive». Indeed, Husserl had sensed, however vaguely and obscurely, a great deal of the personal and philosophical alienation between himself and Heidegger long before he alluded to it in his public lectures. At the end of 1927, for example, Husserl reported to Roman Ingarden that «[he] had unfortunately not determined [Heidegger’s] philosophical education [philosophische Ausbildung]» and that «[Heidegger] was apparently already peculiar [offenbar war er schon in Eigenart] as he studied [his own, i.e., Husserl’s] writings». In the summer of 1929, finally, after he

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109Cf. again Heidegger, 1969/2007, 74–82. This source, though composed in 1963 and 1969, is consistent with what is known of Heidegger’s development between his study of Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* and his reading of his *Ideas I*.  
111Cf. the source cited in Thomä, 2013, 40.  
had often been warned that Heidegger’s phenomenology was different from and hostile to his own, had often been warned that Heidegger’s phenomenology was different from and hostile to his own,117 Husserl, in the face of Heidegger’s dismissive denials of such «nonsense», studied Being and Time as well as other works of his former assistant in order to arrive at «a sober and final position on the H[eidegger]ian philosophy», only to come to «the distressing conclusion that [he] had nothing to do with this H[eidegger]ian profundity [Tiefsinn], this ingenious unscientificality [diese geniale Unwissenschaftlichkeit], that H[eidegger]’s open and hidden critique was based on gross misunderstanding, and that he was involved in the formation of a philosophical system of the kind which he [Husserl] had always considered it [his own] life’s work to make forever impossible».119 Therefore it is understandable how already in 1946 Heidegger could write, in an essay that would only be published in 2000, that he had «from the beginning and always stood outside the philosophical position of Husserl in the sense of a transcendental philosophy of consciousness».120

Finally, one should note that the Complete Edition is not yet complete, not even in terms of the Black Notebooks. The present paper restricts itself to the Black Notebooks of volumes 94–97 of the Complete Edition. For the present time, then, an adequate answer to the question about the full extent of Heidegger’s ontological-historical anti-Semitism, as well as about the relevance of this special-specific anti-Semitism to the philosophical relationship between Husserl and Heidegger, must remain open.121

REFERENCES


117 And after Heidegger’s Inaugural Lecture at Freiburg, «What Is Metaphysics?» (July 24, 1929).
118 Husserl’s marginalia to Heidegger’s Being and Time and Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics have been edited by R. Breeur (see References) and translated in Husserl, 1997, 258–472.
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