DONBASS AT LIMBO: SELF-PROCLAIMED REPUBLICS IN THE INTER-WAR PERIOD (2014-2021) Текст научной статьи по специальности «Политологические науки»

PEACE PROCESS AND VIOLENCE: МИРНЫЙ ПРОЦЕСС И НАСИЛИЕ THE CASE OF DONBASS НА ПРИМЕРЕ ДОНБАССА

DONBASS AT LIMBO: SELF-PROCLAIMED REPUBLICS IN THE INTER-WAR PERIOD (2014-2021)

*

Anna Matveeva King's College London ORCID: 0000-0001-5020-4595 © A.Matveeva, 2022

DOI: 10.20542/2307-1494-2022-1 -92-106

Abstract In order to better understand the new phase of the war in and around Donbass that started in February 2022, the article suggests looking back at the "interwar" period in the region. This period is analyzed through the prism of a combination of three interpretations of the conflict - as an irredentist movement to join the "historical homeland" which the region had been "separated from", as a civil conflict for a different (multiethnic, multilingual, more decentralized) Ukraine, better disposed towards the aspirations of the people of Donbass, and as an international geopolitical confrontation between Russia and the West. All three interpretations are seen as valid.

In 2014-2022, self-proclaimed republics (the DNR and the LNR) went through the stages of their formation in the context of a historical cataclysm, early postconflict development when their economic and social life was still oriented towards Ukraine, the cut-off stage resulting from a strict economic blockade by Kiev, and the concluding period of creeping integration into Russia. The article specifically addresses the limbo phase that lasted from 2016 to early 2022. While this phase brought a greater level of security that allowed life in the DNR and the LNR to go on, security was brittle and prone to significant disruption. However, in both security and socio-political terms, the worst was the sense of a lack of clarity about the entities' future, with three scenarios circulated by politicians at once: return to Ukraine on the basis of the Minsk agreements, joining Russia, and building up their own "statehood".

The Minsk Agreements that were initially viewed positively, as they reduced the level of hostilities, progressively lost their value. Special status was not what the war had been fought for and it remained an amorphous and abstract idea, which the years that passed since failed to fill with practical content. Balancing on the verge of renewal of hostilities necessitated the resources that the two republics did not have, which locked them into dependency on the Russian government. While the republics survived as self-governing entities with a political and cultural proximity to Russia and established proto-state institutions, they also experienced governance deficit and economic decline. By the early 2020s, any illusions of the two republics' independent agency evaporated. What started as a people's rebellion, when the region asserted its right to make choices and act upon them, came to the situation that their future was to be determined elsewhere. This future seemed to clear up since Russia's formal recognition of the

* Anna Matveeva - Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the King's College, London. Анна Матвеева - приглашенный старший научный сотрудник Королевского колледжа Лондона.

DNR and the LNR and the start of Russian military operation in Ukraine in 2022, but its contours lie beyond the article's scope.

Keywords Donbass, Donetsk People's Republic (DNR), Lugansk People's Republic (LNR), armed conflict, peace process, Ukraine, Russia

Название Донбасс в подвешенном состоянии: самопровозглашенные республики в

статьи межвоенный период (2014-2021 годы)

Аннотация В разгар вооруженного противостояния, когда события стремительно развиваются, возможно ли говорить о конфликте на Донбассе, сохраняя необходимую дистанцию от истории, которая делается на наших глазах? Чтобы понять происходящее, есть смысл обратиться к анализу того, с чем донбасские «республики» подошли к февралю 2022 г. Западные пресса и политики привыкли называть самопровозглашенные республики проросийскими «сепаратистами». Правомерна ли такая характеристика? Вероятно, нет. Во-первых, возникшее в 2014 г. на Донбассе движение было реакцией на Евромайдан в Киеве, но не помышляло об образовании отдельных, независимых территорий. Из постсоветских конфликтов как сепаратистские можно охарактеризовать конфликты в Абхазии, первую войну в Чечне и, с некоторой натяжкой, конфликт в Приднестровье. Ситуацию с Донбассом можно, скорее, сравнить с положением сербов на севере Косова, которые продолжают считать себя гражданами Сербии, живя в параллельной реальности сербских институтов, или Карабаха, который де-факто видел себя в составе Армении. Той же логике следовал и Донбасс, которому судьба Крыма дала надежду, что сценарий присоединения к России возможен. Во-вторых, у конфликта была и другая составляющая -стремление не столько к отделению от Украины, сколько к преобразованию ее в государство, более созвучное политико-культурным ценностям и геостратегической ориентации Донбасса. В этом смысле это внутристрановой, гражданский конфликт, где разные видения политического пути решались не путем выборов или референдума, а с оружием в руках и где шло гражданское противостояние о том, по какому пути стране идти. В-третьих, невозможно рассматривать Донбасс в отрыве от международной реальности и контекста отношений России и Запада. За всеми участниками конфликта стоят поддерживающие их силы, чье открытое или закулисное влияние очерчивает рамки, в которых развиваются процессы войны и мира. В статье анализируется условно межвоенная фаза ситуации на Донбассе с учетом всех трех интерпретаций этого конфликта - как ирреденты (движения за присоединение к историческому государству, от которого регион оказался волею судеб отделен), гражданского противостояния и геополитического столкновения.

