CC BY
21
УДК 338.242, 338.24.01 JEL C51, D02, O33
N. I. Suslov
Novosibirsk State University 2 Pirogov Str., Novosibirsk, 630090, Russian Federation
Institute ofEconomics and Industrial Engineering of Siberian Branch ofRussian Academy of Sciences 17 Lavrentiev Ave., Novosibirsk, 630090, Russian Federation
nsus@ieie.nsc.ru
ENERGY SAVING INCENTIVES AND INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT: A CROSS COUNTRY ANALYSIS * PART 1
We suggest as a hypothesis that the main reason why energy efficiency of production in Russia is substantially lower than in developed economies is the weakness of energy saving incentives brought about by shortcomings of institutional system. To demonstrate this we present a theoretical model of energy consuming economic sector and show that the higher is transaction costs caused by facing firms the lower is a probability that any energy saving measures would be undertaken as a respond to a energy price rise. We included into regressions for energy intensity coefficients for 77 World economies constructed for a period of the middle of the previous decade institutional variables which made it possible to estimate demand for energy price elasticities differentiated by individual economies. Average of these indices for CIS economies (by its absolute values) showed itself to be almost four times lower than that for OECD countries.
Keywords: energy intensity, energy conservation, World economies, price elasticity, institutions, Cournot competition.
Introduction
In many countries, during the last decades of the previous century, especially following the energy crisis of 1970s, there was a pronounced declining trend in energy intensity of production. Thus, in the OECD countries (without new members) the average energy intensity reduction from 1973 to 2000 exceeded 15 %. For such countries as Denmark, Germany, United Kingdom, USA, and Ireland the decrease was about 40 %. At the same time, in transition countries energy consumption per unit of production stays essentially higher and exceeds several fold the levels of the West European countries and Japan. In our opinion, this circumstance could hinder further economic growth of these countries.
For instance, RF energy intensity of production is higher than in Canada by 1/3, it is two times greater than in USA, Sweden and Finland, and exceeds the level of most countries of Western Europe and Japan - 3-4 times. The 2-fold production growth targeted by the Russian Government
* Работа выполнена в рамках программы 1Х.86.1 «Теоретические, методологические и прикладные исследования проблем стратегического развития на микро- и мезоуровнях экономических систем плана НИР ИЭОПП СО РАН, основные задания 2014 г.
Suslov N. I. Energy Saving Incentives and Institutional Environment: A Cross Country Analysis. Part 1 // Вестн. Но-восиб. гос. ун-та. Серия: Социально-экономические науки. 2014. Т. 14, вып. 2. С. 61-70.
ISSN 1818-7862. Вестник НГУ. Серия: Социально-экономические науки. 2014. Том 14, выпуск 2 © N. I. Suslov, 2014
document «Long run forecast of RF socio-economic development for the period up to 2030» 1 is impossible without a drastic increase in the energy consumption efficiency. Such an increase was proposed by one of the «Forecast» sections, however, such rates are hardly attainable. Thus, it was projected that in 20 years energy use per unit of GDP would reduce more than by half and in addition, after 2010 the annual reduction rate of energy intensity reduction will exceed 5 %. Such a task seems to be unprecedented on a historical scale. Thus, it is quite urgent to identify the main sources and means of energy conservation feasible for the transitional countries including Russia.
This paper explains factors defining higher energy intensity of production in the former socialist countries as compared to the market economies. We confirm that more severe climatic conditions in most of the post-socialist countries can partially account for this. However, we believe that the «socialist hangover» may also be largely responsible for higher energy intensity in these counties. Namely, we show that in the economies with strong economic institutions, economic agents have higher incentives to implement energy conservation measures than in the countries with weaker institutional environment. For this purpose, we, first, specify transaction cost of a firm as a total cost of an economic agent on interaction with all his partners [1]. In such a view it includes some explicit fraction which could be easily taken into account when calculating the total project cost, and a certain implicit fraction being a sum of both monetary but unofficial transaction cost (e.g. bribes) and non-monetary component, such as «efforts». By our proposition if economic institutions are bad and by this reason the markets are ineffective the total transaction cost could be high especially due to its implicit fraction. Further we propose a theoretical model of a representative economic sector including a certain number of energy consuming firms, which are included in an energy conservation project under the condition of uncertain transaction cost associated with implementation of this project. Each firm can face both a high transaction cost (because implicit fraction of transaction cost is large), and a low transaction cost (when it is low). A high transaction cost completely stops the project because the firm perceives it difficult to realize the project, i.e. the total cost on its implementation is too high. But low transaction cost does not affect the behavior of the firms. We show that the inadequate institutional environment resulting in a high probability for a firm to be faced with adverse external conditions resulting in the high transaction cost brings about the lack of incentives. Thus, under such a condition the substitution effect of energy price change is weaker than in a tough market environment.
