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building technology. Cooperation in nanotechnology would also be lucrative, and both sides are already looking at potential vectors of interaction in this sphere.
Both the supreme leadership of Azerbaijan and Russia and specific state departments and nongovernmental structures are also focusing their attention on humanitarian cooperation.
Relations at the interstate level are being coordinated within the framework of the Russian-Azerbaijani Program of Cooperation in the Humanitarian Sphere for 2007-2009.
Education and science are among the promising areas of cooperation. At present, 5,755 Azeri citizens are studying at Russian higher education institutions, while 1,420 of them have their education paid for from the Russian Federation budget. On 27 February, 2008, a branch of Lomonosov Moscow State University opened in Baku. Now in its second year, almost 200 students are attending it. More than 1,200 people are studying at another Russian education institution in Azerbaijan—a branch of Moscow State Open University. More than 15,000 students are obtaining an education in Russian at Azerbaijani higher education institutions.
C o n c l u s i o n
Summing up this brief analysis of the current period in Russian-Azerbaijani cooperation, it is important to emphasis its creative nature and striving to expand interaction in different spheres. The leaders of Russia and Azerbaijan have defined the strategies, while practical implementation of the coordinated plans is being entrusted to diplomats from both sides, among others.
Russia and Azerbaijan are united by the common historical destiny of their people and their invaluable political, economic, and spiritual potential. Life has confirmed that Russia still needs Azerbaijan, just as Azerbaijan still needs Russia. The relations between these two sovereign states, Russia and Azerbaijan, have acquired a pragmatic, business-like, and mutually advantageous nature that takes particular account of the national interests of each country.
Marina MUSKHELISHVILI
Deputy Head of the Center for Social Studies
(Tbilisi, Georgia).
GEORGIA IN A NEW WAVE OF TRANSFORMATION
Abstract
T
he twenty-year cycle of political transformation did not bring stability to Georgia; the country is still oscillating
between authoritarian rule and democracy. Initially, discourse that merged the Soviet legacies and Western liberal and democrat-
ic values into one teleological vision of democratization directed the transformation. Later on, this monistic vision of democracy split into two, dividing society into supporters of the pro-Western nondemocratic government and the pro-democratic opposition. The deep polarization that has emerged in
society cannot be resolved in the absence of cooperative approaches and practices. This article advocates a more “republican,” rather than “liberal” direction for further reform, European proportional constitutional arrangements, and participatory, rather than elitist, models of sociopolitical relations.
I n t r o d u c t i o n
The third wave of democratic transition is over.1 For the post-Soviet expanse, this means that the epoch that started about 20 years ago has ended. Those countries that did not manage to complete their democratic transition have either become established as open autocracies or have acquired political systems that are neither a democracy nor a full-fledged autocracy.2 Georgia is one of them. At the same time, “democratization” as a project supported by the corresponding discourse and democratization policies has exhausted itself in its capacity to provide ideological momentum for fostering democracy promotion policies. This means the following: imagine that democracy development is a function of two independent variables, but only one of them is given substantial attention. At some point, all the improvements that could be achieved from this variable alone were brought to fruition. But the situation is far from either sufficient or stable because the other dimension is also essential. Further progress cannot follow from efforts that push in the old direction; the trajectory needs to shift. It is true that the “democratization” inspired by the neoliberal paradigm alone has expired; but there are still other ways of developing democracy that may and should help to find a way out of the deadlock.
Since the institutional transformation of the past decades has been called democratization, a new direction can only be introduced into the process by recalling that democracy itself has more than one meaning, although all the individuals participating in the process may see it differently.3 This diversity should legitimize the specificity of its forms and arrangements in various countries, allowing societies to deliberate on their vision instead of closing this question in advance. A similar approach has been formulated by Guillermo O’Donnell: modern democracy is the product of an uneasy tension among three (rather than two) political traditions—democracy, liberalism, and republicanism, which created specific institutional arrangements in different countries, depending on their political culture, socioeconomic development, and historical past.4
This article argues that the 20-year development cycle was dominated by a teleology directed toward the majoritarian and liberal (or Anglo-Saxon) meaning of democracy, which did not allow it to capture all of these traditions. Liberal and majoritarian components overshadowed the republican element, producing political systems trapped in an irresistible confrontation between authoritarian rule and chaos, with Georgia oscillating today between these two polls. However, Georgian society has recently been demonstrating a certain capacity for innovation.
