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James V. WERTSCH
Marshall S. Snow Professor in Arts and Sciences and Director of the McDonnell International Scholars Academy at Washington University in St. Louis. After finishing his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago in 1975 Wertsch spent a year as a postdoctoral fellow in Moscow. He has held positions at several U.S. universities as well as institutions in Western Europe and Russia. Among Wertsch’s publications are: Voices of the Mind (Harvard University Press, 1991); Mind as Action (Oxford University Press, 1998), Voices of Collective Remembering (Cambridge University Press, 2002), and Enough! The Rose Revolution in the Republic of Georgia (Nova Publishers, 2005). Wertsch holds honorary degrees from Linkoping University and Oslo University, and he is an honorary member of the Russian Academy of Education.
GEORGIA AFTER THE ROSE REVOLUTION
Abstract
T
he Rose Revolution in November 2003 created a setting characterized by major new challenges as well as major
new opportunities for Georgia. After presenting the forces that gave rise to the Rose Revolution (emerging civil society, vi-
The statements made and the views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author. The author wishes to express appreciation for the thoughtful comments provided by the anonymous reviewers. Not for quotation.
brant free press, weak state authority, and national memory and unity), several issues that will shape the future of Georgia are examined. The first of these is economic growth, which provides some reason for optimism, though the picture remains tenuous. The second is the struggle over Georgia’s territory, in particular the challenges facing the state when it comes to breakaway territories. Frustration on this front remains to the present time. The third is the
development of a strong state, something that provides particular challenges in light of the failing state inherited by the Saakashvili government, but something that showed some promising signs in the wake of the Rose Revolution. After a promising start, the Saakashvili government has recently drifted in the direction of over-centralization of power in the president’s office, and this is cause for concern as the government continues to struggle to find its way.
In November 2003 the world watched as crowds of Georgians braved cold, rain, and the threat of violence to stay in the streets demanding a new government. A dramatic series of events played out over three weeks culminating in the downfall of Eduard Shevardnadze’s corrupt and moribund regime and the rise of a government headed by Mikhail Saakashvili. Now, with some perspective on these events the question is: What does Georgia have to show for the Rose Revolution? As I shall argue below, the answer to this simple question is complex, a mixed bag of accomplishments and missed opportunities, cause for optimism as well as reason for concern about what the future holds. The bottom line is that there is much to be proud of in the achievements of the past two years, but the momentum that was so inspiring in the wake of the revolution may now have stalled. And looking to the future, there are grounds for real concern on some fronts.
* * *
Why is so much attention in the West focused on the Rose Revolution and its outcome? There are many countries several times the size of Georgia that have garnered much less attention from the U.S. and others, so it is essential to understand what motivates our concern in this case. The two obvious reasons for this are:
1) Georgia’s role in the geopolitics of oil and gas, and
2) the possibilities Georgia holds for serving as a model of emerging democracy and civil society.
The key to understanding the first of these factors in today’s world is the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, a project initiated in the 1990s during the presidency of Eduard Shevardnadze. This pipeline will soon transport a million barrels of oil a day to the West without going through Russia, Iran, or the Bosporus Straits. It is so important for the region that Svante Cornell, Mamuka Tsereteli, and Vladimir Socor have said that it “reconfigures the mental map with which political observers and decision-makers look at the world.”1
The Rose Revolution and the events that have unfolded in its wake are the key to understanding the second reason for the importance of Georgia today. This revolution was an important step in creating a laboratory for democracy, and it provides a context in which political, cultural, and economic issues have played out over the past year and a half.
The BTC pipeline and Rose Revolution have been interpreted in quite different ways, and part of what follows is devoted to presenting opposing perspectives. In particular, American and Russian
1 S.E. Cornell, M. Tsereteli, and V. Socor, “Geostrategic Implications of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline,” in:
The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline: Oil Window to the West, ed. by S.F. Starr and S.E. Cornell, CACI & SRSP, Washington and Uppsala, May 2005, p.17.
views often stand in sharp contrast, and this has been a continuing source of friction between the two countries.
As many events in the former Soviet Union have demonstrated, predicting the future in a place like Georgia is next to impossible. It is possible, however, to identify some core issues around which the future will be worked out, and these will be my focus. The three issues I have in mind are:
1) economic development,
2) territory, and
3) the development of a strong, well functioning state.
Of concern in the first case is the economic viability of the country, the second has to do with the extent and organization of Georgia’s territory, and the third deals with the issue of whether the country can develop the norms required of a modern state.
These three issues are interrelated, but they tend to show up in different discussions conducted by different policy and academic communities. One thing they have in common, however, is that today they are playing out against the backdrop of the Rose Revolution, so I begin with a brief review of this event.
