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44
ЕВРОПА В ПРОШЛОМ Europe in the Past
E. Cech
FOREIGN POLICY OF THE "SMALL COALITION" IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY DURING 1974 - 1976 PERIOD:
MOVING FROM IDEALISM TOWARDS POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PRAGMATISM
Л. Чех
Внешняя политика «малой коалиции» в ФРГ в 1974 - 1976 годах: От идеализма к политико-экономическому прагматизму
Until September 1969, when Willy Brandt became the German Chancellor, all West German governments had insisted that the only legitimate German government was the government of the Federal Republic of Germany. This was based on the Hallstein Doctrine. They refused to recognize the German Democratic Republic and, with the exception of the Soviet Union, they interrupted diplomatic relations with any state that recognized the political regime of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Brandt came up with a radical and completely different solution to the "German question". He claimed that reunification of Germany could be achieved by rapprochement with the Communist Bloc. He called for recognition of the gDr and the Oder-Neisse border as well as for improvement of relations with the Soviet Union. Following "Neue Ostpolitik", his government launched negotiations with the Soviet Union and Poland that were focused on normalisation of relations. Furthermore, the FRG invited the USA, France and Great Britain to take part in talks on the status of Berlin.
This "Neue Ostpolitik" significantly consolidated the country's "Westpolitik" and influenced its foreign policy within its "European" and "Atlantic" context. Until the end of the 1960s and the mid-1970s, Détente had had a positive impact on Europe and the bipolar and divided world. The easing of strained international relations, which happened also thanks to "Neue Ostpolitik" of the social-liberal coalition in the 1969 - 1974 period, led to the creation of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in Helsinki in 19751.
According to some views, which follow from assessment of the 1974
- 1976 period, during which Helmut Schmidt came to power, Ostpolitik was demoted and the "visionary" period of Brandt was over. Helmut Schmidt was a pragmatic person, who held the opinion that foreign policy amounts essentially to action by the Government in the field of energy and of economics2.
The 1974 - 1976 period was important for the success of the "small coalition" over the following years until 1982. Helmut Schmidt did not undervalue the importance of Ostpolitik in any way. However, each politician wants to go down in history for something important - Adenauer became famous for his Westpolitik, Brandt for his Ostpolitik and Schmidt chose economics. Chancellor Schmidt never perceived foreign policy as one-sided. The external circumstances, the world interdependency and the fact that the FRG as an export-oriented country was particularly dependent on global trading conditions forced Schmidt to concentrate on economics when he came to office.
In the mid-1970s, Marion Dönhoff wrote that ... "the "high" foreign policy had reached the top of the agenda of matters of international finance"3. Schmidt as a renowned finance specialist was at the right place and the right moment and his reputation at home and abroad grew accordingly.
* * *
Achievements of the social-liberal coalition in foreign policy in the 1969 - 1974 period outweighed its results in its internal policy. This field was not the coalition's strong point. While Brandt succeeded in hiding this fact by foreign policy activities in his first period, in his second period in office he had much more difficulty defending the thesis that his government is . "the government of reforms, but sometimes it can happen that foreign policy issues will simply dominate"4.
As a result, the social democrats faced certain contradiction. On one hand, their foreign policy helped to increase the influence and recognition of the FRG in global markets, which perfectly suited businesses and entrepreneurs. On the other hand, the social democrats (as politicians proudly pointing out the working-class traditions) were not keeping their election campaign promises regarding the regulatory system that was supposed to mitigate the negative impacts of the incipient economic crisis on the working class.
The internal problems of the FRG were connected with aggravation of economic situation, the consequences of which became evident in 1974 even though its first symptoms appeared already after the 1973 oil crisis. Table 1 shows the development of basic economic indicators of the selected western countries. The FRG did not suffer the consequences of the crisis as intensely as other developed countries in the Western World. However, the economy of West Germany had not faced so many problems, complex crisis phenomena and their accumulation since the
post-war crisis period.
The unemployment rate had almost doubled throughout the year, which along with rising inflation and the decrease in economic growth and real wages resulted in the rising social tension. Despite the stagnation and uneven economic growth, the FRG managed to maintain its competitiveness in foreign markets in the middle of 1974. Good economic relations were the most used coalition's argument when the relations concerning reproduction of capital began to deteriorate - see Table 2.
Table 1.
