CC BY
10
УДК 32.001
BRICHKOV A.S., Doctor of Philosophy, Associated Professor1
NIKONOROV G. А., PhD in Philos. Sc., Associated Professor1
PERTSEV A.A.
Cadet1
1The Russian Federation Armed Forces Army Air Defense Military Academy Smolensk, Russian Federation
Received 12 April 2023
DIALECTICS OF WAR IN 21ST CENTURY: CHARACTER AND TENDENCIES1
The purpose of this article is to highlight forms and methods of warfare in the context of changed military and political situations. Authors emphasize widespread use of «hybrid» technologies in modern wars and armed conflicts. It is necessary to take dialectics and tendencies of modern armed confrontation into consideration in order to achieve military security of state.
Keywords: war, armed conflict, geopolitical confrontation, policy documents, civilians, mercenaries.
А.С. БРЫЧКОВ, доктор филос. наук, профессор1 Г.А. НИКОНОРОВ, канд. филос. наук, доцент1 АА. ПЕРЦЕВ, курсант1
1Военная академия войсковой ПВО Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации, г. Смоленск, Российская Федерация
1 Статья публикуется в авторской редакции.
ДИАЛЕКТИКА ВОЙНЫ В XXI ВЕКЕ: ХАРАКТЕР И ТЕНДЕНЦИИ
В статье актуализированы формы м методы ведения вооруженного противоборства в контексте изменившейся военно-политической ситуации. Авторы акцентируют внимание на широком применении «гибридных» технологий в войнах и вооруженных конфликтах современности. Подчеркивается необходимость учета диалектики и тенденций вооруженного противоборства современности в целях обеспечения военной безопасности государства.
Ключевые слова: война, вооруженный конфликт, геополитическое противоборство, программные документы, гражданское население, наемники.
Introduction. The world is about to fall into the third world war. It is hard to say what it is going to be, but it seems like it will differ from anything seen before. It is proved by warfare practice of last decades and military planning documents of USA's Ministry of Defense. (The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World: 2020-2040).
It will be a war without front and rear. War, in which "defending" party might strike sooner than aggressor. Moreover, will the aggressor even exist in reality? Because "severe confrontations in future will be held under unknown conditions and in unknown place wherein armies will face unknown enemy in unknown coalitions" [1].
If there are "unknown enemies", there are "strange wars: not only armed confrontation on conventional battlefield, but also confrontation in the realms of diplomacy, inner political civil conflicts, behavioral, information, economic, financial and technological confrontation have become synonyms for the word "war" for members of Western civilization.
On the land, in the sea, in the air, space and cyberspace the Pentagon is planning to lead hybrid and proxy wars, asymmetric wars and coun-terinsurgency wars, which in mass media (being both resource and means of warfare) will be called "conflict", "confrontation", "opposition". In fact, it is about mankind entering the new era of "peace war", "shadow war".
While in major part of 20 th century social differentiation in developed capitalistic states and differences between developing and developed countries were reducing (mostly due to existence and influence of Soviet Union), nowadays for almost 30 years an opposite tendency may be noticed. Bigger and bigger part of income, property concentrates in the hands of richest stratum of society, primary upper one percent of society. Gradual dilution of middle class is happening,
population credit burden is rising. This leads to situation where specific increase in living standards if followed by decrease in number of real goods and property belonging to citizens. "Live on credit" has become universal [2].
The problem of "excessive people" has risen. Additional realm of this problem is that stimuli to move production to from western countries to Asia, Africa, Latin America are reducing in pursuit of labor force optimization. Today robots produced in the United States and Japan with pay-off period of about 2 years are cheaper than Chinese or Indonesia workers. It is vivid than increase in property and social inequality, absence of any perspective for working activity and reducing number of "social lifts" will inevitably lead to sudden grow in social tensions and contradictions. Moreover, these contradictions will be constantly escalating, and their participants become more radical. In practice, without any alternative, this will lead to growing risks not only of interstate, global and regional wars, but also civil wars around the world which may lead to global civil war.
Traditional activities previously conducted exclusively by a state are transferred to private sector. For example, it is not commonly known that 70 percent of American intelligence gathering is conducted by private contractors. It is also not realized that the largest private military companies outdo armed forces from third ten of states by fire capabilities and combat performance. There is an expansion of supranational governance institutions which rolls into conflict with policy of national states creating new hotbeds of tension.
