CC BY
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Farhad HUSEYNOV
Lecturer at the Department of International Relations,
Baku State University (Baku, Azerbaijan).
GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Abstract
The author delves into the intricacies of the geopolitical interests of states and the mechanisms of their cooperation to find out the extent to which these
mechanisms allow states to realize their geopolitical interests.
Several other related issues are likewise discussed.
Introduction
The cooperation of states striving to realize their geopolitical interests is directly associated with anarchy as a political scientific concept. Indeed, many authors have pointed out that anarchy has been at the heart of theorizing about international relations since the time of Thucydides.1 This means that no matter how far contemporary civilization has advanced since the Greek historian, the world political processes remain as ungovernable as ever despite the collapse of totalitarian regimes and the consistently growing number of entities of international law that have embraced democratic and liberal values.
One author expressed a more or less commonly shared opinion when he wrote: "For realists, international anarchy fosters competition and conflict among states and inhibits their willingness to
1 See, for example: R. Jervis, "Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation," World Politics, Vol. 40, Issue 3, 1988, p. 317.
cooperate even when they share common interests."2 Robert Jervis is of the same opinion: "The lack of international sovereign not only permits wars to occur, but also makes it difficult for states that are satisfied with the status quo to arrive at goals that they recognize as being in their common interest."3 This means that at least part of the academic community regards the international system as a set of elements (nation-states) operating amid anarchy.4
Any unbiased student of the historical processes can see that order is relative, while chaos and anarchy are absolute. The great powers are trying to bring relative order to the world and, in this way, establish and perpetuate their control, if they succeed in establishing it in the first place. In this context, order is not necessarily a positive phenomenon: it means that rules are applied to a certain state order, a regime. Indeed, if you think of it, the idea of order corresponds to the idea of quality, which is opposed to the idea of quantity.
As relative categories, order or the efforts to achieve order reveal man's systematizing activities and nothing more; this is unrelated to the results—either positive or negative—of this order in any specific region. It is not surprising that the Nazis described their regime as Neuordnung (the New Order). To develop into an order, the new rules presuppose international cooperation.
No matter how inhuman a new order may be, it invariably has its own supporters who did not disappear along with the fallen regime. In fact, there is any number of those who would like to see the Hitler or Stalin regimes restored.
The following can be identified as the pivotal points of the geopolitical aspects of international cooperation: first, any geopolitical strategy is geared toward a certain world order (both inside and outside any given state); second, this order is found outside the realm of morals and cannot be assessed in ethical terms despite the ideology or the slogans behind it; third, the geopolitical strategy intended to establish certain order presupposes international cooperation.
What is Meant by "Geopolitical Interests" and "International Cooperation"
Any country active on the international scene is driven by its geopolitical interests even if it is unable to realize them. The very fact that a state has territory ties its domestic and foreign policy in the most natural and logical way to its geographic location, natural riches (or their absence), proximity to the main transportation and trade routes, its role in the relations of third countries, and the history of its relations with its closest neighbors.
Cultural, civilizational, or demographic domination in the world or its part is another factor that stirs up geopolitical interests. Taken together, these factors cause "expansion" of states, cultures, civilizations, or merely populations. All the interests of any countries associated with "expansion" are of a geopolitical nature. The Ancient Greeks, for example, expanded to create a Hellenic world outside Hellas proper. They built this world in the Orient. Ancient Rome translated its geopolitical domination into a Mediterranean civilization; it expanded this civilization far and wide to create a world in its "image and likeness" far beyond its initial limits. This means that, driven by geopolitical interests, both Greece and Rome created the Western culture as we know it based on the civilizational values of the world of Antiquity. Current Westernization of the world means that the spiritual impulse of these ancient states has not yet been exhausted.
2 J. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3, Summer 1988, p. 485.
3 R. Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, Issue 2, January 1978, p. 167.
4 See: S.J. Majeski, S. Fricks, "Conflict and Cooperation in International Relations," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 39, Issue 4, December 1995, p. 622.
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Cooperation means that the cooperating sides have identical interests; in the context of a haphazard and barely predictable process (which is world politics), the idea of "interests" comes to the fore as the gist of international cooperation. They change fast in a fast-changing world, which means that political alliances follow the trend. To paraphrase Lord Palmerston, there are no eternal allies in the world—only interests are eternal and perpetual.
Cooperation denies violence: as a political process it presupposes that violence is excluded from the relations between sides that have common interests. It is important to note that the absence of violence between the cooperating sides should not be prompted by political or ideological considerations or an injunction. It should stem from the logic suggested by identical (even if temporary) interests.