Further we present a macroeconomic econometric model, which along with the climate and real energy price variables includes an interaction term being a product of a price variable multiplied by an index of institutional strength. This model makes it possible to calculate energy price elasticity of energy intensity of production being a value similar to price elasticity of conditional demand for energy. We tested various versions of interaction terms using different institutional indices and found out the key role of the conditions defining relations between business and bureaucracy: two institutional variables from their common list provided in [2] both of them depicting the quality of these relations - Government Effectiveness and Control of Corruption - are of high significance. We present coefficients of energy price elasticity of energy intensity of production both by groups of the countries and for each economy from the sample. We show that the average of these coefficients for the CIS group is more than four times lower than that for the OECD economies (by their absolute values); in the East European and Baltic countries these values are also visibly lower than in the developed countries although the difference is not so drastic («only» two times). This fact implies that firms do not have sufficient incentives for energy conservation and, thus, may be an important factor of the higher energy intensity of production.
Analysis is based on 2002-2006 statistical data involving a large country sample, which along with 27 former socialist economies includes the OECD countries and also some states from Asia, Africa and America. We apply both OLS and IVLS estimators, institutional variables being instrumented by the latitude degree variable. The import oil cost per unit of oil is used to instrument energy price variables.
The paper is organized in a following way. In section 2, we present a brief discussion of the energy consumption trends during the last decades of the previous century by separate groups of world
1 Long run forecast of RF socio-economic development for the period up to 2030. RF Ministry of Economic Development. Source: http://www.economy.gov.ru
economies. In section 3, a review of literature on the discussed topic is presented. Section 4 is devoted to the consideration of statistical sources, a theoretical model and specifications estimated. Section 5 considers results of energy intensity estimations of integrated models including interaction terms being calculated using various institutional variables. An influence of unofficial economy on the levels of specific energy consumption is estimated and discussed as well. The conclusion is presented in Section 6.
Energy Intensity Puzzle
Before the energy crisis of 1970s, the main trends in energy consumption especially evident in the countries with average income were increased per capita energy consumption and growing energy intensity. Thus, we observe that the average per capita consumption of commercially produced energy had practically doubled in today's OECD countries from 1960s to 1973, out of which in Japan, Portugal, and Spain this growth was 2.5-3 times, and in Greece the increase was almost 5 times. Accordingly, the energy intensity of the income produced grew too. The average growth index of energy intensity for OECD countries over this period was 120 %.
During the decade following the energy crisis break-up, the energy consumption trends were reversed in most countries. By 1983, the average reduction index of GDP energy intensity for OECD countries was 10 %, and by the end of the century this index dropped by further 4 %. At the same time, however, in such OECD member countries as Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Japan, Great Britain, and USA, the reduction in the GDP energy intensity exceeded 20 % over the first post-crisis decade and 30-40 % - before the end of the century (see Fig. 1). Obviously, such a striking improvement of the energy consumption efficiency in the above-mentioned countries should be attributed not only to the skyrocketing energy prices in the efficient markets but also to the special measures of government policy aimed at better energy conservation.