The Internet and means of communication change consciousness faster than political ideas and create a new reality. Existence used to define consciousness before, but now with the help of consciousness transformation it is possible to create a new, up to fully illusionary, existence
and make it reality which, in its turn, can be used to achieve political and military goals.
International law based on legal personality of sovereign states is becoming more diluted due to increasing number of non-state actors. They are used to accomplish political goals on international level.
It is becoming harder to maintain previous work order based on strict military and economic priorities. This new situation is realized in a lot of states around the globe. Last decades were not successful for America in political and military realms. Armed forces of America, generally speaking, faced discernible defeat in Iraq and Afghanistan and did not achieve their goals in Northern Africa and other regions of the world.
Main part. Modern geopolitical situation, according to National Security Strategy 2015 is characterized by following main traits (currently there is no new Strategy of USA, previous edition in force is complemented by Joe Biden's Temporary National Security Guide of the President. It is to prevent "security threat" from Russia and China and to provide Washington and its allies "domination in key world regions", one of the themes is about contest in "grey zones" and deployment of Special Forces.
Firstly, distribution of power and authority between states has changed. "Big 20", rather than "Big 7" is exercising more and more influence on world processes. Potential of India, reinforcement of China and aggression from Russia are influencing potential of relationship between countries more and more sufficiently.
Secondly, contradictions between national and supranational structures are rising.
Thirdly, interdependency of world economy is becoming stronger.
Fourthly, there is a contest between states of Middle East and Northern Africa for power in the region.
Fifthly, considering undeniable leadership of the USA in oil-and-gas sector, problems regarding dependence of Europe on Russian gas continue to worsen due to Russia ready to use its energy carriers for political purposes.
And next as follows: « ... U.S. forces will continue to defend the homeland, conduct global counterterrorism operations, assure allies, and deter aggression through forward presence and engagement. If deterrence fails, U.S. forces will be ready to project power globally to defeat and deny aggression in multiple theaters» [3]. That is how place and role of armed forces in political
reality transformation for the USA's needs is shown. In a section regarding support of forming democracy it is clearly said that «.... We will continue to push for reforms in authoritarian countries not currently undergoing wholesale transition. The corrosive effects of corruption must be overcome. While information sharing allows us to identify corrupt officials more easily, globalization has also made it easier for corrupt officials to hide the proceeds of corruption abroad, increasing the need for strong and consistent implementation of the international standards on combating illicit finance. The United States is leading the way in promoting adherence to standards of accountable and transparent governance, including through initiatives like the Open Government Partnership. We will utilize a broad range of tools to recover assets stolen by corrupt officials and make it harder for criminals to hide, launder, and benefit from illegal proceeds.. More than 50 percent of the world's people are under 30 years old. Many struggle to make a life in countries with broken governance. We are taking the initiative to build relationships with the world's young people, identifying future leaders in government, business, and civil society and connecting them to one another and to the skills they need to thrive. We have established new programs of exchange among young Americans and young people from Africa to Southeast Asia, building off the successes of the International Visitor and Young African Leaders initiatives. We are fostering increased education exchanges in our hemisphere. « We will continue to push for reforms in authoritarian countries not currently undergoing wholesale transitions. Good governance is also predicated on strengthening the statesociety relationship».
This is a the place and the role of so called "civil society"andhuman rights activist (usually corruption fighters) who, if conditions are favorable, are also to solve a problem with uncompromising governments acting before, simultaneously and after armed forces of the US and its allies (for recent examples of actions under the slogan of fight with corruption take successful and unsuccessful attempts to overthrow governments in Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan).
To lead effectively in a world experiencing significant political change, the United States must live our values at home while promoting universal values abroad. From the Middle East to Ukraine to Southeast Asia to the Americas.
Thus the USA make it clear that they are interested in processes on the territory of the former USSR. Furthermore, necessity to promote values on the territory of Ukraine is explained saying "Russia's aggression in Ukraine makes clear that European security and the international rules and norms against territorial aggression cannot be taken for granted. In response, we have led an international effort to support the Ukrainian people", which currently results in "pumping" Ukraine with weapons provoking its military-political to conduct full-scale war in the southeastern part of Ukraine. With Russia being pulled in this conflict claim is also made that in case of full-scale conflict armed forces of NATO will not assist Ukraine.