The geopolitical nature of cooperation is explained by the fact that some states have to pool forces to stand up to the geopolitical expansion of other states. For example, in the post-socialist (post-Soviet) era, Washington's determination to establish its hegemony worldwide and to set up a unipolar world order triggered international cooperation. From this it follows that all political alliances in the world were and still are guided by geopolitical logic, that is, the instinct of self-preservation and the desire to avoid possible or (frequently) real economic and political violence. Some authors have pointed out that "an adequate level of national security requires regional cooperation."5
Interstate cooperation at its different levels, up to and including consolidation within all sorts of structures, is clearly associated with the geopolitical interests of states. Here are two examples.
Example One:
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization
The Soviet Union's disintegration hailed across the world as a victory of liberal and democratic values bred the hope that fairness would triumph in the new world order and in relation to all nations irrespective of their development level and integration into world civilization. The naïve hopes that fair and polyphonic international relations based on international law were within reach collapsed to be replaced with a grim determination to stem America's efforts (which it did not bother to conceal) to build a unipolar world. American supremacy, its geostrategic imperatives, and its barely camouflaged intention to make the entire world a zone of its vital interests6 stirred up concern in the potential zones of its interests. Other states formulated their own vital interests with very specific geopolitical implications. They formed alliances of all sorts to protect their geopolitical interests and check American expansion. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was one of them. Its members were driven by identical political and economic interests as an objective prerequisite of their cooperation. It is commonly believed that the five countries were driven by the threats to their border area emanating from Afghanistan torn apart by the civil war between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban, which made it a hub of instability in Central Asia.
In 1996, the five countries that signed the Agreement on Confidence-Building in the Military Sphere in the Border Area set up the Shanghai Five, a new international structure. A year later, they signed an Agreement on the Mutual Reduction of Military Forces along the Border. The SCO was set up on 15 June, 2001 when 6 heads of state (Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) met in Shanghai, where they signed a Declaration that said in part that the SCO "aims at strengthening mutual trust and good-neighborly and friendly relations among member states, en-
5 J. Eyvazov, "The Caucasus: Limits and Possibilities of Regional Cooperation in the Security Sphere," Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 4 (28), 2004, p. 128.
6 See: Z. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, Basic Books,
1997.
couraging their further effective cooperation in politics, economy, science and technology, culture, education, energy, transportation, environmental protection and other fields, jointly ensuring regional peace, security and stability, and creating a new international political and economic order featuring democracy, justness and rationality."
The summit also adopted the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, Art 1 of which described terrorism, separatism, and extremism as crimes to be "criminally prosecuted in conformity with the national laws of the Parties."
In June 2002, the SCO heads of state arrived in St. Petersburg for the second summit, which adopted three documents: the Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Agreement on the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure, and the Declaration of the Heads of Member States of the SCO.
On 15 January, 2004, the SCO Secretariat was set up in Beijing and, on 17 June, the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) opened in Tashkent.
An analysis of these and other documents shows that cooperation was suggested by the instability created by the region's proximity to Afghanistan, the threat of which had to be neutralized. On the other hand, the members were inspired by possible economic gains. The documents show that the members were determined to neutralize the negative impact of the financial and economic crisis on their economies. It is more or less clearly implied that the six countries, Russia and China in particular, hope to succeed in stemming America's political and economic expansion in the world.
It is equally clear that the other members (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) cannot cope with such global geopolitical tasks. They must be addressed by the two giants (China and Russia), while the four other members should attend to their own geopolitical (particularly economic) tasks and ensure their security. It is not surprising that the SCO members have announced that theirs is an open structure and are doing their best to make it attractive to other regional giants, such as India, Pakistan, and Iran.
The member states are trying to capitalize on the disagreements between the United States and the three regional powers, to which the U.S. responded with a statement in which it described India as its natural strategic partner in the 21st century and expressed its concern about the strategic alliance between Russia and China. In July 2005, the Astana Summit adopted a Declaration that said in part: "Considering the completion of the active military stage of the antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan, the member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization consider it necessary that respective members of the antiterrorist coalition set a final timeline for their temporary use of the above-mentioned objects of infrastructure and stay of their military contingents on the territories of the SCO member states."7 This seems strange: it looks much more logical to pool forces to combat terror; the Declaration, however, pushed the United States and its allies aside. The truth is that despite the rationale of America's military presence in the region, it is invariably interpreted as attempts at geopolitical domination. This makes cooperation within the SCO mainly anti-American.
