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Suleimanov R. 2014. Dlya vahhabitov net granits vnutri strany. [There are no borders in the country for the Wahhabis.] News Agency of Bashmedia. Access: http://bashmedia.info/video/dlya_vahhabitov_net_granic_vnutri_strany/ Metropolitan Hilarion (Alfeyev). 2011. Problema religioznoi neterpimosti. Chto my mozhem sdelat vmeste? [The problem of religious intolerance. What can we do together? ]Tekst vystupleniya na konferentsii "Khristiansko-iudeo-musulmansky mezhkonfessionalny dialog." Budapest, June 2, 2011 Access: http: // hilarion.ru/ The official portal of the Presidential Administration of the Republic of Tatarstan. 2013 December 19. Access: http: //prav.tatar.ru/rus/index.htm/news/252874.html Executive Order on Russia's National Policy Strategy through to 2025 // Legal information portal "Guarant". Access: http://base.garant.ru/
Renkova T. 2014. Ros.Biznes.Konsalting. Access: http://rt.rbc.ru/tatarstan_ topnews/15/05/2014/924015.shtml
"Vlast", Moscow, 2014, No 8, pp. 76-83.
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V. Avksentyev,
Political analyst (Rostov-on-Don)
V. Vasilchenko,
Political analyst (Stavropol)
ETHNIC ELITES AND ETHNOCRACIES
OF THE NORTH CAUCASUS:
INTERACTION WITH INSTITUTIONS
OF MODERN SOCIETY
At present Russia is living through a deep social, political and cultural transformation, which can have a decisive influence on its entire future history. One of the factors supporting disintegration tendencies and contributing to the functioning of Russian society as a state of crisis is ethnic tension. Periodic conflicts caused by rivalry for access to status and resources, in which republican elites have been drawn, street violence of ethnic origin, etc. are a reflection of the acute character of interethnic relations.
Such circumstances, which have emerged in the epoch of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, serve as one of the main reasons for the efforts of the authorities to maintain social peace and accord in the country, but they hamper the implementation of the urgent tasks of modernization.
The titular ethnos (nation) is a notion inherent in Russian social science and social practice, it fixes coincidence between the title of an ethnos and a given territorial-state unit (Kalmyks in Kalmykia, Tatars in Tatarstan, etc.). Despite the fact that the titular ethnos is not necessarily the autochthonous ethnos on the given territory or ethnic majority, this phenomenon of titular ethnos has been, and is used now, for substantiating and bolstering up advantages, especially in the political sphere by the ethnic principle. Although the concept of "titular ethnos" can be used to denote any people whose name coincides with the name of the state (Portuguese, Spaniards, Italians, and others), in practice this term is used to define ethnopolitical processes in Russia, in the post-Soviet area, sometimes in China, and it refers not to the entire state, but to its separate parts having ethnic names. The question arises from time to time as to correctness of the titular name of the Russian people and proposals are put forward - from the constitutional confirmation of their titular character to the creation of the "Russian Republic" within the framework of the Russian Federation.
Thus, the original development of Russia at the present stage is also distinguished by profound social instability connected with several directly opposite processes. The first is civil consolidation and cultural integration of society, the second is a multicultural "disintegration" of the Russian people who have not been completely consolidated and experience centrifugal pressure on the part of ethnic structures.
It should be noted that the forms of expressing interethnic tension in Russian society have changed profoundly recently. The 1990s were
characterized by the sharp growth of separatist tendencies, and the uplift of ethnic self-consciousness of the peoples of Russia was accompanied by demands to grant them the rights of maximal political self-determination, right up to proclamation of nationhood of one's people, whereas in the early 2000s the theme of secession was pushed to the background. This was due to the resolute and consistent policy of the post-Yeltsin political elite of the state. Using both political and forcible means the authorities either cut short separatist attempts, or achieved platonization of claims for sovereignty of regional leaders for the parts of the Federation headed by them.
