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81
Parvin DARABADI
Doctor of Historical Sciences, professor at the International Relations Department, Baku State University. He is the author of more than 100 scientific, academic-methodological, and scientific-popular works on various problems of military-political history, geopolitics, and conflictology including the following monographs: Voennye problemy politicheskoy istorii Azerbaidzhana nachala XX veka (Military Problems of Azerbaijan’s Political History in the Early 20th century) (1991), Geopoliticheskoe sopernichestvo v Kaspiiskom regione i Azerbaidzhan (Geopolitical Rivalry in the Caspian Region and Azerbaijan) (2001), Geoistoria Kaspiiskogo regiona i geopolitika sovremennosti (Geohistory of the Caspian Region and Geopolitics of the Present Day) (2002), and others.
GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRY IN THE CAUCASUS IN THE EARLY 20TH CENTURY
(a geohistorical essay)
Abstract
The article looks at the geopolitical processes as they began in the Caucasian-region in the early 20th century. It points out the main geostrategic goals pursued by Russia (White and Red), Britain, Germany, and Turkey. It focuses particular attention on
explaining the reasons, conditions, and factors defining the geopolitical antagonism over the Caucasus during and after World War I. The author’s conclusions may also help to understand the deep-seated reasons for the current geopolitical situation in the region.
The beginning of the 20th century saw the transformation of the Caucasian region into a major geostrategic center which had great influence on the march of World War I and the military political developments in the Middle East. It was no coincidence that classic of German geopolitics Karl Haushofer placed the Caucasus on the world map of “battlefields on the borders of continents.”1 During World War I, the Caucasus played a significant role in the designs of the conflicting military-political groups—the Entente and the Triple Alliance. In response to Russia’s aspiration “to hoist the banner of Orthodoxy over Constantinople,” the Ottoman Empire aspired to seize the Cauca-
1 K. Haushofer, “Granitsy v ikh geograficheskom i politicheskom znachenii,” in: O geopolitike. Raboty raznykh let, Mysl Publishers, Moscow, 2001, p. 127.
sus and Crimea, hoping to unite all the Muslim peoples, including “the Volga and Kama valleys” with their Turkic population, under its leadership.2 In the meantime, Germany was reckoning on the Caucasus and its natural resources. A book entitled The Caucasus in the World War published in Weimar in 1916 said that “our [the German] politicians should think about establishing a Christian Georgia after Russia’s defeat to form a South Caucasian buffer state bordering on the neutral Caucasian Muslim state near the borders of Russia and Turkey.” In so doing, the Germans were hopeful that “Turkey, with Germany’s assistance, would be able to forcibly take the Caucasus out of Russia’s claws.”3 As a whole, the Caucasus played an essential role in the German-designed strategically important railway, Baghdad-Hamadan-Tehran, which was to operate as a branch of the Baghdad railway.4
Nevertheless, the Caucasian front played a minor role in World War I, for the fate of the combat operations was decided on the Western and Eastern European fronts.
As for the events in the Caucasian theatre of war, Turkey’s attempt to seize the initiative at the initial stage of the war failed. In late 1914-early 1915, the Russian Caucasian army was successful in the Sarykamysh military operation. What is more, at the end of January 1915, the Russian troops seized Tabriz, previously occupied by the Turks, and forced the Turks out of Southern Azerbaijan. The same year, the Russian expeditionary corps disembarked in Anzali, took Hamadan and Qom, and approached Esfahan. Note that a little earlier, British troops landed in the south of Iran.
In the spring of 1916, the Russian troops assumed the offensive all along the Caucasian front, occupied Erzurum and later Trapezund. In the summer of the same year, the Caucasian front advanced almost 250 km into Turkish territory.5
Meanwhile, the grandiose sociopolitical cataclysms in Russia right after the February Revolution of 1917 and subsequent October Bolshevist coup and civil war in the former gigantic Empire paved the way for powerful centrifugal forces which resulted in the separation of the country’s outlying districts, including the Transcaucasus. As for the political line of the White Guard leaders, who put forward the idea of restoring a “united and indivisible Russia,” this idea coincided with the policy of the leaders of the Bolshevist revolution, loyal to the slogans of “world revolution.” Note that the Bolshevist leaders tried at all costs to keep the Transcaucasus in the Russian geopolitical space.
Under the conditions of the continuing war, the geopolitical struggle between the Entente and the Triple Alliance, and the appearance of a new military-political factor hostile to both groups—Soviet Russia, the struggle for control over the entire Caucasian-Caspian region assumed top priority in the Middle East. The largest industrial center of the Caucasus—Baku—with 80% of all Russia’s and 15% of the world oil reserves on the eve of the war served as the key for attaining this geostrategic goal.6 Seizure of this largest industrial-financial center of the Caucasus and the Caspian port opened up good prospects for establishing complete control over the entire Caspian water area. Besides, there were dozens of oil-refining plants and other large industrial enterprises in Baku. The railways, highways, and unsurfaced roads that connected all the main regions of the Transcaucasus with the Northern Caucasus, as well as the Baku-Batum [now Batumi] oil pipeline, built in 1907, the seizure of which could seriously threaten the economic life of the Caucasus, were another important military strategic factor.
“Baku is a beautiful woman, and any foreign adventurer dreams of abducting her from her paternal home,” is how People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation G.V. Chicherin figuratively characterized the international importance of Baku in the period under review.7 In turn, the White Guards considered Baku to be “the black pearl of the Caspian.” “Baku oil reigned over the hearts
2 Istoria Pervoy mirovoy voiny, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1975, p. 385.
3 Quoted from: Istoria Azerbaidzhana, in three volumes, Vol. 2, Izd-vo AN Azerbaidzhanskoi SSR, Baku, 1960, p. 742.
4 See: Ibid., p. 741.
5 See: Istoria narodov Severnogo Kavkaza. XYIII vek—1917 g., Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1988, p. 540.
