CC BY
7ECONOMIC
FEATURES OF THE TYPES OF GAMES IN INTERACTION BUSINESS CORPORATIONS, THEIR
EMPLOYEES AND SOCIETY
Arsenyev Yu.,
Doctor of Technical Sciences, professor,
Minaev V.,
PhD in Engineering, associate professor Tula Branch of the RANEPA Davydova T.,
PhD in Pedagogic Sciences, associate Professor,
Morenova K. graduate student Tula state university L.N. Tolstoy's
ABSTRACT
The types of organizational, political and social games in the interaction of business corporations, their human resources and the whole society are investigated. The methods of designing and forms of organizational architecture of business corporations are considered, taking into account the competitive advantages of their human assets. Keywords: management, organization, methods, subjects of activity, communication, competition.
Each person reveals his condition and shares information only to the extent corresponding to his own material incentives, taken into account by the of business-corporations (BC). He also makes decisions based on his interests, which is not always adequate to the Nash balance conditions [1]. However, in solving the problems of organizational relevance, the main thing is the design of organizational architecture (OA) models at the social, inter- and intra-corporate levels.
At the social level, the strategies of individual corporate executives are focused on the formation of a process of collaborative development, in which individual cognitive needs and a broad social frame act as parties to the OA. The general rules of the organizational game can be considered as "agreements" between agents (holders of material and cognitive assets), forming organizational fields in which corporations with similar
forms form clusters. Competing with each other, they help to understand the self-regulation of BC activities. Individuals using these rules form their cognitive frames of organizational games in which they become participants. Within the corporation, these individual frames interact with their differences, giving rise to a common frame of team play. These differences require motivational adequacy, which is why a specific organizational and contractual internal structure arises at the corporate level. The choice of forms of OA depends on the availability of adequate cognitive assets that have unique advantages in individual markets and in appropriate technologies. Different connections between CG and OA are also able to produce different combinations of their competitive advantages (Table 2).
Table 2.
Comparative advantages of corporations of different forms
Corporations Semantics of the advantages of the application
H-forms It has an advantage in the markets of standard goods manufactured on the basis of simple or complex PHA, when creating new markets based on fast and flexible management. The H-form of unilateral materiality of the MCA can be associated with M. Porter's industry approach, based on the expert knowledge of management, a deep understanding of market opportunities on the part of the top management of the corporation
S- forms It has an advantage in markets with different specifications and continuous fine-tuned coordination at working levels. The S-form can be considered in relation to the resource theory of the firm, according to which competitive advantages are based on long-term organizational capabilities of workers, etc.
G- forms It has an advantage and a high reputation among suppliers of high-quality products (the main factors of the G-form are the national and internal system of vocational training, as well as a typical specialized work ethic)
SV- forms It has an advantage in the rapid creation of innovative commodity systems based on decentralized competitive modular designs. The SV-form can be associated with economic sociology, when the competitive advantage is based on the position of venture capitalists in social networks, allowing them to play the role of an intermediary in the creation of various types of entrepreneurial activity, modular architecture of developments characterized by high uncertainty
RE- forms Has a relatively effective corporate response in global competition with an imperative combining business strategy, well-trained staff with extensive knowledge
Table 2 shows significant differences in the forms of OA and their results. The question is: how to implement a diversified portfolio of forms of OA that allows to serve different types of markets at a higher level?
The answer requires recognizing that organizational-relevant ways can evolve together with human cognitive assets of different types, and vice versa. The following features are revealed in [1]:
1. The joint evolution of OA H- and S-forms allows accumulating the types of individualized and context-oriented human assets (HA) corresponding to them. Collective cognition is different in them:
a) hierarchical specialization and encapsulation in OA H-forms (its members perform individually significant roles in specific segments of collective cognition, are perceived as contributing more to the achievement of organizational goals, having greater honor and respect among their peers, which causes envy, fear, negative feelings in other people);
b) generalization of knowledge vertically and horizontally into OA S-form (it values more members who turn information of individuals into a common property, cooperation with other participants in joint actions who are not inclined to exalt their Self, etc.). These two types of behavior distinguish the parameters of useful cognitive assets, priorities over others in the traditions and rules of behavior of both management and workers;
c) the dominance of an individualistic H-form in OA will demonstrate to a new generation of managers and workers a tendency to invest in individualized HA, more adequate to the H-form, which will simplify the task of hiring the required type of HA and their training. As a result, the H-form may become generally accepted for branches of the national economies of some countries, although the OA of the S-form is more suitable for other economies. The same can apply to S-forms or context-oriented HA. In general, OA of H- and S-forms can evolve within a single cluster or turn into a hybrid of H- and S-forms, for example, RE-forms, and all aspects of cognitive processes in an organizational context can become context-oriented.