The Rose Revolution as Backdrop
The Rose Revolution was an extraordinary event that put Georgia on the international stage for several days in November 2003. It brought Saakashvili, a young populist critic of Shevardnadze’s corrupt government, to power and initiated the region’s most important experiment in democracy. The ramifications of this revolution extend well beyond Georgia’s borders. It has made democratic movements thinkable in places like Ukraine, a country where Georgian flags sprouted in the rallies of the Orange Revolution of 2004. And it emerges in discussions about potential democratic transitions elsewhere, including Russia itself.
A few basic forces at work prior to the Rose Revolution provide insight into why it took place. The first was the civil society that was struggling to emerge at the time. Numerous NGOs had been active in Georgia for years, and they clearly had an impact on government and society by the time of the parliamentary elections of 2 November, 2003. Some of these NGOs had actively defended the rights of religious and ethnic groups and in the process helped create a new kind of public discourse. Opinion differs as to just how important NGOs were in the revolution, but observers generally agree that they at least played a role in laying the groundwork for the event. This view is supported by the fact that after the Rose Revolution leaders of countries like Uzbekistan and Russia, where such upheaval is viewed with trepidation, have restricted or simply closed down many NGOs.
A vibrant free press was a second factor in the Rose Revolution. In the lead-up to the events of 2003 the Georgian public was often inspired by the images and stories provided by the media, especially the television station Rustavi-2. The media, aided by the NGOs, had become so powerful by 2003 that attempts by government authorities in the previous few years to muzzle television stations were met by massive public resistance. Some observers viewed the media’s coverage of the Rose Revolution as bordering on the irresponsible, but they generally agree that it played a pivotal role in initiating and maintaining public support for it.
In contrast to these first two ingredients in the Rose Revolution, each having to do with the presence of a new force, the third involves an element that was largely missing: state authority. During the last few years of his presidency, Shevardnadze’s technology of power was marked by a sort of liberal detachment from the corrupt processes in his government, and this led many to regard Georgia as a frag-
ile, if not failing state. Such a view was supported by the fact that opposition leaders, along with the NGOs and media, encountered relatively little resistance from law-enforcement agencies during the Rose Revolution, something that stood in striking contrast to events that unfolded in Uzbekistan in May 2005.
The fourth essential ingredient that went into the Rose Revolution was Georgian national identity and unity. Despite years of poverty and demoralization, opposition leaders were successful in appealing to powerful feelings of national unity when it came to mobilizing the nation. The fact that they were able to rally the population around a unifying “story of peoplehood”2 was a crucial ingredient in the success of the revolution. This was particularly noteworthy in a country where it is often said that whenever two Georgians congregate, one can be sure to find at least three political parties.
Some of the most powerful statements coming from leaders of the Rose Revolution have to do with themes of Georgian national unity and identity. Whereas there were differences of opinion as to how important the NGOs were or how responsible the media were, there is agreement that the people were the main actors of the events of November 2003. They were motivated by deep frustration with the corrupt government, but this frustration did not simply express itself in an outburst of destruction.
Instead, the Georgian people came together in a way that was moving and often surprising to the leaders—and even to the people themselves. Nino Burjanadze (Chairperson of Parliament in both the Shevardnadze and Saakashvili governments) summarized what she saw by noting that Georgians “can tolerate a lot of things, poverty and so forth, but when it comes to our dignity, we cannot tolerate it... [T]his nation still has kept some inner force that can be used to recover its future.”3 And in his reflections, Zurab Zhvania (Prime Minister in the Saakashvili government until his tragic death in February 2004) remarked that the Rose Revolution “was the first time since regaining independence that Georgians feel like winners. They have this sense that they won. People are still in poverty and have the same economic problems and so on, but they now feel much, much stronger than before. It was like regaining dignity. We are a nation. We are a nation, and we are proud that we are Georgians again.”4
The Rose Revolution provided a new background for developments in Georgia, and the country has responded rapidly—and for the most part well—to this new context. During the first couple of years since the events of 2003, it has undergone major changes, many of them encouraging, in the areas of economic growth, territory, and the emergence of state institutions. These positive developments set the stage for discussions about whether the country continues to be headed down a positive path, but before turning to more critical observations, it is important to outline the accomplishments.
Economic Growth
In the first couple of years after the Rose Revolution the most important news on the economic front was strong growth. This stands in contrast to what was going on during the period leading up to the Rose Revolution and also to what most analysts assume would have happened had this event not occurred. The Economist Intelligence Unit reports real GDP growth of 8-10% for recent years.5 Because collecting statistics on economic growth is still such a new enterprise in Georgia and because much of the economy is still in the process of coming out into the open, these figures meet with skepticism in some quarters. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that they exceed the figures of other CIS countries.
