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УДК 656.7.086
Islamov D.
Senior lecturer "Air navigation Systems" Department "Engineering technology" Faculty Tashkent State Technical University named after Islam Karimov, Tashkent, Uzbekistan
DECISION MAKING IN ADVERSE WEATHER CONDITION
Human factor plays an important role in flight safety. In this article, the importance of decision making in adverse weather condition, is considered by using examples of accidents. Recommendations for pilots to improve flight safety are given.
Keywords: human factor, decision making, accident, flight safety.
Исламов Д. старший преподаватель кафедра «Аэронавигационные системы» факультет «Инженерные технологии» Ташкентский государственный технический университет имени
Ислама Каримова Узбекистан, г. Ташкент
Человеческий фактор играет важную роль в обеспечении безопасности полетов. В этой статье рассматривается важность принятия решений в неблагоприятных погодных условиях с использованием примеров аварий. Даны рекомендации для пилотов по повышению безопасности полетов.
Ключевые слова: человеческий фактор, принятие решений, авария, безопасность полетов.
Adverse weather condition is the condition, which influences to flight safety. Examples such as fog, wind share, heavy precipitations. For these conditions, there are some regulations in aviations documents how to make decision. However, in some cases pilots can make different decision at their discretion. The problem is that some pilots at risk, in its decision, therefore, if the pilots are hesitant to make a decision, it is recommended to choose the safer side solutions.
There are many accidents due to risky decision. There is another situation, which can lead to accident if crew makes a risk in decision-making. For example if aircraft covered with ice on the ground and pilot hesitates to order to remove it or not, it is better to remove it. It will be safety instead of risk. There was crash of ATR-72("UTair airlines", 02.04.2012 at Tyumen airport)[1] during take-off due to ice on the plan, although it could be removed before the flight. The result said it would better to waste anti- ice liquid than make a risk.
Much has been learned in the world of aviation since its beginnings
concerning weather and its effects on air travel. Often times weather conditions such as hail, snowstorms, and thunderstorms were to blame for aviation incidents. Weather proved to be both an aircraft's best friend and worst enemy. Periodically aircraft would crash with no apparent reason and it took some time for those in the aviation world to attribute these crashes to two phenomenon of which few were aware. These two strange and deadly weather conditions know as wind shear and microbursts can be the cause of these unforeseen accidents. Wind shear is a generic term referring to any rapidly changing wind currents (NASA Facts On Line, 1992, p. 1) [2]. A microburst is a pattern of damaging winds driven outward near the surface by the ground impact of an unusually strong convective downdraft (NOAA/Forecast Systems Laboratory, 1994, p. 1) [3].
There have been incredible advances in technology that have had great impact in regards to avoiding and maneuvering aircraft through microbursts and wind shear. In 1992, NASA conducted a research project called the Wind shear Airborne Sensors Program that led to advanced technological systems that began to be installed on aircraft to detect change in wind patterns to alert pilots (Airborne Trailblazer, 1992, p. 2). This project also developed training programs for pilots to teach them how to maneuver an aircraft if caught in adverse weather conditions. In addition, research projects have also contributed to the drastic advances in meteorological detection equipment that detects and forecasts weather conditions from the air and on the ground. The National Center for Atmospheric Research, NCAR, conducted experiments to measure microbursts to determine safe parameters under which aircraft can fly safely (Airborne Trailblazer, 1992, p. 5)[4].
On 24 September 1994, an AS 350B helicopter belonging to Heli-Harricana, registration C-FPHI, left Kuujjuaq (CYVP), Quebec, at 18.01 eastern daylight saving time (EDT) on a visual flight rules (VFR) flight. In response to a medical emergency, the pilot took a physician and a nurse from Kuujjuaq to a fishing camp on George River, 94 statute miles east-northeast of Kuujjuaq. The planned flight route involved flying over an area of tundra that is largely uninhabited. The helicopter landed at its destination in daylight at 18.40. After the patient had been examined, the aircraft, with the pilot, a physician, a nurse and the patient on board, took off at about 19.00 for Kuujjuaq under visual flight rules. At 19.15, the crew of a First Air Boeing 727, FAB 867, relayed a message to the Kuujjuaq Flight Service Station (FSS) that the helicopter pilot expected to land in Kuujjuaq at 19.55. At 19.36, the pilot of C-FPHI informed the Kuujjuaq FSS that he was 42 miles from the airport and was delaying his arrival time to 20.05. The FSS specialist gave him the weather information for Kuujjuaq, and the pilot acknowledged receipt of the information. That was the last communication received from the pilot. When the helicopter did not arrive at its destination at the expected time, a search was begun. The helicopter was found five days later; it had struck the ground in a steep dive, and had been destroyed by the impact. The crash occurred 38 miles northeast of Kuujjuaq, 2 miles south of the planned route. The pilot and the passengers died in the crash. The accident occurred at about
19.39, in darkness, at latitude 53-13'N and longitude 67-22'W. Night had fallen at 19.07.The investigation established that the pilot had considerable flying experience and was considered professional and competent by his peers. He showed a marked concern for flight safety by taking two courses on risk management not required by Transport Canada. The analysis, therefore, concentrates in part on the circumstances that led to the flight being undertaken and continued in conditions where safety was in doubt.
