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THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
Dmitry SHLAPENTOKH
Ph.D. (Hist.), Associate Professor, Indiana University (Indiana, South Bend, the U.S.).
GEORGIA'S FLIRTATION WITH IRAN AND ITS GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS
Abstract
W
ith the decline of both the U.S. and Russia and with no visible single center of power in Eurasia, the small
states of Eurasia have been engaging in geopolitical flirtation with several stronger powers, even when these stronger powers are
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at loggerheads with each other. The desire to switch geopolitical loyalty, or at least distribute it among other states, is especially tempting when the leaders of these small states think they have been betrayed. This has been the case with the Georgian elite. Originally strongly pro-American, it was frustrated in its expectations after the Russo-
Georgian War when Washington did not provide Tbilisi with the anticipated backing. At that point, Georgia engaged in extensive flirtation with Iran. Following the policy of the pragmatic geopolitical game, Tbilisi tried to maintain relations with both Tehran and Washington despite the bitter conflict between the U.S. and Iran.
Introduction
Since the Rose Revolution (2003), Georgia has been the staunchest supporter of the U.S. It was assumed that Georgia would be hostile toward any regime that was hostile to the U.S. However, a few years ago, Georgia started to flirt with the regimes and countries that could hardly be seen as allies of the U.S. Mikhail Saakashvili had an amicable meeting with Alexander Lukashenko, the Belarusian president, who is known in the West as the "last dictator in Europe," and dramatically improved Georgia's relations with Iran, the archenemy of the U.S. This indicates not just Iran's increasing role in the geopolitical game, but is also a sign of how quickly alliances change. It also initiated the emerging multipolar world. It differs not only from the unipolar world that emerged after the collapse of the U.S.S.R., but also from that of the Cold War. Indeed, during the Cold War era, the global power/influence was distributed between two major global powers—the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Under the new arrangements, power became increasingly diffused among several regional power centers. Iran is emerging as one of them and is increasing its influence in various parts of the globe, including the former U.S.S.R. And it does this at the expense of global powers such as the U.S.
Georgia as an Ally of the U.S.
Georgia is one of the unstable states in the post-Soviet space with a tradition of violence that goes back to the end of Soviet era. It was then, in 1989, that Soviet troops used violence to suppress the demonstrations. When the U.S.S.R. collapsed, the government of Zviad Gamsakhurdia was installed. It did not survive very long, and Georgia lapsed into a bitter civil war. Later, the government of Eduard Shevardnadze, the former Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, emerged. However, Shevardnadze was neither able to improve the economic conditions of the country, nor overcome the rampant corruption, and was overthrown during the revolution of 2003. The new government of Mikhail Saakashvili was conspicuously pro-Western, to be more exact, pro-American. His policy was to make Georgia not just Western but, in a way, more Western than the West itself. The government completely deregulated the economy, and some members of the government even accused the West of betraying its own free market principles. Saakashvili was also engaged in an ambitious plan to eradicate corruption. This was, indeed, a most ambitious enterprise if we recall that Georgia had the reputation of one of the most corrupt republics of the U.S.S.R., corruption that increased even more when Georgia became an independent state. Many observers asserted that no one could deal with the corruption. According to them, it was part of the national tradition and could only be eradicated through a blood bath. Despite the assertions of the skeptics, Saakashvili achieved impressive results in dealing with corruption, which is acknowledged even by those who are quite critical of his regime.
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The fight against corruption has been interwoven with a sort of egalitarianism. I was told during my recent trip to Georgia that Saakashvili wanted to travel in the same airplane as ordinary citizens and that he only abandoned his plans when he was advised that this would create a serious problem for the other passengers. The regime also engaged in an unpresidential reinterpretation of Georgian history. The new leadership's approach to Stalin could be quite telling. The Georgians were very attached to Stalin, not because they approved of his policies, but plainly because he was the most famous Georgian in history. This approach is not unique and has become especially pronounced among many nations that were part of either the Warsaw Treaty or the U.S.S.R. National pride has led many of them to choose the most unsavory characters as national heroes. For example, this is the case with the part of Ukraine where some Ukrainians made Symon Petliura, a nationalist and fascist antiSemite, their national hero. Some segments of Georgian society clearly disapprove of such an approach to the past. Stalin's statue was finally removed from its place in Gori—his birthplace—and erected on the grounds of the Russian Occupation Museum. This notion of "Russian Occupation" also implied a post-Soviet interpretation of history and revising it to suit new post-Soviet Georgia. It implied that not just the era of the czar, but also of the U.S.S.R., was the time of the Russian empire when ethnic Russians dominated and abused all the non-Russian minorities, the Georgians among them. While this notion of Georgian suffering from Russian domination is highly questionable, it can be noted that quite a few Russian nationalists regarded the U.S.S.R. as a state of minorities where they lorded over helpless ethnic Russians—it was still a revolutionary move in way. Indeed, Georgia was possibly the only post-Soviet state that made a bloody tyrant out of its most famous son and discarded the notion that he should be seen as a role model in any way. The notion is accepted by young Georgians.
When I raised the question of Stalin's legacy in a conversation with a young Georgian, asking how Georgians could treat Stalin in such a disgraceful way when he was the most famous of the Georgians, my acquaintance noted that the fact that Stalin was the most famous Georgian meant nothing. Indeed, he stated, the fact that Hitler was the most famous German does not mean that present-day Germans should keep his statue in German cities.