Practically all the documents adopted at the SCO summits speak of the need to implement the earlier decisions. Indeed, it is much easier to sign a document than to fulfill it; all similar agreements on political, trade, and economic cooperation, as well as cooperation in the security sphere are adopted to be fulfilled (once they have been signed). This, however, is possible only if all members profit equally from them; otherwise they remain on paper while the summits continue insisting on their fulfillment. There is an obvious clash of interests—a paradox created by two parallel yet opposite trends. This organization is based on its members' agreement that they have to oppose American hegemony. On the other hand, the SCO members (which have joined forces for the sake of cooperation) cannot cooperate for the simple reason that their interests, far from being identical, are better described as clashing.
[http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-06/12/content_6020345.htm].
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On the whole, in all organizations of the SCO type, the interests of the large nations serve as the main driving force; in the SCO, this role belongs to Russia and China. Moreover, their contradictions, their unity, and their struggle (however banal this may sound) serve to stimulate both the further development and the future disintegration of the SCO.
It is next to impossible for the four countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) to "fruitfully cooperate" with the two giants (China and Russia). It seems that they are seeking a geopolitical alliance with them in the hope of protecting their interests and their security. There is no shortage of examples. Let us take a look at what happened to the American bases in Uzbekistan. For some reason they were permitted, while later, for other equally vague reasons, the Americans were asked to pull out in the shortest time possible.
This means that everything the SCO is doing, as well as its viability for that matter, depends on an ad hoc understanding between Russia and China. In some situations, they might achieve an understanding on certain (very specific) tactical issues to move their cooperation into the practical sphere. In a different tactical context, however, their divergent interests might push them apart to make their cooperation mainly virtual. The efficiency of the SCO, therefore, can hardly be assessed outside specific situations, while the mechanism of neutralization of tactical predicaments should receive full attention. For this reason, any long-term cooperation program within the SCO should take account of all the possible tactical problems that might arise in the future in order to prevent the organization from becoming merely declarative.
The above suggests several alternatives for the further development of the SCO and all other similar structures. First, a strong and real external threat might consolidate the alliance to cope with the limited task of opposing the threat and coping with challenges. Second, a realistic approach to cooperation presupposes that potential partners are either aware of a possible clash of interests or are prepared to face such crises. This calls for a preliminary analysis of how they can be neutralized or ignored (not the best of options in either case). Third, the sides might remain unaware of possible conflicts until they have gone too far.
It seems that the future of the SCO and other similar structures directly depends on the depth and intensity of the conflicts created by geopolitical situations. Geopolitical disagreements between China and Russia as two SCO members are unavoidable for the simple reason that Russia is a vast and sparsely populated country, while China's smaller territory is overpopulated. It has ten times more people within its borders than Russia, with which China shares a common border. These facts account for strategic cooperation inside the SCO; the other four are balancing between the giants. On the other hand, no matter how economically attractive, the SCO's prospects will not drive the members' fears (the fear of China's demographic expansion in particular) away any time soon.
Despite the huge economic potential, cooperation among the SCO members is anything but efficient. Certain forces repeatedly overturn energy agreements between China and Russia; this happened, for example, to the contract on equipment deliveries to the Three Gorges Dam hydropower station on the Yangtze. Despite Russia's wealth of experience, its obvious leadership in the power engineering industry, and the fact that it won the tender, the order was placed in Europe.8
Russia, in turn, upturned the preliminary agreements on China's involvement in the development of the Kovytkinsky gas-condensate field in favor of British Petroleum. The Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) was pushed aside when Slavneft put its shares on the market, even though it offered better conditions than British Petroleum. There was no clarity regarding the oil pipeline from Angarsk in Russia to the Daqing refinery in China, the route of which had been agreed upon at the top level. Later it was decided to send oil from Angarsk to Nakhodka on the Sea of Japan along the route, from which China gained nothing.
8 See: L.I. Shershnev, "Shankhaiskaia organizatsiia sotrudnichestva: rasshirenie ili uglublenie?" available at [http:// www.fnimb.org/doc_shos.htm].
