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27ИСТОРИЧЕСКИЕ НАУКИ
Smertin Yuri
Kuban State University, Russia Doctor of Science in History, Professor
COVERT OPERATIONS OF THE USSR IN AFRICA
DOI: 10.31618/ESSA.2782-1994.2022.1.82.285 Annotation: During the Cold War, Africa was of great interest to the Soviet Union, which used various means to win over the elites and counter-elites of the newly independent states in the hope of making them its allies and opposing the West. Covert operations occupied an important place among these means. The purpose of the article is to analyze the secret activities of the state institutions of the Soviet Union in African countries. The study is based mainly on archival materials revealing the strategy and tactics of the actions of the top party leadership of the USSR, the State Security Committee (KGB) and the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU). Memoirs of African and Russian participants of the events were used as important sources of information. The results obtained allow us to conclude that the secret services were an important link in the party-state machine and carried out the political order of its leadership, and their secret operations were an important part of the Soviet Union's foreign policy in Africa.
Keywords: illegal activity; active measures; State Security Committee (KGB); Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU).
Introduction
The relevance of this study is due to the current state of international relations, which many researchers call the new Cold War. The leadership of the Russian Federation in recent years, in words and in deeds, is increasingly appealing to the experience of the Soviet Union and professing a tough confrontation with the West. In these conditions, Africa is once again becoming a field of their rivalry, which has also been joined by China. The objective of the study was to analyze the secret activities of Soviet intelligence and related institutions helps to take a fresh look at some of the events and processes in the recent history of Africa.
Africa was of particular interest to the Soviet leadership and special services. They did not conduct such large-scale covert operations on other continents. According to the author and many researchers, covert operations are intelligence activities, supplying arms and money to anti-government groups and parties, subsidizing trade unions, misinformation, handing money to editors of periodicals or prepared editorials, paying transportation and other expenses to "the right people."
Covert operations were planned and developed by the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU Central Committee) and the leadership of the First Main Directorate of the KGB (Foreign Intelligence). Covert operations were carried out directly by Service A (disinformation, covert operations), Office T (active actions), 9 and 10 departments specialized in English-speaking and French-speaking African countries. Department 18 was responsible for work in Egypt and the Arab countries of the Middle East.
Africa was of great interest to Moscow, not only because the important political, ideological, and strategic interests of the USSR were concentrated here, but also because the continent after World War II became a wide field of intelligence activities of the West and the East. Therefore, covert operations in Africa were common, and both sides tried to surpass
each other in quality and quantity of operations. The author's hypothesis is that the Soviet party and state leadership, based on the idea of expanding the zone of its ideological and political influence in the Third World, considered the recently liberated countries of Africa as a priority goal. Various methods were used for this, not least covert operations.
Materials and methods
The Soviet policy towards African countries was a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, including both its visible part (state visits, official statements, etc.) and secret (operations of special services, arms supplies, intelligence activities of embassies, etc.). Therefore, the main method of research was working with archival materials stored in the Center for the Storage of Modern Documentation, created in 1991 on the basis of archival structures of the CPSU Central Committee. In 1992, the authorities of the new Russia intended to arrange a trial of the CPSU and opened secret documents relating to various aspects of the activities of party and state institutions for a narrow circle of researchers. At this time, the author had the opportunity to get acquainted with the materials that are used in this article. In 1999, the Center for the Storage of Modern Documentation was renamed the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI) and the vast majority of materials were removed from open access. To study the interaction of Soviet embassies in African countries with the structures of the Novosti Press Agency, materials from the Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF) were also used.
Published eyewitness accounts of the events described, former employees of the USSR and US intelligence services, were used in analyzing covert operations in Africa. The main opponent of the USSR in the Cold War, naturally, noticed the activity of the Soviet Union The reaction of the US authorities to this topic and important factual material are contained in documents of the US Congress. Valuable information was extracted from the author's interview with a KGB
officer who had been working in Africa for a long time and the former Soviet ambassador to Zambia. A wide range of sources, most of which are published for the first time, made it possible to clarify some well-known events and take a fresh look at them, as well as to reveal previously unknown facts of secret operations in African countries planned by the top leadership of the USSR.
Results
The main goal of Soviet intelligence was twofold. On the one hand, the KGB worked on the "main enemy" (the United States and the Western powers). The conditions for clarifying relations with the intelligence services of the West and the East were very favorable in Africa. According to I. Prelin, a retired colonel of the KGB, this continent was "free for spies". "There was something to do in Africa and there was an opportunity to do the work relatively calmly" due to the fact that the local weak special services were absorbed in the struggle with the internal opposition and they didn't care "what white people share there".1 The leadership of the USSR focused the special services on obtaining and analyzing reliable information about the processes taking place in African countries and national liberation movements and on influencing these processes in the right way for the Kremlin.
The creation of parallel operating illegal and legal intelligence networks was characteristic of Soviet intelligence. The illegal agents had their own resident, who usually lived in a country with a foreign passport and pretended to be a citizen of another country who, for example, was engaged in business. An example of such an illegal can be an intelligence officer, Yuri Loginov, aka Edmundas Trinke, who was arrested in Johannesburg in 1967. Loginov was trained for intelligence work for about eight years. During this time, he improved his English, refined in accents, customs, roles of an accountant and a traveling writer. In South Africa Loginov collected information about military and naval bases, about De Beers and the political situation in the country.2 The piquancy of the situation was that Loginov offered his services to the CIA as early as 1961 in Helsinki, however in Langley they were not sure of his sincerity, because they thought
1 Prelin I. Kontract s predatelem. Stolitsa. 1993, No 4. P. 13.
2 Carr B. Spy in the Sun. Cape Town: Howard Timmins, 1969. P. 170.
3 Campbell K.M. Soviet Policy towards South Africa. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986. P. 132; Wise D. Okhota na "krotov". Sekretnyj poisk predatelej, potryasshij CRU. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1994. pp. 105-105, 134; Prokhorov D., Lemekhov O. O. Perebezhchiki. Zaochno rasstrelyany. Moscow: Veche, 2001. P. 42.
4 Filatova I., Davidson A. The Hidden Treat. Russia and South Africa in the Soviet Era. Johannesburg & Cape Town: 2007. P. 402.
5 See: Filatova I., Davidson A. The Hidden Treat.
Russia and South Africa in the Soviet Era.