The available data for the countries with socialist economy show that there too was a certain reduction in the output energy intensity in 1970s and 1980s, although is already universally recognized that the official statistics in socialist countries overestimated the output growth indices, and, consequently, the data on the energy intensity dynamics lack reliability. In the early 1990s when the economic reforms were launched, the GDP energy intensity in transitional economies significantly - as often as not several fold - exceeded the levels of market economies, and the situation has not changed significantly since that time (see Fig. 2). The initial transformation period in former socialist countries was characterized by increasing energy intensity of production resulting from the
Fig. 1. Change in the GDP Energy Intensity in Selected OECD Economies: 2000 to 1973, %
Fig. 2. Energy Intensity of GDP in World Economies and Groups of Economies, USA in 1993 = 100 %
shrinking output. After this, however, in most of the above-mentioned countries energy intensity of production decreased fairly fast, although not everywhere it approached the pre-crisis levels. As was shown in [3], the reduction in the energy intensity of production over the above-named period was little related to the increase in the energy prices, and was rather a «byproduct» of increase in the production and capacity utilization.
Higher energy inputs in former socialist countries may partially be attributed to the inclement climatic conditions: in this part of the East Europe and the Asian part of the former Soviet Union average annual temperatures are significantly lower and the amplitude of seasonal variations is much higher than in, say, Western Europe. However, as our analysis showed [3], this factor fails to account for the entire difference in the levels of energy intensity. This suggests that a significant factor affecting the levels of specific energy consumption is the quality of economic institutions determining the key aspects of economic system performance mechanism. Our hypothesis is that weak institutional development can lower the incentives for economic agent to take energy conservation measures, including the implementation of investment projects aimed at energy saving.
In the later sections, a theoretical model is discussed and tested intended to explain why the increasing energy prices sometimes fail to result in replacement of energy by other factors.
Review of Literature
The well-known approach to treat the relationship between output, energy consumption, and other production factors is based on application of translog cost function [4-6]. It permits, for example, to make long-term estimates of demand for energy price elasticity coefficients. Although this methodology has significant advantages, it is hardly suitable for singularities of the objects considered. Tthe translog cost function approach does not allow one reliably to test the significance of separate factors responsible for individual countries differences and at best can only show their aggregate impact on the energy intensity of production.
Another well known method to measure demand for energy elasticities is based on specifying energy demand functions derived from Koyck distributed lag scheme [7-9]. This approach had an abundant history of application resulted in a broad scope of empirical estimations by the world economies [10-13]. Using lagged demand for energy variables provides for estimations of both short and long run coefficients of income and price elasticity.
At the same time this approach as well as the previous one is rather demanded for statistical data and hardly could be effective for the economies with short time statistical series. In addition a recognition of the importance of the problem of data series stationarity, in our opinion, reduces the importance of econometrical estimates provided within the framework discussed.
For these reasons, we chose a simpler approach, with less stringent requirements to statistics.
Since our analytical interest is to identify the economies' differences we used a cross country model and as fare as our investigation matter is energy consumption efficiency we used as a dependent variable energy consumed in production sphere per a unit of GDP. At the same time we correlate energy use efficiency to institutional conditions in the economies.
During the recent period, the problem of influence of the institutional strength on the economic outcomes attracted special attention of researchers [2; 14-21]. It is proved that there is a strong correlation between the quality of institutions and policies on the one hand, and the per capita income level on the other hand. For transitional economies, variations in the duration of transformation decline period are determined by counties' ability to maintain efficient government institutions and to develop market institutional framework [22-27]. In addition, the strength of the transformation decline is associated with the distortions in the fixed capital, production and the trade patterns «accu-mulated» before the reforms launch [24; 28; 29]. The overriding importance of institutional transformation for bringing countries out of the economic recessions and further developments in the transitional countries demonstrated an urgent need for a special scientific discipline to work out an effective strategy and methods for the market transformation [30; 31]. Fredriksson, Vollebergh, and Dijkgraaf [32] provided a theoretical model of corruption influence on energy efficiency. They found a strong correlation between the corruption variable and energy intensity of production sectors in the OECD economies over the period from 1982 to 1996.