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The so-called Chinese threat is another stumbling block on the road toward genuine rapprochement: on the one hand, the SCO countries are cooperating with rapidly developing China, while on the other, they fear its mounting impact. Russia is very concerned about China's demographic pressure on its sparsely populated territory. Kazakhstan does not like what is going on in its energy sector: in 2005, the Board of Directors of Petro Kazakhstan decided to sell the company to CNPC.9
Chinese investment plans in Central Asia are stirring up even more concerns: the region might share the fate of Southeast Asia to become a workshop attached to China. It is not surprising that China insists on economic cooperation within the SCO: it has already appreciated the economy as an instrument of world domination in the 21st century. After gaining a stronger position in Central Asia, China will rely on the SCO when talking to the United States and Europe. While the EU is moving to western Eurasia, China is spreading far and wide in the continent's east. Very soon the interests of China and Russia will clash; so far the outcome is hard to predict, however China stands a good chance.
It should be said that the Central Asian nations also fear China's demographic expansion: Kazakhstan, the territory of which is more or less equal to that of China, has 100 times fewer people living in it.10
The above suggests that internal contradictions are much more destructive than external threats. Time will show whether the members can settle them and tame their fears and suspicions to achieve real rather than illusory cooperation. So far, the six members are kept together by the external threat presented by the United States seeking its control over the region; it remains to be seen whether the organization survives when America pulls out of the region altogether.
Here is one of the options. To balance out China and Russia, the organization needs new partners whose interests will in some ways coincide with and in others contradict those of the giants. It seems that Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan need new members more than the other two in the hope of acquiring freedom to maneuver. This is a highly intriguing situation: Russia and China need new members to acquire a firmer stand against the United States and Western Europe, while Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan want the same to stand opposed to China and Russia inside the SCO.
Here is another important aspect: can violence be used against any of the SCO members? I have already written that cooperation is based on common interests; this obviously excludes violence. On the other hand, it seems that violence is excluded as long as the external threat remains real; as soon as it retreats, one of the two stronger partners might be tempted to put pressure on the weaker partners, who will have to seek the protection of the other strong partner. This means that Kazakhstan, Kyr-gyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan are not so much equal SCO members as members that have to maneuver between the other two (stronger) members.
Example Two:
NATO
NATO supplies another example of contradictions among its members. Several decades ago, NATO was expected to keep the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) in check; both structures insisted on their peaceful intentions, but neither missed an opportunity to use violence in pursuance of its geopolitical aims. Their geopolitical confrontation was obvious in all the corners of the world and on all continents.
9 See: A. Milovzorov, "Druzhba protiv Ameriki—delo tonkoe," available at [http://www.utro.ru/articles/2005/10/ 27/489783.shtm].
10 See: Ibidem.
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Persistent and latent threats to their unity existed in both, however the WTO never betrayed them, while in NATO they cropped up from time to time. Such were the practically permanent contradictions between Turkey and Greece, but neither these nor other disagreements were strong enough to trigger centrifugal trends.
Everything changed when the Soviet Union and the socialist camp fell apart; the WTO, as the rationale which kept the NATO members together, disappeared. With no WTO in sight, NATO, as the only and therefore dominating structure of military cooperation, lured the former WTO members onto its side. In fact it looked like the answer to the dreams of those who escaped from the socialist camp. It moved close to Russia's borders; NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia is being seriously contemplated; when seen from Russia NATO's geopolitical strategy can be described as aggressive; every new NATO member is perceived as another threat to Russia's safety.
Today, some NATO members, Germany in particular, disagree over the strategic landmarks, which are not always absolutely clear. Berlin has its own reasons, but, what is more important, in the absence of the communist threat, there is none of former unity that kept NATO together. United Germany disagrees with the United States and tries to trim its hegemonic designs. Some think that Germany interprets NATO as "integrated security."11 Berlin has formulated the following demands:
(1) The Alliance should serve as a platform for a political dialog between the U.S. and EU, within which the threats to security of its individual members should be discussed. This means that NATO would split into two parts. The idea of a "dialog" presupposes that there is no agreement among the partners, who guide themselves by the formula: "trust calls for verification." It is commonly believed that there is an organic unity among the EU members since the EU is a collective participant in the dialog with the United States. This is not true: there is no unity among the EU members. The shared geopolitical interests of the West European countries create an illusion of their unity in the face of the United States. This illusion dates from the Cold War era when the capitalist West was united against the communist East in the most natural way. At that time, the West closed ranks because it feared communist aggression; freed from this fear, the NATO members revived their geopolitical interests. Today, the EU members cannot abandon their geopolitical interests, even though consolidation remains high on the agenda, which neutralizes private geopolitical interests. This means that cooperation does not exclude private geopolitical interests and latently accepts violence against partners. Confronted with external threats, members increase their consolidation and neutralize private interests. Consolidation retreats together with external threats, while private interests move to the fore, which explains why any alliance of states is based on a balance of interests.
