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A.M. Smorchkov and P.P. Shkarenkov
DEMOCRACY IN MODERN SCIENTIFIC AND POLITICAL DISCOURSE:
THE EXPERIENCE AND LEGACY OF ANCIENT ROME *
А.М. Сморчков, П.П. Шкаренков
Демократия в современном научном и политическом дискурсе: Опыт и наследие Древнего Рима **
Перевод М.А. Царевой ***
Democracy is currently one of the most frequently used ideas in political discourse; it can be said that democracy has become a sacred symbol of modern civilization. But it is still a wide-open question what is understood as democracy in each particular case, while double standards in its assessment no longer surprise anyone. Paradoxically, the same can be said with respect to the analysis of the political system of the Roman Republic, notably in the scientific discourse where the political system of the Middle and Late Republic (the 3rd -1st centuries BC) has been under extensive discussion over the past 30 years.
When assessing the particular characteristics of the Roman republican system, it is first necessary to take into account its polis nature. The polis organization emerged in the course of the people's struggle against the aristocracy, as a result of which most of the population defended their rights, and the ruling elite had to share political powersa with them. The degree of ordinary citizens' participation in governance was different, but in any polis, be it democratic or oligarchic, there was always a popular assembly, without which a polis is unconceivable. This participation of the people in governance carried the democratic potential inherent in any polis. Accordingly, the key issue in its assessment is an analysis of the role and significance of popular assemblies.
Earlier the prevailing concept of Rome's political system in the 3rd -1st centuries BC was that of tough oligarchy. This idea was most fully formulated by the Swiss scientist Matthias Gelzer in the monograph Die Nobilität der römischen Republik, published in 1912. The oligarchic nature of the Roman political system was primarily seen in the dominance
* The article was prepared with the support of the Russian Science Foundation's grant "Discourse of State Power in Ancient Societies and Reception of Its Elements in World and Russian Socio-Political Practices" (No. 19-18-00549).
** Статья подготовлена при поддержке гранта Российского научного фонда «Дискурс государственной власти в древних обществах и рецепция его элементов в мировых и российских общественно-политических практиках» (проект N° 19-1800549), реализуемого в Российском государственном гуманитарном университете.
*** Translated by Marina A. Tsareva (Russian State University for the Humanities, Moscow, Russia). 94
of the nobility in the Senate and in the popular assembly, which dutifully affirmed decisions inspired by a small group of nobles. Accordingly, the political life of the Roman Republic was confined to power struggle among different aristocratic groups.
With the accumulation of knowledge and the expansion of the research field, Gelzer's concept began to raise more and more questions over time. The most stalwart opponent and, consequently, the supporter of the interpretation of the Late Republic's political system as democracy was the well-known British researcher Fergus Millar (starting from 1984). As he put it, it was possible "to restore the Roman people to their proper place in the history of democratic values"1. Similar ideas had been put forward before him2, but it was Millar's works that generated a rather fierce and very fruitful debate, though his conclusions were in a varying degree rejected by most researchers. In short, Millar's concept comes down to the fact that the Roman people were not the object but the subject of political struggle, i.e. the democratic potential incidental to the polis system was fulfilled in Rome in to the full extent. Millar takes Athenian democracy as the model, to which he likens the Roman political system3. In our opinion, Millar's opponents implicitly make the same fundamental mistake, making it easier for themselves to criticize him, for it is in principle impossible to equalize the Roman Republic and Athens in the heyday of its democratic system without excessive allowances. But the point is that modern democracies are just as far (if not further) from the Athenian model. Consequently, refusing to recognize the Roman system as democratic, we refuse to recognize the existence of democratic systems in the modern world, which is impossible. Our further discussion will be based on this thesis.