Development of basic economic indicators of selected countries of the West in 1974
Increase in consumer prices Real social product (%) unemployment Balance of trade in billions DM
FRG + 6 9 +1.5 2.3 +27.8
France +14.5 +4.0 2.3 -3.4
Great Britain +17.1 -2.0 2.4 -12.8
USA +11.8 -1.0 5.8 +2.8
Belgium +14.6 +2.5 3.5 -0.1
Netherlands + 9.5 +2.0 2.7 +0.4
Italy +18.4 +3.0 3.1 -7.5
Jaks J. Nové prvky v soucasné hospodârsjko politické strategii SPD a ekonomice NSR // Mezinârodni vztahy: Ceskoslovenskâ revue pro zahranicni politiku. 1975. Vol. 10. № 1. P. 32.
Table 2.
Balance of trade of the FRG and its closest allies in the first half of the 1970s (in billions USD)
1972 1973 1974 1975
FRG +6.51 +12.95 +20.16 +8.58
USA -9.08 -2.24 -9.49 +2.18
France -0.55 -1.07 -6.44 -0.02
Italy -0.71 -5.57 -10.68 -1.68
Great Britain -3.51 -8.28 -15.50 -5.17
Jaks J. Soudobé krizové jevy v imperialistickych zemich a jejich hospodârsko politické souvislosti // Mezinârodni vztahy: Ceskoslovenskâ revue pro zahranicni politiku. 1976. Vol. 11. № 4. P. 36.
However, it was only a matter of time before the FRG's capital and economic dependence on foreign trade became a problem that the
opposition would formulate as the factor of the social-liberal coalition's capabilities. The economic situation in West Germany had a great impact on the increase in internal political problems, which posed a real threat to the coalition of the SPD and the fDp. These parties were forced to react to this threat. The results of the 1974 local elections, in which the SPD lost from 3 to 10 percent of votes, were the warning sign especially for the SPD. The FDP's vote slightly increased and the CDU's vote surprisingly rose by 8 percent 5.
The situation was not easy, taking the deteriorating relations between the coalition partners into consideration. Within the party leadership the right wing had gained more influence. The internal tensions within the SPD were heightened by the fact that the young social democrats criticized the party's ineffective reforms and by disputes with the SPD's trade union representatives over the incomes policy. However, the coalition partner FDP benefited from this situation at the expense of the SPD by increasing its electoral vote as it deemed the social democrats to be mainly responsible for internal economic and social problems. The right wing parties in West Germany naturally took advantage of this situation and, as a result, the SPD got into an extremely tense situation.
The governmental changes, which began on 7 May 1974 with the resignation of W. Brandt, were probably the only way to prevent further decline of social democrats and to stabilise their position. The resignation of W. Brandt was thought to be caused by the arrest of one of his personal assistants G. Guillaume, who was convicted of espionage for the East German intelligence services. Markus Wolf, the legendary East German spymaster, stated in his memoirs: "A lot of Brandt's supporters still cannot forgive me for being partly responsible for his downfall. They claim that I am mainly responsible for Brandt's resignation. Therefore, I want to say once again that the Guillaume Affair was the biggest mistake our secret service had made until that time. In no way did I desire Brandt's
resignation..... I have always been convinced that the Guillaume
Affair did not cause, but only triggered the resignation of Willy Brandt. Indeed, Brandt in his memoirs wrote that having a spy in his inner circles should not be the reason for offering his resignation"6.
Willy Brandt was the victim of unbridgeable disputes inside his own party and the mistrust in the party's leadership caused by imbalance within the triangle, which was formed by Willy Brandt, Herbert Wehner (the party disciplinarian) and Helmut Schmidt (the Minister of Finance). Herbert Wehner was his strongest opponent. He criticised him for indecisiveness and too much willingness to compromise. Apparently, Helmut Schmidt had long aspired to become the chancellor. Even though he was not hostile towards Brandt, he did not defend him when he was attacked. In fact, Brandt's closest party comrades made him realize that he was not facing only the spy affair but also the sad fact that his colleagues looked down on him with anger and contempt instead of supporting him. Being deeply disappointed, Willy Brandt decided to offer his resignation7.
Brandt was succeeded as Chancellor by Helmut Schmidt, who belonged to the conservative wing of the SPD. Schmidt was the Minister of Defence (1969 - 1972) and the Minister of Finance (1972 - 1974) within the "small coalition". In his information for the East German intelligence service from 11 June 1974 Guillaume wrote about Schmidt: "Helmut Schmidt tries to act as an economical chancellor in front of his voters and as threatening Kassandra in front of the social democrats. He will control and lead the rejuvenated cabinet by means of the budget and thanks to the measures concerning economy and monetary policy he will have a strong influence also on foreign policy ...."8.
