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THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
Malkhaz MATSABERIDZE
D.Sc. (Politics),
professor at Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University (Tbilisi, Georgia).
DRAWING UP A CONSTITUTION FOR THE TRANSCAUCASIAN SEYM AND THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF GEORGIA
Abstract
This article takes an in-depth look (relying on archive documents) at the attitude of the National Council of Georgia toward a Transcaucasian Constitution and its participation in the process. Yet unpublished, these documents are noteworthy because
they shed light on the stand of the National Council of Georgia on issues which the Central Caucasian nations could resolve together. The efforts exerted to resolve these constitutional issues in fact became the basis for drawing up the Georgian Constitution.
I n t r o d u c t i o n
The Transcaucasian Seym, which, after existing for just a short time, gave way to three Transcaucasian states, was created ninety years ago.1 The Transcaucasian Seym was not very propitious in historiography either. “Unviable” is the main epithet used to describe its brief history. Frankly speaking, no one has studied its history in depth, although it is worthy of note for the fact that, under difficult conditions, the representatives of the Transcaucasian nations created unified power structures on their own initiative and tried to jointly resolve the problems facing them. The main weakness of the Transcaucasian Seym was that the representatives of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia tried to work together and resolve common problems without disassociating themselves from each other.
How the Transcaucasian Constitution was Drawn Up
On 9 (22) April, 1918, after the Transcaucasus declared its independence, the Seym elected a commission for drawing up a Constitution of the Transcaucasian state. The Seym resolution on independence of the Transcaucasus comprised of only two articles: “1. Declaring the Transcaucasus as an independent republic and notifying the world states of this. 2. Entrusting the government with im-
1 The Transcaucasian Seym was organized at the beginning of 1918 and formed from deputies elected from the Transcaucasus to the All-Russia Constituent Assembly with the addition of party representatives proportional to the number of votes they received at elections to the Constituent Assembly. The first meeting of the Seym was held in Tiflis on 10 (23) February, 1918. N.S. Chkheidze was elected as chairman of the Seym with the rights of president of the republic. Menshevik E.L. Gegechkori, former chairman of the Transcaucasian Commissariat of the Provisional Government, headed the government. The Transcaucasian Seym existed until 26 May, 1918.
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mediate presentation of a draft law for the Constitution of the independent Federative Democratic Republic of the Transcaucasus.2
The constitutional commission of the Transcaucasian government consisted of 24 members; 15 of them were the representatives of the national councils (five from each of the Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaijani councils), while the other nine were appointed by the government.3
The following representatives of the National Council of Georgia were elected to the constitutional commission (government commission, as it was called) at an assembly of the executive committee of the National Council of Georgia on 2 May, 1918: G. Gvazava, P. Sakvarelidze, Sh. Meskhishvili, R. Arsenidze, and V. Gobechia. It was also deemed necessary to invite specialists to participate in the commission’s work.4
There were a total of nine Georgian representatives (five from the National Council and four appointed by the government) in the Transcaucasian constitutional commission: Akakiy Chkhenkeli, Sergo Japaridze, Zurab Avalashvili, Georgiy Gvazava, Pavel Sakvarelidze, Razhden Arsenidze, Vladimir Gobechia, Shalva Meskhishvili, and Grigol Rtskhiladze.5
The first assembly of the Transcaucasian constitutional commission was devoted to organizational problems. In particular, the question was raised of whether to include the representatives of other national councils (apart from Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia) in the commission with the same representation (five people each), or fewer. This question came up because the Germans living in the Transcaucasus asked the commission if they could participate in its work.6 The representatives of the National Council of Armenia announced that they also intended to raise the question of the participation of other national councils. After discussing it, the issue was removed from the agenda in keeping with the “suggestion of the Muslims” (that is, the National Council of Azerbaijan), and the commission’s membership remained as it had been.7
The second assembly addressed the question of how to draw up a Constitution of the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic. Two opposite opinions were expressed on this. The minority demanded that the “fundamental principles of federation and confederation” be studied in depth first and only after a corresponding general report had been presented should they set about drawing up the Constitution. The majority, on the other hand, felt there was no need for such theoretical “profundities,” rather attention should be focused on which spheres were to be subordinate to the general government and which to “private territorial-political units.”8
As early as the first meetings of the constitutional commission it became clear that, speaking in the words of G. Rtskhiladze, “unity between the Transcaucasus and the Federation will not be close and stable.” The representatives of the Muslim Council demanded the right of free withdrawal from the union for Federation members. According to one of them, this right would also be beneficial for the others.9
Spheres were defined during the discussion which, according to the general consensus, should be subordinate to the central authorities: 1. Foreign policy. 2. Military affairs. 3. Customs. 4. Finances—“search for union revenues.” After this, the constitutional commission elected a so-called small commission and entrusted it to continue working on a constitution draft. Three questions should primarily be clarified:
