CC BY
63DOMESTIC POLICY OF MODERN GEORGIA
Hrant Mikaelyan
The Domestic Policy of Georgia before Saakashvili’s Presidency
After gaining independence in 1991 chaos reigned in Georgia. The economy totally collapsed due to a number of serious problems. Among them were the lost war with insurgent Abkhazia and Ossetia, the civil war, the collapse of the former governance system. The wrong policies of the authorities, including the initiative by Shevardnadze to deposit funds in the Savings Bank with the promise to return twice the amount, contributed to this as well. In a consequence, the economy of Georgia actually became bankrupt and has not come out of recession to date1.
The first president of Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, initially won the elections by a landslide, securing 86% of votes [2]. In just a few months his rating considerably sank because of his absolutely wrong policy, the opposition intensified and the civil war broke out which had dire consequences for Georgia. Soon Eduard Shevardnadze arrived in Georgia who in his turn won about 80% of the votes.
In the Shevardnadze period, the clan structure of Georgia was particularly obvious. His party consisted of two groups - “men of the old school” who were his friends and relatives, and young reformers. The Shevardnadze regime considered the stability their main achievement, meanwhile there had been no promised economic development* 1 2. The reformist wing of The Union of Citizens of Georgia - the ruling
* Researcher at the Caucasus Institute.
1 Among the republics of South Caucasus only Georgia failed to regain the economic development level of the Soviet period. For example, the purchasing power parity per capita in 2007 prices for Georgian SSR in 1985 constituted $7,604, whereas in 2007 - $4,400. For comparison, in Armenia it was $5,693 in 2007. Other than Georgia, also Ukraine, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan failed to meet their Soviet-time standards. [1, pp. 195-198]
2 The economic growth in 1996-1997 changed to stagnation. In 1996 and 1997 the economy of Georgia was growing at a rate of 110-111%, while in 1998-2002 the economic growth was 1-5% annually hardly felt by the population.
See: CIS Statistics Committee, Georgia. cisstat.org/rus/georg.html; Department of Statistics of the Ministry of Economic Development of Georgia, statistics.ge
78
«21st CENTURY», № 1 (7), 2010
H.Mikaelyan
party of Georgia, included those who later became the leaders of the future revolution – Zurab Zhvania, Nino Burdjanadze, Mikhail Saakashvili, Vano Merabishvili, Gia Bokeria and many others. Zurab Zhvania and Nino Burdjanadze held the post of the Parliament Speaker, while Mikhail Saakashvili used to be the Minister of Justice. This is rather typical for the post-Soviet space when the former high-ranking officials from among the young reformers become oppositionists and demand for the revolutionary change of power in the country.
In the 1990s Georgia was like many other post-Soviet countries: abuse of power by officials, mass corruption, plundering international grants and humanitarian aid that Georgia have been receiving for quite a long time. Additionally, there were bread coupons, interruptions of electricity supply, campfires in the yards, and many more. Georgia faced two frozen conflicts – with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in both which it had been defeated. Determining the reasons for these defeats is beyond the scope of this article.
In the first half of the 1990s Georgia was in real chaos – petty rulers controlled most of the country, the roads were unsafe, and the private property and the very life of the citizens in general were not protected either. The crime rates were very high and criminal elements were rampant. In addition, Aslan Abashidze’s Adzharia was out of control; it was a unique phenomenon in Georgia of those times.
In 1991, then President Zviad Gamsakhurdia handpicked Aslan Abashidze1 as the leader of Adzharia. Abashidze created a model of “quasi-state” in Adzharia. Here are some facts that characterize it: (1) Over the whole period of Abashidze’s rule not a single cent was transferred to the state budget of Georgia; (2) with the help from Russia Abashidze managed to avoid the civil war spreading over Adzharia; (3) Adzharia, in fact, had a state border and checkpoints not only with Turkey but also with the rest of Georgia; (4) Adzharia had semblance of state structures functioning in a regular state, such as parliament, armed forces, which consisted of the 25th Brigade of the Armed Forces of Georgia with rather large number personnel by Georgian standards - up to 3000 soldiers; (5) control over the sea port and all the profits from the business on the sea and transit to Turkey from the whole post-Soviet space; (6) there was no economic collapse in Adzharia; (7) The regime of Abashidze in fact had a Ministry of Foreign Affairs masked under the office of the Assembly of European Regions; (8) Abashidze pursued independent
1 At the time Zviad Gamsakhurdia stated to the parliament members: “those who support the independence of Georgia will vote for Aslan Abashidze”.