2 R.M. Smith, Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political Membership, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003.
3 Interview with Nino Burjanadze, in: Enough! The Rose Revolution in the Republic of Georgia, ed. by Z. Karu-midze and J.V. Wertsch, Nova Publishers, New York, 2005, p. 50.
4 Interview with Zurab Zhvania, in: Enough! The Rose Revolution in the Republic of Georgia, p. 42.
5 Country Report for Georgia, The Economist Intelligence Unit, May 2005.
Consumer price inflation has generally been low since the Rose Revolution, but there are indications that it is rising, and this is a cause of growing concern. Trade balances moved in a negative direction temporarily, but this is thought to be due to the construction of the BTC pipeline in an economy that was not sufficiently developed to supply the needs of such a major construction effort. The Georgian lari (GEL) has grown steadily against the Euro and U.S. dollar.
The construction of the BTC pipeline, now largely complete, along with plans for the Southern Caucasus Gas Pipeline Project (SCP), have provided an important engine of economic growth for Georgia. With the completion of both of these projects in the near future, however, the country will no longer be able to rely on major new infusions of construction funds to maintain its economic development. The BTC pipeline will be providing something on the order of 50 U.S.$ mn per annum in transit fees, but it will become increasingly important to foster growth in small and medium sized business, especially in sectors such as agriculture and tourism. The latter was a major part of the Georgian economy during the Soviet years, when several million tourists came to the republic each year, compared to a mere 10,000 in 2004. In this context observers have noted the urgency of developing this untapped potential.6
Turning to economic policy, there has been strong growth in revenue collection since the Rose Revolution. In fact, initial targets for tax revenues had to be revised upward twice in 2004 because of the surge in tax collection. During that year tax revenues doubled over what they were in 2003,7 and as a result the government was able to pay off its arrears to several sectors (teachers, pensioners) and double monthly pensions. These trends resulted from strong economic growth, anti-corruption efforts, and tax reforms. More businesses, especially medium and large-scale enterprises, have come out of the shadow economy as the enforcement of tax laws has improved. In addition, other sources of revenue increased sharply. For example, there was a marked increase in the customs fees with the reintegration of Ajaria into the country in early 2004.
In general, increased revenues have been matched by increased expenditures by the state, which rose 60% in 2004 over the previous year. The largest outlays continue to be for social subsidies, debt repayment, and transfers to local governments. Expenditures on law enforcement and defense have risen rapidly as these undergo structural changes and the government makes new commitments to the country’s armed forces. The number of public-sector employees actually showed a significant drop of 30,000 during 2004 as the government did a great deal of house cleaning, but savings were used largely to improve the salary of remaining employees, a move that makes them less susceptible to corruption.
On the whole, the picture of economic development and policy in Georgia is encouraging. It is strikingly better compared to the prospects before the Rose Revolution, and it is much better than what most analysts assume it would be today had this event not occurred. Some of the improvement can be attributed to increasing confidence on the part of domestic and foreign investors. This stems in part from a more transparent tax code, and it is essential that the government continue to act in predictable, responsible ways to increase this confidence. There are, however, potential problems that observers see, and many of these are tied to the issue of Georgian territory and the challenge of developing a strong state.
The Issue of Georgian Territory
The boundaries and political organization of Georgia’s territory are issues that have been at the center of debate for years and concern the country’s very existence. When discussing these issues,
6 P.B. Henze, Tourism in Georgia: An Unexploited Opportunity for Economic Development, CaucasUS Context, Vol. 2, No. 1, Spring 2005.
7 Country Report for Georgia.
Georgians often employ the expression “territorial integrity,” but I shall just use the more neutral “territory” in an attempt to avoid pre-judging several contested issues.8
Regardless of terminology, the major debates over territory in Georgia focus on the regions of Ajaria, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia. These three regions are quite different in history, ethnic composition, and politics, but one thing they have in common is Russian involvement, which Georgia views as unwarranted meddling, if not hostile intervention. This involvement takes several forms, including the provision of military equipment, and it is often viewed as part of “The [Russian] policy of using separatist groups for policy purposes.”9
The problem presented by Ajaria, a small region in southwest Georgia on the Black Sea coast, was essentially resolved by the summer of 2004. In comparison with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the challenge it presented was so modest that many observers did not even consider it to be a “breakaway region,” the term commonly applied to the other two. South Ossetia, and especially Abkhazia, however, present much greater challenges. Despite the small size of the territories and populations, intense feelings of ethnic nationalism have been the source of seemingly unending confrontation between central authorities in Tbilisi and these two “unrecognized republics,” as they are termed by international observers.