Возможен ли был мирный выход из данного противостояния? Российское военное вмешательство в сентябре 2014 г., переломившее ситуацию на фронте, стало отправной точкой для того, чтобы воюющие стороны отнеслись к перспективе мира серьезно. Киев рисковал потерять часть Донбасса, находившуюся под его контролем, а восставшие против него на Донбассе - поддержку Москвы в случае, если бы они хотели воевать дальше. Однако соглашение Минск-1 (сентябрь 2014 г.) не остановило войну: президент Порошенко оказался более зависим от внутреннего политического давления, чем предполагала Москва, а донбасские республики сложившаяся территориальная конфигурация не устраивала. Минск-2 (соглашение, подписанное в феврале 2015 г. после второй военной кампании, приведшей к новым территориальным потерям украинской стороны) оказался не столько началом мирного процесса, сколько точкой отсчета начинающейся стагнации, которая сопровождалась продолжением

вооруженного насилия. Минские соглашения предусматривали как трудновыполнимые политические шаги (включая особый статус Донбасса, проведение выборов по международным стандартам и передачу контроля над российско-украинской границей), так и задачи, которые при желании были вполне реальны (обмен пленными и прекращение огня). Однако отсутствие существенного прогресса в реализации даже относительно выполнимых условий мирных соглашений определило специфику ситуации на Донбассе по сравнению с другими конфликтами в Европе. В них, как правило, военные действия после одной-двух горячих фаз достигали кульминации и вели к стабилизации фронта, а дальнейшее позиционное противостояние мало отражалось на жизни населения. На Донбассе же боевые действия, с некоторыми паузами, не прекращались на протяжении всех восьми межвоенных лет, хотя и не имели большого смысла, так как стороны не вели крупных наступательных кампаний, которые могли бы привести к существенным территориальным изменениям.

За период 2014-2022 годов самопровозглашенные республики прошли стадии формирования на фоне исторического катаклизма, восстановительного периода, когда их экономика и социальная жизнь все еще были в основном ориентированы на Украину, отсечения от нее в результате экономической блокады, введенной Киевом, и заключительного периода ковидных ограничений и ползучей интеграции в Россию. Все эти годы на первом месте неизбежно стояли нужды обороны, для чего создавались регулярные вооруженные силы. Вытеснение или устранение харизматичных, но своенравных командиров эпохи «Русской весны» лишило новое войско того морального подъема, который присутствовал в начале войны, но сделало его более лояльным властям республик. ДНР и ЛНР политически консолидировались, хотя и за счет ограничения внутренней демократии и несмотря на невысокую эффективность управления и коррупцию. Если до 2014 г. на Донбассе мирно уживались разные политические и культурные позиции, то Евромайдан, война, блокада со стороны Киева, изменения в информационном и культурном пространстве привели к тому, что эти позиции резко разошлись. Экономическая блокада отсекла республики от возможности вести бизнес легально, а закрытие пропускных пунктов из-за ковида привело к тому, что взаимодействие с территорией, подконтрольной Украине, сократилось до уровня семейных связей. Население сосредоточилось на выживании, и в этом контексте отчасти следует рассматривать и массовое получение российских паспортов. Однако тяжелее всего для общества была неопределенность своего будущего в условиях, когда политиками одновременно озвучивались три варианта - возвращение в Украину на основе Минских соглашений, присоединение к России и укрепление собственной «государственности». В 2022 г. это будущее для республик Донбасса стало проясняться, но ценой очередной войны.

Ключевые Донбасс, Донецкая народная республика, Луганская народная республика

слова вооруженный конфликт, мирный процесс, Украина, Россия

I. Introduction

Prior to February 2022, Donbass in South-Eastern Ukraine was the largest active war zone in Europe with roughly 3.5 million population. Yet, little is known about how its people lived, and what they aspired for since the "Donetsk People's Republic" (DNR) and "Lugansk People's Republic" (LNR)1 sprung out into being in April 2014. Trapped in a "Putin's shadow", they were never acknowledged as having a will and a mind of their own, unlike Kosovars or Karabakh Armenians, who were known in policy and public.

Dubbed as "pro-Russian separatists", the Donbass residents were hardly anything more than pieces on geopolitical chessboard, not particularly interesting, as they were perceived in the West as mere tools for the Russian hybrid warfare.2 Their only perceived meaning was to inflict a maximum pain on Ukraine, as "due to their absolute political and economic dependence on Russia, together with the personal ties of the Donbass elite to the Kremlin, Russia could then use these entities as proxies to influence Ukraine's domestic and foreign policy".3 Few studies tried to examine the region on its own terms and it is a puzzle why it attracted so little research attention.4

Much of media and political discourse about Donbass centred on a single event -the downing of MH-17 in July 2014 and the degree of culpability of the Russian government. The human toll of war was hardly noticed, although the armed conflict inflicted over 14000 human casualties (at least 3405 of them civilian victims) in the period between April 2014 and January 2022.5 The war never stopped, unlike those most other intra-state conflicts that become frozen and enjoyed a long period of relative tranquillity in the post-fighting phase.

The article argues for the primacy of local actors. While those actors are commonly labelled as "separatists", that is misleading, as the term transferred from a popular Ukrainian discourse into the mainstream Western discourse without a critical assessment. In fact, the last thing that the people of Donbass wanted was to become "separatists", ending up with a semi-fictional "statehood" on a devastated land, which their industrialised and flourishing region turned into. In fact, they wanted either to join Russia or to go back to a "different Ukraine" that would be sympathetic to them and would respect their rights and values.

The conflict in Donbass is a complex one and does not fit into any single definition. On one level, it is an irredentist movement6 when a territory wishes to (re)join the state it identifies itself with due to historical, ethnic and cultural bonds. It is also a political conflict over the nature of statehood in the country, to which the territory de jure belongs to, evolution of its political system and the ability of the periphery to influence the game-changing decisions. On another level, it is an internationalised conflict that involves global interests and contestations. The conflict in Donbass is also an example of how one type of conflict can transform into another: what started as a centre-periphery political dispute ended in what could become the biggest war in Europe since the World War II.