The analysis of correlation between institutional and biogeographical conditions revealed the significance of the latter; therefore some medical and biogeographical determinants may also be used as instrumental variables for the institutional strength indices (for review see [33]). An example of such variables is the country's geographical distance from the equator suggested by Hall and Jones [17]. We use this variable as one of instrumental variables measuring the capacity of regulatory institutions. Other ones used in our work for this purpose are both death rate and infant mortality rate (following [34]).
The distinctive feature of our work is analyzing the influence of climatic conditions on economic outcomes. Here we could refer to the recent publications by Jeffry Sachs [35; 36] who investigated the effects of the mean temperature and some other biogeographical factors on the agricultural production in developing countries.
In the paper presented we focus our analysis on the level of price elasticity of the demand for energy assuming that the higher is its absolute values for a certain economy, the better operates the market price mechanism, since the stronger is the agents' reaction to the price signals. At the same time a question arises to what extent could these values be affected by the government policy measures undertaken within the special energy conservation programs? May be given the weak firms' reaction to the price signals government is able to strengthen energy saving activities? We stand that the government regulation measures are themselves the more effective, the better is the market mechanism because their influence is realized mainly through the strengthening the energy saving incentives. On the other side there was the solid argumentation that in the total volume of energy saved due to its rise in cost just the market price machinery played the dominant role with respect to government policy. So, Sweeney [37, p. 32] summarizing the experiences of economy reaction to the price shocks of 1970-1980s years of the previous century, formulated: «The extent to which government sponsored energy conservation programs or other nonmarket forces have reduced the demand for energy is unknown. However at least 80 percent and probably much more of the demand reductions can be attributed to price and economic activity changes».
Methodology of Research
Data and Variables. We use several samples with sizes determined by the requirement for data homogeneity and by variations in the number of countries, for which a specific type of data is available. Availability of the price statistics especially narrows the number of the countries involved into
the research. Since we are interested in just the long run differences between the economies we employ the cross country analysis rather than the one based on time series. Thus, in order to provide the comparability of indicators treated by countries we use PPP income variable rather than a real one. Analysis of energy intensity time change indices based on the use of real variables was fulfilled as well and showed the results which are qualitatively similar to those discussed in the present paper but quantitatively less conclusive as compared to them [3]. Whereas we focus our analysis on the use of energy as a production factor, we restrict the subject of investigation with only the production sphere and remove the consumption of energy by households from our consideration. Thus, we deal with energy intensity of production and consider the models of firms. The total samples refer to the years of 2002-2006 and includes up to 118 economies and among them - 27 former socialist ones, 26 OECD countries (without new members) and some other economies from Asia, Africa and America as well.
We use the following information:
E - energy consumption in production sphere. This variable is calculated as the total energy supply in a given economy less the consumption of households and non-energy use. The data source is the International Energy Agency (IEA) Database.
e - energy intensity of production calculated as relation of E and GDP PPP. The latter variable is obtained from the World Bank Database - World Development Indicators 2006 CD-ROM.
DISTE - seasonal temperature fluctuation is used calculated as the difference between mean temperature values in January and July for the period of 1961-1990, measured in tenths of degree centigrade - data from Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
INST - common designation for institutional strength indices obtained from Research project «Governance Matters V: Governance Indicators for 1996-2005» available from the World Bank dataset at http://www.worldbank.org, The following variables are included into this database [2; 19] and were tried directly in regressions for the years of 2002-2004:
VA (Voice and Accountability) - measures the extent, to which citizens of a country are able to participate in the election of governments.
PS (Political Instability and Violence) - measures perceptions of the likelihood that the government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional means.
GE (Government Effectiveness) - measures quality of bureaucracy and credibility of the government's commitment.
RQ (Regulatory Quality) - measures the incidence of market unfriendly policies including price controls and inadequate bank supervision.
RL (Rule of Law) - measures the extent, to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society.
CC (Control of Corruption) - measures perceptions of corruption.
pE - end use energy price for industry. It was calculated using statistical data from two sources: 1) IEA database - end-use prices for industry for different energy products; 2) Transition Report, EBRD, 2006 - electricity tariffs in transitional economies. For each energy product a partial price index was calculated as compared to the USA level. Since the above-mentioned databases are not complete, we obtained different numbers of such indices (from 1 to 8) for different countries. Further for each economy aggregate, a price energy index was computed as a geometrical mean of all the partial indices
P - average output price calculated as a relation of nominal GDP in US$ to PPP GDP obtained from the World Bank Database.