Johannesburg & Cape Town: 2007. P. 386-393.
it was a KGB game and they passed Loginov to the authorities of the Republic of South Africa. Two years after his arrest, Loginov was exchanged in Germany for eleven West German agents who were detained and serving prison sentences in the GDR.3
In 1980, a KGB high-ranking officer, Alexei Kozlov, was arrested in South Africa and exchanged for eight Western agents imprisoned in the USSR. There is information that Mossad requested the South Africans try to get Andrei Sakharov out of the USSR in exchange for Kozlov.4
However, illegal networks were not characteristic of Africa since their existence was associated with serious risks and high financial costs. Illegal networks could exist only in key countries and were created most often by the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, which carried out strategic and military intelligence. South Africa was of interest to the Soviet Union for its nuclear program and the possibility of obtaining technical information about the weapons systems of Western countries and Israel, and the lack of diplomatic relations with South Africa (since 1956) excluded other channels of intelligence activities. The case of the high-ranking naval officer Dieter Gerhardt is widely known5. He represented the navy in all South Africa's security services and transmitted secret information on the armies of South Africa's Western allies and modern military technology to Moscow for 20 years (since 1962), primarily in the field of electronics. For this activity, he received $ 325,000 from Moscow and a life sentence from South African authorities.6
Exploration was carried out through a legal network in the vast majority of African countries. The "legal" intelligence officers were KGB officers who worked in Soviet embassies, trade missions, the Novosti Press Agency and other organizations.7 The saturation of these institutions by KGB officers was very high. I. Greig, based on various data, believes that such officers constituted from one-quarter to one-third of all personnel in the USSR embassies in African countries.8 These assessments should be taken as the most general. The numbers could change upwards or downwards for each country and for each period.
6 Venter Al. J. How South Africa Built Six Atom Bombs. PretoriaA Ashanti Publishing, 2008. P. 64-65; Kalley J.A, Schoeman E., Andor L.E. Southern African Political History: a chronology of key political events from independence to mid-1997. Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1999. P. 480.
7 About illegal activities of Novosti Press Agency in Africa see: Smertin Y.G. Word of the NPA: The Propaganda in Africa during the Cold War. Astra Salvensis Review of History and Culture. 2018, No. 1 (11). P. 257-273.
8 Greig I. The Communist Challenge to Africa. Richmond: Foreign Affairs Publishing Co. Ltd, 1977. P. 116.
According to the testimony of the former KGB officer V. Karpov, who has worked for more than 20 years in African countries, there was no residency at all in some countries. "The policy of local regimes did not care about foreign intelligence. Residency was created where there was an opportunity to work on the main enemy. For example, in Senegal".9 However, the entire diplomatic composition of the embassies was engaged in intelligence activities in one form or another. The document "Perspective plan for support and development of contacts of the operational and diplomatic staff of the Embassy in the diplomatic corps and among representatives of national liberation movements", approved by the USSR Ambassador in Algeria on May 3, 1976, ordered the ambassador, all advisers of the embassy and secretaries to have close ties with specific diplomats of all embassies and representative offices located in the capital. There were 10-15 people for each person.10
A typical example of the non-diplomatic activity of Soviet diplomats in Africa is the incident that took place in Congo (Leopoldville) in November 1963. The Congolese authorities seized documents proving the existence of ties between the Soviet embassy and the National Liberation Committee, an anti-government organization that called itself a "government in exile". The Chairman of the National Liberation Committee, leader of the National Liberation of the Congo (Lumumba) party, Christoph Gbeni and his associates visited Moscow at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee, where they were consulted about the possibility of "progressive forces" coming to power in the Congo.11 Prime Minister Syrille Adoula described the case as follows. On November 19, a boat arrived from Congo (Brazzaville), carrying a car belonging to an adviser to the USSR Embassy. The owner of the car, accompanied by the Embassy attache, wanted to pick it up, but the security service decided to inspect the suspicious cargo and found curious documents. There was a personal message from Gbeni among them. He wrote that the goal of his party was to gain power through a coup. The documents contained a request to the leadership of the USSR for assistance with weapons and special reconnaissance equipment. Gbeni also requested to transfer through the employees of the Soviet embassy 4 billion fake Congolese bank notes.12 The reaction followed immediately. The entire embassy was declared persona non grata, and the adviser and the attache were expelled from the country immediately. Telegrams were sent to Khrushchev and Brezhnev requesting the names of new diplomats to obtain the consent of the Congolese government.13 The new composition of the Soviet embassy in Leopoldville
9 Author's interview with V. Karpov. 01/25/1994.
10 Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF). Fond (F) 68. Opis' (O) 20. Papka (P) 31. Delo (D) 8. Listy (L) 18-19
11 Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI). Card file. Resolution Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU No. 42. 02.10.1962.
12 AVP RF. F. 628. O. 6. P. 9. D. 9. L. 10.
was not much different from the previous one, and ties with anti-government forces continued. In the early 1970s, the Congolese authorities concluded that the KGB was intensifying its activities in the country and has its agents in the army, the ministries of information and foreign affairs, and the national archive. The government expelled four alleged KGB officers and demanded that the size of the embassy be no more than seven.14
Often, the KGB is depicted in Western publications as a well-tuned, soulless, machine operating with mathematical logic. Undoubtedly, the KGB, along with the Main Intelligence Directorate, was the most efficient and effective tool of the Soviet system. However, because the KGB was a part of the system, it had its inherent flaws. The rigid and unconditional subordination of the lower to the higher level, the intervention of the party organization, the leadership of the party leaders from the Central Committee of the CPSU, and nepotism reduced the effectiveness of the KGB and its First Main Directorate. According to O. Gordievsky, reporting in the KGB was not particularly accurate. In messages to the Center on a specific topic, which was requested from the residency, the latter simply copied information received from the media, attributed it to anonymous agents, or even invented some details to please the Center.15 Sometimes it was, apparently, a necessary measure, because the most incredible information was often requested from Moscow. V. Karpov recalled that encrypted telegrams for intelligence were sent from the Central Committee around the world with an order to clarify the position of the leadership of a country on individual world problems, and the specifics of a particular country were completely ignored. For example, a cryptogram arrived in Chad, which described what positions the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, China, etc. occupy on the problems of the seabed. The task was to find out Chad's position on this issue. "Rezidentura" in the response cipher to the Center said maliciously: we analyzed our capabilities, met with sources A, B and C, and they said that since Chad has no sea borders and they will not appear soon, the position of the Chad leadership on this issue is absolutely indifferent. Another example: an instruction was sent to an Arab country to work on the Vatican, because such assignments were sent all over the world. Since there were no Christians, it was impossible to obtain such information.16
The KGB was interested not only in the Soviet embassies in Africa, but also in the African embassies in Moscow in terms of obtaining intelligence information. Through the abduction of information,
13 AVP RF . F. 628. O. 6. P. 9. D. 9. L. 7, 15.
14 Mazov S.V. Holodnaya vojna v «serdce Afriki»: SSSR i kongolezskij krizis, 1960-1964. Moscow: Dmitry Pozharsky University, 2015. p. 101.
15 Gordievsky O. Istoriya vneshnepoliticheskih operacij ot Lenina do Gorbacheva. Moscow: Nota Bene, 1992. p 622.
16 Author's interview with V. Karpov. 01/25/1994.
which was carried out by employees of some embassies, as well as through technical means, the leadership of the CPSU was supplied with secret information of a political nature, which was important for the formation of strategic and tactical approaches in African politics. Thus, the Deputy Chairman of the KGB, R. Zakharov, informed the Central Committee of the CPSU in January 1969 that the Kenyan leader, Jomo Kenyatta, instructed the relevant ministries to prepare a report on the state of Kenyan-Soviet relations and, in order of its implementation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kenya sent a request Kenyan ambassador in Moscow. KGB learned that "in his response, the ambassador spoke out against expanding relations with the Soviet Union".17 On March 31, 1969, Zakharov informed the Central Committee of the CPSU about the content of the letter sent by the Ethiopian Ambassador to Moscow to the emperor Haile Selassie.18 Such information could only be obtained from recruited embassy staff. The Embassy of Cameroon sent a protest note to the USSR Foreign Ministry in May 1967 after night unknown persons entered the Charge d'Affaires' of Cameroon in the USSR, Mvondo, and broke into a metal safe with secret documents and ciphers of the embassy, and he did not take the money in the safe.19 It is unlikely that simple Soviet robbers would be able to get into the embassy's building, which was carefully guarded by the police, and the robbers, having admired the ciphers, could ignore foreign currency.