6 See: Ie.A. Tokarjevskiy, Iz istorii inostrannoy interventsii i grazhdanskoy voiny v Azerbaidzhane, Izd-vo AN Az-erbaidzhanskoi SSR, Baku, 1957, p. 33; Azerbaycan tarihi (The History of Azerbaijan), in seven volumes Vol. 5, Elm Publishers, Baku, 2001, p. 32.
7 Zarya Vostoka, Tiflis, 3 March, 1925.
and minds of European and Asian politicians,” wrote General A.I. Denikin in his Ocherki russkoy smuty (Essays on the Russian Disturbance). “In the spring (1918.—P.D.), competition and ‘chasing each other’ began between the British from Anzali, Nuri Pasha (Enver’s brother) via Azerbaijan, and the Germans via Georgia to their final destination—Baku.”8 The weakening of the Russian position in the Tran-scaucasus after the withdrawal of the Russian army units from the Caucasian front and particularly after the conclusion of the German-Soviet Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (this “obscene” treaty, as Lenin put it) stepped up separatism, ethnic clashes, and sociopolitical conflicts in this region.
In turn, Winston Churchill was apprehensive “that from now on (i.e. after conclusion of the said treaty.—P.D.), the German armies could benefit from the granaries of Ukraine and Siberia, from the oil of the Caspian littoral, and from all the resources of the huge country.”9
Under such favorable conditions, conflicting Germany and Turkey, on the one hand, and England, on the other, applied supreme efforts to establish themselves in the Transcaucasus with their own far-sighted geopolitical objectives. Note that even Germany and Turkey, members of one and the same bloc, differed in opinion; even worse, their relations were characterized by signs of hidden rivalry, which, in turn, gave the British a huge advantage.
The plans of the Turkish command to occupy Vladikavkaz and Baku and thus gain access to the western Caspian littoral would, in many respects, have contributed to realization of the Pan-Turkic idea—unification of all Muslim peoples of the Caucasus and Turkestan and creation of a Great Turan under the aegis of the Turkish Sultan.
This line of Turkish foreign policy worried Turkey’s German allies, who tried to use the Turkish troops in their military operations against the British in North Persia, as the German General Staff planned. “In North Persia, the Turks could possess an advantage over the British,” General Ludendorff noted. “However, Enver and the Turkish government were more concerned about their Pan-Islamist goals in the Caucasus rather than the war against England.”10
One of the traditional priority directions of British policy in the Middle East, consistent with its major geopolitical concept of Eurasia as a whole, was England’s aspiration to seize control over the Transcaucasus and, particularly, Baku (Azerbaijan) and the Caspian.
Thus, former British military representative to Russia, General Knox, pointed out in his book With the Russian Army: 1914-1917 that the political line of England “that used to think on a scale of centuries and continents” was, throughout the 19th-early 20th centuries, aimed at depriving Russia of its access to the high seas. This is not the first time that the Caspian and the routes leading to it have attracted the attention of the British, the London Times recalled.11 “The future of Great Britain will not be decided in Europe,” Lord Curzon wrote, “but on the continent where our first migrants arrived and where their descendants returned as conquerors. Meanwhile, Turkestan, Afghanistan, the Caspian, and Persia are chessmen in a world championship match.”12
The so-called Eastern Committee chaired by Lord Curzon was set up in late March 1918 to coordinate England’s military-political activity in the huge geopolitical space that embraced the Near and Middle East, as well as the Caucasus and Central Asia. Foreign Minister Arthur Balfour, his deputy, Lord Cecil, Permanent Deputy Foreign Minister Lord Harding, Chief of Imperial General Staff Sir Henry Hughes Wilson, Minister for India Edric Montague, and Chief of Military Intelligence Major-General John MacDonne were permanent members of the Committee.13 It should be recalled
8 A.I. Denikin, Ocherki russkoy smuty, Mysl Publishers, Moscow, 1991, p. 139.
9 Quoted from: W. Churchill, Mirovoy krizis, Moscow, Leningrad, 1932, p. 50.
10 Quoted from: E. Ludendorff, Moi vospominania o voine, 1914-1918 gg., Vol. 2, Moscow, 1924, p. 187.
11 See: Times, 10 September, 1918.
12 Quoted from: Ia.L. Mikhailov, “K voprosu o podgotovke angliiskoy interventsii v Azerbaidzhane v 1918 godu,” Izvestia AN Azerb. SSR, Seria istorii, filosofii i prava (Proceedings of the Azerbaijan Academy of Sciences. Historical, Philosophical and Law Series), No. 2, 1979, p. 31.
13 See: S.V. Lavrov, “Politika Anglii na Kavkaze i v Srednei Azii v 1917-1921 godakh,” Voprosy istorii, No. 5, 1979, p. 81 (see also: A.H. Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917-1921, Vol. I, Princeton, 1961, p. 307).
that throughout 1918-1919 there was no unity of views on the Caucasus and Iran in British government circles. Opposing Curzon’s ambitious projects in this region in December 1918, Minister for India Liberal Montague noted: “As for the defense of India, I do not think it necessary to consider the Caucasus. To my thinking, this region is fully outside our interests.”14 This was attributable to the fact that Montague represented the British circles which, in terms of the struggle for independence of the British colonies from Cairo to Calcutta, considered it necessary to pursue a more flexible policy in the East and seek allies among the local national movements.