79
H.Mikaelyan
<21st CENTURY», № 1 (7), 2010
foreign policy, and he had some success in that – he gained the support of Russia and Council of Europe1.
However, the differences of Georgia from other post-Soviet countries are remarkable. Firstly, although Georgia is very rich in water resources, the problems with the electricity supply lasted longer. Back in 2000 the capital of Georgia was still in darkness. Secondly, political instability had manifested itself in quite frequent attempts on the president’s life. Thirdly, Georgia had virtually no combat-fit army; the armed forces numbered 12,000, and the conscription was accomplished only by 3-10%. Fourthly, in Georgia the third sector and free mass media developed rather fast, and Zurab Zhvania played a major role in the development of the non-governmental organizations. This circumstance turned into a ground for the future revolution.
President Saakashvili and Georgia in 2003-2008
The aforementioned was all what Georgia entered into the 21st century with and later met the “Rose revolution.” As one may guess, the effect of the revolution was the change of situation to a completely opposite one. Thus, the first step made was strengthening of the president’s power. It was followed by the arrests and repressions of the old corrupted officials, caused among other things, by the fact that it was impossible to implement all the populist promises given to the people before, and scapegoats had to be found before the winter. At the elections on January 4, 2004 Saakashvili won 97% of votes, and his victory was much more convincing than the ones of his forerunners.
What has been done after that may be called a state creation process. Saakashvili chose the way of creating an authoritarian and sometimes even dictatorial line of command. He relied on the military and police, and because Saakashvili trusted to a restricted circle of people, the rotation of the ministers on different posts has been going on since that time and to date. In average, every minister holds the same position for a half a year to a year. Thus, sometimes the Minister of Education moves to the post of the Minister of the Defense and the Minister of Defense is tasked to find new markets for wine. The only irreplaceable official is the Minister of the Interior Vano Merabishvili1 2.
1 In 1992, the president of Russia Boris Yeltsin bestowed the rank of General-Major to the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Adzharia and in 2004 Walter Schwimmer Secretary General of the Council of Europe saw no problem when the police broke up a rally in Adzharia before his eyes.
2 It has to be mentioned that it was the forced resignation of the Minister of Interior Kakha Targamadze in 2001, who was the right hand of Shevardnadze, that made the regime helpless against the November 2003 revolution.
80
«21st CENTURY», № 1 (7), 2010
H.Mikaelyan
In May 2004 Saakashvili organized a velvet revolution in Adzharia and overthrew Aslan Abashidze; the corruption and bribery were reduced, traffic police was abolished and this solved the problem of the budget revenue. The military and police expenses grew rapidly, and the funding of army, which was about $30 million annually before Saakashvili, have increased 30 times and reached $1 billion by 2007. The funding of police and state security constituted about half of that amount. At the same time, the allocations for social needs, education and health grew slower1.
The Economy of Georgia, 2003-2008
Table 1
Economic growth Budget revenue of Georgia, billion lari Defense expenses, billion lari Social expenses billion lari
2003 +11.1% 1.321 61.2 342.5
2004 +5.9% 2.283 160.4 481.2
2005 +9.6% 3.257 396.0 625.1
2006 +9.4% 4.430 722.2 690.1
2007 +12.3% 6.032,5 1502.9 640.1
2008 +2.3%
Sources: Georgian Statistical Yearbook, 2008, p. 247;
Cisstat.org, Georgia cisstat.org/rus/georg.html;
IMF World Economic Outlook imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/02/weodata/index.aspx
The personnel number of the Georgian armed forces has grown three times and now totals to 36.5 thousand. Saakashvili declared merciless war on the criminals and local arbitrariness and almost completely eliminated them within two years. The problems with electricity were solved rather easily. It should be mentioned that Georgia had a potential to solve them, as one of the main reasons for the lack of power and heating was the resale of electricity to Turkey. Steps were taken towards creation of a rule-of-law state but all this was done by nondemocratic means.
1 Thus, the overall defense, Interior Ministry and state security expenses in 2003 constituted 10.9% of the expenditure budget; in 2007 they constituted 36.6% of all the expenses.