Taking the previous development into consideration, it can be said that this was a change signalling the shift of the FRG's policy (including foreign policy) to the right. The right-wing CSU could not hide its satisfaction at the situation in the country and the political scene in West Germany. Its member F.J. Strauss said the following in his speech delivered in Bavarian Sonthofen in November 1974: "... the crisis must be so deep that our actions can find stronger psychological ground beneath our feet"9.
The opposition sought to shift the development of the FRG to the right also by means of its arguments aimed at discrediting the social democrats. The opposition claimed that the SPD was a "fair weather" party. When the economy was flourishing and the standard of living was not threatened, people voted the SPD. However, when problems occurred, the old and approved CDU/CSU coalition was the one which was willing to mend what others had destroyed10. The opposition pointed out the fact that in 1969 Brandt took over healthy economy left by K.G. Kiesinger and H. Schmidt (the Minister of Finance at that time) took over the full treasury from F.J. Strauss. The Union parties CDU and CSU understood internal problems of the country and the voters' disapproval of the slow implementation of reforms as the support of their own policy. According to their logics, people in West Germany had to realize that the coalition's unsuccessful domestic policy signalled the failure of its audacious foreign policy from the first half of the 1970s - especially in terms of its relations with the Eastern Bloc.
As a result, Chancellor Schmidt was in a very difficult position when he was to present the manifesto in Bundestag on 17 May 1974. In its introduction, he stated that .... "the new FRG's government continues the social-liberal alliance declared in the manifesto from 18 January 1973. This manifesto is valid for the entire legislative period. Today we are doing the continuous evaluation"11.
Even though Chancellor Schmidt acknowledged validity of his predecessor's policy, he chose a more pragmatic approach. Schmidt defined the fundamentals of his government by saying: "Facing the ongoing problems, we shall focus on austerity and realism and on the things that are necessary at the moment .. ,"12.
Consequently, the cabinet gave much more consideration to internal
social and economic issues. Schmidt did not completely reject the reforms that had been earlier proposed. However, he reduced them considerably and preferred the support of businesses. Apparently, these changes were inspired by the efforts to maintain economic power of Germany and they determined the FRG's foreign policy and its position.
In this regard, Brandt and Schmidt and their personal attitudes towards policy and West-East relations as well as the FRG-Soviet relations were also decisive. Even though Brandt repeatedly pointed out the fact that détente did not mean the end of the barbed wire, the characters of Schmidt and Brandt were different. Schmidt was pragmatic and he believed in adopting a pragmatic approach to politics. He mistrusted emotional politics and did not want to continue the emotional politics of Brandt. In fact, these two politicians argued about an emotional approach to politics. In his 1986 farewell speech to the Bundestag, Schmidt said: "I would ... like to call on us to reflect on the ethos of a political pragmatism on a moral basis. That means: that which we achieve and that which we want to do must be morally well founded. The way in which we seek to achieve the objective must be realistic, it must not be illusionary. And -whatever we do - we must not forget: he who wants to achieve a distant goal must take many small steps""13.
Of course, personalities do not mean everything. When Schmidt came to power, the changes in external and internal challenges were as important as the changes in personalities. West Germany refocused its policy. Schmidt's convictions with regard to Ostpolitik were the same as Brandt's. With regard to Poland, Schmidt was even more committed than Brandt having fought there during the war and because he took the suffering of the Polish people to heart. As Marion Donhoff says, when Schmidt came to office, the economy became important. This confirms the opinion that internal politics, economy and the 'oil-price shock' in global economic markets were Brandt's undoing, not the Guillaume spy affair14.
Ambitions and the character of the Schmidt-Genscher period were less grandiose. Schmidt focused on the substance of East-West relations. With regard to emerging issues, he tried to solve complicated details of these relations. After all, Schmidt and Brandt had different past. While Brand had had more contacts with the communists in the past, Schmidt started in politics when the SPD had a strong anti-communist stance having seen the SPD persecuted in the GDR in the post-war period. Brandt had a different ideological approach towards the communist countries arising from the fact that he grew up in times when people could still travel to the Soviet Union. What is more, Brandt had more contacts. Brandt and Brezhnev were friends while Schmidt and Brezhnev met together as personalities who both fought in the Second World War. Neither of them wanted another war as a result of their past experiences. Schmidt and Brezhnev trusted each other. They had a good relationship, which, however, lacked emotional warmth. Schmidt was not emotional
and there was not so much emotion in their relation either as it was between Brandt ad Brezhnev15.