Journalism as a tool of disinformation and intelligence
One of the main tasks of the KGB in Africa, as well as on other continents, was to carry out "active measures" aimed at manipulating the public opinion of foreign countries in order to strengthen Soviet influence and weaken the position of the West. The development of specific projects was carried out by the Service A of the First Main Directorate of the KGB on the instructions of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee and on its own initiative, but with the approval of the party leaders. During the period from 1975 to 1985, according to the testimony of the former KGB colonel, Oleg Gordievsky, Service A grew from 50 to 80 people. It was placed in Yasenevo, on the outskirts of Moscow. Another 30-40 people worked in the Novosti Press Agency on Pushkin Square. Vladimir Kryuchkov, who led foreign intelligence at that time (from 1974 to 1983), enthusiastically supported "active measures" and often discussed specific projects in the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee.20
Counterfeit documents fabricated in Moscow and foreign residences were central to the "active measures". Sometimes these were authentic
17 RGANI. F. 5. Op. 61. D. 544. L. 3.
18 RGANI. F. 5. Op. 61. D. 544. L. 50.
19 AVP RF . F. 576. O. 10. P. 8 D. 2. L. 27-29.
20 Gordievsky O. Istoriya vneshnepoliticheskih operacij
ot Lenina do Gorbacheva. Moscow: Nota Bene, 1992.
p. 631.
documents, modified and interpreted in the "right light", but more often, they were essays completely invented by disinformation specialists. Their goal was to discredit the policies of the United States and its allies, as well as certain influential individuals.
From the mid-1970s, as part of the development of the "main theme", Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, who was very disliked in Moscow for withdrawing from the pro-Soviet course Gamal Abdel Nasser, became one of the main goals of active events. At first, the Egyptian and some other media outlets published anti-Sadat statements by top US leaders, which should have worsened American-Egyptian relations. Then, according to Gordievsky's testimony, "large residencies received a circular from Service A, instructing them to spread rumors that Sadat was a former Nazi, that Nasser spoke of him as a mentally unstable person, that he was under the thumb of his wife, ... that he was a CIA agent, and finally, when he had to flee Egypt, the CIA promised him a villa in [Swiss] Montreux""21.
KGB officers who were in African countries under journalistic cover were often involved in active activities. Along with intelligence activities, this was the main part of their hidden activities. The position of a journalist expanded the possibilities for this kind of occupation, since, unlike diplomats, journalists had greater freedom of movement and greater opportunities to meet with influential people.
In April 1976, the KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov wrote to the CPSU Central Committee: "The Izvestia newspaper has for several years been a correspondent's office for working with the countries of Central Africa with its headquarters in Brazzaville (People's Republic of Congo). A KGB officer holds the post of correspondent in it. In order to create conditions for the deployment of intelligence work and information on events in the People's Republic of Angola (as well as in neighboring countries of Southern Africa), the KGB of the USSR would consider it expedient to convert the above-mentioned correspondent paragraph of the Izvestia newspaper to work with countries Central and South Africa, determining its location in the capital Luanda, and determining the circle for multiple trips by the following countries: Republic of Zambia, People's Republic of Mozambique, Gabonese Republic, People's Republic of the Congo, United Republic of Cameroon, Republic of Zaire, Republic of Equatorial Guinea, Central African Republic". The Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee by its resolution of May 5, 1976 granted Andropov's request.22
The Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS) also did not stand aside from intelligence activities. In 1980, by the decision of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU (No. ST - 210 /
21 Gordievsky O. Istoriya vneshnepoliticheskih operacij ot Lenina do Gorbacheva. Moscow: Nota Bene, 1992. p. 550.
22 RGANI. F. 89. Pereplet (Per) 27. Dokument (Dok) 11. L. 4, 1-2.
57gs. 13.05.1980) a TASS office was established in the Republic of Zimbabwe. A separate paragraph of the resolution read: "The position of a correspondent ... will be replaced by an employee of the State Security Committee".23
V. Karpov spoke about one of the exotic variants of active events in Africa. "We took local newspapers, bulletins, which were covertly financed by the Americans, copied them, inserted materials that were favorable to us, and sent them. Thus, we discredited these publications. For example, they scold the Soviet Union in an article, and we instead insert criticism of Israel. Americans say to the editor: "Oh, you son of a bitch! We paid you money, and you do such things". He begins to make excuses. Sometimes these organs of information were closed down". 24 However, more widespread active activities carried out by KGB officers under diplomatic and journalistic cover were bribing editors and journalists of African newspapers to publish articles fabricated in Moscow, signed by local authors or anonymously. These were anti-Western or pro-Soviet articles that were later reprinted in other African publications, quoted by the Soviet media as evidence of broad international support for the policies of the Soviet Union. Journalists who worked closely with the KGB (sometimes without realizing this fact) became agents of Soviet influence in the high spheres of government in some African countries.
Financial and material support for pro-Soviet parties and movements
Many of the new independent countries of Africa declared their socialist orientation, which opened up prospects for their cooperation with the Soviet Union and gave hope to its leadership to create a broad antiWestern front on the continent. However, in the early 1960s, N. Khrushchev showed skepticism regarding the revolutionary potentialities of "national democratic" regimes and the degree of their closeness to the CPSU. Ghana and Guinea showed excessive autonomy from the point of view of Moscow. Neutralism of African states, which at first seemed anti-Western, increasingly showed its equidistance from the main military blocs; Moscow was not satisfied with the results of a vote by African countries at the UN on many important issues for the Soviet Union. It became clear that revolutionary nationalism could not be a reliable ideological and political pillar of the USSR in Africa, like its bearers, educated and entrepreneurial elite. African policy of the Soviet Union was aimed at supporting existing communist parties and groups and movements close to them, as well as assistance in creating new pro-Soviet political entities. Moscow considered all these parties, movements, groups, at least, as a means of putting pressure on the ruling regimes. Their real strength depended primarily on Soviet support, mainly financial. Every year, the Politburo passed resolutions