The opposing sides in these disputes espouse markedly different ideas about the national identity of the groups involved as well as the historical origins of the regions and their conflicts. These ideas have been elaborated, often in inflammatory and dangerous ways, by leaders on all sides. The result is that the groups have utterly different responses to questions such as: Were the borders of present-day Georgia drawn in artificial and illegitimate ways to include territories that do not belong to the country? Should these regions be independent? Should they be part of another country (namely Russia)?
I shall not go into the histories of these regions, histories that extend far into the past and are the subject of longstanding research as well as quarrels.10 Suffice it to say that the collective memories of various parties paint very different pictures of how Abkhazia and South Ossetia came to be included in the borders of Georgia. The picture is further complicated by the fact that it is not only the people of these two breakaway regions and Georgia who are caught up in this dispute. Other parties, especially Russia, are involved.
As critics of Russia see it, “Moscow continues to unashamedly back the two secessionist territories in northern Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, who wrested off Tbilisi’s control in the early 1990s with Russian help.”11 From a Russian perspective, however, interest in the region stems from quite legitimate concerns. One of these is that BTC and other east-west corridor energy and transportation projects portend a scenario in which a significant portion of infrastructure development will move out of Russia’s central regions to the Southern Caucasus. Indeed, this is already happening and constitutes a blow to the economic and demographic future in the traditional Russian heartland.
The major source of Russian concern stems from traditional fears of being surrounded by potential enemies. In particular, it could result in “total American control along a substantial part of Russia’s state borders.”12 The Russian commentator who made this statement went on to argue that “This control will inevitably evolve into interference in the internal affairs of oil exporters and transit countries, including Georgia. America intends to deploy its own military contingents where the Russian military is stationed nowadays.”13
8 I am indebted to Tom de Waal for pointing out this terminological issue.
9 S.E. Cornell, M. Tsereteli, and V. Socor, op. cit., p. 26.
10 For a summary of some of these quarrels, see St. Kaufman’s book Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2001.
11 S.E. Cornell, M. Tsereteli, and V. Socor, op. cit.
12 Russia Must Protect Its Interests in the Post-Soviet Zone, Interview with Andrei Ishchuk of the Federation Council CIS Affairs Committee, Vremya Novostei, 27 May, 2005.
13 Ibidem.
Perhaps the most striking illustration of where this line of reasoning leads can be found in the seemingly endless process of removing Russian military bases that are on Georgian territory. The two bases involved are holdovers from Soviet times, and the fact that their removal has been so long in coming reflects a lingering mentality of colonialism on the part of some circles in Russia. A new set of agreements to remove them will hopefully bring this point of contention to an end. Interestingly, at a meeting of the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization on 24 June, 2005, Russian officials declared that the expressions “near abroad” and “post-Soviet space” should be taken out of circulation,14 but remnants of the thinking behind such terms clearly remain, at least among some circles in Moscow.
In striking contrast to the Russian perspective, many observers in the West and Georgia view Russia as the cause, rather than the antidote to problems with the breakaway area. This is an assertion that officials in Moscow vehemently deny. Regardless of one’s perspectives on such issues, a basic fact of life for Georgia is that Russian economic and geopolitical interests will continue to be felt in the region. Ideally, however, these should be approached with an understanding that “Russia has a natural right to influence, but not to dominate or dictate policy.”15
Discussions of the frozen conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia routinely revolve around a few possible scenarios. The first is that South Ossetia and Abkhazia would be re-integrated into Georgia, undoubtedly with some special arrangements for autonomy. This is generally the Georgian view of what should happen, and since the Rose Revolution brought him to power Saakashvili has made several bold claims that it would happen. To date, however, negotiations and occasional flare-ups of armed conflict have not been encouraging. For example, a military operation by Georgian forces in South Ossetia in the summer of 2004 was an embarrassing failure for the Saakashvili government. What is generally viewed as an impulsive operation on the part of a Georgian leadership caught up in the hubristic atmosphere of the Ajarian success ended up setting back relationships between Tbilisi and South Ossetia.
A second possible outcome of the struggles in these two unrecognized republics is that they would become sovereign, independent states. This seems highly unlikely, if for no other reason than that they are so small. Estimates of the number of people in Abkhazia today run around 200,000 (half Abkhaz and the other half mainly Armenians, Russians, and Georgians), and less than 50,000 are estimated to live in South Ossetia. Nonetheless, leaders of these regions often make bold assertions of their right to exist as independent countries.