1. Civil rights.
2 See: Sakartvelo, 12 April, 1918.
3 Central State Historical Archives of Georgia (CSHA), rec. gr. 1836, inv. 1, f. 5, sheet 113.
4 CSHA of Georgia, rec. gr. 1836, inv. 1, f. 2, sheet 59.
5 Ibid., sheet 116.
6 CSHA of Georgia, rec. gr. 1836, inv. 1, f. 5, sheet 113.
7 Ibid., sheet 114.
8 Ibidem.
9 Ibidem.
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2. Principles for organizing general governance:
a) a general parliament,
b) representatives to be appointed by the governments of territorial units or elected by the legislative structures,
c) resolving general issues by means of delegations.
3. Institution of a federal court for settling disputes between the central and local authorities.
The commission was given five days to study the mentioned issues. Its first meeting was scheduled for 11 May.10 On the whole, during the work of the Transcaucasian constitutional commission it transpired that, although the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic was declared, it was in fact not created, and the question of state structure vacillated between a federation and a confederation.
Discussion of Constitutional Issues in the National Council of Georgia
Along with the work of the government commission on the Constitution, it was deemed necessary to begin similar work in the National Council. At a meeting of the executive committee of the National Council of Georgia held on 9 May, 1918, a decision was made to hear reports on the work on the Transcaucasian Constitution at a Council meeting scheduled for the same day, discuss this issue, and elect a commission for “defining the general provisions of the Transcaucasian Constitution,” as well as for drawing up the “whole constitution of Georgia.”11
The 14th meeting of the National Council of Georgia was held on the same day. Grigol Rtskhi-ladze (social-federalist) gave a short speech on the work carried out by the government commission. After this, meeting chairman Georgiy Laskhishvili acquainted those present with two ideas voiced at the meeting of the executive committee according to the majority, the commission should be elected without debates and should draw up the main provisions of the Constitution and present them to the National Council at the next meeting for discussion. Some of the committee members thought that debates should begin immediately on this question, which would ease the work of the elected commission.12
R. Gabashvili (national-democrat) expressed the opinion that first the significance for the government commission of the work done by the National Council on drawing up a constitution should be clarified. Moreover, as he put it, according to some unverified data, “there were plans to present the Transcaucasus with a ready constitution”13 —evidently implying that Germany and Turkey would be doing this.
The presupposition about a “ready constitution” was not taken seriously. Only P. Sakvarelidze responded by saying: “Incidentally, they were talking here about a constitution prepared in advance. If this is so, let’s stay one step ahead of them, clarify our desire, and say that we don’t want what you are trying to impose on us forcibly, we want something else.”14
On the other hand, it was deemed necessary that the National Council should provide an explanation of the constitutional issues. The members of the government commission also talked about