The pilot undertook the flight to the fishing camp without finding out about the observed and forecast weather conditions along the route. The pilot stated that the trip to the camp had taken place in conditions of fog and drizzle similar to those prevailing at the camp when he arrived. The return flight was made over an uninhabited area, on a dark night, under an overcast sky and in marginal conditions. The fact that the pilot delayed the expected time of arrival in Kuujjuaq by ten minutes indicates that he had reduced the helicopter's speed. That speed reduction was probably a result of the adverse conditions encountered. In continuing his path to the west, the pilot was likely faced with reduced visibility in shower conditions similar to those observed by the pilot of the Aztec shortly after the crash. The pilot continued the night flight in adverse weather conditions, which he was not able to recognize in time because of the low light level.
The pilot was taking a great risk of losing sight of the ground in the existing environmental conditions. Because he was not IFR qualified and was not experienced in instrument flying, the pilot could not fly using only the flight instruments with which the helicopter was equipped; also, without a proper external visual reference, the pilot was subject to spatial disorientation. Given the flight profile and the helicopter's attitude at the moment of impact, the high horizontal and vertical speed, and the fact that no technical breakdown was found, it can be concluded that the pilot lost contact with the visual references necessary to fly the helicopter, and that he did not see the ground before the impact. While on a night MEDEVAC flight, the pilot likely lost his spatial orientation when he continued the flight in adverse flight conditions, which he was not able to recognize in time because of the low light level. Contributing factors to the accident were that the pilot was not qualified for night flight or for instrument flight, and that the patient's condition likely influenced the pilot's decision to undertake the night return flight to Kuujjuaq for humanitarian reasons.
Conclusion:
Therefore, pilots should know that airline companies do not need heroes but need professionals. Professionals are those who perform flights safe and effectively. For approving this conclusion there are many accidents, which were happened due to wrong decision, making.
Recommendations:
a) If there is hesitation in decision making, to postpone the flight for the better weather condition is good decision.
b) Remember that you are responsible for life of people on board
c) It is good decision to proceed to alternate aerodrome and wait for better
weather condition then make safe approach and landing in good condition
References:
1. "UTair airlines", 02.04.2012 at Tyumen airport. Analysis of the safety of flights in the autumn-winter period of 2011-2013yy. West-Siberian Interregional Territorial Administration of Air Transport
2. NASA Facts On Line, 1992, p. 1
3. NOAA/Forecast Systems Laboratory, 1994, p. 1
4. Airborne Trailblazer, 1992, p. 5.
УДК 656.052.13
Islamov D. Senior lecturer "Air navigation Systems" Department "Engineering technology" Faculty Tashkent State Technical University named after Islam Karimov, Tashkent, Uzbekistan EMERGENCY PROCEDURES AUTOMATION Nowadays many standard procedures are automated in the aircraft such as engine start up or shut down, landing, procedures, etc. These are standard operating procedures (SOP) and these help crew to work, but degrades skills. There are still difficulties for aircrew to cope problems in emergency, also being in panic and nervous decreases level of safety operation.
Keywords: emergency, human factor, safety operation, automation, flight safety.
Исламов Д. старший преподаватель кафедра «Аэронавигационные системы» факультет «Инженерные технологии» Ташкентский государственный технический университет
имени Ислама Каримова Узбекистан, г. Ташкент АВТОМАТИЗАЦИЯ АВАРИЙНЫХ ПРОЦЕДУР В настоящее время в авиации автоматизируется множество стандартных процедур, таких как запуск двигателя или закрытие, посадка, процедуры, etc. Это стандартные рабочие процедуры (SOP), и они помогают команде работать, но деградируют навыки. У экипажа воздушных судов все еще есть проблемы с решением проблем в чрезвычайной ситуации, также находясь в панике, а нервная система снижает уровень безопасности.
Ключевые слова: чрезвычайная ситуация, человеческий фактор, безопасность, автоматизация, безопасность полетов.