In the Strategy concerns are highlighted about Russian aggression and necessity to deter it from Central and Eastern Europe and also that "we will support partners such as Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine so they can better work alongside the United States and NATO."
As a result of relevant political and military trend "this National Security Strategy provides a vision for strengthening and sustaining American leadership in this still young century. It clarifies the purpose and promise of American power. It aims to advance our interests and values with initiative and from a position of strength. We will deter and defeat any adversary that threatens our national security and that of our allies."
As a development of National Security Strategy of the USA in 2019 the heads of military departments agreed on согласовали NATO Military Strategy.
In 2020 allies approved the Concept for the Deterrence and Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA).
In the beginning of 2021 NATO's Warf-ighting Capstone Concept - NWCC was approved. It was developed by headquarters of NATO to transform military-political block to be «guiding North star» up to 2040.
These documents form five key imperatives for NATO for achieving victory in new kind of military conflict:
- Cognitive superiority. Truly understanding the operating environment, the adversary and the Alliance's own goals entails cohesive and shared political-military understanding of the threats, adversaries and environment NATO operates in, from tech, doctrine, to Joint Intelli-
gence Surveillance and Reconnaissance, and big data.
- Layered resilience. The Alliance needs to be able to withstand immediate shocks to supply lines or communications, as well as attacks in the cognitive domain. It must be prepared to sustain in challenging situations over long periods of time.
- Influence and power projection. To shape positively the environment to its strengths, including generating options and imposing dilemmas on adversaries, the Alliance must be proactive, looking forward to take initiative through various means to reach its aims.
- Integrated multi-domain defense. The threats the Alliance faces are no longer in any one domain and a joint and flexible approach to a fluid environment is needed to protect the Alliance's integrity against all threats, regardless of their origin or nature.
- Cross-domain command. Allied commanders must have the ability to apprehend instantly the developments in the operating environment and take effective actions in a more complex multi-domain environment.
Personnel investments, art of leadership, critical thinking, artificial intelligence and brave actions will be key to success.
Possessing required flexibility to ensure development of war in needed pace, NWCC must pose and use instrument of NATO military power to create and support decisive military advantage. This will ensure following success in more complex, interconnected and unpredictable realm of security in future decades [4].
Considering this, the world is preparing for war constantly declaring that it is necessary to save peace. In full accordance with the hierarchy of normative legal acts in government and military administration system, US Army's Win in a Complex World 2020-2040 is to fulfill points of Strategy regarding achieving political goals by military means.
The doctrine has no directive purpose but defines how army acts now and how headquarters of the US Army can use future capabilities to counter expected threats. Concept takes dominance of Anglo sacks in land, sea, air, space and cyberspace domains as granted.
Analysis of key provisions of USA National Security Strategy and USA Army Concept allows us to make conclusions about character and methods of warfare NATO is preparing for up to 2040. We can specify key trends of future war-
fare and develop counter-tactics in reverse. In other words, offensive strategy allows to roughly draw out defensive strategy.
We can assume that although technology advancements will still affect the character of war, the Army will be less influenced than other branches. Threats in other realms (in the air, sea, space and cyberspace) to vital interests of state are ultimately defined by the situation on the land. Even though an ability to project power to the land from the air, sea and cyberspace is still important for joint forces operation, land forces employment still has key importance for the achieving of political results.
It is not only a question of victory over land forces of enemy and holding of territory, but also creations of conditions for creation of temporary military government until switching to civil structures which requires specific specialists in structure of the armed forces. In other words, land forces are to not only win enemy in the battlefield but also be able to convert military victories into political results.
It is shown that the following factors of operation conditions will seriously influence conduct of operation by land forces:
- Ongoing informatization of social realm (information is becoming a resource of influence to government and military administration systems and also social and individual consciousness);
- Increase of military potential (for neutralizing of adversary and elimination of its superiority in military sphere armed forces need to possess significant military potential);
- Increasing proliferation of WMD (it equalizes potentials of states and also increasing the risk of local conflict developing into regional or world war);
- Proliferation of cyber and counter-cyber weapons (in dominating armies cyber forces has already been created and cyberspace itself is regarded as own sphere of contest. Moreover, it is impossible to win cyberwar without proper countermeasures);
- Increasing population, urbanization and following shift of military actions to cities and dense population regions which requires strategy and tactics adjusted to these conditions (according to experts, urbanization will achieve 60% until 2030).