This pro-Western approach is deeply connected with strong pro-American feelings and policies. Georgians fully supported the American war in Afghanistan and sent Georgian soldiers to fight there. This rapprochement with Washington went along with the increasing tension with Moscow, which actually preceded Saakashvili victory. Indeed, as early as 2002, Moscow accused Tbilisi of implicit support of the Chechen rebels. Moscow stated that Chechens and other fighters had found refuge in some regions of Georgia1 and implicitly accused Tbilisi of doing nothing to prevent this. While the tension between Moscow and Tbilisi rose early on, it became even stronger after Saakashvili's victory and his increasing gravitation toward Washington. Taking a strong anti-Russian stand, he clearly wanted to separate Georgia from Moscow. Saakashvili demanded that Moscow remove Russia's military bases from Georgia and increasingly demonstrated his intention to take South Ossetia and Abkhazia by force if needed. Both ethnic enclaves were formally a part of Georgia, but actually became independent states, if not de jure, at least de facto, after the bloody wars that followed the collapse of the U.S.S.R. Their independence was supported by the presence of the Russian peacekeeper. The friction between Moscow and Washington, which seemed to be ready to support Georgia in the event of a possible collision with Russia, encouraged Tbilisi to regard Washington as its major geopolitical patron even more. When George Bush came to Georgia in 2005 he became an "instant national hero."2 Saakashvili's pro-American policy became so strong that one of the streets in Tbilisi, the Georgian capital, was named after George Bush, possibly the only street with such a name in the world. This Georgian gravitation toward the U.S. fit in
1 See: P.E. Tyler, "In Caucasus Gorge a Haven for Muslim Militants," The New York Times, 28 February, 2002.
2 J. Traub, "The Georgia Syndrome," Foreign Policy, 13 August, 2010. The article was republished in The Georgian Daily, 13 July, 2010.
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well with the post-Soviet era when the U.S. quickly spread its influence in what was so recently the Soviet empire. At the beginning of the post-Soviet era, all or at least most of these post-Soviet republics and East European countries were convinced of Washington's practically unlimited economic and military resources. Consequently, not only were many of those ex-Soviet states and East European countries—so recently part of Warsaw Treaty—ready to accept Washington's patronage, they also became Washington's most faithful allies. And this trend had increased dramatically by the beginning of Bush era.3
Georgia emerged not just as one of the most faithful allies, but also as a potential force that could well punish Russia when relations between Moscow and Washington soured by the end of what was, as can be assumed, Putin's first term. Here the interests of both Washington and Tbilisi fairly well complemented each other. Consequently, Washington decided to deploy about 200 military specialists to train and equip the Georgian armed forces.4 Indeed, it was assumed, and apparently not without grounds, that Georgia's attack against South Ossetia in August 2008 was implicitly encouraged by the U.S. as a way to prod Russia. It was also assumed by Washington that Russia would follow the same model it has been exhibiting since the late Gorbachev era, which was nothing but ongoing geopolitical retreats. It was this feeling that stimulated Washington to give Tbilisi a nod of approval to retake breakaway South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which were formally still part of Georgia. It was assumed that the Russian peacekeeper would not put up much resistance and Moscow would acquiesce after, of course, some angry diplomatic barrages. However, the events did not follow the expected scenario. Moscow's response was robust; it was clearly feared that Russian troops could well enter Tbilisi and there was a plan to capture or even kill Saakashvili.5
Soon enough Moscow recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Still for some Russian imperialists, the war was not directed as it should have been. Mikhail Deliagin, a well-known Russian publicist and scholar, noted in his op-ed in nationalistic Zavtra—one of the most well-known nationalistic publications in post-Soviet Russia—that the very fact that Abkhazia and South Ossetia were recognized as independent states was of course quite a positive step. Still, this step was not enough to liberate Russia from being just a geopolitical appendix of the West.6 He and, of course, many other Russian imperialist nationalists assumed that the Medvedev/Putin tandem had reached its limits in its drive to "lift Russia from her knees." However, Washington had also reached its limits. By that time, the "neo-con" doctrine, an ideological inspiration of the Bush Administration, had become increasingly unworkable. The projected blitzkrieg in Afghanistan and Iraq became a protracted war of attrition, and Washington had no desire to create additional problems for itself in the Caucasus. This had immediate repercussions for Washington's relations with Tbilisi.
Tbilisi's request to be supplied with modern weapons was denied, and the Georgians bitterly complained about what they saw as a sign of betrayal. Indeed as a contributor to Wall Street Journal noted in 2010, "Two years ago Georgian officials complained that the Bush administration refused to sell them anti-tank and air defense weapons."7 The Georgians were also quite disappointed about the absence of direct U.S. support when Russian troops were near the gates of Tbilisi. Moreover, "Washington has made it clear that Georgia made a mistake by attacking the breakaway provinces of South Ossetia on 7 August."8 No one but Bin Laden grasped the Georgians' sense of disappointment and bitterness. Soon after the end of Georgian/Russian War, he noted that those who believed the U.S. would protect them were wrong. And Georgia was a good case in point. Washing-
3 See: M. Dowd, "Bush's Warsaw War Pact," The New York Times, 26 February, 2003.
4 See: P.E. Tyler, "Moscow Fears G.I.s' Role Could Deepen Conflicts," The New York Times, 28 February, 2006.
5 See: "Polkovnik Kvachkov: 'Byla postavlena zadacha zakhvatit' Tbilisi i ubit' Saakashvili,'" Kavkaz Center, 8 September, 2008.
6 See: M. Deliagin, "Novye vlasovtsy," Zavtra, No. 37 (773), 10 September, 2008.
M. Kaylan, "Georgia and the Limits of Russian Power," The Wall Street Journal, 13 August, 2010.
7 ]
8 N. Kralev, "Luring Belarus out of Russia's Shadow," The Washington Times, 7 October, 2008.
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ton, Bin Laden noted, provided Georgia with the assurance that it would always protect it in the event of a conflict with Russia. However, Washington's promises were worthless. The U.S. did not defend Georgia against Russia, and those who relied on Washington's help would be rather disap-pointed.9 One of course had to wonder whether the Georgians were aware of this pronouncement by Bin Laden. Still, it is clear that quite a few of them were extremely disappointed. In any case, by the end of the Bush era, the U.S. had increasingly distanced itself from Georgia,10 and after the beginning of the Obama administration, relations between Tbilisi and Washington started to sour even more. The reason was the change in Washington. Obama clearly moved toward improving the U.S.'s relationship with Russia, increasingly leaving Georgia out in the cold. This part of the U.S.'s general strategy implied that the country understood the limits of its resources. Moreover, the changes in the foreign policy posture were implicitly related to the understanding that resources were rapidly dwindling.
