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emerging as a result of such reading should be applied to all spheres of social life and should come forward as an opposition against the attempts to carry out modernization in the North Caucasus.
"SotsIs: Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya ", Moscow, 2011, N 8, pp. 107-114.
K. Landa,
Scholar of Oriental Studies
DAGESTAN AND GEOPOLITICAL PROBLEMS
IN THE SOUTH OF RUSSIA
The republic of Dagestan after disintegration of the USSR became a border subject of the Russian Federation and is contiguous with five states: with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran - by sea, on the one side, and with Azerbaijan and Georgia - on land, on the other side. In connection with the geographic location Dagestan develops more extensive mutual action with Azerbaijan. At the present stage, Russia and Azerbaijan thanks to the adequate Caspian policy (first, by V. Putin and G. Aliyev and further by D. Medvedev and I. Aliyev) solved many contradictory problems and overcame disagreements both in political and economic spheres. It is possible to mention three stages in the post-Soviet relations between the states.
The first stage represents the relations with the leaders of the People Front and president A. Elchibey. At that time the contacts were marked by mutual suspicion, claims and reproaches (often very emotional but unjustified).
Moscow and Baku with difficulties learned to live in a new way. But a lot was worsened by subjective factors. The second stage was characterized by relations with G. Aliyev and the gradual rapprochement (the first agreements on the Caspian Sea, the first
arrangements on Gabarlin RLS, the entry into the CIS), but as a whole the relations were maintained at a cool level. This period may be called to be the period of pipe-dreams.
The third stage started with V. Putin coming to power in Russia. The rise of Russian activities in the post-Soviet space draws countries together and makes it possible to construct the strategic political partnership. At present, this political vector is quite evident. Azerbaijan and Russia have got rid of many complexes and illusions, have learned to practice realism and pragmatism in a new way, have overcome difficulties of the transitory period of their own development and have been able to pass a difficult direction from emotional policy to the long-term partnership and implementation of projects.
Having come to power, G. Aliyev made significant changes in the political course, including foreign policy, of the country: Azerbaijan entered the CIS, corrected the pro-Turkish orientation of the political course of the country and took steps to restore the ties with Russia within the framework of diversification of international relations of the country. In summer of 1993, the suppression of the separatist actions of the Talysh headed by colonel A. Gumbatov in the south of the republic also contributed to the consolidation of G. Aliyev position. It is possible to say that the forces, which promoted dismantling of all connections between Azerbaijan and Russia, exhausted their capacity. They either finally left the political arena or stepped aside to liberate place for G. Aliyev and his team. But their service to the country consists in preparing conditions for de-facto and de-jure independence of Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijanis in Russia are the integral part of Russian society. The leadership of Russia (and in particularly, of Moscow) see that it is needed by common efforts of scientists, politicians and representatives of national communities to create such climate, which will make any
citizen of Russia feel himself a person and citizen enjoying full rights, irrespective of his nationality, religion and language. Azerbaijanis play a rather important role in the Russian space supporting economy of their direct Motherland. The size of external "subsidy" on the part of Russian Azerbaijanis may reach the annual sum of $ 2 billion with due account of the undeclared import plus the non-cash currency transfer.
For the period of formation of new independent states, Moscow committed many rude, realized and non-realized, evident and casual, mistakes in relation to the states of the post-Soviet space, particularly in the Caucasian direction both concerning its subjects and Azerbaijan. At that time Russia ignored the Caspian region, and it was too weak. For the last years of its existence the USSR and further Russia behind the scenes supported Armenia in the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh and made evident mistakes relating to Azerbaijan. The USA used this as an opportunity to extend cooperation in economic (through TNC), political and military spheres and occupied stable positions in Azerbaijan. In the beginning of 2009 another brawl flared up relating to the Russian military equipment for the sum of $ 800 million, which was dislocated in Armenia and given to it. Russia denied this fact, but Baku reminded that formerly, in 1994-1996, Moscow also denied the transfer of arms for the sum of $ one billion to Armenia, which was confirmed later in the State Duma by deputy general L. Rokhlin. It should be reminded that Russia officially occupies the neutral position in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan and that officially the process of peaceful regulation of Karabakh conflict is subject to review by Minsk group of OSCE, where Russia takes part. The recurrences of such separate arrangements in Russia will occur, since no high official became subject to criminal liability for actions to the detriment of the image of the country.
On 14 March 2008, the UN General Assembly adopted the resolution on the situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. The document stressed the need of complete and unconditional withdrawal of all Armenian forces from the occupied territory of Azerbaijan: 39 countries voted "for", 7 - "against", while 100 - abstained. A great number of abstained voters were explained by the fact that all countries, co-chairmen of the Minsk Group of OSCE (Russia, USA, France) voted against the resolution. The position of the Minsk group confirmed the experts' circle view on reluctance of international mediators to promote the final settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. The policy of "double standards" is explained by an instant political conjuncture. The above mention situation produces the impression that Azerbaijan should not rely on anybody: UN and OSCE, the mediators or NATO and USA.