The conflict in Donbass has always been a "live" conflict pulsing as a bubbling volcano and a conflict adaptation has never really happened there. Breaking its trajectory into phases is helpful to understand how the war and peace dynamics played out. Until it gave birth to the larger conflict of 2022, the Non-Government Controlled Areas (NGCAs) went through four stages:

(1) The "Russian Spring" - violent emergence of the breakaway DNR and LNR came into being (2014-2015);

(2) Post-fighting recovery when the ties with the rest of Ukraine began to restore and the Donbass economy rejuvenated (2016 - early 2017);

(3) Detachment: moves by Kiev causing further economic breakup from the rest of Ukraine, introduction of a physical "border" and movement restrictions (2017-2020);

(4) Covid-19 and latent integration into Russia (2020-2022).

In this periodisation, the 2016-2022 is considered as a "limbo" period, whose developments paved the way for an irredentist movement to eventually prevail. This article traces the multi-layered process of how it happened. It discusses internal developments in the NGCAs and how they related to the rest of Ukraine. The Russian policy is left aside here, as it is discussed in my other paper.7

II. Background

Before February 2022, the NGCAs comprised about 30 percent of the former Lugansk oblast and 40 percent of the Donetsk oblast. In 2014, the war was fought throughout the entire region. Many buildings were damaged or destroyed, although different territories sustained uneven damage. While Donetsk city was only destroyed on its edges, Gorlovka (the Donetsk oblast) took a heavy toll in the fighting and supplies hardly reached it. Donetsk and Lugansk airports were destroyed. The frontline town of Uglegorsk (the Donetsk oblast) was almost totally wiped out as a result of ferocious shelling in January 2015. In Lugansk oblast, the worst damage was experienced by heavily bombarded Pervomaisk. Heavily bombed settlements in the countryside, where it has become difficult to sustain life, have suffered most from depopulation, and by early 2016 fewer than 100000 lived in rural areas of the LNR and 110000 in ones of the DNR.8 Devastation of small towns sent resettlers to big cities where they replaced departing middle class urbanites. The NGCAs were left with few farmlands and those that remained had few people to cultivate them. The formerly prosperous region experienced a massive drop in living standards as a consequence of the conflict.

III. Society falls out

Until Euromaidan, no political project of irredentism existed in Donbass where different constituencies co-existed peacefully. However, the violent regime change in Kiev in February 2014 produced repercussions on Donbass and gave impetus to two narratives in this region. One narrative was that of vulnerability and apprehension of political and cultural transformation. According to a Research & Branding poll taken in December 2013, 81 percent of population in Donbass did not support the Maidan protests against President Viktor Yanukovich.9 The other narrative was the one of liberation. Younger and previously unknown figures came out at the time of Euromaidan to articulate this new narrative, becoming actors and ideologues of the Russian Spring movement.

Thus, people started to confront identity choices that they had not been previously conscious of. The emerging worldviews amongst the population now included the idea of repeating the Crimean scenario by joining Russia. This momentous event opened a window of opportunity, unthinkable since the collapse of the USSR, as moving borders now appeared possible. The May 2014 referenda on "sovereignty" took place in that atmosphere. By that time, the Ukrainian government has already launched the Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO), labelling the Donbass protesters as "terrorists".

Not everybody in Donbass shared the rebellious position. There were different views that supported the Ukrainian unitary statehood. "National-democratic" parties had their modest followings in the region. Bearers of strong pro-Ukrainian identity - many among the cultural intelligentsia, NGOs, private business, and employers of administrative bodies - left the region. They relocated to Kiev, Mariupol and Dnipro after the initial conflict developed into a full-fledged war.10 The remaining population of NGCAs regarded what happened in Donbass as an act of aggression by the Ukrainian state, considering the Euromaidan as an anti-constitutional coup. People tried to maintain relations with those who found themselves on the other side of the conflict divide, but this often involved conflict avoidance, meaning that political positions were not discussed. Many old friendships with Kiev-based people were disrupted and what stayed were mostly family ties.

Language and information space altered, as the Russian language became predominant. In the same vein as the Russian channels got banned in the Government-Controlled Areas (GCA) of Ukraine, Ukrainian TV channels now had no

reception in the NGCAs, although they still could be watched online or via privately-owned satellite dishes. Anyway, the audience for them now was activated only at a time of major events, such as elections. Otherwise, the "republics" had their own broadcasting channels and printed media, but their populations largely watched the Russian federal channels.

As the time passed, a new identity has been formed among the populations which remained on the territories of the DNR and the LNR. This identity distinguished those who remained from those who left. It was no longer a regional ("Donbass") identity with a cultural and historical closeness to Russia and a pride of being an industrial region, but the identity of a society that went through the hell of a devastating war and surviving on the war-torn territories. This identity cannot be understood without a reference to the (post)war experience. After eight years, little connected societies on the two opposing sides. The image of a "life in Ukraine" was fading in the collective memory of Donbass while Ukraine itself has transformed since the region was cut off, and it got harder for the populations of the DNR and the LNR to imagine what their lives would be like in reunited Ukraine. These populations lost a habit of Ukrainian speech and children did not really know "Ukraine". The young generation was "burnt by the war and matured early. They know that death exists and value life", told me a mother from Donetsk, and "see their future with Russia".11

