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Facts and theories as elements of natural sciences and humanities
Section 13. Philosophy
Chernyakova Natalia Stepanovna, Herzen State Pedagogical University of Russia, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Northern People Institute E-mail: Cherns2011@yandex.ru
Facts and theories as elements of natural sciences and humanities
Abstract: Facts are considered in the article as independent, undeduced basis of the theory, which, in its tern, is understood as knowledge of the objects of reality that are not created by the subjects of culture and the essence of which is hidden from direct perception of the knowing subject.
Keywords: fact, theory, scientific knowledge, natural sciences, humanities.
Studies of the socio-cultural determination of scientific knowledge have led not only to rethinking of the methodological foundations of natural sciences and to a deeper understanding of the nature of science as a cultural phenomenon, but to a "dangerous convergence" between humanitarian and scientific knowledge also. The desire of humanitarians to prove the scientific status of their researches by the cost of losing the specificity of humanitarian cognition, on the one hand, and the willingness of scientists and meth-odologists of science to rethink the fundamental concepts of scientific knowledge, in particular — the concepts of "fact" and "theory", in the postmodern humanitarian context — on the other, can be considered as "dangerous" to both forms of knowledge. In any case, some aspects ofunderstanding facts and theories as the elements of scientific knowledge need to be clarified.
As a rule, it is emphasized that a fact is not a sense perception only (i. e. is not a displacement of the instrument pointer visible by scientist); that a fact is not accidental empirical data (i. e. is not just the decoded information of oscillograms expressed in the language of science); that a fact is not a statistical summary of empirical data, but a statistical summary with statistical interpretation [7, 178]. Saying that facts cannot be reduced to sense data, researchers rightly highlight the linguistic determination of protocol sentences, which are formulated with the use of well-defined terms of scientific language. However, scientific language contains in itself the possibility of any theoretical interpretation of the essence of the studied object. So, what is needed to be emphasized really is the difference of science from any other kind of cognitive activity.
Only science requires for its implementation a special practical activity — observations and experiments that allow scientists to record in scientific language those features of the studied object, which became apparent in the process of direct sensory contact with it. The very essence of fact as a form of scientific knowledge is that it contains information about sensually perceived characteristics of the studied object obtained in the process of observations and experiments. Just this information is the meaning of protocol sentences, which express the results ofpractical (material) interaction with the objective reality.
Since facts are independent, non-theoretical, undeduced basis of the theory, the function of which is the statement of the objective existence of certain characteristics (parameters, variables) of the studied object, facts cannot include a theoretical interpretation.
On the contrary, it is possible to say: the greater a portion of interpretation — the lower a portion of factuality is in the content of protocol sentences. Therefore, at the empirical level of the study every effort should be made to reduce the amount of interpretation in protocol sentences and statistical summaries of empirical data. Various methods of empirical investigation and gathering facts are developed in order to gain this purpose.
Modern methodology of the empirical research takes into account that measurement as an essential element of scientific experimental practice is a collection of special techniques, predetermining specific procedures of selection and allocation of the measured parameters of the object, the establishment of measurement units, definition of conditions and ways of implementation of the measuring procedures, etc. However, the assertion that scientific facts are constructions that get their status only in some theoretical context or that proven mathematical statement should be considered as a fact also, does not reflect the essence of a fact as the form of scientific knowledge [3].
Understanding that fact is knowledge about that and only that, which is given in sense perception, is of particular importance in the humanitarian knowledge [5]. The fundamental difference between natural sciences and humanities is that an ideal content of human activity that is the object of humanitarian studies is available for study only in material forms of its embodiment and can be revealed only in the process of interpretation of relevant material carriers. It means that protocol sentences and statistical summaries in humanitarian cognition can relate only to the material carriers, but not to the ideal content of products of socio-cultural activity. Attempts to present interpretations of an ideal content of various sources as facts lead to the distortion of the essence not only of fact as the form of scientific knowledge, but of the specificity of humanitarian cognition as well. It is delusion to think that there are some "specific facts" in humanities, which include evaluations, opinions, predilections, and so on of the knowing subject [2; 4], because any statement, the terms of which do not have sensually perceivable referents, just is not a factual statement.