Change in American Policy
For some of neo-conservatives, Obama's reluctance to stand behind Georgia, his plans to withdraw from Iraq and from Afghanistan as well, in addition to other similar foreign policy steps, demonstrated that the Obama administration had made some horrible blunders and exhibited naivety, if not betrayal. Robert Kagan, one of the most influential neo-conservative ideologists, elaborated on what he regarded as a mixture of naivete and treason in Obama's foreign policy succulently enough.11 According to Kagan, Obama implicitly followed the European elite's myopic vision of the world, which implied that national interests could be peacefully reconciled and problems could be solved through negotiation instead of a display of force. As a result of this mixture of short-sightedness and naivete, according to Kagan, "Administration officials play down the idea that the great powers have clashing interests that might hamper cooperation."12 Consequently, Obama tried to accommodate China and Russia "rather than attempting to contain the ambitions of those powers."13 The same blunder/treason could be seen in Obama's treatment of allies and implicitly Georgia. Indeed, according to Kagan, "The Obama administration's new approach raises the question of whether the United States will continue to favor democracies, including allied democracies, in their disputes with the great power autocracies..."14 And this was surely the road to geopolitical disaster. "In this new mode, the United States may be unhinging itself from the alliance structure it had erected in the post-World War Two strategy."15
There is no doubt that quite a few Georgians, especially members of the Georgian elite, share this rather negative view of Washington and believe that the U.S. had actually betrayed them. Israel, a close U.S. ally, all recent friction notwithstanding, gave Georgia an additional bitter pill. Georgia has always been a nation with an extremely friendly approach toward Jews. The tradition goes back to the late Soviet era when Georgia experienced no anti-Semitism, which was not only
9 See: "Bin Laden napomnil evropeitsam o sud'be Gruzii," Kavkaz Center, 26 September, 2009.
10 See: "Saakashvili bol'she ne v favore," Kavkaz Monitor, 4 August, 2009.
11 It should be noted here that while quite critical in regard to Obama's foreign policy at the beginning of his administration, Kagan changed his view later and noted with approval that Obama accepted some of the crucial aspects of his philosophy. Kagan believed that the assumption about the U.S. decline was wrong.
12 R. Kagan, "Obama's Post-American World," IWMPost, No. 103, March 2010, p. 14.
13 Ibidem.
14 Ibid., p. 151.
15 Ibid., p. 15.
20 VfPWHPWPPIMQVP^mWfPQM Volume 6 Issue 3 2012
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encouraged by the authorities, but also had a grassroots appeal among the populace in many parts of the former U.S.S.R. It was not accidental that independent Georgia soon established the most friendly relations with Israel which, of course, received the U.S.'s blessings. It was not surprising that Georgia expected substantial military backing from both the U.S. and Israel. At the same time, the Georgians were quite disappointed, and not only with the U.S., but also with Israel. Israel had been delivering a lot of modern weapons to Georgia. However, Israel soon ended its weapons delivery as the result of Russia's pressure.16 At the same time, relations with the Obama administration continued to deteriorate. Indeed, the news was even more disappointing regarding the U.S. under Obama, which should have been Georgia's major geopolitical patron at a time when Georgia was still in great danger. Indeed, even after the Russo-Georgian War, if we are to believe some observers, Russian troops were "within 20 miles of Tbilisi,"17 and Moscow seemed to have achieved its goal. Indeed, according to François Heisbourg, special adviser to the Foundation for Strategic Research in Paris, Russia "has incapacitated the Georgian military, denied Tbilisi its much-hoped-for NATO status, and put the Georgian leader it despises—Mikheil Saakashvili—in a tough position."18
Not only does Moscow seem to have achieved most of its strategic goals, it is also doing its best to humiliate Saakashvili personally. Moscow propagandists are very aware that a machismo self-image is essential for self-respect in the mind of a Georgian man, and Saakashvili is no exception in the view of these Moscow ideologists. For this very reason, they assigned Tina Kandelaki to denigrate Saakashvili. Tina Kandelaki, one of the leading Russian TV anchors, proclaimed that in the past Georgian men were sex symbols. Saakashvili, however, is not sexy and clearly a man with a derailed psyche.19 The very fact that Kandelaki is an ethnic Georgian and a woman should have made her statement especially humiliating for Saakashvili. It seems that Saakashvili was besieged from all sides and thus expected strong support from Washington.
It would be wrong to assume that Georgia had no friends in Washington. Quite a few of them were Republicans. Some of them, such as Senator and Republican presidential candidate John McCain, see Putin's/Medvedev's Russia as an aggressive authoritarian power driven by neo-imperial ambitions and bound to regain absolute control over the post-Soviet space. McCain also implicitly sees the Russian elite as being solidly "Eurasianist" in its geopolitical posture and, thus, regards Iran as Russia's foremost ally. Consequently, the U.S. should stand behind Georgia.20 McCain assumed that "Georgians feel that Washington is selling them out to Moscow at the price of our 'hitting the reset button'."21 It is not just Republicans who were disappointed with Washington's treatment of Tbilisi. For example, Michael McFaul, the National Security Council official "responsible for Russia and Eurasia" and later ambassador to Russia, had the same views.22 Still, these views do not shape Obama's policy. There are clear feelings of "imperial overstretch"—the popular theory put into circulation by British historian and international relations specialist Paul Kennedy almost two generations ago—and these feelings even influence some members of the Bush cabinet where "neo-conserva-tives" rule supreme. Defense Secretary Robert Gates, whom Obama inherited from the previous administration, was originally on the side of Georgia, but understands that the U.S.'s resources are shrinking—the reason why he engaged in spectacular budget cuts, not as a result of "peace dividends," but because of the increasing shortage of resources, which became evident even before the budget crunch and fear of a U.S. default later on. In general, financial restraints became increasingly
16 See: "Repots: Israel Halts Arms Sale to Georgia," Civil.ge, 5 August, 2008.
17 M. Kaylan, op. cit.
18 Quoted from: R. Marquand, "Russia's Big Caucasus Win," Christian Science Monitor, 14 August, 2008.
19 See: "Kandelaki: 'Saakashvili—nesportivnyi i neseksual'nyi,'" Rosbalt, 13 August, 2010.
20
21 Saudi Gazette, 28 May, 2010
See: "Makkeina razdrazhaet Rossia," Rosbalt, 12 August, 2010. Saudi Gazette, 2i J. Traub, op. cit.