In contrast to the previous period, Schmidt's foreign policy in the 1974
- 1976 period adopted a waiting attitude. It was the period of searching the way, the period in which Brandt's idealism was coming to an end and the new government's pragmatism was becoming dominant. The orientation of the FRG's foreign policy was more complicated, which was caused by tactical modification of its determining elements.
First. The changes were more dynamic as a result of the time factor. When Schmidt and Genscher came to power, the major Ostpolitik treaties had already been signed and the big moves resulting from these treaties have been made. The ensuing period might therefore be viewed as less "spectacular" than the previous one. The period that can be termed as "second phase" of Ostpolitik - the period of putting the treaties into practice - was going to be slower and more difficult. In fact, Ostpolitik was meant to be a long-term process. Détente increased travel and family contacts and defused the situation in Berlin. These achievements were accepted positively by the public. After the bilateral Ostpolitik treaties were signed, détente moved into a multilateral phase, when many issues were being dealt with through CSCE and MBFR negotiations and through contacts between East and West in the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE).
There was an apparent tendency to retreat from self-assertion in Ostpolitik, which lost its dynamics after the treaties with Eastern European countries had been signed. It is true that Willy Brandt predicted movement of Ostpolitik into a multilateral phase. However, it was Schmidt's cabinet that made practical steps. It made a positive evaluation of Ostpolitik and its role in the global easing of tension and the successful final act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. However, Schmidt, made much stronger connection between further development of Ostpolitik and peaceful reunification of Germany. He further developed the political principles put forward by Schmidt, but in a different way. The right wing of the SPD and its coalition partner had made space for their own interpretation of these principles in order to respond to fierce attacks against the results of Ostpolitik from the 1969
- 1974 period (attacks from Germany and abroad). In this way, however, it was much more complicated to use the undeniable economic benefits, which resulted from them.
Schmidt's interpretation of the treaties with the East was partly connected with partial reappraisal of Ostpolitik. The permanent feature of this process was the emphasizing of differentiation and so-called "selected relations" with some socialist countries. When the "small coalition" of the right-wing government came to power, there were some disturbing moments regarding the close connection between the FRG's Ostpolitik and détente in the whole Europe. This was quite obvious during the debate in Bundestag which preceded the signing of the Helsinki Final
Act.
Even though the Foreign Minister H.D. Genscher welcomed the successful conclusion of negotiations at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, his speech included the ideas that the "small coalition" did not use in the 1969 - 1974 period. This especially concerned the statement that ... "realistic détente is the policy which has its own limits ..." and that "... détente also requires security elements and readiness to defend our country. He who thinks that he himself can provide his own security by easing of tensions is a dangerous dreamer"16.
These words implied that détente in the military and security fields would not be an easy process. In his book titled German Foreign Policy Genscher wrote that in no way did the Helsinki Conference legitimize the European territorial status quo. However, it created peace establishment in Europe through which German people could reach "unity by means of self-determination"17. This proves continuity of the strategic goal of West German foreign policy and its implementation within Europe. With regard to this the foreign minister could say with pleasure that . "our interests are not isolated and we can count on our European partners and their support"18.
Debates in Bundestag confirmed that the Schmidt's cabinet evaluated the conclusions of the Helsinki Conference from much narrower points of view than the previous government. The self-confident (and more independent) FRG's policy towards the Western allies from the first half of the 1970s was replaced by closer ties with Western European countries and the USA. Further easing of tensions was bound to be unreal without the North Atlantic Alliance, which was regarded as the fundamental basis of détente in contrast to attitudes of the Brandt's administration19.
Second. From the very beginning of the Schmidt period the western platform of his foreign policy was much more associated with the revival of the so-called special position of the FRG in relations with the USA. Similarly to his predecessor, Schmidt sought consolidation of the country's political and military identity. In contrast to Brandt's dominant interpretation of relations with the Western European region, Schmidt came to the conclusion that Westpolitik had to be modified by strengthening the ties with the USA. At the annual session of the German Council on Foreign Policy on 1 July 1976 Genscher regarded
the previous....."feverish debates between the advocates of Atlanticism
and so called "Europeans" ..as useless and..."obsolete for practical politics"20.