10 Ibid., sheet 115.
11 Ibidem.
12 Ibidem.
13 Ibidem.
14 Ibid., sheet 6.
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this. According to Sergo Japaridze (social-democrat), despite the fact that the decision of the National Council did not have any legal force, “the opinion has already been expressed in the government commission that it will be guided by what the National Councils decide;” what is more, what can be expressed in the National Council, “cannot be expressed in the government commission.” Pavel Sakvarelidze noted: “A decision by the National Council will carry much more weight than a provision of the government commission.”1З
Shalva Meskhishvili (social-federalist) pointed out another aspect of the importance of considering the constitutional issues in the National Council: it was necessary “for eliminating disagreements among the Council members,” which would lead to solidarity among the Georgian representatives “in the government commission and in the future Seym.”1fS
R. Gabashvili demanded that debates be held immediately and the constitutional commission’s tasks defined. Sergo Japaridze thought that the factions should first present their reports, to be followed by debates, and only after that should the commission be entrusted with drawing up the Constitution. The suggestion about choosing speakers and further debates was supported by Pavel Sakvarelidze and he proposed scheduling this meeting for 12 May. Shalva Meskhishvili was of the same opinion.17
Grigol Rtskhiladze considered it unnecessary to present a general report on the characteristics of a federation and a confederation. The speakers chosen by the factions were to talk specifically about “what is best for us.” According to Pavel Sakvarelidze, it would be enough to pick a total of two speakers: one of them could talk about a federation and the other about a confederation as a form of state structure.18 Shalva Karumidze who spoke against this believed that each faction should present its own view.
Grigol Rtskhiladze suggested electing the same nine members of the government commission to the constitutional commission of the National Council, which would make them more responsible to the National Council.19 Shalva Karumidze did not agree with this position since, according to him, they were “government people,” however, after Alexander Lomtatidze’s speech, he received no further support. Alexander Lomtatidze noted that the elected members would have to become reacquainted with “what had been said and done,” and so in terms of saving time, Grigol Rtskhiladze’s proposal was entirely acceptable.20
Finally, a unanimous decision was made to include the nine people in the constitutional commission, “who were elected by the executive committee and appointed by the government.” This commission was to choose a speaker or speakers for the next meeting of the National Council, if the factions considered it necessary to enforce their views. Moreover, the council was invested with the right of cooptation.
On 12 May, 1918, the executive committee of the National Council resolved to organize “extensive debates” after hearing Sergo Japaridze’s report on the Constitution.21 The latter was elected as speaker by the constitutional commission.22
Thirty-one members and 29 candidates attended the ^th meeting of the National Council of Georgia, which was held the same day. Sergo Japaridze noted from the very beginning that the commission had been elected only a few days ago and that it “had not had time to prepare or present a draft of the constitution to the Council.”23 This phrase clearly shows how flippantly some people related to drawing up a constitution, which took almost three years to achieve.
15 CSHA of Georgia, rec. gr. 1836, inv. 1, f. 5, sheet 115.
16 Ibidem.
17 Ibidem.
18 Ibid., sheet 117.
19 Ibid., sheet 116.
20 Ibid., sheet 118.
21 CSHA of Georgia, rec. gr. 1836, inv. 1, f. 2, sheet 65.
22 CSHA of Georgia, rec. gr. 1836, inv. 1, f. 5, sheet 103.
23 Ibid., sheet 104.
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Sergo Japaridze tried to show in his report that creating a “strong union,” that is, transferring broad powers to the federal center, was in Georgia’s interests. In the report he presented on behalf of the commission, Sergo Japaridze essentially expressed the interests of the Georgian social democrats. He tried to substantiate the need for a “strong union” with arguments based on national, economic, and democratic interests:
1. National interests:
a) the Georgian nation is numerically small, and “a small nation cannot exist freely,” it needs to have a patron. Sergo Japaridze did not say precisely who should play this role, but evidently it should be carried out by a strong Transcaucasian union;
b) the immense sympathy for the Tatars that existed among certain circles of Georgians “arose on a romantic basis,” which was confirmed by the events in Akhaltsikhe. For this very reason, believed Sergo Japaridze, a strong union is needed “so that we influence them and not vice versa.”