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the force that shaped the U.S.'s foreign policy posture. Consequently, "the Obama administration is embracing austerity when it comes to providing economic assistance to the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus."23
The financial restraints also shaped a much broader geopolitical agenda and not just the way foreign aid was distributed or the military posture maintained. Obama tried not to irritate Moscow much—at least this was the initial design—in order to be able to concentrate remaining American power where its presence was most crucial, that is, in the Middle East. In addition, Washington hoped to induce Moscow to participate in the war in Afghanistan and scored some success here. For example, Russian and U.S. troops are engaged in a joint operation to destroy drugs in Afghanistan.24 All of this has changed Washington's approach to the East European countries and some of the republics of the former U.S.S.R. The U.S. lost interest in Ukraine and Georgia plainly because the U.S. elite understood that Washington did not have enough forces to dominate all over the world. And Georgia and Ukraine are not one of Washington's priorities.25 It was assumed that with all problems created by Moscow, the U.S. should focus on Iran rather than on Russia, which is implicitly seen as a more opportunistic power that tries to flirt with both Iran and the West. The Obama administration implicitly sees Russia as a pragmatic, if not consistent, "fox," to employ Vilfredo Pareto's definition; and members of the Obama administration definitely see no inherited "Eurasian" imperialism in present-day Russia's political culture. Consequently, Denis Mc-Donough, National Security Council Chief of Staff, thinks Georgia is hardly a U.S. priority, and even Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's visit to Georgia led to no visible results for Georgia. Despite verbal condemnation of Russia's policies, she did not "offer the Georgians any deterrent hardware."26 Predictably, the result was quite pleasing for Moscow27 and disappointing for Tbilisi. "A senior U.S. diplomat has strongly denied any assumption that Washington has placed an arms embargo on Georgia, but also said on 29 June that arms sale was not a solution to Georgia's problems."28 The last part of the sentence undoubtedly reaffirmed the suspicions in the minds of the Georgians that Washington was indeed trying to prevent selling advanced weapons to Georgia,29 and this had the most negative implication for the Georgian army, which lost much of its equipment after Russo-Georgian War. It was actually the end of rearmament of the Georgian army, regardless of Tbilisi's continuous tense relations with Russia. The sense of betrayal became especially strong when Russia deployed S-300 antiaircraft missiles in Abkhazia. Tbilisi proclaimed that this would create a serious danger for European security.30
Despite Georgia's protest and appeal to the U.S. to defend Georgia, Washington was calm and indicated that it saw no reason to change its approach to Moscow.31 The Europeans were equally undisturbed, and the EU expressed its displeasure with Tbilisi by proclaiming that it was Georgia that was responsible for the war.32
23 J. Kucera, "Central Asia & Caucasus: Obama Administration Adopts Moderate Assistance Stance," Eurasianet.org, 10 February, 2010.
24 See: "Rossia i SShA proveli sovmestnuiu silovuiu operatsiiu na territorii Afganistana," Komsomolskaia pravda, 30 October, 2010; "V nachale byl geroin," Lenta.ru, 30 October, 2010.
25 See: V. Dabovyk, "Kyiv and Tbilisi: No Longer Washington's Favorites?" PONARS Eurasia Policy Perspectives, July 2010; M. Corso, "Georgia: Tbilisi to Trumpet Security Success. NATO, OSCE Summits," EurasiaNet.org, 10 November, 2010.
26 M. Kaylan, op. cit.
27 See: "Vladislav Vorob'ev: 'Gruzia bol'she ne Dzhordzhiia,'" Rossiiskaia gazeta, 7 July, 2010.
28 "U.S. Official: We have No Arms Embargo on Georgia," Civil.ge, 30 June, 2010.
29 See: K. Belianinov, G. Dvali, "Mikhail Saakashvili vernulsia iz Ameriki bez oruzhiia," Kommersant, 17 January,
2011.
30 See: "ROAR: "Enemies had Better Not Fly to Abkhazia," available at [www.russiatoday.com], 13 August, 2010.
31 See: "Rossia-Gruzia: raketami po vorob'iam," Rosbalt, 13 August, 2010; "SShA ne vidiat novosti v fakte razver-tyvaniia Rossiei S-300 v Abkhazii," RIA Novosti, 13 August, 2010.
32 See: D. Panovkin, "Tbilisi proignoriroval PASE," Rosbalt, 17 January, 2011.
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The sense of ungratefulness was amplified by the fact that Saakashvili tried to convey the message that despite of all of the problems with the West in general, and the U.S. in particular, he not only still regarded Georgia as a true democratic and pro-Western country in the post-Soviet space, but also firmly believed that finally all of its problems with the West and the U.S. would be solved. Consequently, Saakashvili believed that Georgia would join NATO anyway33 and insisted that English be taught all over the country.34 However, despite of all of these manifestations of goodwill by the Georgian elite, the Obama administration continued to demonstrate a rather cold approach toward Tbilisi. Not only the Obama administration, but also members of the Bush team continued to send negative messages to Tbilisi. The situation involving Condoleezza Rice—Secretary of State during the Bush era—is a good case in point. It was Rice and Bush who actually encouraged the Tbilisi conflict with Moscow.35 While having a grudge against them, Tbilisi still regarded them as more understanding, and Saakashvili was anxious to restore the old ties whenever Condoleezza Rice visited Georgia. Still she tried to avoid meeting with Saakashvili.36 This was a sign both of political or even personal humiliation for Saakashvili. And the problem was not just Saakashvili. It was clear that the Georgian elite was not happy with the U.S.'s approach to the problems in the region37 and believed that the U.S. was selling it out for the sake of better relations with Russia.38 All of this led to feelings accumulating among the Georgian elite that it had been double crossed and that Georgia could well find itself alone in the event of a possible new open conflict with Russia. The sense of isolation was of course an important reason why Tbilisi started to reevaluate its relations with Washington and take steps that could not please the U.S. There were, of course, many reasons for this abrupt and quite risky turn. There is a geopolitical consideration, which could be framed in the context of more or less traditional geopolitical thinking: Georgia starting looking for a possible alternative to the U.S. Traditional geopolitics, of course, played quite an important role here. However, Georgia's behavior could not be reduced to just calculating, cold, real politics.