It is important to point out that Roman (and Greek) thinkers did not at all consider the equality of citizens and the power of people (i.e. ordinary citizens) to be the ideal model, unlike the modern view of democracy as the best possible form of governance. Roman political thinking and political practices were imbued with hierarchy recognized as the norm by both the elite (which is only natural) and ordinary citizens4. Proceeding from this generally accepted fact, Karl-Joachim Holkeskamp, analyzing one of Fergus Millar's works in an article whose title is based on a quote from Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, comes to the conclusion that the label of a power structure is not all that important and that in any case "the Republic was not a 'government of the people' or 'by the people', and in light of all we know about social and economic structures, the distribution of wealth and the living conditions of the crowd in Rome, Italy and the provinces, it was not 'government for the people'"5. And this is true. But let's ask ourselves: are these criteria applicable to modern democratic systems? In our opinion, to proceed from the literal meaning of the term "democracy" in translation from ancient Greek ("rule of the people") is a great error, which actually gives rise to double standards. The phenomenon of democracy is much more complicated. From the
viewpoint of ancient theory, the Roman Republic in its heyday clearly falls under the definition of aristocracy (Polyb. XXIII. 14. 1, cp. VI. 11. 11 - 15. 1). But if democracy is understood only as a system where power directly belongs to the people, modern representative democracies would undoubtedly fall under the definition of oligarchy, if they were evaluated by ancient political thinkers. Therefore, it is completely incomprehensible why the political regime of the Roman Republic must be judged by much more stringent criteria than modern political systems, thereby denying it democracy? This rhetorical question also applies to the following arguments of the researchers who refuse to consider the Roman Republic as a democracy.
Martin Jehne, a staunch opponent of the theory of "Roman democracy", rightly points to the big difference between form and content, i.e. between the inclusion of the people into political acts and their real influence on their content. In other words, if a decision is to pass through the popular assembly, this does not mean that the people can influence it effectively6. One can also agree with this, but again there is a question: what is the influence of the mass of citizens on the bills passed in parliaments in modern democracies? Is it essentially more effective than the influence of Roman citizens who at least formally had the right to vote?
Hence comes another widely-spread argument for the lack of democracy in Rome, which is that the people almost always voted approvingly. Indeed, according to the estimates of Egon Flaig, over the entire five-century history of the Republic, out of the various decisions submitted to the approval of the people only eight7 or ten8 were rejected. However, reducing democracy to protest voting is, in our opinion, excessive simplification. It is not the number of decisions rejected that is an indicator of democracy but the quality of decisions made. In other words, if it were possible to identify the decisions that were contrary to the interests of the people but pushed through the popular assembly, then we could doubt the existence of democracy. For instance, in the year 131 (or 130) BC, the people turned down the proposal for the right of the plebeian tribunes to be re-elected for the next term, which apparently was beneficial to the people, but they still rejected it, having heeded the arguments of authoritative citizens (Cic. Amic. 96). Moreover, this proposal was nevertheless accepted a few years later, so here the people acted as a force choosing a decision and not dutifully following the instructions of the ruling elite. We know many laws (primarily agrarian ones) adopted by the popular assembly contrary to the resistance of the Senate. Of course, in each such case there was always a prominent and courageous leader, but this is only natural, for a collective action of the masses is inconceivable without such a leader. And we must not forget that the "people" are by no means a single mass. For example, the famous agrarian law of Tiberius Gracchus, beneficial to poor citizens, affected the interests of not only the rich, but also those of citizens of medium welfare. They are also part of the people, and the part that resisted the bill of Tiberius Gracchus.
From the above-mentioned follows Egon Flaig's proposition, widely supported in historiography, that the popular assembly was not in fact a place of decision-making but a ritually symbolic organ of public consensus in which the Roman people expectedly agreed with the policies of the aristocracy9. In his opinion, a decision itself depended on the following preliminary stages: a) approval by the Senate; 6) response of the people at contiones; b) obstruction to the decision at comitia10. Thus, Flaig also recognizes that the people influenced the content and success of the bills, first of all, at contiones, expressing their attitude by shouting, rumbling, applauding and other means11. The researcher figuratively compares contiones to a political filter12. These contiones were an informal political instrument, very similar to modern meetings. They could be convened by the magistrate to discuss an issue; no decision was made there, but speeches were pronounced to convince the people of the beneficence or danger of a proposal which would be submitted for the approval of the popular assembly. It was a legal means of communication between the elite and the people, recognized by custom and law, one of the aims of which was to find out about the opinions and preferences of ordinary citizens.
How effective was the influence of the people through contiones is another question, but it is faced by modern democracies too. Indeed, in modern democracies meetings and other similar measures are the most effective and visual forms of the people's influence on politics. So why is now the right to meetings and processions recognized as a democratic achievement, while for Rome they are not seen as an element of democracy13? What is this if not a double approach running counter to the common understanding of the phenomenon of democracy?