IV. Kiev shuts the mousetrap

The seeds of detachment were sown early on. When the rupture happened in 2014, the people of Donbass were angry and bitter towards "Ukraine", but it was still their country. However, the government in Kiev, instead of offering an olive branch, took steps to cut them off. Arguably, such policy was not in Ukraine's best interests, if the government intended to peacefully reintegrate the region. Barriers were erected instead. Freedom of movement has been limited by a permit system introduced on 21 January 2015 by a Temporary Order from the Ukrainian government.12 Going through checkpoints was difficult, as this required possession of a permit approved by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and issued by the ATO command. Roads were frequently closed, and queues could be hours long. Crossing into the LNR was only possible by foot over a damaged bridge which was unusable for vehicles. Families have been disunited. Taking a minor through a checkpoint required legal consent of both parents. Checkpoints were frequently closed and residents had to travel long distances which was expensive and inconvenient. For example, the LNR had only one checkpoint for the entire territory, and the government in Kiev did not want to authorize opening another one.

Access to benefits and pensions was made more difficult by a requirement to reregister by the government in Kiev. The Ukrainian authorities tried to clamp down on "pension tourism" and warned that those who obtained payments illegally would be required to pay them back. Exchange of goods with the GCA has been restricted. Kiev's prohibition on commercial ties by a Temporary Order on 21 January 2015 was tightened in summer 2015. Moreover, in 2017 Kiev introduced a ban on commercial interaction with the territories, knee-capping their economies that were just recovering from the war. All supplies apart from humanitarian aid were criminalised.

As seen from the NGCAs, de facto authorities did not wish to disrupt connections and were keen to preserve industrial links. However, conscious efforts have been made by Kiev to cut infrastructural connections that used to be a part of the same regional system. For example, the main Lugansk power station was located in Schast'ye in GCA, which supplied electricity to the whole oblast, and any disruption inflicted hardship on the LNR. There have been cuts in gas supply because at certain points the lever was on the

Kiev government's side, and NGCAs ended up receiving deliveries directly from Russia to satisfy their energy needs. The main leverage was control over water from Severskii Donets canal, where the government in Kiev had an upper hand, and a threat of water cuts was always present. As survival was made as hard as possible, the turn towards self-sufficiency and reorientation towards Russia became more pronounced.

By 2017, it was getting clearer that a "Different Ukraine" was not going to materialise. The political and social processes that went on in the Ukraine showed that the country has followed a different trajectory and that the "Different Ukraine" vision was no longer applicable. This was noticeable in cultural transformation, including the approach to teaching history and the "de-Communisation laws" that banned the use of imagery and memories from the Soviet era. Laws on Language and Education banned the use of Russian in the official sphere as well as in schools and higher education.

The Ukrainian policy was disappointing for Donbass. Resentful of President Petro Poroshenko (June 2014 - May 2019), who ordered the Ukrainian army into Donbass, the population was enthused by Volodymyr Zelensky when in 2019 he ran for presidency on a pro-peace ticket. His "Servant of the People" TV series were popular and, as put by a Lugansk interlocutor, "the population would have voted for him with both hands if they were allowed to".13 However, they were unable to do so, as the 2019 Electoral Code made it virtually impossible for those from the self-proclaimed republics to vote in the Ukrainian elections.

Instead, President Zelensky, on whom hopes were pinned, went on air in August 2021 to advise those with a pro-Russia orientation to leave for Russia now because "there will be no happiness for these people [in Donbass]".14 Zelensky spoke in Russian to have his message heard. The parliament and its members, elected on a Russia-friendly ticket, were felt as a let-down, as they failed to initiate legislation on reintegration and on amnesty that could alleviate security fears. People from Donbass felt that they had reasons to be afraid after cases of detentions on the government-controlled territory for "collaboration with the enemy", which could involve anybody who held an administrative job. The COVID-19 pandemic was the last nail in the coffin when, in 2020, cross-line movement dropped 95 percent from a previous 1.1 million monthly crossings.15 In March that year, Kiev introduced restrictions, the "republics" retaliated, and the barriers never came down. Only very determined pensioners still ventured to draw their Ukrainian pensions.

V. The mouse got out, but at a price

Apart from managing basic supplies and services as they could, strengthening defences was a necessity for the NGCAs. According to the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, up to 80 percent of civilian live-fire casualties routinely occurred on the "republics" side.16 This happened because these territories were urban and populous and city quarters were in the direct line of shelling and sniper fire of the Ukrainian army. Infrastructure continued to sustain direct war damage when the Ukrainian fire hit water and electricity facilities and the flooding of abandoned mines affected water levels. In autumn 2021, some towns, such as Roven'ki, could not start their central heating systems because of water shortages, as supply lines were bombed out.17

About 20 ceasefires that had been agreed failed to make tangible difference on reduction of hostilities, with the exception of the August 2020 - February 2021 ceasefire. The hotspots remained the same: frontline Gorlovka, suburbs of Mariupol and the area between Alexandrovka and Mar'yinka in the Donetsk city suburbs, as well as the former elite property district of Peski. In 2021, there was a new trend of intensifying electronic warfare.18

The self-proclaimed republics established their armed forces. Two Corps were set up in the DNR and the LNR respectively, with Russian weapons, equipment and military supervision. A large contingent was concentrated at Yasinovataya, 7th brigade was based at Debaltsevo, 9th marine regiment - near Mariupol and 100th brigade - near Alexandrovka. The Corps' command consisted of retired Russian officers alongside local officers. Given that modern warfare is fought by professionals, the aspiration was to create a professional army out of original groups of volunteer combatants. However, the process was haphazardous, corruption in procurement was rampant and the main reason for enlisting was high unemployment. Lack of transparency and of unified command that the DNR and LNR authorities resisted left the fighting capabilities modest. The local political leadership and the military hierarchy seemed disjointed and competed to be recognised as the main authority for giving military orders.