The following variables are used as the instrumental ones: oil import cost per unit of oil (IEA data) energy prices, latitude degree variable for institutional indices.
Some additional variables used are introduced further in the respective sections of the paper.
Theoretical Framework: Change of Technology under Cournot Competition
Model of Energy Consuming Sector. As a theoretical framework to construct a specific macroe-conomic demand for energy function for each economy considered we assume a simple multi-sector economic system. For each economy considered m economic sectors are given designated by index i. Their technologies
Q, = F(E,...), i = 1,...,m (1)
are characteristic of the representative firms in the sector are described by CES production functions. In (1) Qi is the output of the sector i, Ei is the energy consumption in this sector. The existence of other production factors is designated by suspension points (...). We assume that sector production functions in all the economies have equal partial elasticities of substitution, though can differ by some other parameters (see below).
Given the equilibrium on competitive markets sector i the demand for energy Ei is obtained:
E =
( P ^
a, • A-" —
v Pe
■ Q,
where a, is the energy factor intensity coefficient, pE and P, are energy and output prices respectively, a, - stands for the partial elasticity of substitution between energy and another factor, p, is the
parameter such that —1— = a ,, and A, - stands for the efficiency coefficient. Now the energy inten-1+ P
sity of the economies as follows:
i=i
f p ^
V
Pe ,
where si is the sector i share in the economy output.
Taking into account climatic differences of the economies. Energy intensity of production in various countries can differ from each other due to climatic conditions. To introduce this factor into the model we consider a variable DISTE being a measure of climate severity: the more severe the climate in a given country is, the higher the variable DISTE.
Further both the intensity parameters of energy factor and the parameters of general efficiency
da
are specified as functions of DISTE: ai=ai(DISTE) and Ai=Ai(DISTE) so that-'--> 0 and
d (DISTE)
dA
-'--< 0, i.e. in the countries with more severe climate, energy and other production red (DISTE)
source intensity of production is objectively higher.
Failures of institutional development and the lack of incentives for energy conservation. In order to include in the model the influence of institutional development on corporate energy conservation incentives and, in turn, on energy intensity levels in different countries, we consider a sector framework of Cournot equilibrium.
The model presented further suggests that under the bad economic institutions firms are faced with high cost of using market mechanism more often than given the sound institutions. We show that this fact undermining firms' incentives to save energy causes the situation that when the energy factor price rises the reduction of the sector output energy intensity (substitution effect) is weaker and its recession (wealth effect) is stronger than under the good institutional environment.
It is assumed that in any production sector (hereinafter omitting sector indices) there are n symmetrical firms holding some degree of market power none of which holds a leading position. Their production functions depend on the energy factor E and some other factors necessary for production process but not for trading and interacting with other companies and organizations within the mechanisms determined by institutional environment. We specify transaction cost of a firm as a total cost of an economic agent on interaction with all his partners [1]. In such a view it includes some explicit fraction which could be easily taken into account when calculating the total project cost, and a certain implicit fraction being a sum of both monetary but unofficial transaction cost (e.g. bribes) and non-monetary component, such as «efforts». By our proposition if economic institutions are bad and by this reason the markets are ineffective the total transaction cost could be high especially due to its implicit fraction. As we attempt to show, even having technological options to substitute more expensive production resources (e.g. energy factor) for cheaper ones, firms may fail to implement the corresponding investment projects fearing high implicit transaction costs of their implementa-
tion. Further we present a sector model describing equilibrium before the rise in the energy price assuming all the firms symmetrical and equilibrium established after the energy price increase allowing for different reactions of the firms.