These considerations and the sense of deep disappointment with the U.S. are very much related to cultural traditions and expectations of what relations between powers and states should entail. More than perhaps most European nations, the Georgians have preserved their traditional dedication to friends and guests found in the distant European past or still alive today in some parts of Asia. Georgian hospitality is legendary, and guests are expected to reciprocate. The fact that the U.S. did not do this after the Georgians did their best to demonstrate their loyalty was deeply offensive. Last but not least, Georgian foreign policy cannot be understood without taking into account President Saakashvili's personality. Even those sympathetic to him assume that he is a "tempestuous and reckless figure."39 While those who are hostile to him see him as almost insane.40 Moreover, some of those close to him share the same temperament. For these reasons, it can be assumed that, contrary to the U.S., there is no clear division in the Georgian elite with respect to foreign policy, so Saakashvili could be pro-American today, anti-American tomorrow, and change directions once again in the future. Whatever the reason/reasons for Tbilisi to be upset with Washington, and with the West in general, it/they did in fact exist and Tbilisi was in search of a new geopolitical patron, whereby Iran emerged as one of the important alternatives to the West. Georgia not only turned to Tehran because it wished to punish Washington/Brussels, it was not just a form of pecu-
33 See: "Gruzia ozhidaet priema v NATO," Islam News, 26 August, 2010.
34 See: "Saakashvili nashel sebe russkogo preemnika," Utro.ru, 28 August, 2010.
35 See: "Snachala byli bol'shie nadezhdy a teper' bol'shoe razocharovanie," Nakanune.ru, 3 September, 2010.
36 See: "Kondoliza Rais: strannyi visit v Gruziiu," Vesti.ru, 7 September, 2010; "Kondoliza Rais udrala ot Mishiko v Irlandiiu," Kaliningrad.kp.ru, 6 September, 2010.
37 See: "Amerikanskie senatory prosiat B. Obamu razmestit' v Gruzii radar PRO SShA napravlennyi na Iran," Iran News, 11 February, 2011.
38 See: "Obespokoennaia Gruzia sblizhaetsia s Iranom i Turtsiei," inoSMI.Ru, 28 May, 2010.
39 J. Traub, op. cit.
40 See: "Kandelaki: 'Saakashvili—nesportivnyi i neseksual'nyi.'"
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liar diplomatic revenge, but also because of the sense that there was a new turn in global order. Tbilisi understands, or at least feels, that now global affairs are not only run from Washington, or Washington and Moscow, as in the past, but from different places. Consequently, backing from Tehran might be as good or, in some cases, even better than from Washington, Moscow, or Beijing. While continuing its attempts to find solutions to the problems with Moscow, Tbilisi started its unexpected flirtation with Tehran, giving very little thought to what bad feelings this might arouse in Washington.
Georgian/Iranian Economic Ties
Building economic ties between Tehran and Tbilisi was the safest endeavor, at least from Tbilisi's perspective. The people in Tbilisi could always tell Washington that they were driven by purely pragmatic considerations but that their geopolitical heart still belonged to the U.S. Moreover, they could claim that strengthening economic ties with Tehran was merely a response to Moscow's bullying. And here Tbilisi would not be totally off the mark. Indeed, even before the 2008 war, relations between Tbilisi and Moscow had taken a sharp turn for the worse, and Moscow immediately made use of the economy to show Tbilisi its displeasure. Georgia was heavily dependent on gas supplies from Russia, which it inherited from the Soviet era, so in 2006, Moscow created serious problems for Tbilisi by blocking gas deliveries. At the same time, in 2006, Iran provided Georgia with gas.41 By 2010, the initial and rather sporadic economic ties had dramatically expanded. In the summer of 2010, Georgia and Iran discussed plans for economic cooperation in energy production and distribution.42 Tehran continued to imply that it was ready to provide Georgia with gas/oil. At the same time, Iran also wanted to benefit from access to the broad market via Georgia.43 While Iran's plan to sell gas on the broad market via Georgia was just an abstract plan, this was not the case with the Georgian electricity exported to Iran.44 While cooperation in energy was indeed a major aspect of Georgian/Iranian cooperation, it was not the only one. Agriculture, transportation, and other aspects of economic cooperation continued to be discussed by both the Iranian and Georgian sides throughout 2010/2011.45 Economic relations were reinforced by increasing cultural ties and contacts between the citizens of the two countries. By 2011, visa requirements for citizens of Iran and Georgia who decided to visit either country for short time were abolished.46 Direct flights were also established between Georgia and Iran.47 As a result, the number of tourists from Iran who visited Georgia increased dramatically.48
41 See: "Iran aktiviziruetsia na Kavkaze," Iran News, 14 January, 2011.
42 See: "Georgii Lomsadze: 'Tbilisi pytaetsia raspolozhit' k sebe Iran, Vashington nabliudaet za proiskhodiash-chim," RT.KORR Rossia, 2 June, 2010.
43 See: "Iranskuiu neft' i gaz v perspektive mogut nachat' postavliat' na Ukrainu," Iran News, 11 November,
2010.
44 See: "Gruzia v nachale 2014 g. zavershit stroitel'stvo VL-400 KB," Energon'ius, 11 July, 2011; "Gruzia budet eksportirovat' elektroenergiiu v Iran," Iran News, 8 July, 2011.
45 See: "Iran, Georgia Discuss Cooperation in Agriculture," Civil.ge, 2 June, 2010; "Iranskim predprinimateliam budet okazano sodeistvie," Iran News, 24 April, 2001; "Iran i Gruzia podpisali dogovor po sotrudnichestvu v oblasti transporta," Iran News, 14 March, 2011.