Land forces must possess capabilities to achieve set goals by the use of special forces with full-service support (light variant) and also
to conduct full-scale operations with all available resources and means. Also, they must be ready to cooperate with other forces and means of federal executive bodies (joint army formations) as well as be capable to solve questions of population provision in areas affected by military conflict.
To consolidate achieved success after an active phase of armed conflict army units plays support role helping other forces tasked with population provision (military support of local authorities, law enforcement services etc.).
Cultural training personnel including knowing and understanding of national phycology, language and culture features in probable regions of military operation will play more and more important role.
Currently we can see a trend to replace high quality of preparation of troops directly involved into hostilities with sophisticated technological means. Changes in conditions of armed confrontations and its forms are not taken into consideration, meaning that despite superiority in technology and resources troops are unable to carry out their missions.
Attention must be drawn to disparity regarding general armed forces of NATO and Russian Federation with its allies. It will not disappear primarily due to economic reasons. Thus, methods of asymmetric warfare need to be considered.
Power, strength and resources do not guarantee victory in armed conflict. Analysis of 200 years of wars allows to make quite unexpected conclusions. Firstly, the weaker party to conflict gained victory in almost 30% of all asymmetric wars in this period. Secondly, there is an interesting tendency that the closer to modernity asymmetric conflict takes place, the more frequently weaker party gains victory.
The closer it is to modernity, the less interest to win strong parties to the conflict have because it is not a question of their survival. And on the contrary, weaker parties to conflict are more and more willing to fight until the end showing ultimate interest to win because it guarantees their survival. The most popular strategies of asymmetric warfare for military-wise weak party are direct defense and guerilla warfare.
Direct defense suggests the use of the armed forces to prevent enemy from obtaining territory with local population, industry and strategic resources. Like a direct attack, direct defense is focused exclusively in military sphere and sug-
gests the maximum emphasis on the use of regular armed forces.
It is paradoxically but in practice active defense may be realized as preventive offensive actions aimed to destroy the most dangerous groups of the stronger enemy in advance giving him no opportunity to conduct a full-scale successful war due to its superiority in power and resources.
Guerilla warfare is based on regular spread out in space attacks on enemy forces by small groups to cause casualties, destroy logistics and command systems etc. Despite guerilla warfare is realized through constant active armed hostilities on all the territory of guerilla warfare, its goal is not only to cause losses in manpower and material, but also to undermine moral and willpower of the stronger enemy.
To realize guerilla warfare two requirements must be met:
Firstly, appropriate landscape impeding the conduct of military actions of the stronger party to conflict like dense forest, jungles, swamps, mountains, large cities etc.
Secondly, it is possible only if guerilla fighters are constantly and fully supported by local populations.
Guerilla warfare is never intended as quick and decisive victory over the enemy. It is almost always a weariness war.
WW2 experience and fight against different kinds of underground criminal groups shows that for effective organization of this kind of asymmetric warfare during peacetime it is necessary to:
prepare personnel and briefly introduce him to the coming theatre of military operation him (troop generation must involve specialists from FSB, National Guard, MVD, military special tasks forces, GRU and airborne troops, territorial defense forces after appropriate training);
develop weapons and provision stockpile system;
create a special structure in the General Staff responsible for state of those forces and means for this kind of operations (as well as planning and coordination of its actions, logistics after depletion of resources stocked before the war).
In case that significant part of Russian Federation is occupied, without this kind of structure and by only special task forces it is impossible to fulfill tasks of enemy communication disruption and infrastructure destruction on captured territory.
Of a stronger party in the beginning of the conflict were successful fighting against regular forces of a weaker party, but then after weaker party shifted its strategy to guerilla warfare or riot tactics together with terrorism, stronger one suffered defeat.