Before February 2021, the last time when a bout of intense military hostilities took place was early 2018. By the late 2021, a war was in the air. Several incidents took place that increased the feeling of insecurity. On 13 October, Andrey Kosyak, a representative of the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination of Ceasefire and Stabilisation of the Line of Delimitation of the Parties (JCCC) from the LNR side, was detained in the deconflicting zone at Zolotoye19 during the agreed clean-up works on a highway. Kosyak was put on trial in Ukraine. On 26 October, a "Bayraktar TB-2" armed drone procured in 2018 from Turkey was first used in Donbass. Whether or not this was the intended effect, it scared the population and prompted the discourse that Kiev wanted only the territory emptied out of its people. They would be eliminated by armed drones for Donbass to become "virgin lands". According to an increasingly popular discourse, a war could reignite, caused by a series of accidents. Blogs and social media discussed whether the Ukrainian army was likely to launch a military offensive, and residents started to pack their grab bags again.20 Shortly after, the Armed Forces of Ukraine captured Staromar'yivka village in the neutral zone next to the Donetsk area. It was an extraordinary development, given that territorial configuration did not change since 2016.

To sum up, during the limbo period the two self-proclaimed republics did not expand into the territories that they originally held in Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts and where referenda got organised. However, they did not lose either and managed to defend themselves militarily when challenged. Neither side acquired an advantage over the other, but the toll on the republics was greater. Constant insecurity affected the attitudes towards the Minsk peace process. There was a strong perception that Kiev was waging war by both overt and subversive means which included violent acts such as the assassinations of prominent commanders. The question in people's mind was "if Kiev signed the Minsk Agreements, why does it continue to bomb us and want to make us feel vulnerable?"

VI. Dealing with the consequences

In 2014, the "Russian Spring" that brought together adherents from Russia, Donbass, the rest of Ukraine and from further afield, brought aspirations to Donbass not only of protecting itself from the Ukrainian military advances, but also of building a fair and humane society on the territories that emerged. In the Russian Spring period, non-state armed actors operated independently and at will, motivated by their beliefs and motivations. However, their powers and often physical survival did not outlive the time of recovery. Most of the indigenous commanders were killed in the 2015-2017 period, and those who survived, learnt to tread the line. The original leaders who came from Russia in 2014, such as Igor Strelkov and Alexander Borodai, were banned from entering the region for a fear of reviving the spirit of rebellion.

The recovery period witnessed establishment of an administrative system based on inherited governance institutions, but with depleted cadre. Basic service delivery was ensured, but citizens' participation was undermined, even though it was the driving force behind the uprising.

The next thing to come was the time of "detachment" when bureaucratic routine replaced the charisma and energy of the field commanders, and "Novorossiya" liberation project lost much of its emotional appeal. It was not that the Novorossiya idea had been abandoned, but its hold became attenuated: pulled apart by petty schemes and struggles for power and resources. The DNR's and LNR's top figures changed. The DNR's head Alexander Zakharchenko's assassination in 2018 affected the quality of the republic's leadership, as his successor Denis Pushilin did not have the same legitimacy as charismatic Zakharchenko with his battle-worn reputation. Leonid Pasechnik was a more compelling figure than his predecessor and the former LNR "premier" Igor Plotnitsky and the situation in the LNR has stabilised after he came to power. Pushilin and Pasechnik were elected in 2018 with no real competition, with many believing that their victory was orchestrated.

Those high aspirations that had accompanied the Russian Spring did not come true at the time. What came instead were "survival" entities: the republics could defend themselves if challenged, but they were not inspiring places to live. Power was ultimately vested in an unaccountable elite who governed with little reference to the rule of law and were quite prepared to alter it when expedient. Criticism and dissent were suppressed in political systems that were only ultimately accountable to those who ran it.21

Periodically, Moscow's will was successfully resisted. An expected merger of the DNR and LNR did not occur, though Russia sought to persuade the two to integrate. The LNR elite was reluctant to do so, in a belief that they would lose out in appointments to a more powerful Donetsk. The republics maintained a "border" between the two, introduced taxes and custom controls, and treated this "border" as an income-generating opportunity of collecting customs fees. Crossing the "border" for ordinary residents was difficult and sometimes impossible, which negatively affected Lugansk residents who tried to access more developed services, such as private COVID-19 tests, in Donetsk. Only in October 2021, the "border" was dismantled and customs checks abolished.

The changes to the domestic situation in the territories came in 2021, when de facto integration into Russian internal systems became noticeable. Legislation was harmonised to match the Russian law. Russian Labour Code was adopted. Russian social security (SNILS) numbers, education and healthcare systems were all introduced, while local higher education degrees got accepted on par with the Russian ones. The pandemic also reinforced the process of inclusion into the Russian space, as vaccines and medical supplies came from Russia.

Russian institutions could not be formally represented in the territories, and Moscow's policy was carried out by "curators". Distribution networks and access to resources were dependent on proximity to such curators who held the purse strings.22 They were appointed to perform the functions of oversight and management supervision, but actually they often were a part of the local circle of nepotism, and their financial controls were largely ineffective.

VII. Economy as a weak spot

Following the 2017 economic ban, the territories were unable to become self-sufficient, although they used to be net contributors to the Ukrainian state budget before. That happened because they fell out of the legal economic space and entered the world of shades.