81
H.Mikaelyan
<21st CENTURY», № 1 (7), 2010
The official repatriation declared by the government, as well as the confrontation with Moscow in 2005-06 and the expulsion of the Georgian citizens from Russia yielded some results – in 2005 the number of those who entered country was by 76.3 thousand more than those who left it. Despite the official rhetoric of the Georgian authorities, the Russian embargo on some Georgian products seriously affected the Georgian economy. This problem was partially solved by total privatization and economic reforms carried out by the Minister of Economy Kakha Bendukidze who used the slogan “we will sell everything but our conscience.” Later, a new post was created special for him – the State Minister for Coordination of Economic Reforms – and in that capacity he continued implementing his at times radical reforms. As a result of privatization and a number of other actions, as well as repatriation of a considerable number of Georgian citizens, the government of Georgia gained considerable tangible assets that boosted the development of the country for several years.
Table 2
The dynamics of the number of the analytical programmes with political debates in 2003-2008
TV October 2003 October 2006 March 2008
Rustavi-2 1 daily programme 1 weekly programme 2 weekly programmes
Imedi (Hope) 1 daily/1 weekly programme 2 weekly programmes Channel closed
First Public Television of Georgia 1 daily/1 weekly programme None 1 daily programme
Mze (Sun) 1 daily programme None None
9 Arkhi (9 Channel) 1 daily programme Channel closed Channel closed
Iberia 1 daily programme Channel closed Channel closed
Kavkasia 1 daily programme 1daily programme 1 daily programme
202 None 1 daily/1 weekly programme Channel closed
The situation for2003 and2006— from the book "հծյծէոօոցըէ^ոհ Յոէ^օձօյ՚ըյէոօ (™ծ6(օՑծ^ձ° ", p 212 (“Political Landscape in Georgia”, in Georgian).
Interestingly, Saakashvili’s administration also restricted free mass media. For instance, in 2005 “Samshoblo” publishing house was closed, the building of which was home to many editorial offices of the oppositional newspapers and TV
82
«21st CENTURY», № 1 (7), 2010
H.Mikaelyan
companies. Privatization and resale of the building to a foreign investor was the pretext for that, but even as of now (2010) this building in the downtown is still deserted. Some TV companies were closed and others were subject to pressures (see Table 2).
In addition to the aforementioned, the following features can describe Saakashvili’s administration:
• The current authorities of Georgia are “the strong hand” the Georgian people had been longing for in the period of chaos; and several years later they were disillusioned with it;
• The revolution resulted in the growth of the democratic rhetoric and the decline of the level of democracy - that very specific level which allowed revolution to take place [3, с. 13];
• The marked messianism of Saakashvili: the president of Georgia describes most of his initiatives as “the first time in the history of Georgia”, “for the first time in Europe” (or even in the world). This can be added by regularly drawing of parallels between himself and the historical kings of Georgia, and first of all David the Builder. This gave some analysts ground to believe that one of Saakashvili’s goals is “to leave a mark in the history of Georgia”.
• Saakashvili is a charismatic leader. He is emotional, aggressive and vigorous in attaining goals. This could be vividly seen during the events in 2001-2003 when he did not settle for a minor role and managed to win initially stronger competitors represented by the ruling party, the Labour party, Zhvania’s and Burdjanadze’s party, and Abashidze’s “Revival” party.
• Saakashvili set a course for radical “westernization” of the country and carries it out through tough reforms. The orientation to the West is combined with anti-Russian rhetoric. In a consequence, this causes confrontation with a considerable part of population who consider themselves deceived and estranged.
From the very beginning Saakashvili drew attention to the mystique and symbolism, and sometimes even to the “magic of numbers”, linking all of his large-scale initiatives to religious holydays and other memorable dates and hinting that it was predestined. However, later on the opposition adopted this method and he dropped it.
83
H.Mikaelyan «21st CENTUR Y», № 1 (7), 2010
The Issue of Abkhazia and South Ossetia
As one may probably notice, one very important issue remained undiscussed; the issue of secessionist republics Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which won their independence in a result of wars in 1991-1994. Georgians are very emotional people. The image of the warrior Georgian takes a prominent place in their national myth. The issue of the separated regions for Georgia is above all an emotional matter – a matter of hurt dignity.
According to the official data, the number of Georgian refugees from Abkhazia is 300-500 thousand. In reality, this number is significantly overstated. In 1989, 239 thousand Georgians lived in Abkhazian ASSR; the 2003 census showed that there are about 45 thousand Georgians (including those who called themselves Mingrelians) living in Abkhazia1. Taking into consideration that over the aforementioned period the natural population increase was nil and most of the refugees left for Russia, their overall number may constitute 200±5 thousand and no more than a half of them live in Georgia today.