In the period following WW2 until nowadays two completely different strategies of warfare have emerged. One model was common in the USA, Germany, European allies of NATO, Soviet Union and to some degree Japan. It supposes linear strategy based on decisive superiority on the key axes in fire capabilities, resources and organization. This superiority would ensure blitzkrieg by using large mechanized armed forces of all branches with the goal to destroy regular enemy armed forces. Completely different approach was formed during guerilla war in China which was explicitly developed by Mao Zedong. This approach assumed avoiding of any frontal clashes, large battles which could involve large groups of mechanized and more advanced enemy armed forces, leaving large cities to stronger party to conflict. Mao Zedong's strategy was based on concentrating of his own forces, on saving control over territory too complex for mechanized troops inhabited by supportive guerilla forces. Instead of frontal confrontations - frequent raids, shock attacks and strikes on front as well as rear targets. Riot movements in Algeria, in Vietnam, Fidel Castro's guerrilla army, Malayan communists used this reliable tactic afterwards. It needs to be highlighted that the same tactics was implemented by Russian guerilla groups during WW2.
Corresponding training of regular armed forces (up to changes in field manuals), units of which would be able to change their tactics to guerilla warfare if centralized command and control is lost and circumstances are not supportive, needs to be considered.
It needs to be mentioned that leading Western states did not realize important and relevant lessons from history regarding arms spending. They are still fully and completely relying on their technological, information and resource superiority and thinking that weak party to conflict will act specifically in the framework of Western logic, linear strategy and enroll into traditional kind of wars. We need to exploit that situation and prepare to use asymmetric approach to warfare in forests and cities, especially considering that the same factors may compli-
cate our military activities on the enemy territory.
21st century combat analysis shows that cities and agglomerates are more frequently becoming the arena for military activities in international confrontations.
Armed hostilities in urban area provide weak party to conflict with unique capabilities to equate factors restricting him from the use of aviation, tanks, MLRS, tactical missiles etc. Party who obeys norms and regulations of IHL will be forced to minimize its superiority in force and means in the open grounds and forced to conduct combat in close quarters using small arms which always leads to great casualties.
Attention must be drawn to migration factor. Major working force occupied in the city maintenance (especially of megapolises) consists of migrants (they are dominant in public transport, public catering, healthcare, communications, public utilities spheres). They create conditions for ethnical crime activities and provoke disturbances among urban citizens. They are potential «cannon fodder» in war of irregular formations and governmental forces. They are primarily going to be recruited in different military formations, terrorist organizations and nongovernmental structures. Increasing flow of immigrants in metapolicies and urban agglomerations and economic problems does not allow to expand workforce of police, medical and social care and education spheres. Majority of immigrant youngsters are forced to join criminals.
That is the reason why urban infrastructure may malfunction or be taken under control. Taking limitations of language barrier, closeness of ethnic groups and other factors, it is hard for law enforcement services to monitor the situation regarding this category of urban habitants. Moreover, access to different information networks makes sabotage or riot quite possible. Measures against this process must be developed and migrant factor must be considered during preparation for following military actions.
Attention must be drawn to increasing role of irregular formations in armed conflicts. These formations receive support of governmental structures up to taking them under command of special task forces.
Taking this into consideration, there is a high probability that wide spread of mixed conflicts will become the feature of new warfare: in the framework of one armed conflict participants will include armed forces of states as well as
irregular armed formations, small special task forces and scouts of participants of armed conflicts as well as sponsor states which are not formally parties to the conflict but actively supply its members with everything required. Despite that implementation of asymmetric warfare is a prerogative of weak party of conflict, this warfare will be used by every party to the conflict, hence its implementation will become omnipresent.
It needs to be considered that in the future major part of non-governmental armed formations will be formed from civilians possessing wider and wider access to modern tech-nologiesM. It is a fact that today any civil technology may have military application (for example, systems of remote control of different electronics or access to vehicle may be turned to triggers for remote detonation of explosives, household and industrial chemical products may be used for creation of explosives, cars may be used as a ram, flying drones may conduct reconnaissance or deliver munitions to target).
The future of hybrid wars (the use of military and non-military methods, power and means) is also linked to inevitable interaction between military and criminal structures. It is considered that international criminal network will play significant role in future hybrid wars. Transnational criminal network is a structure performing military, politics and business activities simultaneously [2]. Thus, we can expect emergence of powerful criminal structures during scarcity of resources in warring state. These structures may gain control over vast territory and keep it up until substitution unable government structures. This factor must be considered in order to take victory over enemy.