The Donbass is a large industrial region. It used to be Ukraine's powerhouse, but the republics' assets had experienced considerable deindustrialisation and had been reduced to shadows of their former glory. Their economic decline was apparent, as production cycles were disrupted and high-tech businesses withdrew. After the ban, the DNR's and LNR's enterprises lost access to legitimate financial transactions and exports. They had to trade with the outside world through the bottleneck of murky South Ossetian-registered enterprises of the exiled Ukrainian oligarch Sergei Kurchenko. They were not admitted into the Russian formal economic system until late 2021 when concessions started to be made. The state of the banking sector reverted to the 1990s, servicing only local transactions and unable to provide business loans. Trade in metals and coal nevertheless continued in the form of clandestine operations that involved several business groupings, including those from Ukraine.

The local industry functioned on resources that were nearing exhaustion. Even economically viable factories and enterprises periodically had to suspend operations or even to close down because their workforce had emigrated. Kurchenko, in his term, was driving the Donbass industries to destitution, and they accumulated huge wages arrears. In 2021, strikes were called at the Alchevsk Metal Works by workers demanding overdue wages. The responsible economic agent was changed by Moscow that brought a certain stabilisation, but it was obvious that the matters went too far and could not be rescued without a massive assistance package and radical reform. These could not happen in the conditions of limbo.

Some unintended consequences of Russian support also played their role. The "passportisation", i. e. the move to allow the DNR and LNR residents to take up Russian internal ID documents, should be interpreted in light of the faltering economy. Possession of a passport does not have to be equated with a feeling of citizenship, loyalty and belonging, because for many it was a matter of convenience. Announced by President Putin in 2019, the intake was slow at first, but the situation changed in 2020 after the crossing points with Ukraine's government-controlled territory were closed. Access to Russia and benefits that the Russian government paid were all that the residents were left with. The uptake of Russian passports grew. By 15 February 2022, 860000 residents of Donbass received them.23

The major effect of passportisation was economic migration. People packed up and left for Russia where living standards were higher, as they saw no future in the NGCAs.24 It was clear that allocation of passports without development and security would lead to the gradual emptying of the territories. The region already witnessed an exodus of middle class and younger, more qualified workforce, and the trend was set to continue.

VIII. Political and civil activism could not flourish

In NGCAs, the conflict was largely seen as externally driven. The dominant geopolitical narrative framed the conflict as a "clash of civilisations" and a U.S.-Russia proxy war. The civilisational aspect was seen as "the non-West" showing the limits to "the West" on its power and expansion. The West was regarded as a party to the conflict rather than an impartial outsider. It was suspected to be culturally resentful of the people of Donbass because of their pro-Russian orientation, "outdated" beliefs, and traditional values. In that narrative, Kiev had limited powers of agency: the West would not allow the settlement in Donbass to happen even if Ukrainian lawmakers agreed to it, similarly to the situation with the failure of the Kozak Memorandum on Transdniestria/Moldova in 2003.

This interpretative lens accounted for fear of a "colour revolution" through nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), civil-minded independent groups, and forces outside of the governing structures. This explained a move against the organisation

"Responsible Citizens" (that was registered in the GCA in 2016 but had operated in Donetsk oblast) and arrests of public intellectuals, such as religious scholar Igor Kozlovsky. "Responsible Citizens", who used to receive support from several international NGOs, fell afoul of the authorities by going beyond a humanitarian brief. "Responsible Citizens" did not hide their moderate pro-Ukrainian position and were vulnerable to an accusation of a lack of patriotism.25

After those suspected of spying or dissident activities were locked up or forced to leave, public expression of political opposition became limited.26 Spy mania and a search for the "fifth column" tend to run high in political situations characteristic of wartimes. The number of those respondents from the DNR, who considered that a functioning political opposition was needed, decreased from 69 percent in January 2016 to 62 percent in June of the same year.27

Little diluted a closed-up public atmosphere because activities of international NGOs and foundations, and visits of foreign journalists were few. Neither the authorities of the DNR and the LNR encouraged openness, nor did the Kiev side. Travelling via Russia was considered illegal and punishable by Kiev while international assistance was not seen as needed. In 2017, pressures from de facto authorities on international humanitarian NGOs intensified, and most were banned from the region for no apparent reason. The United Nations (UN), Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) kept strictly within the confines of their mandates, and suspicions of deviation got them into trouble. The war situation was dangerous for international organisations, and both ICRC and OSCE had international staff killed in Donbass.

In these circumstances, people saw their basic welfare tied to Russia that provided essential social payments.28 A "coordinator of non-humanitarian assistance" Alexander Zhuchkovsky estimated that from April to October 2015 Moscow spent 150 billion roubles (USD 2.42 billion) on civilian aid alone.29 By 2016, the DNR and LNR authorities established an aid distribution capacity and a system for payment of pensions and social benefits that supplemented those gotten on the Ukrainian side. While main subsidies came from the Russian budget, Russian charity groups were also funded through private donations. For example, the Novorossiya Movement established by the former DNR "commander-in-chief" Igor Strelkov and various Russian Orthodox and Cossack grassroots organisations, such as Georgievskyi Cossack Humanitarian Battalion, focused on the vulnerable people in small towns and villages.