Saakashvili’s populist promises made during the pre-election campaign, his ideas of messianism and later the acute lack of legitimacy make him take active steps in regard to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Among them the followings stand out: the local military confrontation in the firing line with South Ossetia (2004); shutting down the contraband market in Ergneti, off which most of the population of South Ossetia lived (2005); setting control over the Kodori Gorge, renaming it North Abkhazia and locating there an alternative administration (2007); creation of the alternative government headed by Dmitri Sanoyev in the part of South Ossetia controlled by Georgia (2007); launching propagandist “Alania” TV Channel (2007) and as a culmination, the military conflict with South Ossetia which immediately turned into an interstate conflict with Russia in August 2008.
The issue of the separated regions is still topical for Georgia. A part of population still expects reclaiming them for Georgia, while the other part accepts that they are irretrievably lost. If before the August War the number of the first group exceeded considerably that of the second group, today one may assume that those groups are equal in number.
1 The results of the census in Abkhazia from 1897 to 2003 http://www.ethno-kavkaz.narod.ru/rnabkhazia.html
84
«21st CENTUR Y», № 1 (7), 2010 H.Mikaelyan
Political Opposition in Georgia: Origins and Current Situation
The parliamentary elections in 2003 were the most competitive ones ever in Georgia. Six political forces cleared the 7% barrier. The alternative poll carried out by the non-governmental organization “Fair elections” showed somewhat different results. Here the percentage of the votes secured by opposition parties was higher than in the official reports and, correspondingly, the results of the government were lower. After his resignation, on November 25 Shevardnadze admitted that the elections were falsified. Their results were overturned and new elections were set in spring 2004.
Table 3
The results of the parliamentary election in 2003-2008
Elections 2.11.2003 28.3.2004 21.5.2008
For New Georgia 21.32%
Revival 18.84% 3.86%
National Movement 18.80% 66.24% 59.18%
Burdjanadze - Democrats 8.79%
Labour Party 12.04% 6.01% 7.44%
New Rights Party 7.82% 7.56%
United Opposition 17.73%
Republican Party 3.78%
Christian-Democrat Movement 8.66%
By early 2004 the situation had radically changed. The parties which did not take part in the “Rose revolution” were marginalized in the eyes of the public and isolated by the official propaganda. However, the authoritarian methods of ruling caused growth of the number of its opponents and its rating began falling right after the presidential election when Saakashvili secured about 97% of votes.
At the 2004 elections the authorities mustered 66% of the votes and took 220 out of 235 seats in the parliament. Amid the growth of public concern such ratio did not reflect the real popularity of the political parties in the society. The parliament started to be perceived as something non-legitimate, especially when its powers were trimmed under the strong president. The policy implemented by the new authorities outlined new marginal circles, which included various strata
85
H.Mikaelyan
<21st CENTURY», № 1 (7), 2010
of the society. At first, it was intelligentsia from Tbilisi, then street traders, the representatives of different parties. The metaphor of Saakashvili about the moving train and those who do not get on board will be left behind, in fact, can be paraphrased as “those who are not with us are against us”. Eventually, that policy turned against himself.
The forces weakened by the post-revolutionary developments became stronger riding on the wave of radical criticisms of the government, and the ruling block began splitting into parts and groups, as for example, the Republican Party. The centre of the political activity gradually shifted from parliament to the TV and then to the streets. The public protest reached its height in 2007. In September a test meeting took place and in November the protest action began. Judging by the number of the participants it was the most large-scale action in the history of the post-Soviet Georgia. However, as the programmes of the parties differed and they changed constantly during the rally and, due to natural causes, the number of the participants reduced rapidly, on November 7 the rally was broken up, and declaration of the state of emergency ensued with ban of oppositional channels broadcasting.
The opposition adopted many of the methods used by Saakashvili several years before, but the main differences were the absence of a charismatic leader and strategic action-plan. Their consolidation was based on the protest against authorities. However, the coalition of the oppositional parties never discussed what they should have done next. The preliminary consensus was the creation of the parliamentary republic. The opposition vacated their seats in the parliament won in 2008 and renounced the results of the elections. The street protests continued from April to September 2009, which finally came to nothing.