We predict that the worse the institutions are in a given economy, the lower the probability of any representative firm reacting adequately to the changes in the factor price ratios and, thus, the lower the number of the firms changing the combinations of the production factors is.
n
Let Qi be the output of a sector firm i, so, the total sector output is Y = ^ Qt. The firm i cost
i=1
function C(Qi) = c ■ Qi is identical for all the firms since they are considered symmetrical and if
their economic behaviors do not differ. This is our starting point, though in the case of different reactions of two firms to price change their cost functions change differently as well, thus, in this case they are not identical.
We assume a demand function for the sector output is linear and present it in the inverse form:
P = G - H ■ Y
where P stands for the sector output price G and H denotes positive function parameters. By our proposition this function includes also the competition from the foreign firms. Consider sector Cournot Nash equilibrium before any price shock:
\о G - c
Q 0 = Q0 =
Y0 = n • Q0 = n
H • (n +1) '
G - c
H • (n +1)
p o = G + n • c n +1
These formulas are quite general and derived from the solution of a standard symmetrical Cournot problem. In the next part of our paper we will modify it to take into account a possibility to model impacts of energy price shocks on outputs, price and specific consumption of energy factor given different institutional environment. These differences are incorporated into the model by introducing different probabilities for a firm to face either high or low level transaction cost when it is intending to reduce the energy intensity of its production which is caused by energy price rising. Further we are providing results of our empirical investigation seeking to confirm that in economies with worse institutions firms are less active in their energy saving activities.
References
1. Polterovich V. Institutsional'nye lovushki i economicheskie reform. Ekonomika i matema-ticheskie metody, 1999, vol. 2, p. 1-37 (In Russ.)
2. Kaufmann D., Kraay A., Mastruzzi M. Governance Matters VII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators, 1996-2007. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 2008, no. 4654, June.
3. Suslov N., Ageeva S. Energy Consumption and GDP: Analysis of Relation in Market and Transitional Economies. 2005. URL: www.eerc.ru
4. Hudson E. A., Jorgensen D.W. U.S. Energy Policy and Economic Growth, 1975-2000. The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 1974, vol. 5 (2), p. 461-516.
5. Berndt E., Wood D. Technology, Prices and Derived Demand for Energy. Review of Economics and Statistics, 1975, no. 57, p. 259-268.
6. Griffin J. M., Gregory P. R. An Intercountry Translog Model of Energy Substitution Responses. American Economic Review, 1976, no. 66, p. 845-857.
7. Common M. S. Implied Elasticities in Some UK Energy Projections. Energy Economics, July 1981, p. 153-158.
8. Kouris G. Energy Consumption and Economic Activity in Industrialized Economies -A Note. Energy Economics, July, 1983.
9. Haas R., Shipper L. Residential Energy Demand in OECD Countries and the Role of Irreversible Efficiency Improvements. Energy Economics, 1998, no. 20.
10. Kouris G. Elasticities - Science or fiction? Energy Economics, April 1981, p. 66-70.
11. Welsch H. The Reliability of Aggregate Energy Demand Functions. Energy Economics, October 1989, p. 285-292.
12. Beenstock M., Dalziel A. The Demand for Energy in the UK. A General Equilibrium Analysis. Energy Economics, April 1986.
13. Hunt L., G. Judge, Ninomiya Y. Underlying Trends and Seasonality in UK Energy Demand: A Sectoral Analysis. Energy Economics, 2003. no. 25, p. 93-118.
14. Rodrik D. TFPG Controversies, Institutions, and Economic Performance in East Asia. NBER Working Paper, 1997, no. 5914.
15. Tanzi V., Davoodi H. Corruption, Public Investment, and Growth. IMF Working Paper, 1997, Wp/97/139.
16. Wei S.-J. How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors? NBER Working Paper, 1997, no. 6030.
17. Hall R., Jones C. Why do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output per Worker Than Others? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1999, no. 1, p. 83-116.
18. Chong A., Calderon C. On the Causality and Feedback Between Institutional Measures and Economic Growth, Manuscript, The World Bank, 1999.
19. Kaufmann D., Kraay A., Zodio-Lobaton P. Governance Matters. World Bank Research Working paper, 1999, no. 2, p. 196.
20. McArthur J. W., Sachs J. Institutions and Geography: Comment on Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2000). NBER Working Paper, 2001, p. 8114.