2. Economic interests: “Georgia will not have oil” if a strong union is not created.
3. Democratic interests: the Georgian people are democratic and will definitely ensure that an eight-hour working day is instituted. However, a 12-hour working day could be instituted in Baku, thus creating significant competition for Georgian production. We will find ourselves in a disadvantageous economic position, while a strong union will introduce identical work conditions.24
According to the Social Democratic Party, along with foreign policy and military, financial, and customs affairs, the center should also be in charge of the monetary system, railroads, the postal and telegraph service, bill and trade obligations, minimum education requirements, civil and criminal law, and labor legislation.^
Sergo Japaridze believed that the Transcaucasian legislative structure should be a single representative chamber elected by means of direct and universal elections. Questions should be decided by the majority of votes.2fS Sergo Japaridze’s plan to create a “strong Transcaucasian union” was severely criticized by the representatives of the other factions.
Pavel Sakvarelidze (Alioni) said that Sergo Japaridze’s idea would not lead to the creation of either a federation or a confederation. In a federative state, the legislative structure must definitely consist of two chambers; a law adopted by the general parliament should be confirmed by a chamber consisting of representatives of the federation members. Moreover, Pavel Sakvarelidze was doubtful about the prospects for creating a federative union due to the different cultural and economic development levels of the Transcaucasian nations. So he believed that it would be worth looking for a more suitable form.27
Grigol Rtskhiladze supported Pavel Sakvarelidze’s opinion, noting that “what Sergo Japaridze presented as a federation did not have anything in common with either a federation or a confederation.” Grigol Rtskhiladze considered the social-democratic thrust of Sergo Japaridze’s statement (“It is in our interests to keep neighboring democracies under our influence”) to be pure imperialism. Not one Transcaucasian nation possessed the power to carry out the unitary policy so desired by the so-cial-democrats, and this “common weakness” created “equality among the nations.” It was impossible to carry out a policy that would equally suit all the Transcaucasian nations.28
24 Ibidem.
25 Ibid., sheet 105.
26 Ibid., sheet 106.
27 Ibid., sheet 105
28 Ibid., sheet 106.
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According to Grigol Rtskhiladze, it was sufficient for the center to be responsible for foreign policy, military, customs, and financial affairs, while all the rest should remain with the competence of the local (that is, national) states: “In his speech, Sergo Japaridze entrusted the center, the union, with all the functions that belong to the state. What is left for the local governments then? Nothing! If that’s the case, why is it necessary to draw up a Georgian constitution?”29
As for the position of the social-federalists with respect to the state structure of the Transcaucasus, according to Grigol Rtskhiladze, the members of this party did not support “either a pure federation, or a pure confederation.” The constitution should be mixed, with elements of both. “Such a constitution corresponds more to the real conditions of our life,” noted Grigol Rtskhi-ladze, “and let the academics keep on wracking their brains about what our constitution should be like.”30
National-democrat Georgiy Gvazava gave an interesting speech, in which he tried to show the impossibility of creating not only a federation, but also a confederation in the Transcaucasus. He greatly doubted the possibility of coordinated action among even those four spheres which the Al-ionists and federalists had agreed to transfer to the center. For example, the foreign policy priorities of all three nations significantly differed from each other: Georgia looked to the West, Azerbaijan had its sights set on Istanbul, and the Armenians liked the British, as well as the Russians, even if they were Bolshevists. Georgiy Gvazava noted that transfer of these four spheres to the center was not in Georgia’s interests, since its representatives were in the minority, and consequently “all questions will be resolved in keeping with the desire of the majority, that is, against the interests of Georgia.”31
According to him, a single Transcaucasian state in the form of the Seym has done nothing to protect Georgia’s interests: “Has it protected Batumi, Saingilo, Akhaltsikhe, or Akhalkalaki? No! What right do we have to hope that we will be able to use the powers of the Tatars or the Armenians in a confederation? This is fantasy, and we would do well to banish this kind of fanciful dreaming from our minds right now.”32
In the meantime, real policy required a whole different approach. So the National-Democratic Party adopted a resolution demanding that Georgia be declared an independent, sovereign state. It also demanded that a “permanent structure made up of representatives of the Caucasian states” be created “for settling the general affairs of the Transcaucasian states.”33
Georgiy Gvazava responded to Pavel Sakvarelidze’s comment that a “permanent structure” meant creating a confederation by saying that a confederation implies “the transfer of some rights to the center,” but the national-democrats are demanding “the creation of a simple commission,” the decisions of which will not be binding. In other words, the National-Democratic Party long recognized that “the state should be an independent democratic republic,” which would be enforced in the Georgian Constitution.