However, at the beginning of the first presidential term of office of V. Putin another negative tendency became quite pronounced, namely, a tendency for fragmentation of the uniform Russian political and legal area. Seats of local power came into being in regions which did not display a desire to maintain closer relation with the federal center and, on the contrary, functioned largely autonomously. These processes of degradation of managerial ties and subordination tended to grow, which violated the necessary balance in the political system. This problem was described in special literature in the following way: "Previously the main worry was caused by separatist tendencies in republics, whereas now it is caused by the growing trends toward autarchy in Russian regions, which became a cause for alarm among analysts and political elites. Previously, a "sound dose" of decentralization was regarded as an important element of political democratization, taking into account the experience of the many-year tradition of the hyper-centralization of state power, whereas now Russia faced the unmanageable process of the "splintering" of central power. The striking weakness of the Russian state, as well as instability and unpredictability in the process of adopting decisions, primarily, form the basis of the growing self-assurance of regional elites and encourage
regions to act independently, often throwing direct challenge to central power. This tendency causes apprehensions that Russia may in the future turn from federation into confederation, and, if the worst come to the worst, may be thrown back to the period of medieval chaos and conflicts, to the epoch of "apanage principalities."1
On the whole, it can be noted that this catastrophic forecast has not been justified. The complex of measures undertaken in the period of Putin's presidency to strengthen "the vertical of power", despite doubts and criticism voiced by numerous experts so often, produced definitely positive results, including in the sphere of the nationalities question, and "curbed the appetites" of the regional establishment. L. Smirnyagin justly points to the fact that "when the new President of the country came to power, rapid centralization of management began in Russia, and it took place within the bounds of strict symmetry. Certain changes were also introduced in the electoral system.2
At the same time, despite these changes there are still risks connected with the weak functioning and bad quality of managerial mechanism. And it is too early to talk of harmonization of interethnic relations. The problem is that "different ethnopolitical and economic situations and also different systems and styles of management have taken shape in parts of the Federation."3 In most republics, due to various reasons (historical, demographic, social, ethnocultural, and even religious) representatives of the "titular" nation cannot be regarded ruling, irrespective of whether they constitute a minority or majority (even the biggest ethnic group). The leadership of these republics and their ruling bodies, including the elected ones, is not of a mono-ethnic character. However, as emphasized by V. Tishkov in 2001, in certain North Caucasian republics "pseudo-federalism" has acquired some features of "ethno-clan regimes"4. In North Caucasian republics the notions of regional and ethnic elites coincide.
Ethnic elites are part of the political class formed on the ethnic principle. Ethnic elites include representatives of the titular nation The ideological prerequisite of the formation of ethnic elites is nationalism, ethnicity and ethnocentrism, which explain why political elites are formed not on a party or professional basis, but on the ethnic principle. The existence of ethnic elites is a sign of high politicization of ethnicity, when it is a source of the formation of political institutions, as well as political rights and privileges. The activity of ethnic elites should be assessed on the basis of whether they contribute to the development of their regions and whether they are really interested in the stabilization of the socio-political situation. However, in the conditions of growing destabilization and the growing threat to their status, ethnic elites may, willy-nilly, use the mechanism of ethnopolitical mobilization and fan ethnic conflicts.
The struggle between elites is a universal characteristic feature of all societies. One of the instruments of this struggle is the expulsion of rivals by one or another criterion, among which ethnic affiliation holds a prominent place. The struggle of elites leads to the phenomenon called "playing the national card." In this context ethnic affiliation of a participant in this struggle turns into either a great advantage ("ours") or a great drawback ("alien").5 In the conditions of the North Caucasus the political mobilization of the population has been carried on by elites on the ethnic basis, which contributed to confrontations between elites or conflicts between clans. The interference of the federal authorities in these conflicts concerned only the elimination or softening of their consequences. However, the factors conducive to the exacerbation of the nationalities problem and interethnic contradictions remained virtually untouched.