At the Bonn conference on foreign policy held on 17 January 1975 Schmidt described the relations with the USA as follows: "Not only are our relations with Washington freed from specific bilateral burden, but lately they have also reached a new higher level"21.
The Schmidt cabinet set off on a journey to reconciliation with its transatlantic strategic ally. This trend shaped the whole concept of the FRG's Westpolitik in the second half of the 1970s. Of the two
coalition partners, the FDP was much more involved in enforcement of this strategy. The programme of the FDP Congress, held in Frankfurt am Main in October 1975, included the following: "Interests of the European partnerships and the USA are identical in many aspects . both partners have to further develop their relations in a spirit of mutual understanding"22. In his book titled Die Ostpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland William E. Griffith writes that from 1975 certain trend towards the right became noticeable in the FRG and that Schmidt was therefore inclined not to supply the CDU/CSU with election campaign ammunition through a too active Ostpolitik"23.
It would be imprecise to say that the FRG had given up its West European interests and completely succumbed to the requirements of old perception of Atlanticism. As the mediator between Atlanticism and Europeanism West Germany undoubtedly respected the American interests with more attention, avoided any conflicts and openly expressed its understanding of the US political practice.
Even the Western European integration, which played an important role in West German interests, remained considerably conditioned by close ties with the USA. With this regard, H. D. Genscher wrote: "Western Europeans should realize that the foundations of European unification would become unstable without maintenance of trust-based relations with the USA"24. Furthermore, Chancellor Schmidt emphasized the security aspect:" ..security of Western Europe in the coming years and in the future remains dependent on the military and political presence of the USA in Europe"25.
The relationship between West Germany and the USA was reciprocal as the USA realized how important it was to maintain good relations with their closest post-war ally in Europe. Thanks to this ally the USA could still influence the emancipation trends in Europe. Several American media noticed that the FRG had become an economic giant on its own and had a huge economic impact all around the world. In this regard, American politicians started to call for shifting the US interests from Brussels to Bonn26.
Third. Following the 1974 - 1975 recession, the West German government started to focus more on the Western European aspect of Westpolitik. The abandonment of fixed exchange rates, the explosion in oil prices and subsequent problems with balance of payments in the partnership countries, high inflation, unemployment and the deepest recession since the 1930s were all obstructions in the Western European integration process. The FRG saw this process as a tool of its emancipation in Europe as well as in the global system of international relations. Complications in the integration process of communities slowed down the FRG's pursuit of emancipation.
At the above-mentioned SPD conference on foreign policy held in early 1975 Schmidt expressed his discontent at the results of Western European efforts to create the European Union. What is more, he called
attention to searching for political alternatives that would overcome mistrust between the allies. He also pointed out the fact that the FRG would take a leading position in the process the aim of which would be
to overcome ".....numbness and extreme fatigue that are being often
discussed in Brussels these days".27.
The year 1975 saw the shift in priorities concerning the integration policy of European communities. The original idea of the shift from economic to monetary and finally to a political union got complicated. The successes that the European Economic Community had achieved were put to the test. With regard to this, Ralf Dahrendorf said: "We were working on our projects but the reality was different"28. The Tindemans Report contained similar opinions: ". the recession is so deep that, at first, we have to save what we had achieved and then make further energetic steps forward following our previous achievements"29. This proved Schmidt's words true. Schmidt claimed that "the community is still going through the process of its creation and development. There will be . new problems we will have to solve until we reach our distant objective"30.
At that time, the "small coalition" perceived Western European unification with austerity. It re-evaluated its previous ideas of Western European independence from the North Atlantic Alliance system, in which . "Europe was to assert its ambitions by equal harmony and balance"31.
This was concisely expressed by H. D. Genscher who assessed the key roles of the West German foreign policy: ". the North Atlantic Alliance is a necessary supplement to European unification ... confidence in inseparability of alliance between independent Europe and North America is a core of the liberal foreign policy"32.
Therefore, the West German government did everything to assure that "the European identity" would not complicate disagreement between the European Economic Community and the USA. In this way, it did not contradict the Unionist parties in the opposition. Western European integration was promoted also by means of new political impulses. The European Council conclusion from December 1975, which decided on the preliminary date of the first elections to the European Parliament that were originally planned for May-June 1978, was of considerable importance for the West German government. The elections took place almost a year later due to the controversial issues, including particularly divided opinions on the competences of this body of the community.