Let us note that contiones are an important difference between the Roman organization of popular assemblies from the Athenian one. In Athens the popular assembly discussed a proposal and immediately voted on it, while in Rome comitia only voted, and discussions were held at previously conducted contiones. This is seen as further proof of the lack of democracy in Rome14. In our opinion, the opposite is true, and the mentioned separation of the two actions is a manifestation of the Roman political genius. The combination of discussion and voting within one meeting was fraught with the possibility that under the influence of speeches emotions could overwhelm reason. The history of Athens gives such examples - it is enough to recall the infamous trial of the victorious strategists (406 BC). But in Rome we see a kind of an equivalent of the pre-election silence day, when voters can reflect calmly on their choice. Only, here the length of time is not set and may be reduced to a "night of pre-election silence". Thus, the procedure that is now recognized as democratic took place in Rome, not in Athens.
In our opinion, one of the reasons for the consensus between the elite and society in Rome was that, on the one hand, society did not perceive natural inequality between people as injustice, and, on the other hand, the
recognized naturalness and justice of inequality was combined with high requirements, mostly of moral nature, to the ruling elite. In Rome there was a special magistracy of censors, one of the most important duties of which was inspecting morals (cura morum), first of all, of the upper classes, i.e. senators and equites. So, in theory the senators were "the best of the best", having passed several stages of selection: first, one was to become an eques (this was decided by the censors), then to be elected to a public post (this was the prerogative of the people), then to be registered in the Senate (according to the censors' decision) and to be periodically inspected for compliance with moral norms.
Today's "representative democracy" should also be based on stringent requirements to the ruling elite, some of which could be controlled by the mass of citizens. For the balance of interests of the elite and the whole of society is unstable and cannot give long-term guarantees. Without this control, "rule of the best" (aristocracy) or "rule of the worthy" (meritocracy) rapidly develops into "rule of the few" (oligarchy), which ancient thinkers understood very well. This is the democratic element of the political system. The most effective means of controlling power is the election procedure which unites the ancient direct and modern representative democracy. But it also contains an inner objective contradiction, since competent leaders are elected by incompetent (for the most part) citizens. This task was not easy in antiquity, and has remained so today.
To our mind, Alexander Yakobson, when summing up his study of elections in the Late Republic, highlighted precisely the key points in the complicated interrelation of the dominance of the nobility and the power of the people: "It was precisely because the people's prerogative - their suffrage - was real rather than specious, because it gave them a real (albeit limited) stake in the system, that the people accepted the Republican political system as legitimate"15. This consensus ensured a harmonious combination of form (recognition of the people as the source of power) and reality, in which this power was in the hands of the elite, as it was based on the mutual recognition of the legal rights and advantages of each side, which is quite relevant to our days.
We finish our analysis with one more remark clearly inspired by contemporaneity. Robert Morstein-Marx, studying mass oratory in the Late Republic, recognizes the importance of support from ordinary citizens, which the political elite sought to achieve by all means and dem-onstrate16. However, in his valid opinion, in the absence of real debate between alternative viewpoints, ordinary citizens were manipulated by politicians possessing monopolistic knowledge, and therefore Rome cannot be considered a democracy17. But at present the manipulation of public conscience by the media is much more effective despite the seemingly available opportunities to obtain alternative information, which invalidates Morstein-Marx's argument.
Of course, in the Roman republican system there were objective problems caused by the contradiction between the principles and reality.
The most important and essential problem with republican Rome from the point of view of democratic principles is the absence of the concept of quorum in the work of popular assemblies, while very few people could actually attend them. In other words, public decisions were actually made by a minority of citizens, and for Rome their number was very small, literally a few per cent of the total number of people who had the right of vote in the Late Republic18. This is an objective problem for direct democracy when the size of civil society goes beyond a rather narrow framework. This problem was faced already by Athens with a civil society of 30-40 thousand. And in today's understanding of democracy, the secured opportunity to vote, even if a voter does not use it, is an important criterion of the legitimacy of the system.