The speech by representative of the social revolutionaries Parmen Sabashvili was brief. On behalf of his party, he stated that “the creation of a confederative Transcaucasian structure” is a beneficial thing.34
At the 1бШ meeting of the National Council of Georgia held on 12 May, most of the speakers were representatives of the National-Democratic Party who proved the need for declaring the republic’s independence. The national-democrats protested against the call of meeting chairman Georgiy Laskhishvili to talk about a federative or confederative structure for the Transcaucasus.
29 CSHA of Georgia, rec. gr. 1836, inv. 1, f. 5, sheet 103.
30 Ibid., sheet 107.
31 Ibid., sheet 108.
32 Ibid., sheet 109.
33 Ibid., sheet 110.
34 Ibidem.
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Georgiy Gvazava said that drafts had been presented that entirely deny “the central structure and its competence,” and so demanded that the speaker also have the right to talk “against this center.”33 The meeting began with R. Gabashvili’s speech, who sharply criticized the “federative constitution” proposed by “government representative” Sergo Japaridze. On behalf of the party, he spoke against transferring foreign policy, customs, military, and financial affairs to the center, where “opposing elements will gather.”
K. Abkhazi focused in his speech on the reasons for creating a Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic and showed that this was a necessary step. No one gave the Seym members who were elected to the “Constituent Assembly of Russia” such powers. So first separate units should be created in the Transcaucasus and then they should be “united into a union.” Although, in his opinion, due to the unequal rate of economic and cultural development of the Transcaucasian nations, the formation of this kind of union is impossible, “therefore forced creation of a center is pernicious for each na-tion.”3<s
The same demand was put forward by Mikhail Machabeli and Shalva Karumidze. According to the latter, if it is created, the Transcaucasian Federation will be such a conglomerate that “it will soon collapse all the same.” The time has already come for “Georgia to declare its full independence.”37 Razhden Arsenidze (social-democrat), who spoke after the above-mentioned speakers, presented numerous arguments in favor of a confederation and “against complete separation.” In response, Grigol Veshapeli (national-democrat) gave a detailed description of Georgia’s international situation and regarded the declaration of independence as the beginning of carrying out real politics. “First we demand declaration of independence and the building of each individual state, in particular our own national state.”
The last speaker at the meeting on 14 May was Pavel Sakvarelidze who tried to show the advantage of “a confederative structure for the Transcaucasus.”38 Completion of the debates on this question and adoption of a resolution were transferred to the next meeting scheduled for 1б May. This was followed by a protest from Grigol Rtskhiladze who noted that the work of the government commission on the constitution was being carried out at an accelerated rate and the resolution of the National Council could be too late.
Sergo Japaridze said that work on the constitution would continue for a long time to come. At the meeting on 1б May, a request was made to consider the question on competence, and then discuss state organization and so on.
But the situation soon changed and it became impossible to ignore what the national-democrats were saying. Before the meeting of the National Council scheduled for 1б May, the executive committee looked at the question of “how should the discussion of the constitutional issue in the National Council end.” It was decided not to adopt any resolutions on “the form of the constitution,” in order to “leave room for maneuver.” A commission should be elected for “working out Georgia’s political structure in keeping with the opinions expressed.”