1 See: Th. Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 1, January 2002, pp. 5-21.
2 Ibidem and in other sources described by many authors in various terminologies.
3 See: J. Dryzek, L. Holmes, Post-Communist Democratization: Political Discourses across Thirteen Countries (Theories of Institutional Design), Cambridge University Press, 2002.
4 See: G. O’Donnell, “Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 9, No. 3, 1998, pp. 112-126.
Democracy is about the West
“Democracy” seemed quite an obvious notion in Georgia about 20 years ago, when democratization started. The external example of “the West,” especially of the U.S., was taken for granted, blurring various essentially different things, such as democracy, the market economy, prosperity, etc. into one vision of the desirable “good life” named in short “democracy.” So the question of democratization was not so much about “what,” but mostly about “how” and “when.”
The first thing, however, that came with the transformation was not democracy, but freedom. Freedom was granted by historical chance and experienced with excitement. Different individuals might have different opinions about why they need this freedom, while this diversity linked the sense of freedom with another value—the will. This will was very post-modern in its nature—it neither legitimated itself in natural law, nor in utilitarian teleology. It was simply the will per se, following the saying of popular Soviet showmen: “if something is prohibited, but strongly desired, then it is allowed.” This simplistic desire for freedom drove the national independence movement, economic enterprises, migration, and freedom of speech that boosted and trespassed over the remaining constraints of the old regime.
During the first years of the transformation, this freedom was exercised extensively and spontaneously, producing a kind of the Hobbesian “state of nature”: civil wars, economic collapse, state failure, and fragile independence from Russia. This non-institutionalized exercise of freedom was somehow constrained in 1995 when the Constitution of Georgia established a formal framework for democracy. However, between 1995 and 2003, despite a certain amount of political stabilization, in which basic democratic institutions were in place, democratization was considered unaccomplished and its further promotion was dominated by critical voices against the government.
During this period, the pro-democracy discourse was also fueled by democratization promotion efforts from the West. The “liberal” (mostly American) model of democracy directed its institutional vision. First, it envisaged structural differentiation among civil society, the economy, politics, and the state. As for political power per se, three dominant aspects were considered to be formative for its institutional transformation—the division of power, political competition through elections, and majority rule. Such aspects of democracy, as the rule of law, human rights, freedom of speech and other rights and liberties, although constantly in the focus of public attention, were logically placed as exterior elements in this political arrangement. This approach—the liberal components of democracy separated from its political substance and rule by the will of the majority—allowed the external democracy promoters (the West) to legitimate their financial and moral support of them without being accused of interfering in the internal political affairs of the sovereign state.
Some aspects of this arrangement were not challenged by the post-Soviet political culture. The Soviet system considered itself a majoritarian rule, pretending to be a “people’s democracy,” in which the ruling party represented the vanguard part of the people. Political competition, which was a novelty, also appeared to be well supported by the legacy of Marxism-Leninism, which understood politics as a zero-sum, conflict-based realm. Attempts to differentiate between civil society and the political community, while never fully established, allowed for an elitist version of such competition, in which traditionally irresponsible and politically passive citizens easily adopted the role of observers, participating only occasionally in elections. Differentiation of the political realm from civil society was also in line with the legacy of the highly cynical Soviet version of politics, where ends radically prevailed over means.
The teleological vision of development, dominant in the logics of democratization, also contributed to the continuity of certain mental constructions. The radical split with the past in favor of the “bright future,” whatever this future may be—communism, democracy, or the West—placed “democracy” as a teleological goal substituting for “communism” in the public discourse long before the
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
Rose Revolution, thus explaining much of the Bolshevik-style behavior of the “pro-American” Georgian leaders who came to power in its aftermath.
This combination of new institutions and old mental constructions has gained a strong appeal in society. As every political ideology, the pro-democracy discourse provided society with ready answers to all the problems that troubled it. Why is there high unemployment? Because the government is not democratic and the elections are fake. Why is there a shadow economy? Because Shevardnadze’s government extracts bribes from businesses. Why is the quality of the media low? Because there is not enough media freedom. Why is society unhappy with the slow pace of development? Because it has not enough say in government. The deficit of democracy, rule of law, and human rights continued to be a major concern of the public discourse. Other kinds of policy debates that would be less zero-sum and more productive in terms of good governance were blocked from both sides; the government was unable to provide any meaningful leadership that would justify its resistance to change, while the opposition had good reason for avoiding cooperation—the greater the distance from the ineffective and corrupt government, the better things are for acquiring more public support.