46 See: "Bezvizovyi rezhim mezhdu Gruziei i Iranom vstupit v silu s 26 ianvaria," Iran News, 13 January, 2011.
47 See: "Aviakompaniia 'Airzena' osushchestvila pervyi reis iz Tigerana v Batumi," Iran News, 8 July, 2011; "Priamoe aviasoobshchenie Tbilisi-Tegeran zaderzhivaetsia na dve nideli," Iran News, 2 October, 2010; "Mezhdu Iranom i Gruziei s oktiabria otkroetsia priamoe vozdushnoe soobshchenie," Iran News, 22 September, 2010.
48 See: "Bezvizovyi rezhim mezhdu Gruziei i Iranom ekonomicheski vygoden—posol," Iran News, 14 January, 2011; "Bisnesmeny iz Irana profinansiruiut stroitel'stvo riada GES v Gruzii," Robalt, 5 November, 2010; "Gruzino-iran-skaia turisticheskaia kompaniia predstavit novyi proekt," Iran News, 29 November, 2011.
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
There was increasing emphasis on the extensive historical/cultural ties between the two countries. Consequently, Tbilisi organized conferences and exhibitions related to Iran. Tehran reciprocated and organized conferences focused on Georgia.49 While Tbilisi could have convinced Washington that its economic relations with Tehran were purely pragmatic and had no geopolitical implications, the increasing cultural and diplomatic ties with Tehran could not be explained in the context of pure economic pragmatism and could well have irritated Washington. Indeed, a Georgian observer expressed doubt that abolishment of the visa requirements between Georgia and Iran had been discussed with Washington.50 Moreover, Washington was sending an unmistakable signal to Tbilisi that it was displeased by Tbilisi's much improved relations with Tehran and that even cultural/economic relations between Tbilisi and Tehran were not something Washington encouraged. The message was sent in an indirect way. It was stated that the U.S. regarded Iran as responsible for spreading drugs. Iran's improving relations with Georgia helped drug pushers from Iran to send drugs to the wider community. Thus, the U.S. accused Georgia of being a channel for wider drug circulation.51 Georgia disagreed.52 Curiously enough, the way Washington expressed its displeasure with Tbilisi's behavior was quite similar to the way Moscow conveyed its displeasure with Tbilisi. Indeed, as soon as relations between Moscow and Tbilisi soured, Russia immediately found problems with Georgian wines and mineral water. While lately the relations between Washington and Tbilisi have improved somewhat, Tbilisi is continuing to maintain cordial relations with Tehran and engage in cultural exchanges with Iran.53 It should also be said that Georgia's desire to improve relations with Iran was welcomed by Tehran, which has always been anxious to avoid diplomatic isolation. The increasing diplomatic ties, tourism, and cultural exchanges were not the only signs of a deep freeze in Georgian-U.S. relations at the beginning of Obama's term. The relations between Georgia and Iran also acquired clear geopolitical overtures.
Georgian/Iranian Political Rapprochement
Iran has a historically strong influence in the Caucasus, including Georgia.54 However, this long history of Iranian domination/influence in Georgia was not only of little significance throughout the czarist and Soviet eras, but also at the beginning of post-Soviet era when a thaw in relations could well be followed by a deep freeze. It was not Iran but Russia and lately the U.S. that were seen as Georgia's major geopolitical patrons. Nevertheless, diplomatic and geopolitical relations between Tehran and Tbilisi began early on. Georgia and Iran established diplomatic relations in 1992, and since 1994 a Georgian embassy has been functioning in Tehran. In 1995, Iranian president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-1997) visited Georgia. In 2004, Saakashvili visited Iran and met Mohammad Khatami, the Iranian president in 1997-2005. Still at that time, the contacts with Iran were not seen as damaging U.S./Georgian relations. Indeed, Washington had quite a positive attitude toward Khatami and regarded him as a sort of Iranian Gorbachev who would improve Iran's relations with the West. Even Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's advent to power was quite likely not seen as being absolutely threat-
49 See: "V Irane proidet mezhdunarodnyi seminar posviashchennyi Gruzii," Gruzia, 22 September, 2010.
50 See: "Gruziia-Iran: vizy otmeneny," Iran News, 31 January, 2011.
51 See: "Levan Vepkhvadze: "Nel'zia sviazyvat' otmenu viz mezhdu Gruziei i Iranom s narkotrafikom,'" Iran News, 6 March, 2011.