A third scenario is for South Ossetia and Abkhazia to become part of the Russian Federation. In the view of some, this seems to be precisely what Moscow is angling for, given its practice of handing out passports to those in the breakaway regions who want them. There are limits to how vigorously Russia can pursue this strategy, at least overtly. This is because encouraging these regions to break away from Georgia raises questions about why the same approach should not apply to Chechnia and other hotspots of ethnic independence movements in the Northern Caucasus. The wars and the brutal, seemingly endless armed conflict that have afflicted Chechnia in the post-Soviet period are framed against a background in which Russian refuses to give it full autonomy or independence. Any move for such independence by Abkhazia or South Ossetia would raise alarm in Moscow that regions such as Chechnia and Daghestan in the Northern Caucasus could follow, and this would present a fundamental challenge to the Russian state.
A fourth possible scenario for the future is that rather than trying to incorporate Abkhazia and South Ossetia into the Russian Federation, various parties are working to ensure that they remain in limbo as stateless territories. The villas built by Russian generals and businessmen on the Black
14 V. Socor, “From CIS to CSTO: Can a ‘Core’ Be Preserved?” Eurasia Daily Monitor—The Jamestown Foundation, Vol. 2, Issue 125, 28 June, 2005.
15 S.E. Cornell, M. Tsereteli, and V. Socor, op. cit., p. 17.
Sea shore of Abkhazia, as well as the large-scale smuggling of gasoline, cigarettes, and flour in South Ossetia, provide strong incentives to keep these regions outside the control of the Georgian state—or any other state for that matter. This is all part of “the widespread wartime political economy in the Caucasus that is among the region’s most intractable obstacles to peace and democratization.”16
This wartime political economy has emerged in the context of what many observers view as Russia’s confused, or even nonexistent policy in the Caucasus. The seeming inability to come up with a coherent approach can be seen as a reflection of the tenuous standing of government authority in Russia in the wake of what is called “economic reform.” In the view of some observers, the emergence of an economic oligarchy has usurped much of what would otherwise be a state’s sphere of action. And if Anatol Lieven17 is right, this is a stable system, not a passing stage in the development of liberal democracy and capitalism. The plight of Mikhail Khodorkovskiy shows that Russian authorities will try from time to time to re-establish their authority, but no one should doubt the power of the oligarchy and the resulting inability of the state to pursue a single coherent strategy when it comes to issues like the breakaway regions of Georgia.
In sum, the struggle over the size and political organization of territory in Georgia involves several actors and motives, and the result is that competing explanations often exist for events that transpire there. Economic forces and rational geopolitical strategizing clearly play a role, but the most powerful and volatile force at issue, a force that provides the framework within which others operate, may be national memory and identity. Stuart Kaufman,18 for example, has argued that it is hard to account for the disputes between Abkhaz and Ossetians, on the one side, and Georgians, on the other, if one focuses only on economic or political factors. From this perspective it is especially hard to account for why conflicts do not exist elsewhere. For example, Azeris and Armenians each make up about 6% of the country’s population, but there has not been the sort of conflict between them and Georgians that one finds in Abkhazia and South Ossetia with their much smaller numbers.
It is worth noting that this should not be taken to suggest that all is well with Azeri and Armenian minority groups in Georgia. For example, there have been tensions in Samtskhe-Javakheti, an ethnic-Armenian region on the Armenia-Georgia border, with some groups calling for secession from Georgia. And in Kvemo Kartli, a southeastern region predominantly populated by about 300,000 ethnic Azeris, there have also been disturbing developments. The powerful collective memories at work in this latter setting are evidenced in the practice of local radical Azeri groups, as well as some Azeri media, to refer to Kvemo Kartli using the Azeri name Borchaly, which implicitly questions the Georgian origin of this area.19
In sum, Georgian concerns with the issue of territory focus first and foremost on Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but it is important for the country not to overlook other minority populations as well, especially Azeri and Armenian groups living within the country’s borders. In all cases the symbolic politics of nationalism is an essential driving force in the disputes. For the Russian actors, economic motives might play more of a role, but even there the sides are defined and the issues framed in terms of the memory and politics of nationalism.
Most observers, including many Georgians, now recognize that there is enough blame to go around for the sad state of affairs in the crucial regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. If they are to be re-integrated into the Georgian state, it appears that two essential things will have to occur.
16 S. Blank, “The Lessons of War: Chechnya, Russia, the Caucasus,” CaucasUS Context, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2005.
17 A. Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian power, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1998.
18 S. Kaufman, op. cit.
19 Eurasia Daily Monitor, Thursday, 29 September, 2005, Vol. 2, Issue 181. Published by the Jamestown Foundation.
First, the opposing sides will somehow have to transcend or diminish the power of the “sealed nar-ratives”20 that make it impossible for them to see each other’s view of the situation. In this effort the political elite, including public intellectuals, will have to take the lead. Some on the Georgian side have already recognized that an apology from politicians and public intellectuals for words and actions that have exacerbated nationalist feelings might be in order. And second, solid agreement on new forms of autonomy for the regions will be required. At least some Georgians know and accept this, but feelings remain so high that the first response of the opposing sides is often that either complete sovereignty or straightforward re-annexation is the only possible future. Both are nonstarters.