Old legacies and new trends merged in that period not only in mental patterns, but also in their product—the institutional framework of the 1995 constitution. Its arrangements resulted from a compromise between the opposite sides of political divisions. Those who wanted to see Georgia headed by a single and responsible leader got a presidential system of governance. Others who preferred more say in government got quite a proportional assembly which did not have much influence on executive power, but nor did the president. Actually, this arrangement helped to calm down the sharp political struggles of the first years of transformation, but in essence it only postponed the crisis until the leading figure of the period, Shevardnadze, finished his term in power. This system was quite well balanced but very ineffective. Unable to dissolve the parliament, the president could not move further toward more authoritarian rule. At the same time, the parliament was strong enough to block executive power without sharing any responsibility for the unresolved problems. This combination of majority rule with the substantial freedom of political enterprise reached a critical point during elections, when all aspects of democracy—the will of majority, the political rights of individuals, and the aspirations for change—merged. The Rose Revolution acquired its public meaning from these values: victory of the Georgian people, a pro-Western shift, and a complete split with the past.
Democracy is about Georgia
During his visit to Georgia in June 2009, U.S. Vice President Biden met with children displaced from their homes in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region. These children were chosen for the meeting by the government. “How did it happen,” he asked politely, “that all of you here are so fluent in English?” This may be an extremely diplomatic way to say that America is not only about personal achievements, computer skills, and fluency in English, but also about equality, humanity, and democracy. This episode demonstrates quite well that something has happened in Georgia since the Rose Revolution with respect to the monistic identity “West = democracy.” Two camps emerged, separated by their values and their visions: the right-wing government, which respects the U.S. for its power and achievements-oriented culture, and left-wing society, which still struggles for democracy but feels disappointed and inclined to equate democracy more with anti- and alter-globalism than with the West.
When presenting this outcome of the Rose Revolution, it should be keep in mind that whatever the values behind it, the Rose Revolution was first of all a revolution, meaning a zero-sum transfer of
power from one elite group to another, followed by all kinds of repressions against the former elites. “This is a counterrevolutionary attempt [to oppose change of the state flag to new five-cross one] and, correspondingly, the methods that the state uses against it will be those that counterrevolutionaries deserve” (Vano Merabishvili, 14 January, 2004, parliamentary session). “Those political groups who found themselves siding with Shevardnadze or, during the November events, were on the other side of the barricades ... have committed political suicide. This is not going to change any more” (Giga Bokeria, 12 January, 2004, TV Imedi). This kind of radical rhetoric was followed by polarization between the ruling elite and its opponents, which gradually evolved into polarization between the government and most of society, as public support of the government decreased over time.
Despite its pro-Western stance and liberal underpinning, the Rose Revolution did not bring democracy to Georgia. Division of power (both horizontal and vertical) and the rule of law, which restricts the tyranny of the majority in the U.S., never developed, quite the contrary. After the Rose Revolution, political power started to be concentrated more and more in the hands of the president, trespassing the constitutional limits and encroaching everywhere—in the economy, civil society, and judicial system. Strong majoritarianism well exceeded the weak attempts to defend liberal values: “I am not interested in personalities; it is the Georgian people who should stand with me. I need the people’s support, I have the people’s support and ... with the people’s support I will bring the fight against the mafia to a [victorious] end” (Mikhail Saakashvili, 4 February, 2004). This is how the Rose Revolution, instead of promoting democracy, caused its decline. This decline manifested itself in public opinion long before it led to election falsification and political repressions.5 Institutional transformation followed gradually,6 leading to termination of the social contract; in 2008, the opposition refused to acknowledge the election results as they considered the elections neither free nor fair.7
However, the decline of democracy did not mean that the government changed its pro-Western orientation, or that the West reduced its support of Saakashvili. In vast areas of policy reform, the government started to speed up new approaches, programs, and its capabilities. Compared with the previous rule, it demonstrated a capacity for speedy and sometimes authoritarian actions; its style of leadership became achievement-oriented and strong. The new policies of the government can be described as neoliberal and even libertarian in some cases. “.. .This Act [On Economic Freedom] is very ambitious, because after its adoption Georgia will become the world’s leading country in terms of observance of economic liberalism,” said Saakashvili when proposing a set of amendments to the constitution, which involves, among other things, setting the maximum ratio of budgetary expenditures to GDP at 30%.8
In 2007, the political struggle took a very dramatic and sharp turn. Mass mobilization was fueled for various objective and subjective reasons. Many suffered personally, since the impressive figures of economic growth were accompanied by an increase in unemployment and inequality. No less important was the sense of voluntaristic and arbitrary rule, which affected everybody. The hubris, which directed the government’s attitude toward its opponents, caused shared need for the nemesis that brought the people into the streets demanding that Saakashvili resign. Accusations against the government were once more articulated and legitimated in the familiar terminology of violations,
5 The number of respondents who were satisfied with how democracy was developing in Georgia dropped from 77% to 38% in the course of three years (source: [www.iri.org.ge]), changing from the post-revolution optimism (beginning of 2004) to the radical demand for Saakashvili’s resignation (in 2007).