The tension arisen after the election of Saakashvili has been easing and intensifying again in the recent years, but the protest remains rather strong. Of course, it is very difficult to talk about the exact numbers, but one may try making some assessments based on a number of public opinion polls and recent elections.
The ratio can be approximately estimated in the following way: in the capital city: supporters – 30%, opponents – 50%, the rest are not sure/undecided; in the regions – supporters – 40%, opponents – 15%, the rest either hesitate or are indifferent to the domestic political struggle.
As for the external powers, Russia, till recently, supported Igor Giorgadze who used to be the Minister of State Security of Georgia but who has been accused in arranging attempt on E. Shevardnadze’s life and fled to Moscow back in the 90s. This fig-
86
«21st CENTURY», № 1 (7), 2010
H.Mikaelyan
ure had been finally marginalized in Georgia in 2005-2006, but Moscow could not find any alternative. Washington prefers cooperating with several groups simultaneously as to avoid problematic situations.
If one tries to simulate the situation in future, no dynamic developments are expected because Saakashvili’s failures recur both in domestic and international policies. At the same time, opposition proved unable overthrowing Saakashvili and consolidating for any serious goal. It seems the number of people disappointed in politics of the country grows with time.
In the domestic policy, “national treachery” and “collaboration with Russia” mostly used by the official circles remain the main arguments.
Religion in the Politics of Georgia
One of the main peculiarities of post-Soviet Georgia is the marked religiousness of the population and the factual involvement of the Orthodox Church in the politics. The Constitution of Georgia declares the freedom of religion. The Article 9 of the Constitution reads that the State accepts the exceptional role of the Georgian Orthodox Church in the history of Georgia and at the same time it proclaims ... the independence of the church from the state. In 2001, a second paragraph was added to this article, according to which the relationship between the State and the church are determined by the Constitutional agreement that is subject to controversial assessments [4, с. 59, 62-63].
So far, no law on religion has been adopted in Georgia and there are many problems concerning the religious minorities. First of all, the Jehovah’s Witnesses sect and a number of traditional religions in Georgia - Armenian Apostolic Church, Catholic Church, etc. – are discriminated against. At the same time, as of now, no religious organization can be registered in the status other than that of nongovernmental organization and naturally, this does not make Armenian Apostolic, Catholic and other churches happy.
According to the census of 2002, the share of the ethnic Georgians and members of the Orthodox Church is approximately the same - 84%1. However, among the members of the Orthodox Church there are Russians, part of Armenians and other national minorities, while part of Georgians are Muslims1 2.
Today the Georgian Church is a competitor to the state in the national projects and tries to establish its absolute influence. Under these circumstances, the conflict of
1 See: http://statistics.ge/_files/english/census/2002/Religious%20beliefs.pdf — the population of Georgia according to its religious affiliations — countrywide and in the regions.
2 These are mostly Lazes and Adzharians.
87
H.Mikaelyan
<21st CENTURY», № 1 (7), 2010
interests between the government and the church as a centralized structure is natural. Meanwhile both parties try to conceal and even out the conflict. Since the Church is the only comprehensive structure in Georgia that survived in the Soviet period, at the same time claiming to be the highest moral authority, its role and authority are indeed high and in fact they exceed those of the state structures.
Today the Georgian Church in essence is taking over the issue of consolidation of the nation. This may be proved by many facts but it is suffice to mention only one of them – in his Christmas address delivered on January 7, 2010 the Georgian Orthodox Church’s Patriarch said: “There are forces that urge some small minded people to translate Bible and other books into Mingrelian, Svan, Avarian and Laz, in order to prepare grounds for declaring these variants of Georgian as separate languages. ... The maps and qualifications are spread all over the world that allege Georgia an artificial unification of Adzharians, Lazes, Svans, Mingrelians and others; and supposedly each of them has its own language and culture. Thus they aspire to present our nation as a combination of different nations. This brings us close to the collapse of the state.”1 In ecclesiastic terminology, this is called phyletism, but, as it has already been mentioned, the Georgian Church sees its main mission in the consolidation of the nation.