Fourth. Another important element of the FRG's foreign policy was its increasing and open association with the military issues. In his inaugural speech, Chancellor Schmidt clearly stated that he was going to use his experience in the field of finance but also in the field of security and defence. Even the realistic politician W. Brandt proudly praised ... "the certainty with which the two social democrat ministers were accomplishing their mission as commanders-in-chief of the Bundeswehr
"33 ... at the Mannheim Congress of the SPD in November 1975. W. Brandt was convinced that nobody had the right to question the SPD capabilities to preserve security of West Germany.
The Federal Republic of Germany excellently performed its duties in the integrated political system of the North Atlantic Pact, following from the NATO dual strategy implemented in 1967. In contrast to the Brandt period, there was an increasing imbalance between deterrence and détente. This was not an easy position for H. Schmidt and his government due to the facts that:
- successful results of the Helsinki Conference were to assure deepening and continuation of the process of détente also through the easing of military tensions; the Vienna negotiations on reductions of military forces and armaments in Central Europe called for a constructive approach;
- considering their experience from the past, the small countries in Western Europe were not much willing to accept the growing military power of the FRG;
- Great Britain and France closely watched all the steps of their partner that could disrupt the relations within the "small triangle";
- the "small coalition" realized that détente was associated with its greatest achievements in the field of foreign policy and with the strengthening of the FRG's international influence.
At its meeting held in May 1975, the NATO Council called for elimination of the Soviet military threat by strengthening its own military capabilities. The final communique pointed out that only "collective security .. based on reliable capabilities to deter and defend is a stabilising factor .. and necessary prerequisite for détente and peace"34.
These conclusions were widely acknowledged in the White Book of the Ministry for State Security. It was pointed out that ... "the security situation and distinguishable tendencies require maintenance of the alliance and deterrence capabilities as well"35. The statement that the military capabilities had to be maintained . "because they ensure the negotiation position in relation to the East"36 confirms a certain comeback to the Cold War language.
* * *
In the 1974 - 1976 period, the West German government applied a kind of "interest-oriented" détente. It exploited the partial and necessary cooperation with the socialist countries in order to stabilise the FRG's position in Europe. Furthermore, it sought the FRG's sustainable manoeuvrability towards its NATO allies.
This cautious approach of the "small coalition" and shifting of the balance between the two elements of the NATO "dual-track strategy" was to provide enough time for both ruling parties to become a solid and united power ready to win the 1976 elections. What is more, this
approach created the conditions and psychological atmosphere necessary for further adaptation of foreign policy to new environment of the first half of the 1970s.
Each of the aforementioned four modified factors of the FRG's foreign policy was to represent the social and liberal capabilities to govern the country. After the elections held in October 1976, the "small coalition" remained in the government. However, the fact that H. Schmidt gained a narrow majority by just one vote was a warning sign for the SPD/FDP coalition.
In his television appearance on 1 March 1976, the American President G. Ford said that the military force was the basic means of implementation of the peace policy. Furthermore, he disavowed from the word détente, which in his opinion had lost its applicability. He made his attitude more precise in Chicago on 12 March 1976: "The peace through strength has always been and remains the basic concept of our policy"37.
The manifesto from 16 December 1976 showed the tendencies of the FRG's foreign policy to connect two aspects of its foreign relations. On one hand, the FRG wanted to maintain its significant role of an intermediary between East and West. In case of the worsening of the international political situation this position could maintain and even consolidate its international authority and exceptionality within the international relations. On the other hand, the FRG sought rapprochement with the USA to ensure its ambitions within integration of Europe. The higher involvement of the Schmidt government in strengthening the NATO military capabilities was the price it offered to the USA in return for their understanding of the FRG's specific interests in the East.
Schmidt and his government realized that the USA regarded the FRG's interests in the East with distrust. Even though Schmidt was not planning to restore the vigorousness of Ostpolitik, the USA vividly remembered the experience with Brandt's "Atlantic indiscipline" and they feared its recurrence. The USA asked the question whether the Schmidt government was double-faced and was threatening their "European interests" or not. As a result, Bonn relied on the least vulnerable part of its NATO participation. The efforts the FRG made within the NATO military structures over the following years were decisive for compensation of its increasingly complicated position in the western alliance.
Even though the coalition of SPD and FDP was re-elected in the 1976 federal elections, the opposition started to gain more power. The opposition parties increasingly criticized the social-liberal foreign policy. They reproached the cabinet for preferring the relations with the East instead of strengthening the western alliance.