This decision was based on the difficult situation that had developed whereby the only way to save Georgia was to declare its independence. Two days earlier at a meeting of the executive committee of the National Council, items in an address to Germany were discussed.39 At the meeting on 1 б May, a decision was made to create a separate commission in order to “prepare the ground in every way for declaring Georgia’s independence.”40 N. Ramishvili, D. Vachnadze, and Sh. Meskhishvili were elected as members of this structure.
35 Ibid., sheet 133.
36 Ibid., sheet 134.
37 Ibid., sheet 136.
38 Ibid., sheet 139.
39 CSHA of Georgia, rec. gr. 1836, inv. 1, f. 2, sheet 67.
40 Ibid., sheet 65.
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This is how the discussion of the constitutional structure of the Transcaucasus and Georgia in the National Council ended. It became clear that restoring the state independence of the latter was inevitable.
“We Must Declare Georgia a Sovereign State”
When considering the constitutional issues in the National Council of Georgia, the political parties evaluated the republic’s situation at that time and presented various visions of its future. The discussion developed around the problem of the Transcaucasus’ state structure. The positions of the factions were as follows:
social-democrats “unitary federalism”
social-federalists merging of a federation and confederation
The Alioni Group confederation
social-revolutionaries confederation
national-democrats sovereign state
As we can see, two poles formed: the social-democrats were striving to create a strong Transcaucasian state, while the national-democrats wanted to declare Georgia’s independence. The positions of the other political forces were somewhere in-between. The radical difference in positions of the social-democrats and national-democrats was due to the difference in their ideological priorities and, consequently, their different visions of the international situation and national problems.
The Georgian social-democrats were afraid of the “small state,” did not believe in the possibility of Georgia’s independent existence, and stated this directly. “The Georgian nation is geographically small and numerically small. A small nation is incapable of an independent existence,” said Sergo Japaridze.41 “They say, let’s detach ourselves and we will live separately, but no one talks about what this will mean,” noted Razhden Arsenide.42
A large state was the Marxist ideal of social democracy. Since the idea of “big democratic Russia” proved unsuccessful, they are now trying to preserve the unity of the Transcaucasus. In this respect, K. Abkhazi emphasized: “At first the social-democrats were in love with the center in Russia, now the center has been transferred here and changed its name—it was called a federation, with which it has nothing in common.”43
The social-democrats justified their striving to be part of a big state saying that it was in the interests of the Georgian people. “We are deeply convinced,” noted R. Arsenidze, “that the smaller our republic is, the more rulers and misfortunes it will have, the larger and wider the political arena is, the freer cultural and economic development will be.”44
The arguments of the social-democrats, which boiled down to the fact that an independent Georgia cannot exist since it does not have its own oil and gold, cannot have its own currency, etc., seemed
41 CSHA of Georgia, rec. gr. 1836, inv. 1, f. 2, sheet 104.
42 Ibid., sheet 137.
43 Ibid., sheet 134.
44 Ibid., sheet 137.
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absurd to the national-democrats. The claims that Georgian democracy would achieve hegemony in local democratic powers and be able to “tear [the Muslims] away from the Ottomans” looked just as unconvincing in the eyes of the other parties.
According to G. Veshapeli, the social-democrats remained a party of Russian orientation; the idea of creating a Transcaucasian state was a continuation of this trend. “The old and new combinations of social-democrats have been compiled in such a way as to make it easy to restore communication with Russian social democracy, if Russian democracy gets back on its feet.”
The position of the national-democrats was based, in their words, on “real politics.” G. Ve-shapeli noted: “For a small nation, such as we are, keeping in mind foreign state powers should be the main focus when resolving any question.”43 Russia’s fall made any orientation toward it pernicious, particularly since it had been dominating in Georgia for 100 years. And this is the “maximum time-limit for a small nation, and if it has not been liberated by this time, it is ultimately degener-ated.”4fS
They believed that the creation of a single Transcaucasian state was impossible due to the different interests and orientations of the nations living there. Even if it was possible to create such a union, this would have contradicted Georgia’s interests, since the Muslims would have been in the majority, promoting the establishment of an Ottoman protectorate in the Transcaucasus. In this way, the nation-al-democrats believed that Georgia should be an independent state in order not to have its hands tied and be able to protect its own interests. Georgia’s main task was to ensure territorial integrity and an economic-cultural upswing.