6 The institutional decline of democracy is not well-documented, except for major milestones such as the constitutional amendments of 2004, the new system of local governance in 2005, the events of November 2007, and the elections of 2008. Though there were many less significant developments that add substantial information for completing the picture.
7 See: OSCE/ODHIR observation mission’s reports on the quality of the elections.
8 6 October, 2009, available at [http://www.civil.ge/eng/_print.php?id=21541].
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
corruption, and crime, while the demands centered on the rule of law, free and fair elections, and democracy. However this time, the claim for democracy could not be the same as it was before the Rose Revolution: in contrast to that period, when only one mainstream public opinion was dominant, this time the media propaganda, as well as public opinion, had split into two camps that sharply opposed each other.
The monistic vision of democracy that existed prior to the revolution started to transform soon after it. It differs from the previous period in that now it has become clear that being pro-Western does not necessarily mean being democratic; the government’s controversial performance also demonstrated that all aspects of development could not be attributed to a single explanation that paints the world outlook in black and white. The former “democrats” found themselves in a situation where they had to form their political preferences in accordance with a difficult choice of values: either become liberal autocrats who believe that the government, however guilty it may be in many respects, is still preferable because of its commitment to the West, or join the parochial democrats who took the side of unprotected society and valued democracy for the power that it would give to the common sense of ordinary individuals. Given that political support from the West was still on the side of the government, or, at least, the West was not revealing any open support this time of the democratic movement, the latter began perceiving themselves increasingly in isolation: “. . .our struggle, the struggle of the Georgian people, is not simply against the Saakashvili regime; it is a struggle against world geopolitics, a struggle against American interests. That is why this struggle is difficult. We would have changed this government had the elections been free and fair” (Levan Gachechiladze’s address to supporters, 26 May, 2008).9
This split demonstrated that the institutional consensus built by Shevardnadze between the aspirations for majority rule and liberal rights and freedoms appeared to be fragile. Initially, the postrevolutionary regime built its legitimacy on the fantastic combination of pro-Western reforms and Soviet-styled leadership and propaganda. After popular support decreased and found itself in the minority, the regime had to strengthen the authoritarian methods of governance, while pretending to remain a democracy at the same time.
Neither were the opponents of the regime successful. The mass democratic movement that started in 2007 experienced a chain of failures over the following two years, demonstrating its inability to make a difference and fostering even more consolidation of the antidemocratic features of governance. On 7 November, 2007, when the government used violence against the protestors for the first time, the leaders of the opposition arranged several waves of mass mobilization with various demands. But all of these attempts were defeated by a combination of latent violence, open neglect, election falsification, and political repressions on the part of the government.
Failure of the new movement may at least be partly attributed to the fact that its leaders had no other rhetoric at their disposal than what they used during the Rose Revolution. Appealing for elections, the rule of law, and human rights, they failed to unite larger shares of society around any political vision that would be different in substance. In other words, they did not have any specific political ideology; rather they were appealing for standard values, demanding justice and equality per se. This demand, as experience has so far demonstrated, cannot win on its own, because it lacks the more selfish components that make mass movements stronger. In short, freedom and majority rule alone are not sufficient to produce democracy. This was the second time in Georgian history when democracy did not follow from their combination.