In spite of this, the SPD/FDP coalition did not completely give up its verbal support of détente. The strengthening of relations between the FRG and the East Bloc was limited despite the initial hopes and expectations. In the 1974 - 1976 period, when détente slowed down, Chancellor Schmidt managed to create an interesting platform of his
foreign policy. On one hand, this platform was sufficiently pro-Western, e. i. pro-European and pro-Atlantic. On the other hand, Schmidt's foreign policy "saved face" in terms of Ostpolitik. Schmidt was a realistic and pragmatic politician who, however, did not betray the Brandt's vision. This was very important for the success of the SPD/FDP coalition in the difficult period of the second half of the 1970s until 1982.
Notes
1 Plskova J. Vychodni politika Brandtovy vlady v letech 1969 - 1974. Prague, 1999. P. 149, 150.
2 Pittman A. From Ostpolitik to Reunification: West German - Soviet political relations since 1974. Cambridge, 1992. P. 134, 135.
3 Dönhoff M. Foe into Friend: The Makers of the New Germany from Konrad Adenauer to Helmut Schmidt. London, 1982, P. 167, 168.
4 Bulletin des Presse - und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung. 1970. Jan. 14. № 6. P. 43.
5 RezekR. Nemecka spolkova republika - H. Schmidt spolkovym kanclerem // Mezinarodni vztahy: Ceskoslovenska revue pro zahranicni politiku. 1974. Vol. 9. № 5. P. 54.
6 Wolf M. Sef spionaze v tajne valce: Vzpominky. Prague, 2004, P. 219.
7 Ibidem. P. 220, 221.
8 Ibidem. P. 219, 220.
9 Bezymenskij L. Dva tabory na Ryne // Nova doba. 1975. № 24. P. 15.
10 BezymenskijL. Jake tendence se objevuji v NSR? // Nova doba. 1975. № 2. P. 14.
11 Schmidt H. Kontinuität und Konzentration. Bonn, 1975. P. 9.
12 Ibidem.
13 Genscher H.D. Deutsche Aussenpolitik. Stuttgart, 1977. P. 66, 67.
14 Pittman A. From Ostpolitik to Reunification: West German - Soviet Political Relations since 1974. Cambridge, 1992. P. 136.
15 Ibidem. P. 135.
16 Genscher H.D. Deutsche Aussenpolitik. Stuttgart, 1977. P. 66 - 67.
17 Ibidem. P. 67.
18 Ibidem. P. 71.
19 Ibidem. P. 79, 80.
20 Ibidem. P. 170.
21 SchmidtH. Op. cit. P. 236.
22 Parteien - Jahrbuch 1975: Dokumentation und Analyse der Entwicklung des Parteiensystems de BRD im Jahre 1975. Meisenheim am Glan, 1978. P. 170.