52 See: "Mid Gruzii ne vidit ugroz narkotrafika so storony Irana," Iran News, 6 March, 2011.
53 See: "V Tbilisi otkroetsia fotovystavka rabot iranskogo fotografa," Iran News, 31 January, 2011.
54 See: V. Evseev, "Iranskie lokti na iuzhnom Kavkaze," Nezavisimaia gazeta, 26 November, 2010.
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ening to Washington in the first year of his rule. It can be assumed that Washington regarded his antiWestern and anti-Israel escapades as a temporary phenomenon. Tbilisi could also well have assumed that close relations with Tehran would not damage Tbilisi's relations with Washington. Moreover, Tbilisi might have assumed that Washington would actually be pleased with Georgia's contacts with Iran, since this meant Tbilisi could play the role of intermediary between Washington and Tehran. Consequently, in 2006, Deputy Foreign Secretary of Iran visited Georgia and Saakashvili told him that he was inviting Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to visit Georgia.55 Despite all of Tbilisi's flirting with Tehran, Tbilisi still regarded Washington as a major patron. The very fact that relations between Washington and Tehran became extremely tense was definitely noted by both Tbilisi and Tehran and "in 2008, Iranian-Georgian relations were put on ice—really cold ice—for almost a year after Georgia agreed to extradite an Iranian citizen to the U.S. on charges of smuggling, money laundering, and conspiracy."56
By the beginning of Obama's presidency, Iranian/Georgian relations had become quite warm again. However by 2010, the context of Georgian/Iranian relations was very different, since by that time Tehran had emerged as a mortal enemy of Washington and, in a way, the entire West. Moreover, Iran emerged as isolated from most of the other major centers of power. Relations with Moscow can serve as good example here. Tehran's flirtation with Moscow has a long history. Some members of the Russian elite even had serious thoughts about building a full-fledged military/geopolitical alliance with Tehran in the 1990s. This was a lynchpin of Eurasianism, a philosophical and quasi-political doctrine that emphasized Russia's Asian heritage and geopolitical gravitation. However, by the end of what can now be regarded as Putin's first term, relations between Tehran and Moscow had become increasingly tense and, by 2010, Moscow had joined the West in imposing tough sanctions on Tehran. Admittedly, Moscow proclaimed that it was against attacks on Iran, which the West accused of developing a nuclear program. Still, Moscow began dragging its feet with respect to supplying Tehran with advanced weapons and finally, by 2010, had joined Western sanctions.57 Consequently, Iran became increasingly dissatisfied with Russia, which Tbilisi still regarded as a mortal threat to Georgia.58
The very fact that Iran's relations with Russia lost the degree of trust they enjoyed in the late 1990s/early 2000s—the era of "Eurasianism" popularity among the Russian elite—provided Tbilisi with additional incentives to look at Tehran as a potential ally/geopolitical prop. However, it was not just Tehran's defiance of both Moscow and Washington that made Iran attractive in the eyes of the Georgian elite. The most important thing here was Iran's political culture—its faithfulness to allies and its readiness to defend them regardless of everything, including in a direct confrontation with the U.S.—a superpower. Iran's approach to the Israel-Lebanon War in 2006 is a good case in point. Indeed in 2006, Israel engaged in war with Lebanon and was ready to strike Syria, which supported the anti-Israeli forces in Lebanon. Tehran made it clear that in the event of an attack against Syria, it would strike against Israel, regardless of the fact that Israel was strongly supported by the U.S. As a matter of fact, Bush's Washington, in contrast to Obama's Washington, was quite ready to engage in war with Iran. By the act of supporting Syria, Iran demonstrated that it was not only not afraid of direct confrontation with the U.S., a superpower, but was faithful to its allies. All of this was certainly noted by Tbilisi. It is true that Tbilisi had no desire to burn its bridges and most of the avenues of rapprochement with Tehran were in the economic and cultural realm. However, as Tbilisi's frustration with Washington grew, it took a step clearly intended to show Washington that Georgia had a choice, and an alliance with Iran could well substitute its relations with the U.S.
55 See: "Glava MID Irana oformit s Gruziei bezvizovyi rezhim," Iran News, 1 November, 2010.
56 H.S. Edwards, "Babylon & Beyond," Los Angeles Times, 5 November, 2010.
57 See: "Novaia provokatsiia protiv Irana," Iran News, 31 October, 2010.
58 See: "Posol Irana shantazhiruet Moskvu grozia terrorizmom, narkotrafikom i razvalom Rossii," NEWSru.com,
27 October, 2010.
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
Consequently, in May 2010, Ahmadinejad was invited to visit Georgia59 and Foreign Minister of Iran, Manouchehr Mottaki, was tentatively expected to visit Georgia in June 2010.60 In late May, it was reported that "Georgian Deputy Foreign Minister Nino Kalandadze last week hailed a 'new stage' in relations with Iran as she hosted the Islamic Republic's foreign ministry spokesman Ramin Mehmanparasat."61 Both sides expressed the desire to expand relations in the future. "Bilateral relations between Iran and Georgia are entering a 'new stage' and Tbilisi hopes ties will further deepen," Nino Kalandadze, Georgian deputy foreign minister, said on 22 May, 2010.62 Georgian/Iranian contacts continued through the fall.63 In November 2010, Saakashvili had a conversation with Mottaki and thanked Iran for its support of Georgia's territorial integrity.64 Here Iran implicitly emerged as the geopolitical patron that defended Georgia against Russia, which had transformed South Ossetia and Abkhazia into Russian protectorates. Tbilisi/Tehran relations did indeed become quite close, and there were rumors that Georgia was selling Iran weapons it received from Ukraine. Iran was certainly ready to move closer to Georgia. Indeed, it is not religion but national interests that are the driving force behind Iran's foreign affairs, and Tehran's rapprochement with Tbilisi indicates this, along with other actions.65 It can also be stated that Iran's improved relations with Georgia were designed to create a broader strategy. Indeed, Iran has been developing relations with many countries of the former U.S.S.R. It can also be added that Iran was not the only country in the Middle East with which Georgia tried to forge relations. Turkey was the other country.66
New Georgia/U.S. Rapprochement
By 2011, the Obama administration discovered that rapprochement with Moscow was not working, or at least not much was expected there, and the approach to Tbilisi changed once again. By 2011/2012, the U.S. planned to provide Georgia with some weapons,67 despite Moscow's strong protests. In addition, Washington assumed that Tbilisi would make a positive move with respect to "human rights,"68 while before, as it was implied, it was sliding in an authoritarian direction. In response, Tbilisi immediately proclaimed that its relations with the U.S. were the most important for Georgia and, as some observers implied, Georgia was ready to support all of the U.S.'s endeavors, including a strike against Iran. Moreover, there were rumors that, in preparation for the war with Iran, the U.S. was building hospitals and airports in Georgia,69 and Georgia actually encouraged the U.S. to strike against Iran.70 However, there was no return to the previous trust, and both sides continued to view each other with considerable skepticism. It was also quite unlikely that Tbilisi would abandon its
2010.
59 See: "Obespokoennaia Gruzia sblizhaetsia s Iranom i Turtsiei."
60 See: "Iranian FM Expected to Visit Georgia in June," Civil.ge, 21 May, 2010.
61 Saudi Gazette, 28 May, 2010.
62 See: "Georgian Deputy FM: 'New Stage in Georgia-Iran Relations,'" Civil.ge, 22 May, 2010.
63 See: "Gruzia i Iran rassmatrivaiut perspektivy razvitiia sotrudnichestva —MID," Iran News, 18 September,
' See: "Mikhail Saakashvili prinial glavu MID Irana," Regnum, 5 November, 2010.