The idea of creating a compact belt of lands under British control by combining the three “C’s” (Cape Town-Cairo-Calcutta) with a fourth “C”—Canberra gave birth to a new motive in British policy in the Middle East, i.e. establishing its control over the Caspian and Transcaucasus, especially oil-rich Baku. “The allies arrived at their victory on waves of oil,” Curzon inferred in late 1918.15 It was no coincidence that during the meeting of the Eastern Committee to discuss Transcaucasian policy, its chairman, Lord Curzon, under the pretext of protecting India, put forward a plan of long-term occupation of the key points and communication routes of the region. In so doing, he stressed the importance of Baku and its environs “with vast resources.”16 Balfour was of the same view, saying that “Batum, Baku, and the railway and oil pipeline between them” cannot be missed. His deputy Cecil spoke plainly: “England should possess Baku because of its vast oil reserves.”17 It should be kept in mind that during World War I, England’s share in Baku’s oilfields made up 60% of all investments.18 As viewed by French senator Beranger, England was eager to create a gigantic oil region stretching “from Egypt to Burma, from the Caucasus to the Persian Gulf” in counterbalance to the American oil empire.19 Of interest is the fact that the Americans also considered it the allies’ top priority task to seize the major oil regions of the Caucasus. For this to happen, the New York Times stressed, it was essential to prepare large forces to be used in North Persia and the Caucasus. Perhaps this was the major direction of the allies.20
On the whole, Curzon’s geopolitical plan provided for the creation of a chain of buffer states stretching from the northern borders of India to the Mediterranean to serve as a shield against attacks on India and as a connecting link between Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand.21 The Cauca-sian-Caspian region, which occupied a particular place in Britain’s military-strategic plans in the period under review, formed the pivot. According to The Times, the Caspian was a center crossed by major trade routes, and Britain’s recent interest in this inland sea did not mean that it had not known anything about the region’s commercial and political significance before. As the paper put it, Britain had long been aware of it, since the Caspian was one of Britain’s oldest interests.22 In June 1918, British Secretary of State for War A. Milner informed the command of the British troops in Mesopotamia that “His Majesty’s government attaches great importance to seizing permanent control over the Caspian.”23 For this reason, the mission of the military expeditions of Generals L. Dunsterville and W. Malleson was to occupy the large Caspian ports of Anzali, Baku, and Krasnovodsk (now Turkmenbashi) and seize the entire Caspian fleet.24
14 Quoted from: S.V. Lavrov, “Bor’ba v politicheskikh krugakh Velikobritanii vokrug anglo-sovetskikh peregovo-rov 1920-1921 godov,” Voprosy istorii, No. 6, 1977, p. 74 (see also: A.H. Ullman, op. cit., Vol. II, Princeton-Oxford, 1968, p. 79).
15 Quoted from: A.A. Fursenko, Neftianye tresty i mirovaia politika, Moscow, Leningrad, 1965, p. 433.
16 Quoted from: N.K. Buzynina, K.B. Vinogradov, “Lord Curzon,” Novaia i noveishaia istoria, No. 5, 1973,
p. 119.
17 Ibidem.
18 See: R.G. Suny, The Baku Commune, 1917-1918, Princeton, 1972, p. 5.
19 Quoted from: N.K. Buzynina, K.B. Vinogradov, op. cit., p. 119.
20 See: The New York Times, 14 July, 1918.
21 See: Ia.L. Mikhailov, op. cit., p. 32.
22 See: Times, 29 September, 1918.
23 Quoted from: S.V. Lavrov, “Politika Anglii na Kavkaze i v Sredney Azii v 1917-1921 gg.,” p. 83.
24 See: L.I. Miroshnikov, Angliiskaia ekspansia v Irane, 1914-1920 gg., Moscow, 1961, pp. 114-115.
First, this would make it possible to substantially weaken the position of irreconcilable rivals— Germany and Turkey—in the Near and Middle East, and prevent a possible Turkish-German attempt to outflank West Iran and further invade India via the Caspian Region and Khorasan.
Second, this would help to neutralize the revolutionary Bolshevist threat from Soviet Russia to its eastern colonial possessions.
Third, control over the Caspian would enable the British to secure the littoral flanks of their troops in the Transcaucasus and Turkestan and make direct contact with the White armies of General A. Denikin in the Northern Caucasus and of Admiral A. Kolchak in the Urals, unite them at the mouth of the Volga, and thus cut off the south of Russia from its central Red provinces.
The aforesaid blended with Britain’s major geopolitical goals in the East—to establish itself in the Near and Middle East, separate the Caucasus and Turkestan from Russia, and seize the oil sources of Iran, Mesopotamia, and Azerbaijan. This policy was justified by the traditional allegation about the need to “protect the approaches” to British India against the attacks of German-Turkish troops via the Trans-Caspian, as well as “liquidation of Bolshevism to the east of the Black Sea,” a meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers said on 13 November, 1918.25 In accordance with a secret British-French convention of 23 December, 1917 (Paris), under which Russia was divided into “zones of action,” Great Britain seized control over the Don, the Caucasus, and Turkestan, i.e. a greater part of the Caspian region.26 In so doing, the British Cabinet attached particular importance to Baku and the Caspian as “having great military, political, and economic importance.”27 In December 1917, the Cabinet decided to send intervention troops to Baku and the Transcaucasus. Under the instructions of 24 December,
1917, the military expedition formed by the British in Baghdad and composed of the comparatively small, but crack troops of General Dunsterville, should have made its way toward the Baghdad-Baku destination. Meanwhile, General Malleson’s detachment was to go to Mashhad and further on to the East Caspian.
In the summer of 1918, the British occupied the northern Iranian port of Anzali in an attempt to disembark their troops in case of a successful anti-Bolshevist overturn in Baku arranged by the bloc of Socialist-Revolutionaries, Menshevists and Dashnaks.