Nevertheless, one should do justice to both parties. Given the impact of the Karabakh conflict on the bilateral relations, this theme (participation of the RF in the MG of OSCE, the support by the Kremlin of military balance in favor of Armenia and other aspect with negative impact on Baku) long time ago was put in the separate block of relations, which does not exert pressure on the substantial part of bilateral relations.
For the last years, despite many internal difficulties Azerbaijan much better than, for instance Georgia, succeeds to maintain good relations simultaneously with Moscow and Washington. It is connected with the fact that Baku, unlike Tbilisi, has no complex of inferiority in its relations with Moscow; and in Baku they do not regard the Russian military presence (Gabalinskaya RLS, project "Kasfor") as a threat to sovereignty.
Regretfully, Azerbaijan has not attained the level of cooperation, primarily in military and political spheres, which exists today in
relations between Russia and Armenia. Unlike Armenia, Azerbaijan is not affiliated with EvrAzES and ODKB (the structure considered by Russian diplomats and military officials to be important for ensuring security in the post-Soviet space). Azerbaijan is a member of GUAM, the organization with the anti-CIS image and counter-balance to Russian influence in near abroad. But the nearness to the anti-Russian alliance to a large extent is dictated by the pro-Russian orientation of Armenia. The leaders of Azerbaijan unjustly see in the future a danger of escalation of Armenian-Azerbaijani opposition. To what extent these concerns are justified (if justified), that is another question.
Azerbaijan strives for efficient exploiting a rather great transit capacity. The so called transport corridor, which for a long distance goes on through the territory of the republic, may transform it into a center of international trade and re-export. The leadership of Dagestan is ready by all means to promote development of transport communications of both states from the Russian side, understanding well economic advantage of valuable functioning of automobile and railway transport on the territory of the republic. In this context, the cooperation with western countries in the sphere of communications acquires the rising significance. Baku receives from EU the pre-investment technical assistance for restoration of the system of pipelines. The program TRASECA in this context is the most important initiative taking into account the big reduction of the railway transportation of the republic with Russia.
There is another problem like "smouldering" in the relations of Russia with Azerbaijan, which has not yet attained the inter-state level. The social-political situation in Northern Azerbaijan, where live in compact settlements Avars, Lezgins, Tsakhurs and other related nationalities of Dagestanis. After disintegration of the USSR they became the separated peoples living in two different states. Their
destiny is rarely subject to public discussion in Azerbaijan and in Russia on the part of official representatives. However, the regional mass media in Dagestan devotes much attention to the position of relative peoples abroad.
The main problems of Dagestanis living in Azerbaijan relate to three spheres - language, political and religious spheres. For instance, only in 20% of schools in Azerbaijan, where study Avar children, the Avar language is taught only two hours per week. Dagestan is unable to send to Azerbaijan the textbooks for teaching the Avar, Lezgin and Tsakhur languages due to the lack of the corresponding state agreement between Russia and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan purposefully postpones conclusion of such agreement. In Zakatal district formerly existed two local TV channels broadcasting at least songs in Avar language. One of them, DM-TV, owned by Avar person Mustafa Dibirov, was closed. The Avar music almost disappeared on the other Aigyun TV channel. Of great significance is the problem of preparing school teachers for teaching the native language in the districts, where live Dagestanis. At present, the branch of the Dagestani State University was closed and does not function in Baku. Since 1998 the branch of Dagestani philology ensured training of teachers of Lezgin and Avar languages.
The Avars living in Azerbaijan are rarely represented in official structures of the country. In Zakatal district, where exists the biggest Avar community, its representative occupies only the post of deputy head of the district in charge of culture, while the post of the head of the district is occupied by the person of origin in Nakhichevan. The repeated appeals of the local population to the leadership of Azerbaijan and Dagestan were left unattended.
The contradictions unsettled at the inter-state level have a negative impact on mutual relations between Dagestan and Azerbaijan, although it is clear that without participation of Moscow Dagestan is
unable to have an influence on the situation. The constitution of Russia does not allow the subject of the Federation to carry on self-dependently negotiations on regulation of inter-state relations with other states. Thus, given the inability of the state officials to define the reasons of conflicts and to have the will to settle them and the ability to use state mechanisms for this sake, there emerge social movements and organizations, which start in their way "to solve" trans-border problems. Just in this way Lezgin national movement "Sadval" started its activities in the south of Dagestan.
After disintegration of the USSR the problem of separation of the Lezgin people on the both banks of river Samur became more acute than the problem of Belakan and Zakatal Avars in Azerbaijan. The border dividing Dagestani and Azerbaijani Lezgins is river Samur. The Lezgins themselves might become the leading ethnos among neighbors, but their influence is greatly reduced by their separation. The national movements in this region are marked by the great force and it is not alleviated by any urban centers. Due to this circumstance a knot of inter-ethic contradictions is being made in the south of Dagestan. Up to present, both the authorities of Dagestan and the leadership of Azerbaijan try to prevent aggravation of the situation.
The idea of Lezgins on "transparence" of the Russian-Azerbaijani border along river Samur and the proposal on creation of conditions for development of public-political, economic and cultural ties between northern and southern Lezgins is the most acceptable proposal.