But is modern representative democracy a solution to the problem inherent in direct democracy? After all, elected deputies rely on their understanding of state and public interests, not having the opportunity or even the need to consult with their voters on each issue. For the governance of a vast state is a difficult task, inaccessible to most citizens. This is objective, and it must be clearly realized that modern governance requires special training and knowledge. So, "democracy" in the literal sense of the word ("rule of the people") is now impossible because it carries a threat of making decisions that are dangerous for society itself. But the Athenian principle stated that any citizen (with some reservations), by virtue of his status, was able to occupy positions. However, this direct rule by the people is possible only in numerically limited societies with simple managerial tasks, whereas the governance of a vast and complex state requires competent specialists, the "managerial elite". This was the case in republican Rome, and this is also true for current democracies.
As for the understanding of democracy, in our opinion, it is determined not by the existence of formally democratic institutions (though this is important), but by their content, by what is called civil society. This means citizens' interest in politics, the sense of responsibility for the future of their homeland, conscientious performance of their duties to the homeland, respect for government bodies (which they have elected themselves!), willingness to help an individual citizen, etc. In other words, this means civil unity before the government and before destructive elements within society. By these indicators Rome was not inferior to modern democracies. The polis principles per se, on which the Roman Republic was based, presumed citizens' active interest in joint affairs. The polis nature of the socio-political organization combined with the political genius of the Roman people gave rise to a citizen protection system that was unique for antiquity (and not only). The cornerstone of Roman freedom was iusprovocationis, i.e. the right to appeal to the popular assembly in the case of a death sentence or a large fine. The Roman historian Titus Livius justly called this right "unique bastion of liberty" (unicum praesidium libertatis: Liv. III. 55. 4). Thus, the civil society itself acted as the highest court of appeal. At the very beginning of the Republic, by agree-
ment between patricians and plebeians, the post of plebian tribunes was established; it resembles the modern institution of human rights ombudsmen. The initial and most important duty of the plebian tribunes was to protect individual citizens against the arbitrariness of the supreme power and, in general, to uphold the interests of the people.
Of course, speaking about the achievements of ancient Rome's civil society, we should not forget the question of how effective they were and to what extent their content corresponded to the stated goals and forms. But the same problem faces the modern civil society institutions in the most democratic states. Thus, the Roman republican system had the same objective defects (with natural variations) as the modern political systems that are called democracies. Consequently, recognizing one thing, we must recognize the other, i.e. recognize the Roman Republic as a democracy, with, of course, its specific features (in fact, modern democracies, too, are very different from each other). In other words, the point at issue is the content of the term and not the presence or absence of the phenomenon.
Notes Примечания
1 Millar F. Rome, the Greek World and the East. Vol. 1: The Roman Republic and Augustan Revolution. Chapel Hill; London, 2002. P. 158.
2 Jehne M. Einführung: Zur Debatte um die Rolle des Volkes in der römischen Politik // Demokratie in Rom? Die Rolle des Volkes in der Politik der römishen Republik. Stuttgart, 1995. P. 1, no. 4; P. 2, no. 7; Дементьева В.В. Государственно-правовое устройство античного Рима: ранняя монархия и республика. Ярославль, 2004. С. 223, 224.
3 Millar F. Rome, the Greek World and the East. Vol. 1: The Roman Republic and Augustan Revolution / Ed. by H.M. Cotton and G.M. Rogers. Chapel Hill; London, 2002. P. 112, 139.
4 HölkeskampK.-J. The Roman Republic: Government of the People, by the People, for the People? // Scripta Classica Israelica. Vol. XIX. Jerusalem, 2002. P. 203-223.
5 Hölkeskamp K.-J. The Roman Republic: Government of the People, by the People, for the People? // Scripta Classica Israelica. Vol. XIX. Jerusalem, 2002. P. 223.
6 Jehne M. Einführung: Zur Debatte um die Rolle des Volkes in der römischen Politik // Demokratie in Rom? Die Rolle des Volkes in der Politik der römishen Republik. Stuttgart, 1995. P. 8.
7 Flaig E. Entscheidung und Konsens: Zu den Feldern der politischen Kommunikation zwishen Adel und Plebs // Demokratie in Rom? Die Rolle des Volkes in der Politik der römishen Republik. Stuttgart, 1995. P. 80, no. 13.
