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the region and neutralize the actions of ideologists and leaders of Islamic radicalism.
"Voprosy natsionalnykh i federativnykh otnoshenii," Moscow, 2013, issue 3 (22).
A. Adiev,
Ph.D. (Political sciences), R. Abakarov,
Ph.D. (Philosophy), Regional Centre for Ethno-political Studies DSC RAS, Makhachkala ETHNO-POLITICAL AND CONFESSIONAL PROCESSES IN MODERN DAGHESTAN (Conclusion)
The notion "land conflict" was introduced into the discourse of All-Russia scientific-practical conference on "Actual problems of counteraction to national and political extremism" in 2008. This concept denotes different territorial and land disputes. Participation of village community in such disputes lends a political aspect to conflict, as it can act on behalf of an ethnic group.
The main area of land conflicts in Daghestan are plains, foothills and coastal districts of the country. There are several forms of contradictions, contributing to the development of interethnic conflicts. First, the contradiction between the indigenous population of lowland and steppe districts and highlanders, concerning winter pastures. Secondly, the confrontation between "local" people and "newcomers" about construction of housing and countryside farming. Thirdly, the illegal sale of municipal land to local officials, running counter to the interests of residents of settlements.
Another variety of land conflicts is an uncompleted land reform that is beneficial to the district authorities, selling or renting agricultural
land to their advantage on long-term lease. The administration of rural settlements had to complete registration of plots of land. Thus, property rights would have been protected legally, and non-interference of the heads of district administrations in the economic activities and land policy in rural settlements would have been guaranteed. However, land is administered by district, but not rural settlement authorities. The policy of the regional authorities is encouraged by the republican government. The republican authorities report to the Federal Center about attracting investments. Large agricultural firms are formally involved in agricultural investment projects, most of which remain unfulfilled. Work is carried out only to persuade the Federal Center of the need of the state to co-finance agricultural projects. Subsequently, the allocated funds are redistributed between the participants. One of the outcomes of such land policy is extrusion of the rural population. Unemployed villagers have to join the ranks of migrant workers, leaving for other regions.
According to experts, land and ethnic conflicts in Daghestan are a long-term destabilizing factor in the region. Institutional changes are necessary to overcome it.
However, researchers hold two diametrically opposite views on solution of the problem. As a rule, ethnicity affects the positions of scientists: highlanders believe that there is one country of Daghestan without ethnic lands, but lowlanders adhere to the concept of ethnic lands as an integral part of the environment of their ethnic group. The lowland peoples of Daghestan believe that immigrants do not consider the land as an agricultural resource, but as an object of territorial acquisition. Some researchers are of compromise opinion, recognizing the existence of land in rural communities, but not as ethnic in the broad sense. Historically, multi-ethnic people settled in Daghestan, that is why land is regarded as an ethnic property. Land problems are
politicized on the ethnic basis, not only in Daghestan, but throughout the North Caucasus.
Thus, it is the land conflicts that is a major risk factor in the ethno-political situation in Daghestan.
Confessional situation:
The politicization of Islam
The role of the Islamic factor in the post-Soviet period has constantly been growing in the region. Analyzing the problems associated with confessional contradictions and religious and political extremism, researchers use the following keywords: fundamentalism, religious and political extremism, Wahhabism and Salafism. Today the concept of Wahhabism is used much less. The concept of Salafism has become more common. The Salafists are divided into moderate and radical, who organized an armed underground. The latter mentioned is referred to as a forest armed underground. The actualization of religious issues began in the mid-1980s, when Wahhabi enclaves appeared in a number of mountain districts. These enclaves continued to grow and to move away from the cultural and legal environment of the Russian state up to the invasion by international terrorists from Chechnya. The consolidation of the multinational Daghestani people around the Russian army in the face of a common enemy, both external (international terrorists) and internal (Daghestani militants), has taken place as a result of this invasion.
A decade later the situation has changed, so that the Chechen Republic has appeared as a region of stability and prosperity in comparison with Daghestan, which has turned into the most unstable region of the country.
Today Wahhabi communities (experts refer to them as Salafi) are present in Daghestani towns and in almost every rural district of the
country. Some of them carry on an underground armed struggle against the Russian state, primarily against law-enforcement agencies, committing terrorist acts.
The broad dissemination of ideas of Salafism has led to a split within the confession itself between the Sufis and Salafis. The conflict is manifested not only in competing to preach "true" Islam, or accusing of paganism and apostasy, but even in murdering imams and other members of the clergy, both the Sufis and Salafis.
An analysis of the current situation shows that Wahhabism spread exclusively among uneducated young people has become the country's serious long-term factor. Extremism among Muslims has roots in their dissatisfaction with corruption among the local authorities. Therefore, one of the primary tasks of the state is the fight against corruption, as well as a sound long-term policy toward young people.
Currently, there are 2,050 mosques and 327 prayer houses, 298 Islamic educational institutions - 15 universities, 82 madrasahs, and 201 schools at mosques in the Republic of Daghestan. The most active religious organizations that play a significant role in the political life of modern Daghestan are the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Daghestan (SAMD) and the Association of Ahl al-Sunnah scholars in Daghestan.
Initially, competition within the Sunni currents of Islam was based on the ethno-confessional principle. SAMD traditionally headed by representatives of the Avar ethnic group has been criticized by religious leaders of other nationalities which led to the creation of Muftiats on a national basis in the territory of Daghestan in the first half of the 1990s.
Contradictions between the supporters of traditional Sufism and fundamentalist Salafism are a major problem in Islamic Daghestan.
The complete eradication of Salafist ideas in Daghestan was originally one of the main tasks of SAMD. A chronicle of confrontation between the two organizations contains dozens of killed religious leaders on both sides. It was obvious that religious radicalization escalated by 2010, and SAMD has initiated the beginning of a peaceful dialogue with Salafis. Salafi followers have founded the "Association of Ahl al-Sunnah scholars in Daghestan", the vigorous activity of which is noticeable in the public and religious life of the republic.
The growing influence of the Salafi community has forced the authorities of Daghestan and SAMD to reckon with it. The increased pressure on the secular aspect of public life, as well as a split in the Salafi community have been a consequence of such policy. The armed underground of the Salafists has accused the moderate Salafis of flirting with the state and has not taken any forms of interaction and compromises with the secular authorities. The moderate Salafis have lost influence on the supporters of religious and political extremism and terrorism.
Confrontation and tension between Sufis and Salafis increase in the relationship between the secular and clerical sections of Daghestani society. It is expressed in an effort of Islamic religious organizations (both Sufis and Salafis) to increase their influence on the political, educational, media and other sections of society in Daghestan. The ideal for which both moderate and radical Muslims are striving is to build a society on religious model.
Obviously, there are two sets of basic problems in Daghestan for a long time: ethnic and political conflicts and inter-confessional problems among the Muslim population of the republic split into two irreconcilable camps.
"Nauchnaya mysl Kavkaza," Rostov-on-Don, 2013, N 4, pp. 137-144.