23 RGANI. F. 89. Per. 32. Dok. 29. L. 3.
24 Author's interview with V. Karpov. 01/25/1994.
25 RGANI. Card file. Minutes No. 8 of the meeting of
the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the
CPSU of 06/24/1966; Minutes No. 73 of the meeting of
determining recipients of money and specific amounts. Among the recipients were the Congress Party for the Independence of Madagascar, the People's Democratic Party (Sudan), the All People's Congress of Sierra Leone, the Kenya People's Union, the Socialist Workers and Peasants Party of Nigeria and others. The average annual infusion into the pro-Soviet party was $ 30-40 thousand. The Politburo had always instructed the KGB to transfer currency.25
African communists understood Moscow's interest in them and did not hesitate to ask for money using the anti-imperialist rhetoric that was dear to the Kremlin leaders. In 1968, Otegbey, general secretary of the Socialist Workers and the Peasants Party of Nigeria, asked for increased financial and material assistance, "which was a great help in normal times, but would not be enough in the face of growing and continuing problems fierce cold war. Comrade Otegbey was invited to Moscow "to discuss the issues raised in the letter".26 In Congo (Brazzaville) after the overthrow of the regime Fulbert Youlou in 1963, the recipient of "fraternal assistance" was the Marxist wing in the ruling party, the National Revolutionary Movement. His leader, A. Massamba-Debat, spoke of the socialist orientation of his policies, but his socialism seemed to Moscow and local Marxists to be too "african". Therefore, the Central Committee of the CPSU regularly supplied money to A. Noumazalay, the leader of the pro-Soviet group, whose aim was to overthrow the Massamba-Debat regime. Such ambitious tasks required large expenditures; Noumazalay reported this to Moscow through KGB officers. The Chairman of the KGB, Y. Andropov, informed the CPSU Central Committee on February 9, 1968: "In accordance with the decision of the CPSU Central Committee No. P 68/39 of January 30, 1968, the representative of the KGB delivered the leader of the Marxist group of the People's Revolutionary Movement of the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville) to Noumazalay $ 5 thousand. When receiving the money, A. Noumazalay handed a note to the KGB representative asking for financial assistance in the amount of 100 thousand US dollars. If it is decided to satisfy the request of A. Noumazalay, I would consider it expedient to transfer money to him in parts, since the presence of a large amount of money may bring suspicions to A. Numazalay".27 It was written by hand on the appeal of Y. Andropov to the Central Committee: "A. Noumazalay's request was considered by the Politburo on 04.22.68. Noumazalay reported ".28
Perhaps this money, if it was not stolen, worked for a leftist military coup that Marian Ngouabi committed in August 1968. However, contradictions soon arose between Ngouabi and the Marxist group. Congolese Marxists viewed Ngouabi as a tool to break through to the levers of power. However, Ngouabi did
the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU of 04.03.1968, etc.
26 RGANI. F. 50. Op. 60. D. 448. L. 33-34.
27 RGANI F. 89. Per. 51. Dok. 26. L. 2.
28 RGANI. F. 89. Per. 51. Dok. 26. L. 3, 2.
not want to be on the sidelines and began to limit their claims. In addition, he saw in Marxism an important means of mobilizing the people and receiving help from the USSR. The new Congolese leader found support in the Central Committee of the CPSU in this, since he relied on the only real force - the army, unlike the Congolese left-wing intellectuals who are prone to fruitless discussions. The Congolese Party of Labor, founded in 1969, was to implement Ngouabi's policy of building the foundations of socialism and a close alliance with the USSR in the country. The "historical leftists", as the Congolese marxists called themselves, feeling offended and deceived, decided to fight against the Ngouabi regime, which had destroyed their monopoly on relations with Moscow. They again needed money, but the Soviet leadership had already made a choice. The Central Committee of the CPSU, in response to the regular request letter from Noumazalay made a decision: "On the inexpediency of satisfying the request of Noumazalay, the former party secretary of the National Revolutionary Movement (Congo-Brazzaville), to provide him with financial assistance to revitalize his activities against the leadership of the ruling Congolese Party of Labor, as unjustified and not appropriate to the situation in the Congo".29 By this time, Moscow had reconsidered its attitude towards the perspectives of the communist movement in Africa. The support of weak and inactive pro-Soviet Marxist groups demanded large financial expenditures, and the effectiveness of their actions was extremely low. The foreign policy under L. Brezhnev became more pragmatic and cynical, although the support of stronger communist parties and movements close to them continued, where it was beneficial and fit into the context of confrontation with the West.
One type of clandestine operations in Africa was the training of intelligence personnel for the parties of Marxist-Leninist orientation. Training and practical classes was conducted in the USSR and the KGB was engaged in it, while the reception and servicing of students were assigned to the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee. The archives of the CPSU Central Committee contain many requests from African communist parties with a request to accept their members for "special training" and to teach "organizing actions to decompose the enemy", "the experience of the revolutionary movement in using women to gather information", "making false documents" and etc. Sometimes Moscow directly came to the rescue and compensated for the weaknesses of its ideological allies
29 RGANI. Card file. Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU, adopted without a vote. Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee March 4, 1970
30 RGANI. F. 89. Pereplet 46. Document 118. L. 1-3.
31 RGANI. Card file. Minutes No. 42 of the meeting of the commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU on ideological, cultural and international party relations dated January 9, 1960.
32 RGANI. Card file. Resolution of the Secretariat of
the Central Committee of the CPSU: №100 from
with all the power of its well-established system of conspiracy activities. In June 1974, the Central Committee of the CPSU received a letter from one of the leaders of the South African Communist Party with a request to produce 100 blank passports of the neighboring country Swaziland for its "activists". The Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee instructed the KGB to make fake passports "with the necessary number of seals and stamps in a three-month period and hand them over to the leadership of the SACP".30 The greatest financial, material and intellectual expenses were demanded by clandestine operations to support anti-government groups and parties that set themselves the goal of overthrowing "anti-people" regimes by armed means. Moscow acquired its first such experience in Africa in the early 1960s when it decided to place a stake in the Congo (Brazzaville) on government opposition groups and Antoine Gizenga, an associate of Patrice Lumumba, chairman of the African Solidarity Party, created before the independence of the country. In January 1960, Gizenga was invited to Moscow, where he negotiated with the Soviet leadership for two weeks.31 When the Congolese authorities discovered the facts of hidden financial and material assistance to underground anti-government forces, the entire staff of the Soviet embassy in Brazzaville was expelled in November 1963. However, after this, Moscow did not interrupt contacts with the opposition. The leadership of the Congolese National Movement, whose co-founder was Gizenga, was secretly invited to Moscow for consultations, followed by material assistance.32 Hopes for the overthrow of the pro-Western regime remained. In December 1964 and in January 1965, 12 heavy transport planes with Algerian identification marks printed on top of red stars transported more than 100 tons of weapons and ammunition from Algeria to Khartoum (Sudan). Soviet pilots, who had Algerian doublers, controlled the planes. From Khartoum on light aircraft, cargo was transferred to South Sudan and from there by truck delivered to the borders of Congo (Brazzaville).33 However, even this support could not provide the "patriotic forces" of coming to power. Large-scale assistance ceased, but A. Gizengu was resettled to Moscow in 1969, where he was reunited with his family, who had lived on Soviet money for several years. In November 1971, the Soviet authorities, having lost their hopes for a change in the situation in Zaire, sent Gizenga to Belgrade and gave him $ 200.34
20.05.1964; No. 109 0t 04/01/1965; №125 from 8/24/1965.