23 Griffith W.E. Die Ostpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Stuttgart, 1981. P. 300.
24 Aussenpolitik. 1974. № 4. P. 366.
25 Schmidt H. Op. cit. P. 15.
26 Europa - Archiv. Bonn, 1974. Feb. 25. № 4. P. 15.
27 Schmidt H. Op. cit. P. 233.
28 BezymenskijL. Ci hodina uderila v zâpadnej Europe? Il Novâ doba. 1974. № 37. P. 6.
29 Europa - Archiv. Bonn.1976. № 3. p. D57.
30 Schmidt H. Op. cit. P. 234.
31 GenscherH.D. Deutsche Aussenpolitik. Stuttgart, 1977. P. 38.
32 Ibidem. P. 37.
33 Brandt W. ... auf der Zinne der Partei ... Parteittagsreden 1960 bis 1983. Berlin; Bonn, 1984. P. 249.
34 Dokumenty ke studiu mezinârodniho prâva a politiky. Vol. 4. Prague, 1982. P. 212.
35 Weissbuch 1975I1976: Zur Sicherheit der BRD und zur Entwicklung der Bundeswehr. Bonn, 1976. P. 3.
36 Ibidem.
37 Europa - Archiv. Bonn, 1976. Apr. 25. № 8. P. D187.
Author, Abstract, Key words
Eubomfr Cech - Doctor of History, Associate Professor, Vice Dean for Science, Research and Doctoral Studies, Head of the Department of International Political Relations, Faculty of International Relations, University of Economics in Bratislava (Bratislava, Slovak Republic)
lubomir.cech@euba.sk
During the Cold War, the open 'Berlin question' was one ofthe key issues that complicated the post-war international relations. In the early 1970s, Chancellor Willy Brandt came up with a radical and completely different solution to this problem. His "Neue Ostpolitik - New Eastern Policy" - the philosophy and policy towards Eastern Europe called 'Wandel durch Annäherung' (rapprochement towards changes) - contributed to positive development of East-West relations. His successor Helmut Schmidt faced a completely different situation. According to some views, which follow from assessment of the 1974 - 1976 period, e. i. the first Schmidt cabinet, Ostpolitik was demoted and the 'visionary' period of Brandt was over. First and foremost, this paper aims to show that the 1974 -1976 period was determining for the success of the 'small coalition' over the following years until 1982. Furthermore, following the real facts and materials we aim to prove that in no way did Helmut Schmidt undervalue the significance of Ostpolitik. He was a realistic and pragmatic person, but he did not betray the Brandt's vision.
Federal Republic of Germany, foreign policy, "eastern policy" (Ostpolitik), Cold War, Berlin question, détente, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Soviet-German relations, W. Brandt, H. Schmidt
References (Articles from Scientific Journals)
1. Bezymenskij L. Cí hodina uderila v západnej Európe? Nová doba, 1974, no. 37, p. 6.
2. Bezymenskij L. Dva tábory na Ryne. Nová doba, 1975, no. 24, p. 15.
3. Bezymenskij L. Jaké tendence se objevují v NSR? Nová doba, 1975, no. 2, p. 14.
4. Jaks J. Nové prvky v soucasné hospodársko politické strategii SPD a ekonomice NSR. Mezinárodní vztahy: Ceskoslovenská revue pro zahranicni politiku, 1975, vol. 10, no. 1, p. 32.
5. Jaks J. Soudobé krizové jevy v imperialistickych zemích a jejich hospodársko politické souvislosti. Mezinárodní vztahy: Ceskoslovenská revue pro zahranicni politiku, 1976, vol. 11, no. 4, p. 36.
6. Rezek R. Nemecká spolková republika - H. Schmidt spolkovym kanclérem. Mezinárodní vztahy: Ceskoslovenská revue pro zahranicni politiku, 1974, vol. 9, no. 5, p. 54.
(Monographs)
7. Dönhoff M. Foe into Friend: The Makers of the New Germany from Konrad Adenauer to Helmut Schmidt. London, 1982, pp. 167, 168.
8. Griffith W. E. Die Ostpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Stuttgart, 1981, p. 300.
9. Pittman A. From Ostpolitik to Reunification: West German - Soviet political relations since 1974. Cambridge, 1992, pp. 134, 135.
10. Pittman A. From Ostpolitik to Reunification: West German - Soviet Political Relations since 1974. Cambridge, 1992, p. 135.
11. Pittman A. From Ostpolitik to Reunification: West German - Soviet Political Relations since 1974. Cambridge, 1992, p. 136.
12. Plsková J. Vychodní politika Brandtovy vlády v letech 1969 - 1974 [The Eastern Policy of Brandt's Government in 1969 - 1974]. Prague, 1999, pp. 149, 150.
Автор, аннотация, ключевые слова
Чех Любомир - докт. ист. наук, профессор Братиславского университета экономики (Словакия)
lubomir.cech@euba.sk
Открытый «германский вопрос» во времена Холодной войны был одной из ключевых проблем, которая усложняла международные отношения в послевоенный период. Канцлер В. Брандт в начале 1970-х гг. пришел с радикальным и совершенно иным решением этой проблемы. Его «новая восточная политика» и философия "Wandel durch Annäherung" («Изменение через сближение») по отношению к Восточной Европе спо-
собствовали позитивному развитию отношений на оси Восток - Запад. Его преемник на посту канцлера Г. Шмидт находился в совершенно иной ситуации. При анализе периода с 1974 по 1976 гг., то есть во время первого срока деятельности его правительства, появляются взгляды, что «восточная политика» деградировала, и тем самым закончился визионерский этап, сформированный В. Брандтом. В статье показывается, что 1974 - 1976 гг. были решающими для успешного правления «малой коалиции» в последующем периоде до 1982 г. Кроме того, на конкретных фактах и документах приводятся доказательства, что Г. Шмидт отнюдь не недооценивал важность «восточной политики». Он был реалистом и прагматиком, но видения и подхода В. Брандта не предавал.
Федеративная Республика Германия, внешняя политика, «восточная политика», Холодная война, Берлинский вопрос, разрядка международной напряженности, Организация Североатлантического договора (НАТО), советско-германские отношения, В. Брандт, Г. Шмидт