General Dunsterville’s memoirs clearly defined Baku’s geopolitical importance: “Seizure of Baku would result in cutting off access to the oil reserves and closing the doors to Central Asia (italics mine.— P.D. ).”28
It would be appropriate to recall that the government of Soviet Russia attached paramount importance to Baku. During a meeting in the Kremlin with Colonel R. Robins, head of the American Red Cross Mission in Russia, V.I. Lenin stressed: “What is the economic importance of Baku for the Russian Soviet Republic? It is oil, light, and energy.”29 The loss of oil-rich Baku would inevitably lead to the collapse of the entire Soviet economy, to say nothing of the geopolitical losses for the entire Caucasian-Caspian region. By rendering all-round, including military, aid to the Baku Council of People’s Commissars, which declared the Baku province an integral part of the R.S.F.S.R., the Bolshevist government tried to turn Baku into a springboard for further spreading its influence to the entire Transcaucasus. By placing special emphasis on the region, the Soviet government took drastic measures to strengthen the defensive capability of strategically important Astrakhan and the combat readiness of its navy in the Caspian.
In the spring of 1918, the military-political situation in the Transcaucasus became increasingly aggravated. Withdrawal of the Russian army units from the Caucasian front and occupation of
25 S.V. Lavrov, “Bor’ba v politicheskikh krugakh Velikobritanii vokrug anglo-sovetskikh peregovorov 1920-1921 gg.,”
p. 60.
26 See: Grazhdanskaia voina i voennaia interventsia v SSSR, Sovetskaia Encyclopedia Publishers, Moscow, 1983, p. 38.
27 See: F.D. Volkov, Tainy Uaitholla i Dauning Strit, Moscow, 1980, p. 50.
28 General-Major Densterville. Britanskiy imperializm v Baku i Persii. 1914-1917, Sovetskiy Kavkaz Publishers, Tiflis, 1925, p. 122.
29 Pravda, 21 April, 1989.
Erzurum by the 36th Turkish division on 12 March, 1918 enabled the Turkish army to penetrate deep into the Transcaucasus. On 14 April, the Turks occupied Batum, then Kars, Ardahan, and Alex-andropol.
On 14 May, 1918, the National Council of Georgia appealed to Germany and asked this country’s leaders to draw their troops (which had occupied part of Ukraine, the Crimea, and Rostov) closer to the Northern Caucasus, approach the Georgian borders and thus protect Georgia from external threats. On 25 May, 3,000 German soldiers arrived in Poti, and on 30 May, a German diplomatic mission arrived in Tiflis. Soon after, all of Georgia’s railways and water transport, including the Chiaturi manganese mines, fell under German control.30
Bringing troops into Georgia, as witnessed by General Ludendorff, provided Germany “with the opportunity, regardless of Turkey, to possess Caucasian raw materials and have some control over operation of the railway that passed through Tiflis. This railway was of particular importance for the war in North Persia, so its operation under German control would be more effective than with Turkish assistance. Finally, we should try to secure our position with the help of Georgian troops to be used against England.”31
The situation was rather peculiar, especially since Germany was jealous of Turkey’s plans to occupy Baku. The point is that seizure of Baku was a part of the strategic plan of the German military command. It was exhaustion of their fuel supplies that compelled the Germans “to commission the Batum-Tiflis-Baku railway as soon as possible... However, the main issue was to attack Baku.”32
The point is that in late May 1918, the Germans planned to move their forces, after the occupation of Baku, to the north Iranian port of Anzali controlled by the British, with subsequent invasion of Iraq and access to the Persian Gulf in the region of Basra to thus destroy Britain’s positions in the Middle East.33 However, the lack of necessary forces in the Caucasus and aggravation of the situation on the Western front prevented the Germans from accomplishing their goals. They had no time to move their troops to the Transcaucasus to attack Baku (two divisions and several regiments). “Nuri occupied Baku before we finished transporting our troops,” said Ludendorff regretfully, “in addition, subsequent developments in Bulgaria made us transfer these units to Rumania.”34
After the declaration of the Georgian Republic on 26 May, 1918, and the Azerbaijan and Armenian Republics on 28 May, a qualitatively new military-political situation arose in the Transcaucasus. The main efforts of F. Khoyskiy’s government in Azerbaijan were directed toward establishing sovereignty over the entire territory of the country and, first of all, its capital—Baku, which was seized by the Bolshevists in the period under review. The interests of Azerbaijan and Turkey coincided here, which was reflected in the Treaty on Peace and Friendship of 4 June, 1918 concluded in Batum. Under this document, Turkey committed itself to rendering all-round aid, including military (under clause IV of the Treaty), to the newly formed Republic. This mission was carried out by the United Turkish-Azerbaijani Caucasian Islamic Army, formed in June 1918 in Ganja and headed by Lieutenant-General Nuri Pasha. After occupation of Baku, the Turkish command planned to advance to the Northern Caucasus and further on to Turkestan via the Caspian.
The Germans, as the Turks’ allies, suggested that they use their military units to secure the rear of the Turkish units attacking Baku in June-July 1918. If successful, the Germans intended to establish their control over the strategically important Batum-Baku main railway line. However, the Turks
30 See: A.B. Kadishev, Interventsia i grazhdanskaia voina v Zakavkaz’e, Voenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1960, pp. 65-68.
31 E. Ludendorff, op. cit., p. 188.
32 Ibidem.
33 See: N. Yüceer, Birinci dünya sava§i’nda Osmanli ordusu’nun Azerbaycan ve Dagistan harekati, Genelkurmay basim evi, Ankara, 1996, S. 59.