The Development of a Strong Georgian State
As noted earlier, one of the reasons that the Rose Revolution succeeded was that little in the way of state authority stood in its way. Shevardnadze had been presiding over a failing state for years, and by late 2003 corruption, chaos, and demoralization had created such a crisis that he could no longer assume the loyalty of state actors, including the police and military.21
In the aftermath of the revolution President Mikhail Saakashvili and his leadership team made several moves with an eye toward rebuilding trust in the state. The campaign they launched in 2004 to create a clean and effective police force is a prime example. Saakashvili fired all the traffic police with their low pay and bad habits and hired new ones at salaries high enough to allow them to resist corruption. These new officers, outfitted in distinctive uniforms and supplied with a fleet of new Volkswagen police cars, made their debut in the fall of 2004. This reform effort is viewed as one of the most important success stories of the government.
Although the immediate motivation for strengthening state authority might have been the crisis that the Shevardnadze government had left behind, it is being pursued in an historical context where trust in state institutions has always been superficial at best. People in Georgia and the Caucasus more generally have a long history of relying on family and personal networks rather than on bureaucratic institutions when pursuing economic goals and other forms of social action. Society has traditionally relied heavily on “clientelistic”22 relationships somewhat like those found in twentieth century machine politics in U.S. cities. Recent findings from studies in the Southern Caucasus suggest “high levels of personal support from family and friends but lower levels of trust and integration into the wider society.”23 This system grounded in networks of personal relationships, as opposed to generalized trust,24 remains in force today and provides a challenge to anyone wishing to build a modern state in Georgia.
20 This is an insightful term that Thomas de Waal has used in his analysis of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh (T. de Waal, Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War, New York University Press, New York, 2003). He has also applied it to other conflicts in the Southern Caucasus more generally (see the Roundtable Discussion of the Caucasus International Forum in CaucasUS Context, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2005).
21 See the interviews with Nino Burjanadze, Zurab Zhvania, and Richard Miles, in: Enough! The Rose Revolution in the Republic of Georgia.
22 C.H. Fairbanks, “Clientalism and the Roots of Post-Soviet Disorder,” in: Transcaucasus, Nationalism, and Social Change, ed. by R.G. Suny, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1996, pp. 341-374.
23 P. Abbott, “Wealth, Health, Happiness, and Satisfaction in Post-Soviet Armenia and Georgia,” CaucasUS Context, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2005.
24 H. Farrell and J. Knight, “Trust, Institutions, and Institutional Change: Industrial Districts and the Social Capital Hypothesis,” Politics and Society, Vol. 31, No. 4, 2003, pp. 537-566.
One of the steps taken by the Saakashvili government to counter this was a public relations campaign aimed at broadening support for state institutions. This campaign is reflected in billboards that appeared early in 2004 in Tbilisi depicting the clean and trustworthy police force that serve the Georgian people. One reading of these billboards is that they were part of the same kind of advertising one can expect from just about any political machine. Namely, they were meant to publicize a success story of the ruling party and remind Georgians of what the Saakashvili government had done for them. To be sure, this was at work, but they were also part of a campaign to build loyalty to Georgian state authority more generally.
In this connection, consider the billboard below. It was part of a campaign to educate members of the public about how they could contact the police in an emergency, namely by calling the new emergency number of 022. But the broader message is to be found in the photos of the officers. Their smart uniforms and badges clearly distinguish them from the old, Soviet-style look of their predecessors. And in case anyone missed the pictorial representation of trustworthiness and dedication, the written text proclaimed, “When you need a help, we are at your side.”
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The second billboard shown below was even more pronounced in its emphasis on the trustworthy nature of the new police, going so far as to suggest that they provide good role models for future citizens. At the top of this billboard was “23 November,” which is the official date of the Rose Revolution in 2003, and the bottom proclaimed, “In the Name of Georgia.” Again, this presentation can be taken to be a reminder of how much the country owes Saakashvili and his party, but it goes further in its appeal to the citizens of Georgia. The two officers present a friendly, yet disciplined face of the new state and are put forth as reason to trust in central authority. And the boys saluting in the foreground imply that this new precedent of trustworthiness could help foster the next generation of citizens.