21. Rodrik D., Subramanian A., Trebbi F. Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development, DP3643, November, 2002.
22. Sachs J. D. The Transition at Mid Decade, American Economic Review, 1999, no. 2, p.128-133.
23. Aslund A., Boone P., Johnson S. How to Stabilize: Lessons from Post-communist Countries. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1996, no. 1, p. 1217-1313.
24. Krueger G., Ciolko G. A Note on Initial Conditions and Liberalization during Transition. Journal of Comparative Economics, 1998, no. 4, p. 718-734.
25. Popov V. Sil'nye instituty vazhnee skorosti reform. Voprosy ekonomiki, 1998, no. 8, p. 5670 (In Russ.)
26. Transition Report 1999: Ten Years of Transition. EBRD, 1999.
27. Transition Report 2001: Energy in Transition. EBRD, 2001.
28. De Melo M., Denizer C., Gelb A., Tenev S. Circumstance and Choice: The Role of Initial Conditions and Policies in Transitions Economies, The World Bank, International Financial Corporation, 1997.
29. Popov V. Reform Strategies and Economic Performance of Russia's Regions. Paper Prepared for the Conference «Economic Growth and Institutional Development. Lessons from Economic Reform in Russia». Moscow, 1999. December, 10-11.
30. Polterovich V. Na puti k novoj teorii reform. Ekonomicheskaja nauka sovremennoj Rossii, 1999, no. 3, p. 32-48 (In Russ.)
31. Polterovich V. Transplantatsija ekonomicheskikh institutov. Ekonomicheskaja nauka sovremennoj Rossii, 2004, no. 3, p. 24-50 (In Russ.)
32. Vollebergh H. R. J., Dijkgraaf E. Corruption and Energy in OECD Countries: Theory and Evidence. Journal of Environmental Economic and Management, 2004, no. 47, p. 207-231.
33. Olsson O. Review of Plausible and Implausible Linkages. Working Papers in Economics, Goeteborg University, 2003, no. 106.
34. Acemoglu D., Johnson S., Robinson J. A. Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2000, no. 4, p.1231-1294.
35. Sachs J. Tropical Underdevelopment. NBER Working Paper, 2001, no. 8119.
36. Bloom D., Sachs J. Geography, Demography and Economic Growth in Africa. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1998, no. 2, p. 207-295.
37. Sweeney J. The Response of Energy Demand to Higher Prices: What Have We Learned? The American Economic Review, 1984, vol.74, no. 2.
Material received 01.03.2014
Н. И. Суслов
Новосибирский государственный университет ул. Пирогова, 2, Новосибирск, 630090, Россия
Институт экономики и организации промышленного производства СО РАН пр. Акад. Лаврентьева, 17, Новосибирск, 630090, Россия
nsus@ieie.nsc.ru
СТИМУЛЫ К ЭНЕРГОСБЕРЕЖЕНИЮ И ИНСТИТУЦИОНАЛЬНЫЕ УСЛОВИЯ:
ОПЫТ МЕЖСТРАНОВОГО АНАЛИЗА ЧАСТЬ 1
Наша гипотеза состоит в том, что главной причиной значительного отставания России от передовых стран по энергоэффективности является слабость стимулов к энергосбережению, обусловленная недостатками институционального механизма. Чтобы это продемонстрировать, мы строим теоретическую модель энергопотребляющего сектора экономики и показываем, что чем выше транзакционные издержки, вызванные недостатками рынка и регулирования, тем ниже вероятность осуществления энергосберегающих мероприятий в ответ на рост цены энергии. Включение для 77 стран мира для периода середины предыдущего десятилетия в регрессии для коэффициентов энергоемкости институциональных переменных позволило построить коэффициенты эластичности спроса на энергию по цене, дифференцированные по различным экономикам. Такие показатели (по абсолютной величине) для стран СНГ оказались почти вчетверо ниже, чем в странах ОЭСР.
Ключевые слова: энергоемкость, энергосбережение, экономики мира, эластичность по цене, институты, конкуренция по Курно.