34 Quoted from: G.V. Pipia, Germanskiy imperializm v Zakavkaz’e v 1910-1918 gg., Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1978, p. 130.
guessed what their ally was planning and rejected this suggestion, saying that they had enough soldiers at their disposal to occupy Baku.35
So the Germans could only hope that the Caucasian Islamic Army would be defeated on the approaches to Baku. Count Friedrich von Schulenburg, Consul General to Tiflis, wrote in his report to Berlin of 4 July, 1918 that “it appears highly unlikely that the Turks will succeed in seizing Baku; it would be good if they were defeated there.”36 “If we come to an amicable agreement with the Bolshevists,” the German diplomat maintained, “Baku’s oil sources will be in our hands, safe and sound. If, against our wishes, the Bolshevists have to leave the city, they are sure to burn Baku, so neither the Turks, nor we will be able to benefit from the oil.”37 As further developments showed, Schulenburg’s apprehensions proved groundless, since the Baku Bolshevists did not resort to extreme measures.
Meanwhile, the failure on the front resulted in a change in power in Baku. On 31 July, 1918, the Bolshevist Council of People’s Commissars headed by S.G. Shaumian resigned, and the coalition government made up of rightist Social-Revolutionaries, Menshevists, and Dashnaks, called the Dictatorship of the Central Caspian and Presidium of the Provisional Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers’ Deputies, came to power in the city. As per a prior agreement, this government invited the British to defend the city against the Turkish army.
On 4 August, a British detachment arrived from Anzali and disembarked in Baku. By mid-August, other military units of the so-called Dunstervilleforce, numbering slightly over one thousand bayonets with 16 ordnance and several armored cars, were concentrated here.38
However, due to insufficient numbers, the British troops failed to hold Baku. Only the high battle training and determination of the British military units enabled them to hold onto the front line for a month. However, it was evident that the British forces were not large enough to protect the city. The supreme British military circles realized what was going on. A telegram from the War Ministry of 6 July, 1918 instructed Dunsterville, if the enemy occupied Baku, to destroy all the oil pipelines, reservoirs, and refineries, but not the oil wells. In so doing, the British were keeping in mind the longterm interests of British oil companies.39 Besides, the British also took into account the military-strategic factor that Turkey would inevitably be defeated soon in the world war, so they did not want to shed blood for their local “allies.”
In the meantime, the Turkish military command concentrated huge groups (5th and 15th incomplete divisions with 10,000 bayonets and 40 ordnance) on the approaches to Baku.40 After preliminary artillery preparation, the Turkish troops attacked Baku in the early morning of 14 September and within a day seized the city’s suburbs. In the evening, the British evacuated from Baku and went to Anzali, and the Caucasian Islamic Army entered Baku on 15 September. On 17 September, the Azerbaijan National Government moved to Baku from Ganja.
At the same time, dramatic events of diplomatic nature broke out around Baku. As early as 27 August, 1918, the Soviet government signed an additional agreement with Germany to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, under which the Germans resolved, in exchange for one quarter of the oil and petroleum products produced in Baku, not to back any third power in the Caucasus and not to allow the Turks to enter the region.41 However, owing to the rapid developments on the World War I fronts, the treaty remained on paper. In turn, the occupation of Baku by the Turkish troops caused sharp protest in the Soviet government, which sent a note to Turkey on 20 September, 1918 saying that Turkey had
35 See: G.V. Pipia, op cit., p. 125.
36 Ibid., p. 126.
37 Ibidem.
38 See: [L.] Dunsterville, op. cit., p. 251.
39 See: S.V. Lavrov, “Politika Anglii na Kavkaze i v Sredney Azii v 1917-1921 gg.,” p. 82.
40 See: Ie.F. Ludshuveit, Turtsia v gody Pervoy mirovoy voiny. 1914-1918 gg., Moscow University Publishers, Moscow, 1966, pp. 254-255; N. Yüceer, op. cit., pp. 145-155.
41 See: Ie.A. Tokarjevskiy, op. cit., p. 152.
grossly violated the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which had essentially been denounced.42 On 21 September, an identical note was sent to the German government, which accused the latter of non-compliance with the Treaty of 27 August, 1918. Note that Article 14 of the Treaty said that the Germans would “take measures to compel the Turks retreat beyond the Kura River line.”43
Following the occupation of Baku, the Turkish troops assumed the offensive along the western littoral of the Caspian Sea, invaded Daghestan, and, in October 1918, occupied, first, Derbent and, later, Port Petrovsk. In so doing, the Turkish troops dislodged a Cossack detachment headed by L. Bicherakhov from Port Petrovsk, who fled to the British in North Turkey.44 However, Turkey as a loser in World War I had to withdraw its troops from the Caucasus, including from Baku and Batum, to comply with the provisions of the Armistice of Mudros concluded on 30 October, 1918 on board the British cruiser Agamemnon. Of interest is the fact that the Soviet government, as far back as early October 1918, was aware of the existence of a secret agreement between the Entente countries and Turkey “on transfer of Baku to it.”45 On 16 November, 1918, the Anglo-French squadron entered the Black Sea, and on 17 November, units of the 39th infantry brigade from Anzali (1,000 British and 800 Indian soldiers and officers) headed by commander of the British troops in North Persia, Major-General W.M. Thomson, disembarked in Baku again. Before leaving for Baku, the British general voiced the position of the allied powers, declaring that “Baku with its oilfields will be occupied, while the rest of the country will remain under the control of the Azerbaijan government and related troops.”46 It is significant that in his first statements, W.M. Thomson plainly stressed that the allied troops “are on Russian land” and arrived in the Caucasus “to ensure total security on this Russian territory located between the Black and Caspian seas.”47 “A final decision,” the British general’s appeal said, “will be adopted by a peace conference to settle the problems of this territory.”48 As for the local government, it was pointed out that “Azerbaijan will not be excluded from the debates over the principle of national self-determination at the Paris Peace Conference.”49
After British troops occupied other towns of the Transcaucasus—Batum, Tiflis, Ganja, Nakh-chyvan, Shusha, etc., the British paid special attention to building up their military might in the region. Note that the British navy was concentrated in Batum, which was the principal base of the British troops in the Caucasus and the port through which Baku oil was transported to the West. In late
1918, England’s army in the Transcaucasus numbered 20,000. It was no mere coincidence that on 14 February, 1919, Churchill sent his first dispatch as Minister for War and Air to Chief of Imperial General Staff Henry Wilson, which demanded that Churchill be informed about “the actual role of the British Armed Forces keeping control over the Baku-Batum railway, as well as that of the British Navy in charge of the Caspian seacoast.”50
On the whole, Churchill highly appreciated the military-strategic importance of the Transcaucasian occupation. “The British troops disembarked in Batum and quickly captured the Caucasian railway from the Black to the Caspian seas, in other words, to Baku. They set up a navy, which gave them priority in the Caspian Sea. The British troops possessed the world’s largest strategic lines.”51
After taking control of the Caspian navy and 150 trade ships, the British began urgently creating their own navy in the Caspian. After the occupation of Port Petrovsk on 13 January, 1919 on the island of Chechen (near the Daghestani seacoast), the British established their naval base there. As