In 2001, the level of confidence in the state institutions was very low; only 4% gave confidence to police, whereas church had 63%. The runner-up was the institution of Ombudsman - 14% [5]. Since that time the reputations of both the state institutions and church has grown. In order to clearly understand the dynamics of the situation with the Georgian church, it has to be noted that in 1978 only 1% of the respondent students at the Tbilisi University admitted that they believe in God, while in 2000 their number constituted 89% [6]. It is clear that in 1978 not everybody who believed in God dared to admit it, and in 2000 not all atheists admitted their atheism, but the trend is absolutely clear. According to another poll, 65% of the population shared the opinion that “faith and religious values should condition all aspects of the life in the society and state”. Moreover, about 70% of students were among the adherents of the fundamentalism.
It is important to mention that the Catholicos-Patriarch Ilia has held the office for 32 years1 2. The day of his enthronement and the birthday of the Patriarch of the Georgian Church are celebrated as national holydays. Thus, the modern Georgian Orthodox Church and the name of Ilia II are virtually synonyms in today’s Georgia. Every political power in Georgia appeals to him, especially the opposition that hoped to find a support in him for the struggle against Saakashvili.
1 http://www.apsny.ge/2010/soc/1262901255.php
2 His enthronement took place on December 25, 1977
88
«21st CENTURY», № 1 (7), 2010
H.Mikaelyan
Today the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) tries to carry out independent policy, including foreign policy. The GOC, headed by Ilia II is in diplomatic contact with Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and even achieves some results1. For instance, the ROC so far has not recognized the Abkhazian and South Ossetian self-proclaimed churches independent from the Georgian Church and calls GOC its main ally in the struggle against “schismatics” in Ukraine1 2.
Among the recent incidents between the church and state one may mention the demolition of a hilltop church under construction near Batumi, which was being built without permission. Later the blame for that action was placed onto some low-ranking official who would have never dared to do that without an instruction from above. Consequently, the public was so outraged that the church was re-built at the state expense.
In late 2009 Teya Tutberidze, one of the leaders of the Liberty Institute made some clips and placed them in Facebook, as well as gave an interview where she “unmasked” Patriarch and his pro-Russian and anti-state activity. That caused a scandal in Georgian society3; the conflict has been aggravating because the Liberty Institute was one of the main structures that brought Saakashvili to the power and it is considered the ideological base of today’s Georgian authorities.
Conclusions
The whole last century Georgia strived for unity. That result is partially attained though it caused conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The interim tension maintains in the inter-ethnic relations.
In Georgia the phobia of territorial losses and further breakup of the country is explicitly manifested. The anti-Russian rhetoric remains one of the main political claims in all debates, and although the opposition tries to reduce the tension in the Russian-Georgian relations, the authorities avert any thaw.
The rating of Saakashvili and his regime remains at the mark of about 40%, which grants him some freedom of actions; some forces routinely put forward allegations in treachery and support of the Armenian demands related with construction of Batumi-Gyumri highway and opening of Kazbegi - Verkhni Lars border checkpoint. Nonetheless, Saakashvili will most probably remain in power until the end of
1 Patriarch of Georgia: Abkhazia and Ossetia will return to Georgia. After the meeting with Patriarch of Russia Cyril in Baku. http://ru.trend.az/news/politics/foreign/1611936.html
2 http://www.stavropolye.tv/russian/view/12702
3 http://www.inosmi.ru/sngbaltia/20091027/156438658.html http://evrazia.org/article/1143
89
H.Mikaelyan
<21st CENTURY», № 1 (7), 2010
his second term and he will appoint a successor from his team.
The influence of the foreign policy on the domestic one is significant; however, it is not that crucial and military defeat suffered from Russia made virtually no difference for the inner conflict.
The role of the political opposition will remain stable; meanwhile the role of the Georgian Orthodox Church may continue growing. This circumstance will complicate both the interstate relations between Georgia and Armenia and the issue of concessions to the Armenian community in Tbilisi.
January, 2010
Reference Sources and Literature
1. UNPD HDI (Human Developement Index) 2009 Complete report, Table "Economy and inequality".
2. Фатех Вергасов. Гамсахурдиа. Псевдология (Pseudology.org), 17.03.2007. №0241.
3. Искандарян А., Феномен цветных революций. Кавказ-2004. Ежегодник Кавказского института СМИ.
4. Ивлиан Хаиндрава. Религия в Грузии: 21 век // Религия и политика на Кавказе. Материалы международной конференции, CMI, Ер.
5. Your Rights. Periodical of Georgia’s Ombudsman, №1, 2001 (in Georgian)
6. NugzarPapuashvili, World religions in Georgia, Tbilisi, Liberty Institute, 2002.
90