In September 2010 president of Russia D. Medvedev visited Baku. Within the framework of the visit, the agreements should have been signed on delimitation of the state border, on utilization of water resources of border river Samur and on some aspects of property of the complex of buildings of the embassy of Azerbaijan in Moscow. It was
supposed to sign the agreement on transfer to Baku the complete authority and on subordination to it of Samurski hydro-station, which is the main water scoop in Samur. Baku as a 3-million city, takes water from this reservoir. The Samur natural complex, the relict forest takes water from it as well. Earlier, in April 2010, the arrangements were achieved on delimitation of the state border and on water division on the border river Samur. It was supposed to arrange the joint "50 and 50" utilization of the water resources of river Samur and to establish a joint commission for management.
For the 1999-2000, the actual water intake from river Samur was as follows: Azerbaijan - 53%, Russian Federation - 9%, the ecological pass - 38% of the annual flow. The hydroelectric station and the intake dam were constructed by the decisions of the Council of Soviet of Ministers of the USSR in 1949 and 1952, and these constructions at present are exploited by Azerbaijan, which makes Azerbaijan control completely the water resources of Samur. Such distribution of water resources infringes upon lawful interests of Russia, but the leadership of the country is not concerned about it, the author thinks. The details of the visit of the Russian delegation to Baku in September 2010 were not publicized, which engendered some rumors. According to the information collected by the author, there emerged more significant concessions to disadvantage of Russian policy in the region.
Some arguments were expressed in favor of the conclusion that certain forces in the Kremlin recently in the course of negotiations with Baku represented rather interests of Azerbaijan than Russian Dagestan. In particular, it was the unauthorized withdrawal of Russian border guards, for the beginning, to the middle of the bridge and further to the left bank of Samur, while the border was actually fixed on the right bank. Further - the concession on the issues of delimitation of the border with Azerbaijan and the unexplainable reluctance of the federal
center to allocate financial means for commission of the water intake construction near village Kuisun, which would make it possible to control completely the water flows of Samur.
Some experts regard the actions of the federal center as a sign of defeatism or even worse of the refusal to protect the interests of Dagestan in exchange of ephemeral loyalty of Azerbaijan. Does Moscow understand that any unlawful concessions to Azerbaijan will result in infringement of the rights of Dagestanis living in Azerbaijan? In his time, president of Russia D. Medvedev took the decision to postpone this issue and said: "We ought to think". It was the better decision than the defeatist positions relating to Dagestan proposed by high officials in the presidential circle.
The lack of information on the meeting and the not transparent adopted decisions preclude the other conclusion than the surrender of interests of Dagestan - the southern outpost of Russia, which not once in difficult situations for the country proved its devotion to the ideas of all-Russian patriotism, to please the imaginary loyalty of a potential member of NATO. Today it is evident that the population of Russia near the border with Azerbaijan becomes a victim of great policy.
What will be the position of the leadership of Dagestan in these circumstances? One should recall a sad experience of the president Mukhu Aliyev, when the experienced leader of Dagestan at the ordinary negotiations between the presidents of Russia and Azerbaijan (Baku, 29 July 2009) resolutely objected against the division of Samur and limitation of the state border, which was planned to disadvantage of Dagestan. (Mujhu Aliyev agreed to divide the water intake of Samur by 70% to 30% in favor of Dagestan with the remark that his people would not understand the division "50% and 50%" proposed by Moscow and Baku.) Addressing to the Head of the Administration of the President S. Naryshkin (as the organizer of the meeting) and to the Minster of
Foreign Affairs S. Lavrov (he had a talk with him in a raised voice in Moscow), he asserted that the proposed by them direction was "anti-Dagestani and anti-state" and that he would not be able to agreed with it. It is unknown, whether the present president of Dagestan M. Magomedov will defend in the same way the interests of Russia, speaking against policy of Moscow and Baku, taking into account close relations between the families of the presidents of Dagestan and Azerbaijan?
Nevertheless, one matter is clear that, irrespective of all problems and discords on the two sides of the state border, they should be solved in the course of negotiations in the interests of the peoples of Russia and Azerbaijan, first of all, in the interests of all peoples living in the region. (The people in Dagestan hope that it will be done not at the expense of infringements of interests of Russian Dagestanis and Dagestanis living in Azerbaijan.) We should not lose our positions in Azerbaijan, since Russia takes the risk by Azerbaijan to weaken its influence on the Caspian region. The return of Azerbaijan into the vector of Russian foreign policy remains quite urgent.
"Voprosy natsionalnyh i federativnyh otnosheniy", Moscow, 2011, pp. 193-204.
Rasim Musabekov,
D.Sc. (Phil.) (Azerbaijan)
AZERBAIJAN BETWEEN TURKEY AND RUSSIA
Throughout many centuries the geopolitics of South Caucasus had been determined by rivalry between Turkey, Iran and Russia. However, other actors came into being there in the 19th - 20th century. First, it was Britain, which boasted global influence in the epoch of the thriving of its empire. Then, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union