8 Flaig E. Ritualisierte Politik: Zeichen, Gesten und Herrschaft im alten Rom. 2nd ed. Göttingen, 2004. P. 175, 176.
9 Flaig E. Entscheidung und Konsens. Zu den Feldern der politischen Kom-
munikation zwishen Adel und Plebs // Demokratie in Rom? Die Rolle des Volkes in der Politik der römishen Republik. Stuttgart, 1995. P. 84-91; Flaig E. Ritualisierte Politik: Zeichen, Gesten und Herrschaft im alten Rom. 2nd ed. Göttingen, 2004. P. 155-212.
10 Flaig E. Entscheidung und Konsens. Zu den Feldern der politischen Kommunikation zwishen Adel und Plebs // Demokratie in Rom? Die Rolle des Volkes in der Politik der römishen Republik. Stuttgart, 1995. P. 91.
11 Flaig E. Entscheidung und Konsens. Zu den Feldern der politischen Kommunikation zwishen Adel und Plebs // Demokratie in Rom? Die Rolle des Volkes in der Politik der römishen Republik. Stuttgart, 1995. P. 94; Flaig E. Ritualisierte Politik: Zeichen, Gesten und Herrschaft im alten Rom. 2nd ed. Göttingen, 2004. P. 195-199.
12 Flaig E. Ritualisierte Politik: Zeichen, Gesten und Herrschaft im alten Rom. 2nd ed. Göttingen, 2004. P. 198.
13 Flaig E. Ritualisierte Politik: Zeichen, Gesten und Herrschaft im alten Rom. 2nd ed. Göttingen, 2004. P. 145.
14 Flaig E. Entscheidung und Konsens. Zu den Feldern der politischen Kommunikation zwishen Adel und Plebs // Demokratie in Rom? Die Rolle des Volkes in der Politik der römishen Republik. Stuttgart, 1995. P. 95.
15 Yakobson A. Elections and Electioneering in Rome: A Study in the Political System of the Late Republic. Stuttgart, 1999. P. 229.
16 Morstein-Marx R. Mass Oratory and Political Power in the Late Roman Republic. Cambridge; New York, 2004. P. 124-128, 280.
17 Morstein-Marx R. Mass Oratory and Political Power in the Late Roman Republic. Cambridge; New York, 2004. P. 160-203, 281, 282.
18 Mouritsen H. Politics in the Roman Republic. Cambridge; New York, 2017. P. 55-58.
Authors, Abstract, Key words
Andrey M. Smorchkov - Doctor of History, Professor, Russian State University for the Humanities (Moscow, Russia)
smorchkovtuber@yandex.ru
Pavel P. Shkarenkov - Doctor of History, Professor, Vice-rector, Russian State University for the Humanities (Moscow, Russia)
chkarenkov@mail.ru
This article studies the phenomenon of democracy as part of the discussion on the nature of the political system of the Roman Republic in the 3rd - 1st centuries BC, generated by the works of the British researcher Fergus Millar. The authors of the article believe that the key mistake of the opponents in this discussion is that they take Athenian democracy as the criterion. As a result, the researchers who refuse to consider the Roman Republic as a democracy place on it such demands that modern democratic states cannot meet. In this article, such criticisms of the Roman Republic have been analyzed and compared the
current state of affairs.
In the authors' view, direct democracy in the Roman Republic had the same achievements and the same problems with the implementation of the rights of the people as modern representative democracies. Summing up the conducted analysis, the authors come to the conclusion that as compared with the modern democratic states, the Roman Republic can in full measure be recognized as a democracy (with its natural peculiarities and distinctions). It had a full-fledged civil society that united citizens by mutual interests and goals, the sense of responsibility for the future of their homeland, conscientious performance of their duties to the homeland, and willingness to help an individual citizen. By these indicators Rome was not inferior to modern democracies. The consensus between the ruling elite and society was seen in the harmonious combination of form (recognition of the people as the source of power) and reality, in which this power was in the hands of the elite.
Ancient Rome's experience proves that it is not direct rule of the people but stringent requirements to the ruling circles that are the foundation of a democratic system in the conditions when because of the size of a state the direct rule by the people (according to the Athenian model) is not possible. Such control, also on the part of most citizens, the search for its effective methods is highly relevant for today's representative democracy as well.