IX. What about the future?

What distinguished the DNR and LNR residents from most other people was the lack of chance to plan any future ahead. No compelling vision could be developed amidst continued uncertainty of where things were going. Three options were simultaneously proclaimed by politicians: moving back to Ukraine on the basis of the Minsk Agreements,30 joining Russia, or entrenching own "statehood". Given that there was no accord on which was the preferred option, the public was left confused trying to guess what the real plan was among those who decided on their future.31

Perspectives on what should happen were not uniform, but the overall climate was unfavourable for political reintegration. An anti-Ukrainian narrative was strong in spite of everything that the republics went through at the hands of their own leaderships: banditry, proliferation of rebel militias, and Russia's reluctance to take the DNR and the LNR in during the inter-war period. According to interlocutors and closed polls, most ordinary people cherished the dream that Russia would eventually accept them in. However, the local leaderships had to adhere in public to the provisions of the Minsk Agreements, i. e. Ukraine's territorial integrity and a "special status" for Donbass. Thus,

the narrative of becoming a part of Russia could not be openly announced, though local politicians, as well as state-affiliated Russian media personalities periodically raised the subject.

2015-2016 polls suggested that support for reintegration into Ukraine has not disappeared in the earlier years. Data illustrates this: according to a June 2015 poll by the DNR-registered sociological centre "Osobyi status", 10 percent of respondents would agree to a special status within Ukraine. In another poll, conducted for 18 months (January 2015 - June 2016), the constituency wishing to return to Ukraine remained largely stable, with a slight increase up to 15 percent.32 Further on, about 24 percent of respondents in 2019 thought the DNR/LNR should return to Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts.33 However, the Minsk Agreements that were initially viewed positively as they reduced the level of hostilities, progressively lost their value. Special status was not what the war was fought for and it remained an amorphous and abstract idea, which the years that passed since failed to fill with practical content.

By 2021, no illusions of the two republics' independent agency were left. What started as a people's rebellion, when the region asserted its right to make choices and act upon them, came to the situation that their future was to be determined elsewhere. They could only hope that their interests would not be sacrificed by those who decide for them.

X. In lieu of conclusion: end of an era

The limbo phase that lasted from 2016 to 2022 brought a greater level of security that allowed life in the DNR and the LNR to go on, but that security was brittle and prone to significant disruption. Balancing on the verge of renewal of hostilities necessitated the resources that the republics did not have, which locked them into dependency on the Russian government. The two republics survived as self-governing entities with a political and cultural proximity to Russia and established proto-state institutions, but also experienced governance deficit and a lack of internal coherence behind a façade of unity. The decline that their economies suffered painfully impacted living standards and the territories did not benefit from economic progress that took place in Ukraine or Russia at the time.

The worst was the sense that the clocks have stopped: forward-looking development could not take off in the limbo conditions. Failed expectations from the liberation undermined public morale as these expectations were seemingly leading nowhere and the local leaders could not give coherent answers to difficult questions. In the meantime, Ukraine's intentions were getting clearer and did not appear benevolent for the populations of the DNR and the LNR, while at the same time Russia's plans remained opaque. These plans clarified in February 2022 with Moscow's recognition of the DNR and LNR sovereignty and the start of military campaign although the republics' population largely expected a direct incorporation into Russia. Feasibility of this scenario lies beyond the scope of this paper.

ENDNOTES

1 "DNR" and "LNR" are abbreviations from "Donetskaya narodnaya respublika" and "Luganskaya narodnaya respublika", respectively.

2 Coyle J. Russia's Border Wars and Frozen Conflicts. - Orange: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018; Jensen D. Moscow in the Donbas: Command, Control, Crime, and the Minsk Peace Process. NATO Defence College (NDC) Research Report. - Rome: NATO Defence College, 2017.

3 Potocnak A., Mares M. Donbas conflict: how Russia's Trojan Horse failed and forced Moscow to alter its strategy // Problems of Post-Communism. Fist publ. online. 16 May 2022.

DOI: 10.1080/10758216.2022.2066005. URL: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10758216.2022. 2066005 (accessed 01.06.2022).

4 Matveeva A. No Moscow stooges: identity polarisation and guerrilla movements in Donbass // Journal of Black Sea and South European Studies. 2016. V. 16. No. 1. P. 25-50; Matveeva A. Through Times of Trouble: Conflict in Southeastern Ukraine Explained from Within. - Lanham: Lexington Books, 2018; Matveeva A. Donbas: the post-Soviet conflict that changed Europe // European Politics and Society. 2022. V. 23. No. 3. P. 410-441; Sasse G., Lackner A. Attitudes and Identities across the Donbas Front Line: What Has Changed from 2016 to 2019? Zentrum für Osteuropa und Internationale Studien (ZOIS) Report no. 3/2019. - Berlin: Zentrum für Osteuropa und Internationale Studien, 2019. URL: https://www.zois-berlin.de/fileadmin/media/Dateien/3-Publikationen/ZOiS_Reports/2019/ZOiS_Report_3_2019.pdf (accessed 04.06.2022); Druey C., Hess A., Kaplan J., Cherevatenko V. The Minsk Process: societal perceptions and narratives. OSCE Insight no. 8 // OSCE Insights 2020. - Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2020. P. 113-127; Peace in Ukraine (III): The Costs of War in Donbas. International Crisis Group Europe and Central Asia Report no. 261. - Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2020.

5 Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine. 1 August 2021 - 31 January 2022. UN Office for High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR). - Geneva: OHCHR, 2022. URL: https://www.ohchr.org/sites/ default/files/2022-03/33rdReportUkraine-en.pdf (accessed 04.06.2022).

6 Kornprobst M. Irredentism in European Politics. - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

7 Matveeva A. Donbas: seven years on, peace no more in sight // IFS Insight. Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, Oslo (IFS). 2022. No. 2. URL: https://fhs.brage.unit.no/fhs-xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/2977071/ IFS%20Insight%202_2022% 20web%20version.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (accessed 04.06.2022).