Now Georgia is into its third year of political crisis based on radical polarization within society and the political elite. The opposition, by demanding (at various stages of the crisis) a shift toward the parliamentary system, various power-sharing instruments, and referendum, tried to avoid the same “winner-takes-all” approach that caused this crisis. However, we can assume that against
[http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=18387&search=
the background of the deep polarization existing in society, this declarative commitment for more cooperation might be forgotten if a change in power really happened. The government, in turn, uses all leverages, especially the election code, to decrease any signs of proportionality in the existing system: a recent example is the shift toward the first-past-the-post rule in the spring of 2010 election of Tbilisi mayor. Despite the direct demand from the West that the opposition and the government settle their relations through cooperation, no signs of such cooperation have yet emerged. All attempts at compromise have failed, since there can be no compromise between the choice of “staying in power” or “going to prison.”
One West or Two: Comparing the Anglo-Saxon and Continental European Models
This backslash of democracy after the Rose Revolution has once again demonstrated that zero-sum, majoritarian, and teleological approaches do not help to build democracy. At best, in a partly free environment, they create one-shot, revolutionary cycles of legitimization—de-legitimization games, which those in power cannot afford to lose, since they have no chance of return. In contrast, cooperative and positive-sum logic, which builds a social contract and public regulations of procedural ethics, reciprocity, and solidarity within and between the elites and the general public, has been the most difficult to develop so far.
Thinking of further democratization policies, we must distinguish, however, between positive-sum competition and consensus-building cooperation. These are not the same strategies in terms of democracy development, nor do they have an equal chance of institutionalization in the specific postSoviet context. The first could be realized if the basic rules of the game are observed, meaning that competition itself remains within the framework of regulatory restrictions. But these regulatory restrictions have to develop from competition alone, which is not realisvic. The democracy promoters in Georgia made several attempts to change the agenda of the political discourse and make it more policy-oriented. The failure of these attempts is sometimes attributed to the quality of the political elites and the weak representative capacity of the existing political parties."This explanation does not seem sufficient, superficially substituting outcomes for reasons.
Majority will and liberal rights and freedoms are necessary but not sufficient components of democracy. If the social contract and republican values of solidarity and reciprocity are missing, nothing will make democracy work. Moreover, continuous attempts to build democracy from competition alone could undermine society’s ability to establish this contract, since the logic of competition, which is linked to periodic elections, may make any attempts at cooperation irrational for the political actors. As for liberal values, in the absence of social cohesion, nothing will help to distinguish between liberal values and Bolshevik traditions, take, for example, the liberal value of freedom of conscience versus the Bolshevik tradition of freedom of conscience. In actual fact, in the post-Soviet context, the latter too often substitutes for the first.
Democratization policies that stress political competition as the main tool necessary for democratization seem to emerge out of a latent wrong perception about the nature of post-Soviet societies. Since the dominant Soviet ideology was based on collectivist values, it was supposed that societies were also dominated by collectivist values and practices. Thus, the promotion of individualistic values and institutions was envisaged as the main challenge. As a matter of fact, historically, liberalism has always accused all of its opponents of certain collectivist values. However, Western democracies never developed from liberalism alone. In contrast to Bolshevism, liberalism always coexisted with other political and cultural traditions, which made Western societies open and pluralistic.
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
The reality of post-Soviet societies was far from this simplistic collectivist stigmatization. The Soviet Union left its societies lacking not only in freedom, but also in solidarity. These societies were anomic, consisting of atomized individuals incapable of any kind of social cohesion. Although not all of them were similar. In this regard, Georgia had a much better developed social structure compared, for example, to Russia. This helped Georgia to achieve a higher level of democracy than Russia. However, society is still lacking in the institutional mechanisms that would give it the informal power to keep the government under control and restrict the hubristic voluntarism of its rulers. In Soviet times, everything beyond the front door of the family apartment belonged to the state; now, when the state has minimized its involvement, the space between private individuals and the state is almost empty in the institutional sense. There are the authorities, on the one hand, and relatively free individuals, on the other, but no power formation mechanisms in-between.