In these future hybrid wars, it is expected that legality of international conflict will further blend with fanatism and rage of guerilla warfare. Enemies in these future conflicts (states, state-sponsored groups or volunteers) will use modern weapons and communication means (including encryption systems), MANPADS and other systems, improvised explosive devices causing mass casualties. State capabilities such as antisatellite weapons, cyberweapons and state terrorism will be used too. That is why it is becoming harder and harder to associate state armed forces with regular forces and non-governmental organizations and forces with only irregular forces.
As a whole armed forces and law enforcement services were created in the era of prehy-brid and proxy wars, hence they were created to battle particular internal and external enemies. However, the character of threats has changed so to fight this new kind of threats it is necessary to create complex groups which includes regular as well as special task forces able to act accordingly to such situations against such enemies and threats (participation of PMC members in these groups is quite possible).
Future wars will be harder to classify according to national and international legal systems. Structures participating in them will include state and non-state, national and international, voluntary and mercenary, religious and illegal groups.
Practice of war in Syria and conflict on the territory of southern-eastern Ukraine showed that shift must be made from traditional types of military formations to specially trained expeditionary ones capable of acting autonomously in urban area with support of aviation ad high-precision weapons. Traditional regiments, brigades and divisions must be created on modular principle using existing ones as a basis. This requires shifting from development of highly technological weapons systems (especially long-ranged ones) to individual and group training aimed to achieve required level of qualification. These "modular" formations must be capable of rapid regrouping into powerful combined arms formations (regiments, brigades and divisions) after completing tasks (or following an order). After that they are to carry out attacks against large objectives and perform tasks in accordance with the overall plan.
It is impossible to hold territory using only military force. Fast integration of captured territory under state governance is required, that is why shifting to joint forces approach needs to be considered seriously. These forces would encompass groups of specialists capable of operational infrastructure support and, if necessary, restoring of fuel, energy and municipal infrastructure of cities on the territory of military actions.
Conclusion. Also, development of military-civil administration on the territory of active military actions must be considered. In case of repelling of aggression on the territory of Russian Federation and its allies, systems of rapid response to infrastructure crises must be created in every large city armed conflict takes place.
Reserve life-support recovery systems (including food and water supply) also must be further developed [5].
It is necessary to restore territorial defense system with corresponding forces and means and begin to carry out joint exercises of military and law-enforcement structures featuring Ministry of Emergency Situations and local authorities to minimalize consequences of military actions on the densely inhabited areas [6].
Therefore, civil and military command and control points as well as cities will be main targets for strikes in future wars. In future military actions methods of asymmetric warfare in complex terrain as well as megacities and agglomerations will be employed. Huge populations, fragrant social inequality, dense building-up which in most cases has poor infrastructure and ineffective management must be considered. Hostilities will have asymmetric, hybrid, irregular character combining actions of regular armed forces, private military companies, other non-state actors and illegal groups. In addition to combined arms hostilities, forms of military actions will include urban rebellions caused by despair, well-prepared riots, terrorist acts and shadow wars inspired from abroad.
Overall future opponents will use any methods, tactics and technologies which, in their point of view, will disturb our plans. We need to improve our armed forces; reduce risks we face and redistribute scarce economic resources to deal with threats posing the highest operational risk. Hybrid threats are deeply asymmetric and pose extremely high risk for armed forces of the US and realization of strategic goals of NATO in case of its aggression.
Armed forces of Russian Federation and its allies must keep the ability to conduct successful military campaigns against large states and their armed forces as well as vast array of nongovernmental armed groups - and also against everything between them. Our forces must be rapid, we must create flexible, multitask forces adapted to unique aspects of every conflict. Some level of specialization may be required, but perspective forces must be prepared not only for one or another realm of conflict but for complex hybrid threats in urban area and challenging operational environment [7, 8]. This will allow to minimize risks and maximize readiness for future requirements considering limited resources. This statement claims different kinds of
balance between competing necessities and limited resources.