64 (
65 See: "Iran: mezhdu ideologicheskoi dogmoi i pragmatizmom," Iran News, 17 April, 2010; On economic and po-
litical collaboration between Iran and Georgia, see also: "Ekspert: Sblizhenie Gruzii i Irana opasno bez soglasiia Zapada," Rosbalt, 3 November, 2010.
66 See: "Saakashvili Hails Georgia-Turkish Ties as Exemplary," Civil.ge, 17 May, 2010.
67 See: "U.S. Senior Diplomat on Defense Cooperation with Georgia," Civil.ge, 10 January, 2012.
68 "SShA: v Gruzii imeet mesto ogranichenie svobody slova," Komsomolskaia pravda, 9 April, 2011.
69 See: "Vzorvet li Iran Rossiiu i Kavkaz?" Iran News, 24 January, 2012.
70 See: "Gruzia provotsiruet amerikano-iranskuiu voinu?" Iran News, 24 August, 2010.
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rapprochement with Tehran completely just to please Washington. It was even less likely that Georgia would be happy to see conflict between Iran and the U.S., in which it would be directly involved on the side of the U.S. After all of its experience with Washington—with both the Republican and Democratic administrations—Tbilisi clearly became suspicious about Washington's intentions to be fully on the side of its allies, despite all the rhetoric, and Washington's subsequent foreign policy moves did not inspire much trust in Washington's commitments. Tbilisi, of course, was watching the U.S.'s treatment of Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak. Mubarak was a faithful American ally for generations and was praised by both the Republicans and Democrats. However, when the going got tough, Washington demanded that he step down and made no attempt to save him personally. These actions by Washington made quite a bad impression on the U.S.'s allies in the Middle East and certainly reinforced Israeli suspicions that Washington could easily sell them out, regardless of the endless public assurances of the U.S.'s support of Israel. Tbilisi undoubtedly noted this and took Washington's new assurances with a pinch of salt. This includes the Obama administration's assurance that Georgia would receive the requested weapons. The Georgian side still doubted that the U.S. would indeed fulfill its promises.71 Consequently, Tbilisi was in search of alternative source of weapon supplies. Indeed, Georgia and Azerbaijan planned to receive weapons from Poland.72 In addition, Tbilisi planned to develop its own weapons industry in order to be fully self-sufficient and made no secret of why it had decided to engage in this. Observing the newly manufactured Georgian weapons, Saakash-vili noted that Georgia has already experienced problems with supposedly friendly countries on which Georgia relied in the past. Some of these countries, Saakashvili noted, shared sensitive information with Georgian enemies. This was a barb against Israel. At the same time, Saakashvili noted that some other potential seller of weapons was providing Georgia with what it promised.73 Here Saakashvili was making a clear reference to the U.S. It is obvious that while continuing to deal with the U.S. and possibly expressing its full support of a possible U.S. strike against Tehran, Tbilisi was also continuing to maintain its relations with Iran.74 Moreover, relations with Iran were not broken even when there were attacks against Israeli diplomats, in which Iran was possibly implicated. This could well have been seen as retaliation for the murder of Iranian nuclear scientists. Tehran insisted that Israel had done this in retaliation to Iran, regardless of the objections from Washington.
Conclusion
While being quite unstable since the late Gorbachev era, Georgia seems to have fallen fully into the American orbit after the 2003 revolution that brought Mikhail Saakashvili to power. However, disappointment with its American patron and the still tense relations with Russia have led to quite an unexpected flirtation with Iran, which has become increasingly alienated from Russia and, needless to say, continues to be the archenemy of the U.S.
There are several implications of these events. One—and the most evident—is that geopolitical alliances can change in the twinkling of an eye. Tbilisi, for example, as well as other countries, can move from Washington to Iran and back as easy as that. Even more important, it demonstrates the end of unipolarity, which is not just due to the limits of American power, but also to the changes in the U.S.'s political and, one might assume, foreign policy culture. Almost two centuries ago, Carl von Clausewitz made his famous statement in which he emphasized the direct connection between foreign
71 See: "Obama mozhet poschitat' 'neobiazatel'nym' vypolnenie polozhenii o Gruzii v biudzhete oborony SShA," Civil.ge, 3 January, 2012.
See: "Stratfor: Prezident Pol'shi otpravilsia v Zakavkazie oslabliat' ob'iatiia Rossii," Regnum, 26 July, 2011.
See: "Gruziia khochet proizvodit' sobstvennoe oruzhie," VOA News.com, 7 March, 2012.
See: "Vashadze obsudil s poslom Irana sotrudnichestvo mezhdu stranami—MID," Iran News, 18 January, 2011.
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and domestic policy. It can also be noted that business culture and foreign policy have become quite related.
Reckless and irresponsible speculation, which is an essential aspect of the U.S.'s economic life, has had a direct impact on U.S. foreign policy. While in the past the U.S. was a reliable ally, this is increasingly not the case now. At the same time, Iran has demonstrated that it is a reliable and strong partner that could well stand up to the U.S.—the only superpower. In 2006, Israel engaged in a war in South Lebanon against Hezbollah. It was also actually at war with Lebanon and threatened to strike Syria. Israel was supported by the U.S., whereas Syria was backed by Iran. The Iranians stated that if Israel attacked Syria, Iran would engage on the side of Syria, even if this led to a confrontation with the U.S. As a matter of fact, Iran, by supporting Syria, assumed the role of the U.S.S.R. of the past. This was noted by the countries of the region. Iran's increasing assertiveness and apparent intention to improve its relations with Georgia have evidently increased its influence in Armenia and Azer-
baijan.75
Indeed, Iran's ability to carve out a sphere of influence at the expense of the major powers—the U.S. and Russia—demonstrates the emergence of a new multipolar world. However, this multipolar world is quite different from what has been envisaged by the majority of pundits. Most of them believe that one of the larger states—China, Russia, or India—will take the lead. Still, the geopolitical landscape could be much more complicated; and many other regional powers, such as Iran, could increasingly play the role of a regional power center, paying little attention to much stronger states such as the U.S. and/or Russia.
75 See: "Georgii Lomsadze: 'Tbilisi pytaetsia raspolozhit' k sebe Iran, Vashington nabliudaet za proiskhodiash-
chim."