2. In general, the existence of differences specific to OA and priority ways of cognition, expression of emotions and behavior of HA reveals a lot of cultural differences, cognitive and mental orientations, behavior specifics, widely reflected in new sciences - sociological and cultural psychology, neurobiology, etc. Real practice is characterized by different types of games, for each of which different frames or subjective perceptions of games are applicable. Organizational games usually use team-oriented frames.
In social exchanges, political transactions, markets, communities, and society, agents can use frames of different types, adequate to the customs, traditions, and rules of behavior prevailing in OA, similar, though individualized in detail cognitive frames, and the relationship of decisions made. Their joint evolution with the rules of corporate behavior is the result of individual strategies, not culturally rooted permanent preferences. Guidelines in the family, school, education, society, and market relations strongly influence the formation of individual strategies for investing in cognitive skills, so cognitive orientations in society
change slowly. Hence, the architectural form that is a priority in the BC cluster can be traditional, but without a quick flexible adaptation to emerging technological, information and market requirements. Experiments, strategies, deviations that meet normal (or better optimal) conditions of BC activity can constitute new sets of cognitive assets in a typical architectural structure.
3. BC clusters with a similar architectural structure make up the organizational field. There the main outcomes of "negotiations" between holders of cognitive, material or financial assets should be highlighted.
Suppose, BC have accumulated cognitive assets. In combination with the supply of adequate cognitive tools, it is possible to organize a suitable corporate OA without guaranteeing the correct organization of collective cognition. It is required that each member shares a common understanding and confidence in adequate fundamental rules regarding: a) placement, integration or withdrawal of assets at the corporate level; b) control over the use of cognitive tools; c) responsibility for possible organizational failure; d) remuneration for each participant, etc.
These general rules of the organizational game ensure the self-government of the BC without centralized control of their joint mutual competition. They form the basis of the corporate governance structure (CG), even if these rules are formulated as formal norms and imposed by a third party. Self-management of business corporations makes it possible to turn them into an active element of the institutional mechanisms of the economy. Formal management rules underlying all organizational games can be considered a general "agreement" in the field of organization of owners of cognitive and tangible assets. It is this negotiating balance that can be achieved on the basis of collective bargaining of real holders of assets of different types and levels or created by institutional designers. It should include a set of requirements that are implicit: a) a deep sense of justice (Nash's axiom of symmetry); b) stability that can withstand the pressure of competitors in the organizational field (Nash's axiom of "effective" Pareto balance); c) cognitive economics (Nash's axiom of "independent or irrelevant alternatives").
In general, Nash's decision in negotiations provides a maximum of a weighted amount of winnings for holders of MCA, WCA and PHA assets. It may require maximizing the collective knowledge of a common corporate goal. It is quite difficult for the management of a business corporation to clearly define the tasks of maximizing value for many interested groups.
4. At the level of individual business units, specific forms of OA-CG communication are defined, the rules associated with them in addition to general agreements at the level of the organizational field that allow creating a specific template. Other factors of influence are: a) the history of the corporation; b) the balance of power in the negotiations of asset holders; c) relevant technology; d) various norms, etc.
This makes it possible to define the rules more precisely before starting an intra-corporate game with a combination of all participants in collective cognition, their actions and individual interests. Corporates may have their own cognitive frames of the organizational
game, in some ways even conflicting, but mutually adequate due to precisely defined rules of the corporate game. This variant of joint actions in a common game, considering the organizational rules following from the general agreement, applies to the entire organizational field. R. Sugden [2] identified three possible mechanisms for fulfilling this condition: a) rationality; b) agreement; c) diverse experience. At the same time, each member imagined the organizational game as a game in a team, and himself as one of its players.