Along with a campaign for public trust waged through billboards, Saakashvili has engaged in an ongoing rhetorical effort, one that often employs the intriguing strategy of harnessing ethnic nationalism in an effort to build civic nationalism. The seeming paradox in this is actually not so surprising if one takes into account what Jurgen Habermas has called the “Janus-faced” nature of modern nationstates. Although the source of political legitimacy in the modern state may be the voluntary nation of citizens, he argues that the political mobilization required to secure social integration continues to rely on ethnic nationalist notions like language, culture, and a shared history. “Staatsburger or citizens constitute themselves as a political association of free and equal persons by their own initiative. Volksgenossen or nationals already find themselves in a community shaped by shared language and history. The tension between the universalism of an egalitarian legal community and the particularism of a community united by historical destiny is built into the very concept of the national state.”25 The upshot of this formulation is that Saakashvili’s strategy for building a strong, trustworthy state requires walking a tightrope between the ideal of civic nationalism and the alluring, but potentially dangerous appeal of ethnic nationalism. On several occasions he has carried off this balancing act in some striking ways. Consider, for example, an event of 24 January, 2004, which was the day before Saakashvili’s official state inauguration as president of Georgia. On that day he made a pilgrimage to the ancient monastery in Gelati in western Georgia in order to take an oath on the tomb of David the Builder.26 The patriarch of the Georgian Orthodox Church, who was also present, gave his blessing to the event, declaring, “You are entrusted with Georgia with its great hardships and problems. Georgia expects reunification from you and we are sure that you will do it with God being your helper.”27
25 J. Habermas, “The European Nation-state: On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship,” in: J. Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other. Studies in Political Theory, ed. by Ciaran Cronin and Pablo De Greiff , MIT Press, Cambridge, 1998.
26 David the Builder continues to play a central role in the Georgian imagination. In a recent poll conducted by the International Republican Institute, he was the top choice among Georgians as “a hero in our time.” Saakashvili received only 2% of the votes (reported in The Messenger, #119 (0893), 3 June, 2005).
27 Caucasus Knot/News, 24 January, 2004.
As many as 10,000 people listened as Saakashvili responded to the patriarch’s call by stating, «Today Georgia is split and humiliated. We should unite to restore Georgia’s territorial integrity. Georgia has existed and will exist. Georgia will become a united strong country.” These comments by the patriarch and Saakashvili sound like a clarion call to ethnic nationalism. Indeed, in the early 1990s it was precisely such statements that gave rise to the outbreak of nationalist violence between Georgians and the Abkhaz and Ossetians.
However, Saakashvili has often managed to use such utterances in a more dexterous and strategic manner. His assertion that the country must once again become “a united strong” entity is something to which no Georgian would object, and as such provides a foundation for everyone to participate in a national discussion. However, his performance at the tomb of David the Builder, the founding figure of Georgia’s “Golden Age,” would at first glance seem to be addressed to a narrower audience. Namely, it would appear that he was speaking to ethnic and religious nationalists, for whom David’s success in building the first strong Georgian state is a great source of pride.
But the way Saakashvili followed up on this performance reveals a calculated effort to lure na-tionalistically oriented Georgians into the broader community of citizens. He did this by relying on the fact that an essential part of this heroic narrative is that King David called for tolerance and sought the commitment of a wide range of national groups in carrying out his state building project. Hence, Saakashvili was framing issues in such a way that it appealed to those motivated by ethnic nationalism, but in the process encouraged them to recognize their responsibilities to building a multi-ethnic state.
In Habermas’s terms, by speaking to nationals, Saakashvili wanted them to think as citizens. All Georgians, including those motivated by ethnic nationalism, were being invited into a discussion around a shared national narrative, but the reading that is emphasized is not what they may have assumed at the outset. Instead of viewing national difference as a threat to the state and its territorial integrity, Saakashvili harnessed a national narrative in which diversity is a strength, a claim he has made explicitly on several occasions.
The public relations effort and rhetorical strategies of the Saakashvili team reflect a major campaign to foster trust in the state, but is there any evidence that the government has been effective in its efforts? Does this campaign amount to anything more than the sort of propaganda put forth by Soviet authorities in previous decades? Or is it part of an effort that is having more profound and concrete consequences? An interesting answer to this can be found not in billboards, surveys, and the like, but in another fact already discussed: the striking increase in tax revenues.
This development was partly attributable to the fear that the Saakashvili government has struck into the hearts of Georgian citizens and businesses. Soon after taking office it launched an aggressive anti-corruption campaign that included detaining suspected tax evaders and putting them in “pre-trial detention.” This involved incarcerating individuals suspected of tax evasion with little or no legal procedures and then negotiating their release in exchange for back taxes. Other instances of making searches and arrests without due process or before proper warrants had been issued have also been widely reported. Such measures are highly questionable from a legal perspective and run the risk of being abused by the government. Indeed, in the view of many there have already been too many instances when they have been harnessed for crude political ends.