During the past years the situation has not changed for the better. The North Caucasian region continues to be a zone of high ethnic
tension, and corruption and nepotism continue to thrive in the local bodies of power. The ethnocratic tendencies which have taken shape in North Caucasian republics have not only been eliminated, but, on the contrary, have strengthened. In certain republics "typical dictatorial regimes characteristic of Central Asia rather than Eastern Europe are thriving. Instruments of power in the region lose their functions, and terrorism is increasing as a result of all these processes.6
Thus, interaction between the federal center and regional elites in the North Caucasus leaves much to be desired. This concerns specific features of local ethnocracies and the formation of ethnic elites, because it is they that are responsible for the awakening of emotionality and politicization of the national sentiments of popular masses.
It should be noted that inasmuch as the concepts of ethnocracy and ethnic elite are closely connected, the genesis of ethnocracy as a form of political rule cannot be defined without analyzing the specific features of recruiting ethnic elites. Ethnocracy has never been born below or developed by itself; it is a product of ethnic elites. The latter are traditionally regarded by political science as stable groups having access to power resources and the opportunity to use them as they think fit.
Sociologies, political analysts, ethnologists, etc. have time and again tried to explain the social nature of North Caucasian societies and their relations with the surrounding world. However, satisfactory answers to many questions have not been obtained so far. Difficulties in the interpretation of local realities have cropped up largely due to the fact that mountain societies are organized quite differently than social structures within "big" Russia.
Traditionalism as a driving force of cultural life, domination of tribalism in politics, and priority of concrete rules and practices, but not
abstract, formal-legal reasons and standards are often incomprehensible for many theorists of modern society.
The main obstacle for the creation of a coherent concept of stability of North Caucasian ethnocracies is the absence of an adequate analytical scheme with the help of which it could be possible to comprehend properly the events taking place in the region. Even those researchers who take the Caucasus as the main subject of their work, but not as an appendage to the history of Russia, often find themselves in a difficult position as soon as they touch on the fundamental problems of its historical development. The bulk of special literature devoted to the North Caucasus is devoted to very narrow problems and is not oriented to the modern methods used by social sciences. It is confined to describing phenomena and enumerating facts.
This narrow specialization is unproductive, inasmuch as the study of regional ethnocracies, including in the North Caucasus, could contribute to a more profound interpretation of considerable number of major questions of general sociological and political character. This article is an attempt to deal with the problem using institutional development models of traditional society to explain its political originality.
Experts on the North Caucasus are often engaged in creating generalized concepts, but sometimes pay little attention to details. In order to analyze and explain the historical process in the region it is necessary to test theoretical models on concrete ethnological material. Such approach will make it possible to better understand and explain political phenomena, besides, it will show how some or other features and standards of social evolution were or will be implemented in social practice.
The North Caucasus is a zone of prolonged interaction of two different cultures having stable ideological concepts and views about
themselves and their neighbors. For over two hundred years mountain societies were fighting the world's biggest country, even having been included in it and having partly accepted its culture, and defended the superiority of their cultural values and way of life. Such ethnocentrism is well-known and there is nothing surprising in it, however, manifestations of ethnic sentiments and self-identity of inhabitants of the North Caucasus are too great and sophisticated.
Recently, attempts have been made to connect the sources of interethnic tension in the Caucasus with the archaic political and legal way of life in the region, and rebirth in a distorted form of traditional practices preventing economic modernization and integration of the Caucasian peoples in Russian society.
According to M. Astvatsaturova, ethnocracies in the North Caucasus have historical roots connected with traditional canons and general laws of North Caucasian peoples. The clan system exists in North Caucasian societies irrespective of political regimes, power doctrines, government policies, or party construction.7
Mountain peoples of the Caucasus have always been distrustful toward all and sundry reforms and innovations. At the same time the North Caucasian ethnic groups have demonstrated throughout their history ability to adapt to changes in difficult, even crisis, circumstances and shown their talent for social creativity and cultural dynamism.