42 See: Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1957, pp. 491-492.
43 Ibid., pp. 492-493.
44 See: N. Yuceer, op. cit., pp. 144-145.
45 V.I. Lenin, Complete Works, Vol. 50, Moscow, p. 372.
46 Quoted from: A. Raevskiy, Angliiskaia interventsia i musavatskoe pravitel’stvo, Baku, 1927, p. 33.
47 Quoted from: Azerbaijan, 19 November, 1918.
48 Azerbaijan, 24 November, 1918.
49 Quoted from: A. Raevskiy, op. cit., p. 87.
50 Quoted from: F.D. Volkov, op. cit., p. 87.
51 Quoted from: W. Churchill, op. cit., p. 105.
early as the spring of 1919, the British had 18 large battle units at their disposal in the Caspian Sea, including 5 auxiliary cruisers and 4 gunboats, according to Soviet intelligence data.52
Thus, England ultimately succeeded in securing its naval presence in the Caspian on the third attempt (the first was in the 1730s-1740s; and the second in the early 19th century).
The establishment of British control over the Baku-Krasnovodsk-Anzali triangle afforded the British a real opportunity to take control over the Caspian water area with all the ensuing military-strategic advantages. This enabled the British to provide the White Guard armies of Denikin and Kolchak with weapons, ammunition, and petroleum products. Besides, “the presence of the British army also served the useful purpose of preventing combat operations between the Voluntary Army and the troops of the Caucasian Republics,” Commander of the British Army to the Transcaucasus General J.M. Milne said.53
The point is that in the end of 1918 appreciable changes occurred in Britain’s policy with respect to the Transcaucasian republics. On 22 January, 1919, General Milne declared that “no interference in the domestic affairs of the Transcaucasian states will take place.”54
Such an essential change in British policy in the region could not help but arouse the suspicion of Denikin’s supporters regarding the true intentions of the British with respect to Russia, and not without reason. For example, British Prime Minister Lloyd George, like Lord Curzon, believed that an undivided Russia “would pose a deadly threat” to the British Empire and even “the whole world.” During a meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers on 25 July, 1919, he plainly declared that he was worried that a united Russia would pose a deadly threat to them in the East.55 Besides, England intended to grant Iran some of the territory at the expense of Russia and Turkey “when identifying the borders of Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Turkestan.”56 Meanwhile, conclusion of the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 9 August, 1919 increasingly consolidated Britain’s position in the South Caspian. In turn, Denikin charged the British with “whipping up separatism among the ethnographic groups of the Transcaucasus,” and as a result, “a real force (the Voluntary Army is meant.—P.D.) was the only way remaining to hoist the Russian flag in the Transcaucasus.”57
Meanwhile, the British backed the Dashnak rulers of Armenia in every possible way, who established allied relations with Denikin and were ready to grant their country’s territory, as well as military and economic potential, to the Entente. As “a reward,” Armenia received the Kars Region and a part of Erivan Province from England. What is more, in the spring of 1919, the allies gave every encouragement to Armenia’s aggressive actions against Nakhchyvan and Zangezur.
As viewed by heads of the French General Staff, England was pursuing two goals in the Caucasus: first, “to drive Russia back to the Northern Caucasus and thus encourage Georgia and Azerbaijan’s independence trends; second, “to prevent the creation of a state in the region acting as an ally of revived Russia and thus endangering England’s relations with the Muslim world.”58
As a whole, the Entente sought to create a sort of “safety belt” of South Caucasian states, which would be the major element of a gigantic “geopolitical arc” encompassing the Baltic states-Black Sea-Caucasus-Caspian-Central Asia.
As viewed by head of the Russian National Council in Baku, Constitutional Democrat B. Baykov, “Britain’s attitude toward Russia, particularly toward Denikin and the Voluntary Army, lacked sincerity, and their policy with respect to Baku was ambivalent.The problem is that this political line was backed by the British military who had experience of service in the colonies and, particular-
52 See: Direktivy Glavnogo komandovania Krasnoy Armii (1917-1920 gg.), Sbornik dokumentov, Voenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1969, p.156.
53 Quoted from: Dialogue (Moscow), No. 2, 1993, p. 73.
54 Quoted from: Azerbaijan, 25 January, 1919.
55 See: S.V. Lavrov, “Politika Anglii na Kavkaze i v Sredney Azii v 1917-1921 gg.,” p. 87.
56 Ibid., p. 89.
57 Azerbaycan arxivi, No. 1-2, 1988, p. 97.
58 Svobodnaia mysl, No. 16, 1991, p. 37.
ly, in India, where hatred of the Russians and belief in the Russian threat to India formed the basis of General Thomson’s activity.”59 Note that the fierce Russian-British confrontation in Central Asia in the second half of the 19th century, which nearly ended in open warfare between the two powers, was vividly engraved on our memory.