33 Greig I. The Communist Challenge to Africa. Richmond: Foreign Affairs Publishing Co. Ltd, 1977. P. 155.
34 RGANI. Card file. Resolutions of the Central Committee of the CPSU, adopted without discussion: from 09/28/1967; from 02.22.1968; Minutes No. 77 of the meeting of the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee of August 12, 1969; Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU, adopted without a
South Africa as a special interest area
The emergence of "national liberation movements" in the South of the African continent gave Moscow a chance to increase its influence in this strategically important region and try to bring proSoviet regimes into power in the future. The biggest bet was made in the Republic of South Africa, where a strong the South African Communist Party (SACP) operated in alliance with the left-handed the African National Congress (ANC). Moscow hoped to provide the ideological leadership of the communists in the ANC-SACP alliance and, through them, pursue its policies in the liberation movement of the Republic of South Africa. However, the ideological differences between these organizations were too deep, and the ANC did not seek to bring positions closer together. Its leaders wanted to use the links of the SACP with the Soviet Union, believing that the leadership in this alliance should belong to them. The Soviet leadership did not like this situation, and they made it clear that the provision of military assistance would be associated with the establishment of a more equal partnership in the liberation movement in South Africa. In 1969, the ANC and the SACP agreed to establish a joint revolutionary council to lead the armed struggle at a conference in Morogoro (Tanzania). White communist Joe Slovo, who was considered a specialist in military matters, joined the leadership of the ANC. After that, it was possible to demand the expansion of military assistance from the USSR35. In July 1969, a delegation of the ANC-SACP arrived in Moscow for talks with the leadership of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Oliver Tambo, President of the ANC, asked for help with weapons, equipment and ammunition, train military and political personnel in the USSR, and assist in the transfer of ANC fighters in South Africa by sea. South African requests were satisfied by the decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU.36 Weapons began to arrive regularly at the ANC bases; hundreds of South Africans began to learn military science and underground work techniques in the USSR. Ronnie Kasrils wrote of his military training in the USSR:
"After a year ... we had become proficient in the use of small arms - including the pistol, AK-47 assault rifle and a variety of light and heavy machines guns. We went through a range of exercises on assault courses - in all conditions. We learnt to throw hand grenades and lay minefields. We learnt field craft and became adept at navigating in various terrains, by night
and day, with and without a compass. We learnt how to sabotage installations, with military and home-made explosives, and we became skilled at laying booby-traps. Some of us specialized in heavy artillery weapons, while others concentrated on tactics, engineering, communications or commando tasks. We all learnt how to drive army trucks and, most exciting of all T54 tanks".37
Supplies of Soviet weapons increased especially in the late 1979s, after Angola gained independence. In 1976, a military and naval attache of six persons was created at the Embassy of the USSR in Angola, "taking into account the development of relations with this country along military lines and the volume of tasks facing the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff in the southern parts of the African continent.38 Tanks, artillery guns, mortars, air defense equipment and much more flowed into Angola for the ANC. Food, buses, cars, cinema sets, radios, typewriters, propaganda literature, etc., up to pants and socks, besides guns, regularly entered the ANC bases.39 According to Chief Department of Military Technical Co-operation of the Ministry of Foreign Economics Relations the total cost of assistance to the ANC from 1963 to 1990 was about 61 million rubles.40 (In the 70s-80s, 1 dollar was officially estimated at 0.6-0.7 rubles.
All this was not given disinterestedly. As compensation, Moscow was counting on loyalty and benefits in the future and in the present.
For intelligence activities, the KGB widely practiced recruiting its agents among ANC members, although, as noted by O. Gordievsky, Moscow prohibited such activities in the ranks of the SACP. One of the main points of contact between the KGB and South African agents was Stockholm, where the ANC had the largest representation outside Africa. Another task of the KGB in South Africa was the transfer of money to the leadership of the SACP and the ANC. Gordievsky asserted that he personally handed over to Yusuf Dadoo, the National Chairman of the SACP, in a total of 54,000 pounds sterling for the SACP and 118,000 for the ANC from mid 1982 to January 1983.41
How effective were these financial and military injections into the "national liberation movement" of South Africa? Many experts believe that the return on money was inadequate to the invested funds. This is confirmed by other information. The KGB officer Alexei Kozlov, mentioned above, was tasked with finding out the effectiveness of using Soviet aid, since there were suggestions that the ANC was not working
vote of the Secretaries of the Central Committee of the CPSU, without recording in the minutes of 05.11.1971.
35 The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the Anti-Apartheid Struggle // South African History Online https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/union-soviet-socialist-republics-ussr-and-anti-apartheid-struggle
36 RGANI. F.5. Op.61. D. 543. L.186.
37 Kasrils R. Armed and Dangerous. From Undercover
Struggle to Freedom. Johannesburg & Cape Town: Ball
Publishers, 2004. P. 72.
38 RGANI. F.89. Per.27. D. 7. L.18, 15.
39 RGANI. Card file. Minutes of the meetings of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU: №84 from 01/19/1972: № 27 0t 01/19/1972; №133 from 07/30/1974; No. 151 of December 11, 1974; No. 25 of 09/13/1976; №117 ot 07.24.1978 and others.
40 Nezavisimaia gazeta, 8 August 1992.
41 Gordievsky O. Istoriya vneshnepoliticheskih operacij ot Lenina do Gorbacheva. Moscow: Nota Bene, 1992. p. 564.
enough on the money spent by Moscow. During interrogations, he showed that it was precisely in such a way that "the leaders of the ANC are ineptly squander Soviet aid".42 Moscow had no significant influence on the policy of this organization. The leaders of the ANC regularly came to the USSR, they were accepted by the Central Committee, and they, together with their curators, plotted plans to fight imperialism and apartheid. The South Africans, knowing the weaknesses of their owners, told them pleasant things, and receiving another batch of money and promises of military aid, they drove off to European and African capitals. Most of them were very far from communism, socialism, and asceticism.
Another major recipient of Soviet military and financial assistance in Southern Africa was the People's Organization of South-West Africa-SouthWest Africa's Peoples Organization, (SWAPO), created in 1958 on the basis of various political groups opposing the Pretoria government in Namibia. In the early 1960s, due to the radicalization of the liberation movement in South Africa, The SWAPO switched to guerrilla tactics and began to receive military assistance from the Soviet Union, China, Algeria and Tanzania. Until the mid-1970s, the degree of USSR involvement in Namibian affairs was insignificant and was expressed mainly in propaganda support and irregular supply of small quantities of weapons.43 The situation changed in 1976. The anti-Western Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) came to power in Angola with the help of Cuban troops and Soviet weapons (including tanks, anti-tanks and anti-aircraft weapons and MiG-17 fighters), and this country became the main base for large-scale covert operations in the region44. In 1976, at its congress in Lusaka (Zambia), The SWAPO adopted a political program in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism. In the same year, the head of the SWAPO Sam Nujoma came to Moscow three times to present his positions and negotiate the expansion of Soviet aid. In addition, he twice visited Cuba, where he negotiated the military training of his fighters. The consequences of all this were the expansion of armed struggle and the creation of the armed forces of the SWAPO - the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN). The Soviet leadership, convinced by the example of Angola and Mozambique that the strong support of the partisan movements could bring them to power and bring political dividends,
42 Campbell K.M. Soviet Policy towards South Africa. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986. P. 132.
43 Legum C. Soviet Union, China, and the West in South Africa. Foreign Affairs. 1976, No 4, P. 758.
44 Shubin V. The Hot "Cold War": The USSR in Southern Africa. London: Pluto Press, 2008. P. 57; Somerville K. The U.S.S.R. and South Africa since 1976. Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 November 2008 //
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-
of-modern-african-studies /article/abs/ussr-and-southern-africa-since-
decided to radically strengthen the assistance of the SWAPO. Moscow had no illusions about the military victory of the PLAN over the armed forces of South Africa. The goal, apparently, was the creation of instability in South Africa, its isolation in the international arena and possible political benefits in the future, when the situation in southern Africa would change dramatically.