Traditionalist societies have always been striving to establish priority of their culture, religion and the economic and social structure, rejecting other forms of collective life as false or inferior. These societies are directed to reproduction of the already existing social forms, blocking all innovations. However, traditionalist society is always divided into groups - ethnic, confessional, clan, family, etc. The clan structure is a way and means of the functioning of traditional
society, and a manifestation of its social order. Conflicts between separate subgroups are a typical and ordinary phenomenon of traditional society.
The well-known ethnologist V. Bobrovnikov examines Caucasian specificity through the prism of theory of legal pluralism, according to which the state is not the monopolist in the sphere of production of legal standards and rules, and there can be coexistence of various forms, both state and non-state, of systems of norms and regulators. In his view, "transformations" which took place in the region in the course of the past one-and-a-half and two centuries have led either to the strengthening of legal pluralism (in the latter half of the 19th century and early 20th century, as well as in the post-Soviet epoch), or to the formation of hidden poly-legal pattern8.
Despite their autonomous character, the societies of the North Caucasus have maintained constant contacts between themselves and with a more distant social environment. If we examine political entities in the North Caucasus in isolation, it might seem that they emerged and collapsed haphazardly, however, if they are analyzed in the general regional context for a prolonged period, they will reveal a host of striking regularities connected, among other things, with the cycles of power in Russia. For one thing, Shamil's Imamat was an adaptive answer of Caucasian ethnic groups to the military-political challenge of the Russian Empire.
Mountain societies put forward political elites in the crisis conditions, which cement, as it were, political area. At the same time, it should be taken into account that opportunities for reforms exist only within the framework set by the cultural-historical context.
Following the problem of political interaction of Russia with the North Caucasus, we come across a more difficult problem of cultural communication. The significance of events taking place as a result of
the influence of different cultures on one another is often interpreted quite differently. Differences in the picture of the world make their relations especially problematic. In this context it should be noted first of all that mountain societies have shown themselves quite capable to manipulate the Russian system of power, often taking its forms, but rejecting its essence.
One of the means of conservation of Caucasian traditionalism is the form of the state structure of Russia. The asymmetrical forms of relations between the federal center and parts of Russia of different types are a factor of politicization of ethnicity. "True federalism," as the foundation for the exclusive rights of national state units, becomes, apparently, one of the main political problems of today's Russia. The model of federalism functioning in Russia has not contributed to softening ethno-confessional tension in the country and proved unable to create an atmosphere of ethnopolitical consensus in Russian society. Moreover, Russian federalism, mixed as it really is, contains a well-pronounced ethnic dominant engendering a number of political and legal collisions.
Most proposals on reforming Russian federalism were unfeasible and proceeded from the premise that there is no alternative to federalism in Russia.
This thesis has been taken, and is taken now, for granted. Federalism is regarded as something sacral. There can be no talk of any variants of national-territorial organization of the country.
At the same time, relations between the center and regions, including ethnic ones, is a broadly discussed problem. In certain countries (for example, the People's Republic of China), with a view to improving relations between the center and "national" territories, national-territorial autonomies within parts of the country built on territorial principle are created, but not national parts of the federation.
According to the PRC Constitution, a national autonomy is created in districts of compact residence of national minorities. Self-government bodies are organized and autonomous rights are granted. Districts of national autonomy are an inalienable part of the People's Republic of China.
A unitary state with national-territorial autonomies is a stable enough formation guaranteeing the implementation of state power over the entire territory of the country, which deals effectively with separatist tendencies and is able to ensure protection of the rights of national minorities. The autonomy is, as a rule, deprived of most attributes of nationhood, but at the same time it can have certain additional rights.
A specific feature of national-territorial autonomy existing in the People's Republic of China is that it does not have a character of national statehood, but is in its nature an administrative autonomy. For the first time in China's history it gives the center an opportunity to establish control of the state over all national-territorial autonomies, and at the same time to contribute to the development of each one of them. In other words, the institution of national-territorial autonomy helps consolidate the country and become a guarantee of its integrity, as well as ensures state support to national-territorial autonomy.