In the period under review, the oil factor occupied an important place in British policy in the Caucasian-Caspian region, though Curzon believed that England was not attaching the appropriate importance to the oil and oil pipeline (meaning the Baku-Batum oil pipeline). The oil strategy was an integral part of the efforts to establish British hegemony in the Near and Middle East, as well as of the competitive struggle with France and the U.S. In the period under consideration, the geopolitical odds were in favor of England. Chairman of the Bibi-Heybat Oil Company Herbert Allen pointed out late in 1918 that after the British troops appeared in the Caucasus from Batum in the Black Sea to Baku in the Caspian Sea and from Vladikavkaz to Tiflis ... the British government had an excellent opportunity to influence the situation involving oil production in Grozny, Baku, and the Caspian oilfields.60
Meanwhile, in the summer of 1919, the British Cabinet of Ministers adopted a decision on withdrawal of the British troops from the Transcaucasus. This was, first of all, attributable to the changing military-political situation in Russia due to the achievements of Denikin’s army, which made the Red Army go over to the strategic defense; second, to the growth of the national-liberation movements in the colonial countries of the East—Egypt, India, Afghanistan, Turkey, and Iran—which, in turn, called for mobilization of considerable military-material resources; and third, to the fact that the British government had to take account of the mass movement “Hands off Soviet Russia!” and the population’s and army’s complete exhaustion after the war. Also, there was England’s fiasco war in Afghanistan in 1919, which resulted in the independence of the latter.
At the same time, England was not going to lose its position in the Transcaucasus. The government decided to leave some British troops in Batum, which served as its base in the Black Sea. By controlling the oil pipeline terminal from Baku, the British could control the export of Azerbaijani oil. Along with this, in May 1919 England suggested that Italy send its troops to replace the British ones. At first, Orlando’s government gave its consent to send Italian troops to the Transcaucasus and even prepared the 12th army corps for that purpose, however, Nitti’s government, which replaced it, only sent a mission to clarify the situation in the region.61
As for the extremely complicated relations between Denikin and the Azerbaijan Republic, the British command eased the tension by establishing a 5-mile demarcation line between the territory occupied by the White Guard troops and Azerbaijan and Georgia.
In mid-1919, the U.S. also began showing an interest in the Transcaucasus. Whereby, during their summer visits to the region, the special missions headed by King-Crane and General Harbord believed that only extending the U.S. mandate to Turkey and the entire Transcaucasus might justify all the money to be spent on dispatching large military contingents to the region62 (there were plans to send 70,000 American soldiers there).63
During talks with Prime Minister of Armenia in the summer of 1919, Colonel V.H. Gaskel plainly stated that from now on the U.S. and its troops would be responsible for Transcaucasian affairs.64 Late in September 1919, on the instructions of President Woodrow Wilson, an American mission arrived in Baku. The mission was headed by Chief of the U.S. General Staff in France General Harbord, who believed that “a strong hand is required to rule the Caucasus.”65
59 B. Baykov, “Vospominania o revoliutsii v Zakavkaz’e (1917-1920 gg.),” in: Arkhiv russkoy revoliutsii, Vol. 9, Berlin, 1922, p. 164; S.V. Lavrov, “Bor’ba v politicheskikh krugakh Velikobritanii vokrug anglo-sovetskikh peregovorov 1920-1921 gg.,” p. 74.
60 See: Financial News, 24 December, 1918.
61 See: A.B. Kadishev, op. cit., p. 217.
62 Ibid., p. 176.
63 See: Ie.A. Tokarjevskiy, op. cit., p. 239.
64 See: Zashchita zavoevaniy sotsialisticheskikh revoliutsiy, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1986, p. 188.
65 Quoted from: Azerbaijan, 23 October, 1919.
On 1 November, 1919, a meeting of the council of delegation heads to the Paris Peace Conference adopted a decision on extending the powers of High Commissioner to Armenia, American Gaskel, to Azerbaijan and Georgia.66 The participants in the conference put forward a project to create a U.S. General-Governorship in Nakhchyvan headed by Colonel Daly.67 Although the Americans failed to fully attain their goals in the Transcaucasus (England and France were jealous of the Americans), they rendered immense financial and military aid to Armenia. Note that in late 1920-early 1921, Armenia began active combat operations against Turkey in the Kars Region. However, Armenia experienced complete political and military collapse at this time.
Under the real threat of Bolshevist occupation of the entire space between the Black and Caspian seas and Turkestan by the spring of 1920, Caucasian expert Lord Curzon warned his colleagues in the Cabinet of Ministers that should control over the Caspian be lost, Britain would soon discover that the whole of its Eastern Empire had taken a turn for the worse.68 A meeting of the British military elite was held on 17 February, 1920 in Paris. The meeting was attended by Minister for War and Air Winston Churchill, Field-Marshal Henry Wilson, First Lord of the Admiralty Walter Long, Admiral David Beatty, and members of the Transcaucasian states’ delegations, who discussed issues relating to these states’ military potential, as well as the organization of military naval defense of the Azerbaijani littoral of the Caspian and Batum.69
Considering that the Red Army’s access to the Transcaucasus threatened Britain’s geopolitical interests in the Near and Middle East, Curzon offered to strengthen the British garrison in Batum, send additional troops, including aviation, to the Caucasus or Persia, secure “Baku’s protection,” and supply Georgia and Azerbaijan with weapons. Curzon was backed by Walter Long and Admiral Beatty, who also sought to retain British control over the oil of the Persian Gulf and Baku for the needs of the British Navy.70
“The English,” French radio reported in January 1920, “are feverishly completing their preparations to dispatch tens of thousands of soldiers to the Caucasus. The British and the Bolshevists are chasing each other to reach the Batum-Tiflis-Baku railway. No one other than the British is showing such vital interest in closing access to the Caucasus. The reward for the English is Baku, a major oil center.”71 However, they failed to accomplish their goal in full measure. They needed troops to suppress Ireland, they had to strengthen their position in Mesopotamia, India, and Egypt, and they had to render military aid to Poland, endangered by the Red Army. The English were successful only in deploying troops in the Tehran-Hamadan region and in stationing garrisons in Anzali and Ghilan.