Soviet weapons and military equipment entered Angola and then were shipped to SWAPO bases. The size of these supplies was determined by the Main Intelligence Directorate and approved by the Central Committee of the CPSU. However, sometimes the leadership of the SWAPO took the initiative and requested additional assistance. So, Sam Nujoma, in a letter to the CPSU Central Committee (07/31/1985), presented a list of more than 40 pages, including tanks (10), mortars, recoilless guns, Grad missile launchers, Strela-2m anti-aircraft launchers, 2800 AKMs (the modification of AK-47), rifles, pistols, cartridges, grenades, mines, communications equipment, 6 Volga cars, trucks, gasoline, uniforms for 20 thousand people, as well as food, knives, forks, axes, nails, pants and socks. The SWAPO received "free extra help".45 This was for one year only.
One form of the secret Soviet aid to the SWAPO was the training of its armed forces. As in the case of the African National Congress, military training was carried out both in the USSR and in Angola. Almost all students from Namibia who graduated from Soviet educational institutions, then additionally studied in special centers set up by the GRU, methods of guerrilla warfare, political work in the army and with the population.46 The situation in Rhodesia was more difficult for the Soviet Union. The two, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) liberation movements, led by Marxist Robert Mugabe and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), led by the "revolutionary democrat" Joshua Nkomo led the armed struggle against the white minority in Rhodesia. Each organization has advertised itself as the sole representative of the black population. The choice of Moscow fell on the ZAPU and Nkomo, since Mugabe did not hide his sympathy for China and enjoyed his support. ZAPU armed forces received weapons from the PRC and were trained by Chinese military instructors.
1976/3428AECC01A68EAE82E084AB4723491D#a rticle; Westad O.A. The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of our Time. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. P. 235.
45 RGANI. F.89. Per. 15. Doc. 19. L. 2-86.
46 U.S. Congress, Senate Subcommittee of Security and Terrorism of the Committee on Judiciary. The Role of the Soviet Union, Cuba and the East Germany in Fomenting Terrorism in Southern Africa. Vol. 1, 97 / Congress, 2d Session. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982. P. 59, 67.
The first contacts with ZAPU were established in the early 1960s with the mediation of the African National Congress.47 From the mid-60s, Moscow began to provide financial, political and, most importantly, military assistance to the ZAPU. Soviet instructors trained the ZAPU fighters in the USSR, Zambia and, possibly, in Egypt and Algeria, and after the MPLA came to power, and in Angola.48 The latter circumstance, as well as the arrival of V. Solodovnikov, the former director of the Institute for African Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences, to Zambia in July 1976 as the USSR ambassador to this Republic greatly expanded the scale of military aid to the ZAPU. Solodovnikov managed to break the ice of distrust that arose between Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda and the Soviet leadership. The former ambassador told the following about this: "I came to Zambia when our relationship was nil due to the events in Angola. President Kaunda, his government, advocated reconciliation for all liberation movements in Angola. There were many who sympathized with the MPLA and endorsed our help to him. Somewhere in early 1976, student unrest with anti-government slogans began in Zambia. The Americans, through the mass media controlled by them, succeeded in convincing Kaunda that this was the intrigue of the Soviet embassy, that it provoked these disorders. Indeed, the USSR distributed Russian literature through the Novosti Press Agency and other channels, but did not engage in anti-government activities. Kaunda took a tough antiSoviet stance and strongly criticized the USSR. Crowds of protesting people gathered at the USSR Embassy, even tore off the flag from the embassy flagpole".49 With a few precise moves, Solodovnikov managed to incite the Zambian President against the Americans, who were trying to rely on his moderate regime when pursuing their policies in Southern Africa. The leaders of the SWAPO, the ANC and the ZAPU, whose headquarters were located in Lusaka, helped him in this. Soon the Soviet trade mission, the Aeroflot representative office, an organization that was widely involved in clandestine operations, was opened in the capital. V. Solodovnikov recalled: "Kaunda really appreciated me and trusted me. Sometimes he even consulted with me on some internal affairs and asked me how I would act in his place".50
The leader of ZAPU, Nkomo, was now in direct contact with Solodovnikov and through him sent requests to the Central Committee of the CPSU for the supply of weapons, military and other property. The ambassador forwarded the ZAPU applications to the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Nkomo highly appreciated the activities of the Soviet ambassador in promoting his requests, called him a good person and professional in his business.51 Only in 1976, weapons, ammunition, means of transport and communications, food, clothing and other
property were supplied sufficient to equip 6 thousand people.52 Despite great efforts and costs, Moscow did not achieve its main goal - the coming to power in Zimbabwe of a friendly regime. The unconditional victory of the leader of the ZANU, R. Mugabe, in the elections of 1980 was generally unexpected for the Soviet leadership, although at the final stage of the armed struggle it tried to establish contacts with the leadership of the ZANU, which was ready for dialogue, and even more to receive weapons from the USSR. However, the "Chinese syndrome" did not allow the Kremlin to pursue a more balanced policy. A year after the ZANU came to power, Moscow and Harare established diplomatic relations and gradually the situation returned to normal.
"New political thinking" and old methods
"Perestroika" changed little in the nature of covert operations abroad. The appointment of Vladimir Kryuchkov as chairman of the KGB and Leonid Shebarshin as head of the First Main Directorate of the KGB in 1988 meant the continuation of the previous course. This is clearly seen from the 1988 KGB report submitted to Mikhail Gorbachev: "... Intelligence seeks to provide in-depth coverage of the plans of the US and from its NATO allies, Japan and China regarding the USSR and the countries of the socialist community. ... A number of active measures designed to have a long-term impact on influential foreign circles have been carried out ... There was a positive impact on the policy of the US Administration ... In the work on NATO, efforts were directed ... to introduce disagreements between the United States and its allies in the bloc. Shares of beneficial influence on West Germany were held. (...) The provision of advisory, logistical and financial assistance to the special services of some developing countries continued. In the area of intelligence, special attention is attached ... to the implementation of active measures in the interests of implementing the party's foreign policy. V. Kryuchkov".53 In general, "perestroika" did not receive hot approval in the structures of the KGB, including foreign intelligence. Gorbachev embraced Western leaders, and they gave money for reforms in the USSR. The KGB leadership continued to frighten the new leader with a threat from the West and stigmatize the "democrats" as agents of the imperialist intelligence services, but the honeymoon of the communist leadership and the western political elite was in full swing.