The sooner we begin to prepare to this kind of war, the better it is not only for government and armed forces, but also for citizens of urban and rural areas where main military activities will take place in future
References
1. Available at: http://politikus.ru/articles/39575-novaya-voyna-ssha-totalnaya-voyna-protiv-rossii.html.
2. Larina E.S., Ovchinsky V.S. Mirovojna. Vse protiv vsekh. Novejshie konczepczii boevy'kh dejstvij anglosaksov [World war. All against all. The latest concepts of the fighting of the Anglo-Saxons.]. M.; Book World, 2015, 149 p. (In Russian)
3. Zarubezhnoe voennoe obozrenie [Foreign military review]. 2015, no. 6, pp. 3-10. (In Russian)
4. Bartosh A.P. Putevodnya zvezda v tupik. Voenno-promy shlenny j kur er [Guide star to a dead end]. Voenno-promy'shlennyj kur'er [Military-industrial courier]. 2022, no. 4 (917). (In Russian)
5. Nikonorov G.A., Brychkov A.S., Sokolova S.N. Sfera bezopasnosti: rossijskij vektor strategii socziafnogo razvitiya [Security sphere: Russian vector of social development strategy]. Vestnik Polesskogo gosudarstven-nogo universiteta. Seriya obshhestvenny'kh i gumanitarny'kh nauk [Bulletin of Polessky State University. Social and Humanities Series]. 2017, no.1, pp. 78-87. (In Russian)
6. Sokolova S.N., Sokolova A.A. Ugrozy' gi-bridnykh vojn: obespechenie bezopasnosti cheloveka i obshhestva [Threats of hybrid wars: ensuring the security of man and society]. Preduprezhdenie i likvidacziya chrez-vy'chajny'kh situaczij: protivodejstvie sov-remenny'm vy'zovam i ugrozam [Prevention and elimination of emergency situations: countering modern challenges and threats]. Minsk: UGZ, 2017, pp. 36-38. (In Russian)
7. Sokolova S.N., Sokolova A.A. Sfera bezopasnosti socziuma i gibridny'e vojny' [Social Security and Hybrid Warfare]. NaczionaFnaya filosofiya v globaFnom mire: tezisy' Pervogo belorusskogo filosofskogo kongressa [National Philosophy in the Global World: Theses of the First Belarusian Philosophical Congress]. National Academy of Sciences of Belarus, Institute of Philosophy;
Ed.: V.G. Gusakova (previously) [et al.] Minsk: Belarusskaya Navuka, 2017, 406 p. (In Russian)
8. Sokolova AA, Sokolova S.N. Neo-terrorism as a resource for hybrid wars. Vestnik Polesskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Seriya obshhestvenny'kh i gumanitarny'kh nauk [Bulletin of Polessky State University. Social and Humanities Series]. 2022, no. 1, pp. 16-21.
Список литературы
1. [Электронный ресурс] - Режим доступа: http://politikus.ru/articles/39575-novaya-voyna-ssha-totalnaya-voyna-protiv-rossii.html
2. Ларина, Е.С. Мировойна. Все против всех. Новейшие концепции боевых действий англосаксов / Е.С. Ларина, В.С. Овчин-ский. - М.: Книжный мир, 2015. - 149 с.
3. Зарубежное военное обозрение. - 2015. -№ 6. - С. 3-10.
4. Бартош, А. П. Путеводня звезда в тупик /. А. П. Бартош // Военно-промышленный курьер. - № 4 (917) - 2022.
5. Никоноров, Г. А. Сфера безопасности: российский вектор стратегии социального развития / Г. А. Никоноров, А. С. Брыч-ков, С. Н. Соколова // Вестник Полесского государственного университета. Серия общественных и гуманитарных наук. 2017. - № 1. - С. 78-87.
6. Соколова, С. Н. Угрозы гибридных войн: обеспечение безопасности человека и общества / С. Н. Соколова, А. А. Соколова // Предупреждение и ликвидация чрезвычайных ситуаций: противодействие современным вызовам и угрозам. Сборник научных трудов - Минск : УГЗ. - 2017. -С. 36-38.
7. Соколова, С. Н. Сфера безопасности социума и гибридные войны / С. Н. Соколова, А. А. Соколова // Национальная философия в глобальном мире: тезисы Первого белорусского философского конгресса / Национальная академия наук Беларуси, Институт философии; редкол.: В.Г. Гуса-кова (пред.) [и др.] - Минск: Беларуская навука, 2017. - С. 406.
8. Соколова, А. А. Neo-terrorism as a resource for hybrid wars / А. А. Соколова, С. Н. Соколова // Вестник Полесского государственного университета. Серия обще-
ственных и гуманитарных наук. - 2022. - №1. - С. 16-21.
Статья поступила 12 апреля 2023 г.