Thus, giving power to society rather than to individuals is the task of “republicanization,” which may help to fill in the blank spots of the previous period. This task may be difficult to support from the outside, however some aspects may be promoted. To do so, the democracy promoters should pay more attention to Europe’s historical experience of democracy-building, since it is different from the Anglo-Saxon experience in those respects that are important for our consideration.
America’s formal constitutional arrangement developed democracy based on the context provided by the American people, and not vice versa.10 When society is not powerful, it is difficult to achieve a workable model of democracy from constitutional engineering alone. However, when comparing the two regimes that have functioned in Georgia during recent years, under Shevardnadze and Saakashvili, respectively, we can assume that some constitutional arrangements may be preferable to others. The constitution of 1995 had weaknesses, but it also had its strong sides. If in 2003 the constitution had been transformed into a parliamentary proportional model, similar to that in continental Europe, the subsequent regime would have been better protected from its extreme hubristic attitudes. Instead of being demanded, cooperation among the political elites could have been imposed on them by means of proper constitutional engineering.
Constitutional constraints on the power of authoritarian leaders are often ineffective because such leaders have enough leverages to overcome them. “Constraints” are usually associated with such mechanisms as the division of power, or power dividing. Power dividing however, is one, but not the only, constitutional instrument that restricts the tyranny of the majority. Power sharing (or proportionality as other authors put it) is another one, which plays just as important a role, especially in shaping continental parliamentary democracies, where power does not belong to the majority but to “as many people as possible.”11 Instead of placing the origins of cooperative and positive-sum rational political logic within the political environment, these democracies provide them with formal institutional arrangements within the political system. The boundary between the political realm and civil society becomes blurred, rather than differentiated, and political cooperation within the system is as equally important as competition. Equality of positive political rights, rather than equality of negative freedoms, plays an important role in their basic settings.12
Concentrating on the quality of elections, recent democracy promotion efforts in Georgia were once again directed toward the same goals of fair competition for offices. Instead, the new pro-democracy policies should be based on substantially innovative approaches and methodologies. At some time in the future, the current regime will go and Georgia will acquire another opportunity to decide about its political system. In the deeply polarized context, no one can guarantee that the rule of
10 See: R. Dahl, How Democratic is the American Constitution? Yale University Press, New Haven, London. 2002.
11 See: A. Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries, Yale University Press, New Haven, London, 1999; B. Powell, Elections as Instrument of Democracy. Majoritarian and Proportional Visions, Yale University Press, 2000.
12 See: J. Habermas, “Three Normative Models of Democracy,” in: The Political, ed. by D. Ingram, Blackwell Publishers, 2002, pp. 151-159.
law and division of power will be institutionalized quickly to ensure that the winning majority will not try once again to use its advantage against the losers. Institutional and discourse settings should be developed to promote more cooperative rational political behavior at all levels of the political system.
C o n c l u s i o n: Bringing Society Back
Georgian experience has demonstrated that freedom cannot be sustained without solidarity, and democracy cannot be promoted from the outside. Even when granted by historical circumstances, freedom and democracy depend on the power of society acting in their defense. Strengthening society may not be a realistic goal if considered in the short time perspective. For the last 20 years, the legacies of atomization and anomie were the most difficult problem to overcome in establishing a civil society. However this process of society-building is underway. It started in a new fashion about two years ago when a new wave of the pro-democracy movement began. This direction was somehow enhanced, rather than weakened, by the absence of external promotion. In contrast to the previous wave of democratization, those who opt for democracy and freedom now feel that they have no external “referee” to whom they can complain, as was the case before. Institutionally, in the absence of an external “referee,” competitive games with positive outcomes become impossible. This time, civil society is developing on its own, which may take longer, but may yield surer results. The fate of freedom and democracy in Georgia is still unclear, but the new trend of development is becoming more and more salient.
Kenan ALLAHVERDIEV
Ph.D. (Philos.), Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science and Political Administration, Academy of State Administration under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan (Baku, Azerbaijan).
AZERBAIJAN: STRATEGY OF ETHNOPOLITICAL SECURITY IN THE MODERNIZATION CONTEXT
Abstract
The author takes an in-depth look at the top priorities in the ethnopolitical sphere of national security, namely the field in which ethnopolitical processes and security
problems overlap to form a “borderline” zone. He convincingly ties together these priorities and the tasks of national importance the country faces in the wider modernization context.