As for the Third World and Africa in particular, some members of Soviet political elite realized that the theory and practice of "socialist orientation" were not effective even with massive Soviet economic, political and military support. V. Karpov recalled with bitterness: "Under Gorbachev, we felt that our information was poorly perceived by the political leadership of the country".54
47 Golan G. The Soviet Union and the National Liberation Movement in the Third World. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988. P. 271.
48 Legum C. Soviet Union? China, and the West in South Africa. Foreign Affairs. 1976, # 4, P. 755.
49 Author's interview with V. Solodovnikov
01/10/1995.
50 Author's interview with V. Solodovnikov 01/10/1995.
51 Nkomo J. The Story of My Life. London: The Chaucer Press, 1984. P. 175-176.
52 RGANI. F.89. Per.27. Doc 21. L. 20, 21, 4-10, 19, 1.
53 RGANI. F.89. Per. 51. Doc. 15. L. 2, 3, 10.
54 Author's interview with V. Karpov 01/25/1994.
There were economic reasons for this. In May 1988, the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU, in response to the next request of the SWAPO, decides on the "gratuitous supply" of weapons, property and food "according to real needs" in 1989.55 The last addition actually meant a refusal, it was a consequence of the growing economic crisis. The Soviet party leadership was not up to Africa, although the KGB machine continued its work by inertia. "New political thinking" implied foreign policy actions aimed at providing support by the West for reforming Soviet socialism. The USSR was living out its last days.
Discussion
The Soviet Union as a state disappeared 30 years ago. However, the Russian Federation inherited from the Soviet Union relations with many influential people, political and economic structures in some African countries and uses them for own purposes. In modern conditions, in the era of hybrid wars, Russia has stepped up its activities on the African continent, combining both purely pragmatic actions and preserving the former ideal goals, that is, causing political damage to the "main enemy" - the United States and Western countries. Covert operations are not a thing of the past.
During the Cold War, several works were published that directly or indirectly covered the problems of the illegal activities of the USSR in the Third World countries, including in Africa.
Many authors who have studied the policy of the USSR in relation to the Third World countries and Africa, in particular, were convinced that the Soviet leadership was using illegal methods to achieve its own goals. As R.D. Grey noted, Soviet leaders tend to see the world in fairly subtle terms. Countries are classified according to the nature of their ruling class, and by their progress along what is seen as an inevitable, albeit gradual, path towards socialism, as well as by their attitudes towards the capitalist states and the socialist bloc, respectively56.
G. Golan in her book57 studied a large number of official statements of the leaders of the USSR, theoretical studies of academic experts in the field of theories of "socialist orientation" and "world revolutionary process", specific policies. From all this, it is concluded that support for national liberation movements is pragmatic and subordinated to the main goal - to resist the collective West. But not only Western countries were active players on the African "chessboard". Since the early 70s, China, which was in deep ideological and political conflict with the USSR, began to be active on the continent, supporting and
55 RGANI. F. 89. Per. 2. Doc. 2. L. 1-2.
56 Grey R.D. The Soviet Presence in Africa: An Analysis of Goals // The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Sep., 1984), P. 513.
57 Golan G. The Soviet Union and the National Liberation Movement in the Third World. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988.
58 Legum C. Soviet Union, China, and the West in
South Africa // Foreign Affairs. 1976, № 4. P. 742-765.
financing movements that were not controlled by Moscow, primarily in Southern Africa. Therefore, the task of Soviet intelligence was to collect information about the actions of the Chinese in this region. C. Legum drew attention to the rivalry between the Soviet Union and China for influence in Africa58.
I. Greig in "The Communist Challenge to Africa: an analysis of contemporary Soviet, Chinese and Cuban policies" analyzed in detail and documented the policy of the Soviet Union in the main countries of the continent, aimed at undermining the positions of Western countries and world domination.59
As for the concrete facts of the illegal activities of the USSR in Africa, there were few of them, and the nature of the activities of the Soviet special services assumed strict secrecy. Some works contained information about the activities of Soviet intelligence, and mainly it concerns South Africa, which occupied an important place in the global strategy of the USSR. Several Soviet intelligence officers were arrested in South Africa and made confessions that became public. Some well-known facts about their activities are highlighted in the work K. M. Campbell "Soviet Policy towards South Africa.60
Some information about the illegal activities of the USSR in African countries was known to Western politicians thanks to the reports of intelligence agencies and information supplied by recruited Soviet officers of the GRU and the KGB (for example, Oleg Gordievsky). But it, for obvious reasons, did not become the property of the academic community.
The situation changed after the collapse of the Soviet Union in a short period of deep democratic transformation. Some previously secret archive data became available, and participants of the events of interest to us were able to openly share their information and impressions. Among them was Vladimir Shubin, who knew a lot about the actions of the USSR in Africa. He held high positions first in the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, which was associated with foreign intelligence and acted in its interests, and then in the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, heading the African direction. He had close ties with the leadership of the ANC, and many previously unknown facts and events related to Moscow's involvement in South Africa are described in "ANC: A View from Moscow"61 In "The Hot Cold War: The USSR in Southern Africa", he details the Soviet Union's actions in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa, especially the role of the Soviet military, between 1960 and 1990.62. For his research, he uses the
59 Greig I. The Communist Challenge to Africa. Richmond: Foreign Affairs Publishing Co. Ltd, 1977.
60 Campbell K.M. Soviet Policy towards South Africa. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986.
61 Shubin V. ANC: A View from Moscow. Cape Town. Mayibuye Books, 1999,
62 Shubin V. The Hot "Cold War": The USSR in Southern Africa. London: Pluto Press, 2008.
archives of the ANC, conversations with direct participants of the events, which is of particular value.
A significant amount of valuable information is contained in the works of famous africanists A. Davidson and I. Filatova, devoted to the relations between Russia and South Africa in historical retrospect. In the book "Russia and South Africa: Building bridges" a separate chapter is devoted to the activities of Soviet agents in South Africa. It is based mainly on facts that have received wide publicity in the African and world press. In their other joint work "" there is a chapter "The Secret War", which contains new information gleaned mainly from interviews with participants in the events in Southern Africa.63 S. Mazov, in his book64 devoted to the participation of the USSR in the Congolese crisis of the early 1960s, mentions the case of the expulsion of alleged KGB officers from the Congo (Leopoldville) in the early 1970s.
The book by O. Gordievsky65, who served 23 years in the KGB's Foreign Intelligence Service, gave a broad retrospective of the operations of the Soviet foreign intelligence service from its foundation in 1917 until the collapse of the USSR. From it, one can learn about the methods of work to misinform foreign public opinion and also about the regular monetary support of the South African Communist Party and the African National Congress.
The memories of direct participants in the turbulent events in the South of the continent, including the secret operations of Moscow, significantly added to the picture. From them, one can learn about the atmosphere in which contacts with the Soviet side took place, about organizations and institutions involved in illegal activities in Africa. Much valuable information of this kind is contained in the autobiography of Ronnie Kasrils66, one of the main commanders of Umkonto We Sizwe, the armed wing of the ANC and a member of the Central Committee of the South African Communist Party.