However, within the framework of such a structure, there are risks of violating the rules, illegal actions, lack of room for maneuver due to shirking, negligence, misunderstanding, lack of motivation among a number of members of the business corporation team, the danger of small groups and coalitions resisting or hindering the maximization of its main goal. These risks can be eliminated by contract design, by turning organizational rules into the central core of the team game. This is the most important task of all corporate management and senior management, managers of a business corporation, as well as the entire society and government bodies. Considering the presence of the corporation's management in the conditions of H-form or other forms of communication in the structure of OA-CG, the designs of its contracts may significantly differ.
The analysis of the system of collaborative cognition and management of BC staff showed that its relations manifest themselves in five main forms. Pure and mixed forms of OA can function in the economy, forming the basic framework of the internal activities of corporations based on compliance with the rules of self-government, as well as the ability of business corporations to generate and maintain the rules of their own architecture and management. At the same time, corporations are included in different domains of social exchanges, far surpassing organizational fields and economic markets. There are a lot of elements in these domains: formal and informal rules, corporate charters, social norms, political leadership, moral and other values that even the most powerful BC want to demonstrate.
A number of scientists (A. Shleifer, his supporters) have shown that stock markets contribute to the high results of BC activities, the dissemination of information about them. In this situation, adequate corporate law is required to protect the interests of shareholders -systems of general (not civil) law that restrict any control by corporations for the development of stock markets. Another part (M. Rowe, R. Rajan, L. Zingales) believes that institutions are more important than corporate law. These institutions should include: a) protection of property rights; b) state policy.
The status right expressed in legislative acts is provided by the policy of the state. Business corporations are important political actors involved in lobbying, sometimes in bribery, support of political companies, and political decision-making. Therefore, answers to the following questions are important: how justified is the approach to analyzing the relations of politics (status law) with corporations and stock markets; is it real that there are no significant relationships between institutional forms of corporate governance at the highest level and political leadership?
BC, active participants in the company's activities, strive to improve their own reputation and image in society through the protection of ecology, the environment, business and natural environment, the creation of adequate legal conditions and regulatory instruments. If earlier M. Friedman believed that BC should not engage in social charity, because their main goal is to create and provide wealth to shareholders, then later other scientists gave a positive assessment of corporate donations for the benefit of society. Today BC are not only economic, but also political and social entities. Political and social factors play an important role in shaping the structure and behavior of the BC, having a strong impact on the structure of society and state policy. D. North wrote [3]: "The environment that surrounds a person - the choice of rules, norms, conventions and ways of behavior created by man and determining the structure of relations between people - is divided by specialists in social science into various segments studied by such sciences as economics, political science, sociology. But the constructions of human consciousness that we need in order to comprehend the environment do not coincide with these artificial categories. Our analytical framework must integrate the results of these artificially separated disciplines if we want to understand the process of change. Moreover, we must understand what deep force controls the constructions that consciousness generates. Why are there rules, norms, conventions and ways of behavior? What makes consciousness structure human relationships in this way?".
The neoclassical economic approach is based on methodological individualism, while the main attention of political scientists is focused on power, and sociologists - on primary categories (norms, values, meanings, meanings). M. Aoki in [4], an integrated structure of the study of organizational, economic, social and political institutions is given, the leading role of BC in relationships with the external environment. The solution to this problem is based on game theory and its language. BC members can consider the evolution of organizational frames and the rules of the game. The interaction of CG and corporations with each other and with external parties in the field of politics and social life provides them with mutually beneficial positions, and the roles they play determine emotions, intangible factors, positions, sympathies in society, taking them into account in the games of agents and in the interactions of BC.
References
1. Aumann R.J. and Branderburger A. Epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium // Econometrika, 1995, # 63. P. 1161-1180.
2. Sugden R. The logicof ream reasoning // Philosophical Exploration. 2003< # 6. P.165-181.
3. North D.C. Understanding the Process jf Economic Change. Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press, 2005.
4. Aoki M. Corporations in conditions of growing diversity: cognition, leadership and institutions. M.: Publishing House of the Gaidar Institute. 2015. 368 p.
5. Arsenyev Yu.N., Davydova T.Yu. Culture, religion, business, politics, law, management: models of description, means of implementation Moscow-Tula: TulSU Publishing House, 2021. 364 p.