8 Cited in: Кириллов Д., Дергачев В. Зарплата в 10 тысяч рублей в ДНР очень хорошая! // ra3eTa.Ru [Kirillov D., Dergachev V. 10 thousand rubles is a very good salary in the DNR! // Gazeta.ru]. 12.08.2016. URL: http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2016/08/ 09_a_10112825.shtml (accessed 04.06.2022).

9 Копатько Е. 81% жителей Востока Украины не поддерживает события на Майдане и захват обладминистраций [Kopat'ko Ye. 81% of Eastern Ukrainians do not support Maidan and takeovers of regional governments' buildings] // Reporter.ua. 12.02.2014. URL: http://reporter-ua.com/2014/02/12/81-zhiteley-vostoka-ukrainy-ne-podderzhivaet-sobytiya-na-maydane-i-zahvat (accessed 04.06.2022).

10 Author's interview with Sergei Tkachenko, Kiev, October 2014. See also Tkachenko's statement in: Сильная Украина слабого президента [Strong Ukraine of a weak president] // Радио Свобода [Radio Liberty]. 25.05.2014. URL: http://www.svoboda.org/a/25398049.html (accessed 04.06.2022). Радио Свободная Европа/ Радио Свобода внесены Министерством юстиции РФ в реестр СМИ-иноагентов.

11 Author's interview with a female academic from Donetsk, November 2021.

12 Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine. 1 December 2014 to 15 February 2015. - Geneva: UN Office of High Commissioner on Human Rights, 2015. URL: https://reliefweb.int/attachments/8c22b5e6-2b6a-3fff-bd05-60ae604f973b/9thOHCHRreportUkraine.pdf (accessed 04.06.2022).

13 Author's interview with a Lugansk city resident, November 2021.

14 Эксклюзивное интервью президента Украины Владимира Зеленского телеканалу «Дом» [Exclusive Interview by the Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky to the "Dom" TV channel] // Youtube.com. 05.08.2021. URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_v3cLAL48d0 (accessed 04.06.2022).

15 Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine. 1 August 2021 - 31 January 2022. - Geneva, 2022. URL: https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/33rdReportUkraine-en.pdf (accessed 04.06.2022).

16 Conflict in Ukraine's Donbas: A Visual Explainer // International Crisis Group web-site. 2021.

URL: https://www.crisisgroup.org/content/conflict-ukraines-donbas-visual-explainer (accessed 04.06.2022).

17 Author's interview with a Lugansk city respondent, November 2021.

18 Дурнев Д., Ширяев В. «Точки-У» и другие звери // Новая газета ["Tochka-U" and other animals // Novaya gazeta]. 29.03.2021.

19 Neutral territory from where troops and military equipment were pulled out.

20 Author's interview with a Lugansk city resident, November 2021.

21 Author's interview with a "Novaya gazeta" journalist, October 2021.

22 "Kuratory" (curators) were supervisors and mentors that were sent from Russia to the NGCAs to oversee the operations of offices and departments, accompany implementation of policies, offer technical advice, and monitor financial expenditures.

23 The figure was unveiled by a Member of Parliament Viktor Vodolatsky at the State Duma hearing. В Госдуме назвали количество жителей ДНР и ЛНР с российскими паспортами // РИА Новости [[The State Duma cited the number of DNR and LNR residents with Russian passports // RIA Novosti]. 15.12.2021. URL: https://crimea.ria.ru/20220215/v-gosdume-nazvali-kolichestvo-zhiteley-dnr-i-lnr-s-rossiyskimi-pasportami-1122372251.html (accessed 04.06.2022).

24 Author's interview with a Moscow-based journalist from Donbass, October 2021.

25 Никитина Ю. Донецк без ответственных // Фонтанка.ру [Nikitina Yu. Donetsk bez otvetstvennykh // Fontanka.ru]. 09.02.2016. URL: http://www.fontanka.ru/2016/02/09/138 (accessed 04.06.2022).

26 Кириллов Д., Дергачев В. МГБ приходит ночью // Газета.Ру [Kirillov D., Dergachev V. The Ministry of State Security arrives at nights // Gazeta.ru]. 30.01.2016. URL: https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2016/01/ 30_a_8048999.shtml (accessed 04.06.2022).

27 Дергачев В., Кириллов Д. «Хорошего мало, зато нет "бандеров"» // Газета.ру [Dergachev V., Kirillov D. "It is little good, yet there are no 'Banderites'" // Gazeta.ru]. 03.08.2016. URL: http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/ 2016/08/03_a_9747233.shtml#! photo=0 (accessed 04.06.2022).

28 Russia and the Separatists in Eastern Ukraine. International Crisis Group Europe and Central Asia Briefing no. 79. - Kyiv; Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2016. P. 5.

29 Александров Г. Воевать нельзя мириться [Aleksandrov G. (Do not) make war/peace] // The New Times. 07.12.2015.

30 Minsk Agreements - a series of agreements to achieve peace settlement of the conflict in Donbass (southeast Ukraine) that were part of the so-called Minsk Process (summer 2014 - February 2022). This series included the Minsk Protocol of September 5, 2014 (Minsk-1) and Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements, February 11-12, 2015 (Minsk-2).

31 Author's interviews with a Donetsk-based academic and Yevgenii Kopat'ko, October 2021.

32 Дергачев В., Кириллов Д. Там же. [Dergachev V., Kirillov D. Op. cit.].

33 Sasse G., Lackner A. Op. cit.

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