(2) The European Union should play a much stronger role with respect to the United States within NATO. With this aim in view, Germany suggests that non-military (political, law enforcement, and economic) initiatives should be moved to the center. They should be used on a par with military measures to combat terrorism and WMD proliferation and prevent regional conflicts. Transportation routes should receive more attention. Germany associates the civilian component of NATO's activities with the EU.
(3) Germany wants to see Russia's greater role in the NATO-Russia Council; it is convinced that Russia should be more actively involved in the NATO and EU missions. Significantly, Germany disagrees with its NATO partners over NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia. It should be said that this position creates problems for the United States and, what is
11 G. Tinskiy, "Evropeyskoe protiv atlanticheskogo. Struktury NATO razdiraiut vnutrennie protivorechiia: u SShA i Germanii raznye kontseptsii razvitiia aliansa," available at [http://otechestvo.org.ua/main/20092/2806.htm].
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even more important, for Europe. Strange as it may seem, a dialog between the U.S. and EU within NATO does not mean that there is unity in the EU. Europe is bothered by Germany's activity. If the EU becomes a collective member of NATO, new members will be deprived of the right of veto. No matter what those who prefer to see Europe talking in one voice say, the right of veto is regarded as an instrument of real equality and real cooperation. If deprived of this important right, new members will feel inadequate; what is more, they will not have the same right within the EU. This means that theoretically the issue of EU unity within NATO will invite two different assessments, even if both are "European." The idea of a single European voice will be regarded as a step toward closer cooperation; on the other hand, this can be viewed as coercion within the EU; new members will be deprived of their sovereign rights.
At first glance, it seems that the anti-Americanism of NATO's European members deprives the Alliance of its unity and is, therefore, a negative phenomenon. Since Europe is pursuing a potentially splitting policy, it is up to the United States to be reasonable. Indeed, if some of the members of a military bloc, a security umbrella for all members, unite into a group within the bloc, they close ranks against the other members. This is illogical and hazardous; this threatens the military bloc or any other security organization. In fact, any group inside a bloc makes it wobbly, while those left outside can be regarded as victims of violence.
On the other hand, the forming of groups inside NATO (this is how I tend to describe the initiative of setting up European armed forces and a single European voice) was prompted by geopolitical interests that must be protected. Specialist have pointed out that the idea of all-European armed forces was first voiced in France and Germany in the wake of the 1999 war against Yugoslavia. It is commonly believed that in 1999 the Americans concentrated on gathering and analyzing intelligence, operational planning, and the handling of troops and pushed the Europeans to the margins of the operation. This explains the demand of the European countries at the 1999 Helsinki Summit "to establish a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)."12 This was not an attempt to split NATO but a response to America's violence. Indeed, the fact that the Americans ignored NATO's European members during the operation in Yugoslavia can be described as discrimination and violence within a structure set up for cooperation.
Conclusion
International cooperation is a complex process with many aspects and very specific and contradictory dynamics related to the structure of the relations inside all sorts of cooperation organizations.
This approach to the nature of cooperation suggests that contradictions stimulate the dynamics of political alliances and vice versa: any international alliance remains alive and efficient as long as it is torn apart by contradictions. This is not a-logical—this statement is strictly logical.
Third countries, that is, those which cooperate with two or more members of an alliance, should take into account all the contradictions among the member states. The political maneuvering of alliances in their relations with third countries does not mean that their strategies change with each political move. Political maneuvering means that the geopolitical interests of an alliance as a whole do not exclude the private geopolitical interests of any of its members which contradict partners' geopolitical interests. The CIS, which is gradually losing its integration impact and which was and is brimming with geopolitical contradictions, is the best proof of the above: several of the members united into GUAM, a smaller structure. The SCO and NATO are following a similar and well-trodden path. This
12 D. Tymchuk, "Vooruzhennye sily ES: Evropa protiv NATO?" available at [http://glavred.info/archive/2008/02/ 21/120726-0.html]; [http://www.wsws.org/articles/1999/dec1999/euro-d14.shtml].
means that geopolitics not only keeps members together, it can also disunite them, the two processes taking place at one and the same time.
The geopolitical challenges of our day urge countries to unite; they also urge members of alliances to fall apart. This means that none of the blocs now in operation can be described as totally integrated geopolitically. Geopolitical integrity inside alliances depends on the extent to which the geopolitical interests of the member countries coincide.