In the opinion of the national-democrats, Georgia could protect its interests by orientating itself toward Europe, where Germany had come forward as a real power by that time. Rumania and Ukraine were under the control of the latter, and the Brest Peace Treaty registered the still nonexistence states of the Transcaucasus. Georgia should take advantage of this situation to declare its independence.
Rejection of the idea of a single Transcaucasian state did not mean rejection of close contacts with the Caucasian nations for the national-democrats. According to their reasoning, Azerbaijan and Chechnia-Daghestan could be independent Georgia’s allies. As for Armenia, Georgia should not enter into conflict with the Muslim world over it, which would be a fatal step for the republic. What is more, Georgia would have to ensure the security of the Armenian population on its territory.
According to the national-democrats, Georgia should carry out a loyal policy toward Turkey and the Muslim world as a whole. There were two reasons for this: in the future Turkey could form a counterbalance to Russia’s aggression. Moreover, Muslim Georgia remained under the control of the Ottomans. There was hope that “economically developed Georgia” would strengthen “the national union between Muslim and Christian Georgia.”47
It is worth noting that the discussion on Georgia’s sovereignty unfolded in May 1918, ten days before its declaration, and those social-democrats who stubbornly insisted on the impossibility of independence—Sergo Japaridze and Razhden Arsenidze—soon became members of the constitutional commission of sovereign Georgia.
As for the depth of comprehension of the constitutional problems, in May 1918, K. Abkhazi noted in this respect: “In my opinion, the reports presented had one shortcoming: they could be read both in the National Council of Georgia and in Turkestan or Siberia, only in the local languages. They had no personal or individual trait inherent in the Georgian nation. They took the structure and adapted everything else to it.”48 Drawing up the Georgian Constitution took much longer than people expected at that time.
4З Ibidem.
46 Ibidem.
47 Ibid., sheet 138.
48
Ibidem.
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C o n c l u s i o n
So light can be shed on the history of the Transcaucasian Seym and the drawing up of a Transcaucasian Constitution in particular only through the joint efforts of academics from the three Central Caucasian countries. This article can only be regarded as a call to begin such work. Having an idea of the archive documents that exist in the Georgian language will help researchers to delve more deeply into the history and experience of the Transcaucasian Seym.
Kerim SHUKIUROV
D.Sc. (Hist.), associate professor at the History of Azerbaijan Department, Faculty of the Humanities, Baku State University
(Baku, Azerbaijan).
ON AUTONOMY FOR NAGORNO-KARABAKH: LESSONS OF HISTORY
Abstract
This article, which offers new approaches to the already known facts and documents dating to 1920-1923 when Nagorno-Karabakh acquired its autonomy, can be described as a successful attempt at restoring an objective picture of the past events. This process, which was neither natural nor historically justified, was a result of the old imperial policies pursued by the new Center (read the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party
(Bolsheviks) and the Caucasian Bureau of the RCP (B) that infringed on the rights of the Azeris of Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as elsewhere across the Caucasus [in Armenia, Georgia and Daghestan]). The author has convincingly demonstrated that the autonomy of Nagorno-Karabakh imposed on Azerbaijan served as the first step toward the region’s gradual degeneration into a seat of ethnic extremism and separatism.
I n t r o d u c t i o n
The lessons of history are invaluable when it comes to settling contemporary conflicts—we have learned that much from the political practices of other countries. In fact, the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh is no exception: its autonomy gained through purely Soviet-Bolshevist methods has become part of the conflict’s roots. This means that the time has come to study the issue in detail.