As you can see, the overwhelming majority of publications concern the actions of the Soviet Union in South Africa. This is due to the fact that the fight against apartheid was in the center of attention of the world community. As for other African countries, information about Moscow's clandestine operations against them is extremely scarce. This is primarily due to the lack of reliable information among researchers, which is still contained in Russian archives closed to researchers. The author had the opportunity to review some of these documents in the early 1990s. The result was the article "Word and Work of the NPA: Soviet Propaganda in Africa during the Cold War"67 and a this
63 Filatova I., Davidson A. The Hidden Treat. Russia and South Africa in the Soviet Era. Johannesburg & Cape Town: 2007.
64 Mazov S.V. Holodnaya vojna v «serdce Afriki»: SSSR i kongolezskij krizis, 1960-1964. Moscow: Dmitry Pozharsky University, 2015.
65 Gordievsky O. Istoriya vneshnepoliticheskih operacij
ot Lenina do Gorbacheva. Moscow: Nota Bene, 1992.
study on the USSR's secret operations in Africa. The author saw as his task the introduction into scientific circulation archival and other unpublished materials that shed light on little-known pages of the history of Soviet-African relations.
It is now becoming clear that the Soviet policy in Africa was largely idealistic. Moscow saw the whole world as an arena of the struggle between socialism and capitalism, and Africa was given a very important place in this struggle. The Soviet leadership proceeded from the idea that African countries liberated from colonialism should experience a genetically determined hostility towards the former colonizers, i.e., to the West. Therefore, they should be allies of the USSR and strive to build socialism. Soviet ideologists counted up to two dozen countries of "socialist orientation" in Africa. It was necessary to help these countries financially and politically, and in the rest to support pro-Soviet parties and organizations by illegal methods. Huge material and intellectual resources were spent on both.
After the collapse of the USSR the ideas of the "socialist orientation" almost instantly disappeared from the political discourse of the African countries, and the successor of the Soviet Empire, the Russian Federation, left Africa as a noticeable factor for a long time.
Conclusion
An analysis of the secret operations of the USSR in Africa suggests that they were multifaceted, systematic and long-lasting. Covert operations are not an invention of the Soviet Union. All countries resort to covert operations to solve their problems to one degree or another. The uniqueness of the Soviet phenomenon is that illegal activity played not auxiliary, but often a dominant role, but diplomacy and propaganda served it. Undercover operations were made the essence of Africa's foreign policy. Its effectiveness was different in different countries and regions of the continent, but the overall result looks modest. The socialist project for Africa as a whole has failed. However, the Russian Federation inherited from the Soviet Union relations with many influential people, political and economic structures in some African countries and uses them for own purposes. In modern conditions, in the era of hybrid wars, Russia has stepped up its activities on the African continent, combining both purely pragmatic actions and preserving the former ideal goals, that is, causing political damage to the "main enemy" - the United States and Western countries. Covert operations are not a thing of the past.
References
66 Kasrils R. Armed and Dangerous. From Undercover Struggle to Freedom. Johannesburg & Cape Town: Ball Publishers, 2004. 300 p.
67 Smertin Y.G. Word and Work of the NPA: Soviet Propaganda in Africa during the Cold War // Astra Salvensis-Review of History and Culture. 2018, № 1 (11). P. 257-273.
1. Campbell K. M. Soviet Policy towards South Africa. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986. 223 pp.
2. Carr B. Spy in the Sun. Cape Town: Howard Timmins, 1969. 224 pp.
3. Golan G. The Soviet Union and the National Liberation Movement in the Third World. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988. 374 pp.
4. Greig I. The Communist Challenge to Africa. Richmond: Foreign Affairs Publishing Co. Ltd, 1977. 396 pp.
5. Grey R.D. The Soviet Presence in Africa: An Analysis of Goals // The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Sep., 1984), pp. 511-552.
6. Filatova I., Davidson A. The Hidden Treat. Russia and South Africa in the Soviet Era. Johannesburg & Cape Town: 2007. 533 pp.
7. Kalley J. A, Schoeman E., Andor L. E. Southern African Political History: a chronology of key political events from independence to mid-1997. Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1999. 904 pp.
8. Kasrils R. Armed and Dangerous. From Undercover Struggle to Freedom. Johannesburg & Cape Town: Ball Publishers, 2004. 300 pp.
9. Legum C. Soviet Union, China, and the West in South Africa // Foreign Affairs. 1976, № 4. P. 742-765.
10. Nkomo J. The Story of My Life. London: The Chaucer Press, 1984. 270 pp.
11. Somerville K. The U.S.S.R. and South Africa since 1976. Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 November 2008 Available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/iournals/iournal-of-modern-african-studies/article/abs/ussr-and-southern-africa-since-
1976/3428AECC01A68EAE82E084AB4723491D#art icle
12. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the Anti-Apartheid Struggle // South African History Online https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/union-soviet-socialist-republics-ussr-and-anti-apartheid-struggle
13. U.S. Congress, Senate Subcommittee of Security and Terrorism of the Committee on Judiciary. The Role of the Soviet Union, Cuba, and the East
Germany in Fomenting Terrorism in Southern Africa. Vol. 1, 97 / Congress, 2d Session. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982. 579 pp.
14. Shubin V. The Hot "Cold War": The USSR in Southern Africa. London: Pluto Press, 2008. 337 pp.
15. Smertin Y. G. Word and Work of the NPA: Soviet Propaganda in Africa during the Cold War // Astra Salvensis-Review of History and Culture. 2018, № 1 (11). P. 257-27
16. Venter Al. J. How South Africa Built Six Atom Bombs. PretoriaA Ashanti Publishing, 2008. 233 pp.
17. Westad O.A. The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of our Time. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 484 pp.
In Russian:
18. Filatova I., Davidson A. Rossiya i Yuzhnaya Africa: navedenie mostov. Moscow: Vysshaya shkola ekonomiki, 2012. 491 pp.
19. Gordievsky O. Istoriya vneshnepoliticheskih operacij ot Lenina do Gorbacheva. Moscow: Nota Bene, 1992. 768 pp.
20. Nezavisimaiya gazeta, 8 August 1992.
21. Wise D. Okhota na "krotov". Sekretnyj poisk predatelej, potryasshij CRU. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1994. 364 pp.
22. Mazov S.V. Holodnaya vojna v «serdce Afriki»: SSSR i kongolezskij krizis, 1960-1964. Moscow: Dmitry Pozharsky University, 2015. 312 pp.
23. Prelin I. Kontract s predatelem. Monolog razvedchika // Stolitsa. 1993, No 4 (114). P. 13-16.
24. Prokhorov D., Lemekhov O. O. Perebezhchiki. Zaochno rasstrelyany. Moscow: Veche, 2001. 462 pp.
Archives
25. Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI)
26. Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF)
Interviews
27. Author's interview with V. Karpov. 01/25/1994
28. Author's interview with V. Solodovnikov 01/10/1995.