The more ominous long-term outcome would be that such practices lead to diminished, rather than enhanced trust in the state, and this is what the government may be starting to see. The result is that many Georgians and outside observers believe that such practices should be phased out and the government needs to make increased efforts to make the transition to a more normal form of governance.
In sum, the larger situation is one in which the increase in tax revenues presents an encouraging picture. How much of this is motivated by fear of the tax police, as opposed to the more positive development of growing trust in the government, remains an open question. But the trajectory has been encouraging, especially if the government can make the transition to using practices that are legal, fair, and transparent. The possibilities for doing this have been increased by the passage in 2004 of a new, simpler, and fairer tax code.
Problems and Prospects
The new pipelines and the Rose Revolution provide a backdrop for economic growth, the resolution of territorial disputes, and the beginnings of a strong state in Georgia. Much of this suggests that there is good reason to be sanguine about where the country is headed. As is always the case, however, yesterday’s successes only raise questions about what needs to be done today.
A pessimistic view of the current situation would emphasize that Georgia’s drive for territorial integrity seems to be stalled, that large segments of its population have not seen any of the benefits of the economic upturn they keep hearing about, and that new concerns are rising over just where the government is headed and how much to trust it. From this perspective the afterglow of the Rose Revolution has faded and the population’s patience is beginning to grow thin, something reflected in a significant drop in Saakashvili’s poll ratings. Fortunately for him, the opposition to date has been weak and disorganized, so there is no imminent threat to his presidency. Nonetheless, some serious thought is now in order about what comes next.
What should be at the top of the agenda of the Saakashvili government at this point? There is growing consensus that a key item should be making the transition from the centralized control it has employed since the Rose Revolution to one in which the distribution of power is the norm. Demands for this are rising, and the government is approaching a fork in the road where it will have to make some decisions on how to address them. Continuing down the path of centralizing power in the president’s office raises serious questions about the country’s future. To be sure there are those who believe that Georgia is still in a state of emergency that requires a strong, centralized hand. Many, however, now appear to see this as bordering on the kind of permanent revolution invoked by Soviet leaders to retain their power.
One of the most alarming results of over-centralizing power in the president’s office is the weak and insufficiently independent judicial system in Georgia, a system that people simply do not trust. Judges are widely viewed as being beholden to, if not outright intimidated by the executive branch, and this means that their decisions are assumed to be subject to whatever the current political agenda might be.
This view is beginning to have a deleterious impact on the economic climate as domestic and foreign investors become less certain that they can count on the judicial system to get a fair hearing, especially in disputes with tax collectors. In 2004 a special procedure was established to help businesses arbitrate such disputes. This was popular with the investment community, but after losing several cases and the tax revenues that went with them, the Saakashvili government abruptly cancelled the practice, saying it was costing the state too much. The motivation of the government is understandable, but this move was a blow to investor confidence in Georgia. The bigger story, however, has to do with why the arbitration panel was needed in the first place. The answer is that it grew out of the assumption that the courts could not be trusted to deliver fair decisions.
Today the major danger that the government may be facing stems from the over-centralization of power. People are beginning to view this as a form of permanent, stultifying authoritarianism reminiscent of the Soviet era. The Communist Party and Komsomol may no longer exist, but the patterns of rhetoric and thought associated with them seem to be re-emerging, and the fact that Saakashvili is sometimes referred to as a “neokom” is revealing in this regard. This trend is especially alarming because trust in the actions of the state may hold the key to economic development and even the settlement of territorial disputes. If Georgia can create a trustworthy judiciary, this could unleash a new wave of investment and economic growth. And this, in turn, would provide such an attractive alternative to the corrupt political economies in breakaway regions that they would be more likely to negotiate new, productive relationships with the Georgian state.
What can be done to right the current imbalance in the distribution of power and heighten the credibility the government will need to move on to the next stage? A good first step would be to reverse the questionable changes in the constitution that were made in 2004. Those changes, which transferred power from the legislative to the executive branch, are raising more and more questions as
the country tries to make the transition to a normal democracy. Dealing with this situation would be an encouraging sign that the government has recognized the problem of over-centralization of power in the president’s office.
A second step would be to create a more consultative form of political dialog in Georgia. Many would like to see Saakashvili welcome more voices from the opposition into public debate in an effort to bring along the whole country as it pursues future challenges. This is not simply part of an effort to defuse the opposition, but to produce wiser and more widely accepted solutions to the problems faced by the country.
Both of these steps involve judgments about timing: at what point do the strong measures needed to fight corruption and establish a first draft of a working state need to be replaced with the inherently messy, but more open and consultative procedures that eventually have to be part of a democracy? Finding the right answer to such questions will determine much about where the country will head in the future.