Meanwhile, military-political events continued to develop impetuously in the spring of 1920. The defeat of Denikin’s troops and the occupation of Stavropol, Piatigorsk, Armavir, and Novorossiisk by the Red Army in March radically changed the military-strategic situation in the region. In its efforts to seize control over oil-rich Baku—“seizure of Baku was of paramount importance,” (V.I. Lenin)—and the entire Transcaucasus, Soviet Russia was unexpectedly backed by Kemalist Turkey, which, in turn, needed the support of its northern neighbor to combat the Entente countries. The first official appeal of the Ankara government to the R.S.F.S.R. government—a letter by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk to V.I. Lenin of 26 April, 1920—noted that “if the Soviet leaders plan to launch military operations against Georgia or make Georgia diplomatically join the alliance and banish the British from the territory of the Caucasus, the Turkish government is committed to combating imperialistic Armenia and compelling Azerbaijan to join the Soviet state.”72 The successful Baku operation carried out on
66 See: B. Stein, Russkiy vopros na Parizhskoy mirnoy konferentsii (1919-1920 gg.), Moscow, 1949, p. 346.
67 See: Azerbaijan, 23 October, 1919.
68 See: A.H. Ullman, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 331.
69 See: S.Z. Yusifzadeh, Pervaia Azerbaidzhanskaia Respublika: istoria, sobytia, fakty anglo-azerbaidzhanskikh ot-nosheniy, Baku, 1998, p. 184.
70 See: S.V. Lavrov, “Bor’ba v politicheskikh krugakh Velikobritanii vokrug anglo-sovetskikh peregovorov 19201921 gg.,” p. 67.
71 Azerbaijan, 25 January, 1919.
72 Quoted from: P.G. Darabadi, Voennye problemy politicheskoy istorii Azerbaidzhana nachala XX veka, Elm Publishers, Baku, 1991, p. 153.
27-28 April by the 11th Red Army and the Volga-Caspian Navy led to abolishment of the independence of the Azerbaijan Republic and to the establishment of Soviet control over the entire western littoral of the Caspian as far as Astara. The so-called Anzali operation of the Volga-Caspian Navy in May 1920 proved to be the spectacular finale to the struggle for the Caspian.
As a result of the successful landing operation on 18 May, 1920 carried out by the Volga-Cas-pian Navy and the Red Navy of Azerbaijan in the Anzali area, units of the 36th British infantry division had to retreat to Rasht. Note that 23 warships and trade ships, 50 ordnances, as well as a great quantity of military equipment were returned to Soviet Russia. On 26 May, Soviet warships left the territorial waters of Iran.73 In early July 1920, the English left Batum.
Thus, the highly dramatic military-political struggle for the Transcaucasus and the Caspian ended in favor of Soviet Russia.
Echoes of the battles in the south of the Caucasus and the Caspian were heard in London causing a scare in governmental circles out of fear for the British colonial possessions in Asia. The military prestige of the British Empire in the Middle East was greatly damaged with far-reaching geopolitical consequences. “British prestige is at stake,” the London Times wrote, “seizure of the Persian port of Anzali is a deadly danger capable of igniting the highly inflammable material scattered across the Middle East, from Anatolia to the northeastern borders of India.”74
Although Lloyd George’s government took the path of establishing trade and economic relations with Soviet Russia (nevertheless with simultaneous support of Vrangel and Poland), Westminster’s imperial ambitions, Whitehall’s bellicose aspirations and London City’s desire prompted British circles to prepare for new military adventures in the Caucasus.
In the fall of 1920, the Western powers hoped to set Kemalist Turkey against Soviet Russia. In November 1920, the British Daily Herald wrote that a plan to create a new front against Russia in the Caucasus was in full swing. Western capitalists did not want to abandon their hopes for Baku’s oil riches. All anti-Russian newspapers were full of reports on the dangerous alliance between Soviet Russia and the Turks headed by Kemal. This was being done to conceal the true intentions of the reactionaries. A real danger, the paper went on, came from the secret alliance between Kemal and the Entente against Russia.75
Failing to attain its major geopolitical aim in the Middle East—military consolidation in the Caucasian-Caspian region—England resorted in the early 1920s to complex diplomatic maneuvers to weaken the position of Soviet Russia in the region. Flirting with the new Kemalist leaders of Turkey, Lloyd George’s government, during the February 1921 London talks with head of the Turkish delegation Bekir Samibey, declared that England was prepared to transfer the Transcaucasus, including the Baku oilfields, to the protectorate of Turkey.76 However, in the period under consideration, British diplomacy experienced serious failures, while Soviet Russia succeeded in entering treaties with Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan in February-March 1921, which secured its leading geopolitical status in the Caucasian-Caspian region. Of paramount geostrategic importance was Sovietization of the entire Transcaucasus and Turkestan by the spring of 1921, following which there was a military-political lull until the beginning of World War II.
73 See: Grazhdanskaia voina i voennaia interventsia v SSSR, p. 670; N.A. Aliev, Voenno-morskaia istoria Azerbaidzhana, Elm Publishers, Baku, 2002, pp. 153-155.
74 Quoted from: Izvestia VTsIK, 16 June, 1920.
75 See: Daily Herald, 13 November, 1920.
76 See: Istoria vneshney politiki SSSR, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1976, pp. 145-146.