As a special form of knowledge scientific theory arises because there are such levels of essence of the studied objects of reality that cannot be known through direct sense perceptible contact with them in the process of observations, descriptions, measurements, classifications, and any other methods of empirical
Section 13. Philosophy
studies [1; 6; 8]. In order to understand causal relationships at this level of essence, which is inaccessible for sense perception, a special — theoretical — means are required: ideal objects, theoretical schemes, thought experiments, etc. These means allow scientists to create an ideal, hypothetical model of the studied object, on the base of which, in turn, it is possible to carry out a particular kind of scientific practice — experiments, to interpret existing empirical data and to search for new data.
Theory is the invention of philosophy and natural sciences dealing with natural and social objects, which are independent of human will and activities in principle. Since the basis of the existence of these objects is unknown and cannot be known empirically, the knowing subject has to invent, to design a special — theoretical means of knowledge. The emergence of the theory in natural science and humanitarian knowledge is the result of creative, constructive activity of the knowing subject, because there is no methodological algorithm that allows deducing the original principles of the theory from aggregate of empirical data. In this sense, any hypothesis/theory is an ideal interpretation of facts.
Whatever kind of characteristics of a scientific theory researchers would single out, the chief among them is a consistency ("coherence") of the theory, deducibility of all its claims from a few source principles. This attribute expresses the very essence of the theory as a form of knowledge: an attempt of a knowing subject to penetrate in the essence, in the basis of existence of a studied object that allows explaining (derive) phenomenon observable at the empirical level of scientific research. Not being a logical consequence of the available empirical data, scientific theory gives the possibility not only to formulate the laws underlying these data, but to predict also those data that scientists will be able to produce in experimental practice many years later perhaps.
The functional significance of empirical level of knowledge is not in its allowing scientists to derive a theory by inductive generalization, but in its providing an independent of theory, underived basis of facts, without the conformity with which no any scientific hypothesis can obtain the status of the theory. The independence of studied obj ect from the adopted conceptual scheme appears in the possibility to describe any experiment and obtained empirical data in terms "neutral" in relation to this conceptual scheme. In the simplest case, such a description can be done in everyday language. If the invariant set of empirical data does not exist, it is meaningless to say that we have one and the same object or a fragment of reality.
The fundamental difference between humanities and natural sciences is that the objects of humanities are not only objective socio-cultural reality, but the products of human activity as well. The basis of existence of socio-cultural reality as a form of Being, like the basis of existence of nature, does not depend on the will and
desire of man as the subject of socio-cultural activities and cognition. Therefore, it is necessary to create theoretical models of society and culture, which are giving the opportunity to penetrate the essence of socio-cultural reality that is hidden from direct perception.
However, the basis of existence of the products of human activities is in the human activity itself. These products (results) exist only because such is the will of cultural subject as their creator (author, producer). If the will of subject creating a material product is significantly restricted by the laws of nature, the will of subject creating a spiritual product is limited only in the selection of material carrier, but not in the producing of an ideal content, which may be contrary to any laws of nature.
Since theory as the form of knowledge arises and exists only because the basis of the existence of certain objects does not depend on a person and is not known to the knowing subject, it is obvious that theory of culture as a particular reality is possible, but theory of a museum or literature is impossible. Subjects of culture may create any museum and any books, guided exclusively by their own views about these products of human activity and introducing a variety of reasons for their existence.
Identification of scientific theory with any combination of more or less consistent reasoning about the object of knowledge has made possible the introduction in the postmodern humanitarian discourse of the term "narrative theory", which contradicts the original meaning and functional value of theory in the structure of knowledge. That, which humanitarians call by such terms as "muse-ology", "musicology", "narratology" etc., is literally "the word" (story, narrative) describing a history of various products of human activity or generalizing experience of their creation, but not a theory.
Theory as a form of mental activity is neither a narrative, nor a description of the sense perceptible existence of the object, but the ideal form of penetration into the essence that is hidden from direct perception not only in everyday practice, but even in a special empirical interaction with cognitive reality. As a necessary element of natural sciences and humanitarian knowledge the theory arises only when the object of knowledge is not created by man as a subject of culture and the basis of its existence is not known to the knowing subject.
As to the facts as the element of natural sciences and humanities, it ought to be emphasized that finding of facts is a practice not of talking, but of material interaction with studied object, the result of which is not a mere linguistic introduction of terms, but a sense perceptible verification of the contact with objective reality. Any interpretation, the terms of which do not have sense perceptible referents, is a structural element not of a fact, but of a hypothesis/theory. Fact as undeduced knowledge always refers to the practical verification. Fact can be installed, updated or refuted only as a result of practical contact with the studied object.
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