Of course, the nationalities problem in China cannot be considered completely resolved. Complex problems still remain in Tibet and in Xinjiang-Uighur district. Nevertheless, Chinese experience in solving relations in the interethnic sphere is worthy of study, and its certain aspects may be taken into consideration in elaborating the strategy of nationalities policy in Russia.
It should be noted that Russia has its own experience of the formation of the inner structure of the state through establishing autonomies, and it has positive aspects. The point is to revive on a new
basis the idea of forming autonomies, but with due account of the new experience obtained in the 20th century.
The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) proclaimed federation is a unitary structure with autonomies. In accordance with the Constitution of 1978, it consisted of 16 autonomous republics, five autonomous regions and 10 autonomous okrugs (areas), along with territories, regions and cities of republican subordination.
Many problems encountered by Russian society in the sphere of interethnic relations at the present stage are rooted in the specificity of the state-territorial structure of the Russian Federation. Ethnic federalism, which is actually one of the principles of the state-territorial organization of the Russian state, contributes to the politicization of ethnicity, does not allow the country to extricate itself from the impasse of endless claims of ethnic subjects to one another and to the country's authorities, and keeps ethnic tension at a sufficiently high level.
Reorganization of the federative system on the administrative-territorial basis is hardly feasible now due to the opposition of ethnic elites and the inadequacy of the legal backing of such reform. The means to solve the nationalities question should be sought in a cautious transition on to the path of a unitary state with national-territorial autonomies.
The change of the status of ethnic entities can be regarded as the first step in abandoning politicized ethnicity in Russia. There are signs that the Russian political elite at present is gradually ceasing to interpret federalism as a universal means to resolve interethnic problems.
Notes
G. Lapidus. Asimmetrichny federalism i gosudarstvennoye stroitelstvo v Rossii // Federalism v Rossii. - Kazan, Institute of History, Tatarstan Academy of Sciences. 2001, pp. 288-289.
A. Smirnyagin. Aktualna li problema asimmetrii v sovremennoi Rossii? // Federalism i etnicheskoye raznoobraziye v Rossii. Moscow. Rossiiskaya politicheskaya entsiklopediya. 2010, pp. 53-54.
V. Tishkov. Pro et Contra etnicheskogo federalizma v Rossii // Federalism v Rossii. Kazan, Institute of History, Tatarstan Academy of Sciences, 2001, p. 30. Ibid. - P. 31.
M. Belousov. Etnicheskiye elity Severnogo Kavkaza: Opyt sotsiologicheskogo analiza. Volgograd, 2001, p. 54.
V. Degoyev, R. Ibragimov. Severny Kavkaz: Postsovetskiye itogi kak rukovdstvo k deistviyu ili povestka dnya na vchera. Moscow, Imperium-XXI vek, 2006, p. 14. M. Astvatsaturova. Expertnoye intervyu // Etnokratii na Yuge Rossii v ekspertnom izmerenii. Rostov-on-Don, 2007, p. 133.
V. Bobrovnikov. Musulmane Severnogo Kavkaza: Obychai, pravo, nasiliye: Ocherki po instorii i etnografii prava Nagornogo Dagestana. - Moscow, 2002, p. 106.
"Elitologiya Rossii: Sovremennoye sostoyaniye i perspektivy razvitiya," Rostov-on-don, 2013, vol. 1, pp. 401-417.
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Alexander Knyazev,
Political analyst
CENTRAL ASIA AFTER MAIDAN
The Crimean-Ukrainian crisis has ended the transition period in the global system of international relations and marked the beginning of a new epoch, whose distinguishing feature is the multipolar structure of the modern world. Experts are now convinced of the Ukrainian events having an extraordinary influence on Central Asia and Kazakhstan in the not-so-distant future.