Ancient Rome, republic, polis, democracy, political discourse, historiography, Historian Fergus G.B. Millar.
References
(Articles from Proceedings and Collections of Research Papers)
1. Flaig, E. Entscheidung und Konsens: Zu den Feldern der politischen Kommunikation zwishen Adel und Plebs. Demokratie in Rom? Die Rolle des Volkes in der Politik der römishen Republik / Ed. M. Jehne. Steiner, 1995, pp. 77-127. (In German).
2. Hölkeskamp, K.-J. The Roman Republic: Government of the People, by the People, for the People? Scripta Classica Israelica. Jerusalem Academic Press, 2002, vol. 19, pp. 203-223. (In English).
3. Jehne, M. Einführung: Zur Debatte um die Rolle des Volkes in der römischen Politik. Demokratie in Rom? Die Rolle des Volkes in der Politik der römishen Republik / Ed. M. Jehne. Steiner, 1995, pp. 1-9. (In German).
(Monographs)
4. Dementeva, V.V. Gosudarstvenno-pravovoe ustroystvo antichnogo Rima: rannyaya monarkhiya i respublika [The State and Legal Structure of Ancient Rome: The Early Monarchy and Republic.]. Yaroslavl, 2004, 247 p. (In Russian).
5. Flaig, E. Ritualisierte Politik: Zeichen, Gesten und Herrschaft im alten Rom. 2nd ed. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2004, 288 p. (In German).
6. Millar, F. Rome, the Greek World and the East. Vol. 1: The Roman Republic and Augustan Revolution / Ed. by H.M. Cotton and G.M. Rogers. University of North Carolina Press, 2002, 416 p. (In English).
7. Morstein-Marx, R. Mass Oratory and Political Power in the Late Roman Republic. Cambridge University Press, 2004, 313 p. (In English).
8. Mouritsen, H. Politics in the Roman Republic. Cambridge University Press, 2017, 202 p. (In English).
9. Yakobson, A. Elections and Electioneering in Rome: A Study in the Political System of the Late Republic. Steiner, 1999, 251 p. (In English).
Авторы, аннотация, ключевые слова
Сморчков Андрей Михайлович - докт. ист. наук, профессор, Российский государственный гуманитарный университет (Москва)
smorchkovtuber@yandex.ru
Шкаренков Павел Петрович - докт. ист. наук, профессор, проректор по непрерывному образованию, Российский государственный гуманитарный университет (Москва)
chkarenkov@mail.ru
В статье рассматривается феномен демократии в рамках дискуссии о характере политического строя в Римской Республике III—I вв. до н.э., вызванной работами британского ученого Ф. Миллара. Авторы статьи считают, что ключевой ошибкой оппонентов в этой дискуссии является выбор афинской демократии в качестве критерия. В итоге, исследователи, отказывающиеся считать Римскую Республику демократией, предъявляют к ней такие требования, которым не соответствуют и современные демократические государства. Такого рода претензии к Римской Республике были проанализированы в статье и сопоставлены с современным положением дел.
По мнению авторов, прямая демократия в Римской Республике имела те же достижения и те же проблемы с реализацией прав народа, что и современные представительные демократии. В итоге проведенного анализа авторы приходят к выводу, что в сравнении с современными демократическими государствами Римская Республика вполне может быть признана демократией (со своими естественными особенностями и отличиями). В ней полнокровно функционировало гражданское общество, объединявшее граждан общими интересами и целями, чувством ответственности за судьбы родины, добросовестным выполнением обязанностей перед родиной, готовностью прийти на помощь отдельному человеку. По этим показателям Рим не уступает современным демократиям. Консенсус между правящей элитой и обществом выражался в гармоничном сочетании формы (признание народа источником власти) и реальности, при которой эта власть находилась в руках элиты.
Опыт древнего Рима показывает, что не прямая власть народа, а жест-
кие требования к управляющей верхушке, являются основой демократического строя в условиях, когда в силу размеров невозможна непосредственная власть народа (по афинскому образцу). Осуществление такого контроля, в том числе со стороны основной массы граждан, поиск его эффективных методов весьма актуально и для современной представительной демократии.
Древний Рим, республика, полис, демократия, политический дискурс, историография, историк Фергюс Миллар.
