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Коммуникационный менеджмент и стратегическая коммуникация в государственном управлении
Вакарелу М.
Сотрудничество и доверие: когда Россия и Европа слушают друг друга
Мариус Вакарелу — Ph.D., преподаватель, Национальная школа политических и административных исследований, Бухарест, Румыния. E-mail: marius333vacarelu@,gmail.com
Аннотация
Европейский Союз и Россия необходимы друг другу. Географию невозможно игнорировать, и улучшение взаимоотношений необходимо обеим сторонам. В то же время непозволительно забывать уроки истории. В будущем сотрудничество возможно при соблюдении двух условий: обе стороны обязаны быть честными и уважать интересы друг друга. Эти условия признаются всеми; сегодняшнее общество более прозрачно, и каждый неправильный шаг может обернуться тяжелыми последствиями. В данной статье предпринята попытка анализа кризисного состояния отношений между ЕС и Россией, рассматриваются возможности взаимовыгодного сотрудничества сторон с использованием инструментов и технологий стратегической коммуникации.
Ключевые слова:
Россия, Европейский Союз, сотрудничество, соглашения, доверие, граждане, экономика. Introduction
Communication, in its simplest form, not only helps states to construct and preserve a productive and friendly political environment, but also maps out the shared needs, values and attitudes among the citizens who receive more trust to develop their skills, which in turn results in economic progress for individual countries and for the whole of humanity.
Communicational objectives, such as message efficiency, creation of learning networks and sharing of knowledge represent the guidelines for any strategy that aims to develop a modern distribution of information. At the same time, when we are talking about the globalization of communicational practices, we should acknowledge the changes brought to this area by social media platforms; the diffusion of power and the hierarchical structure inside states however, are still dependent on some old-style practices.
For states, strategic communication is one of the most important ways of acting in international relations; it is a process that includes the integrating function, the planning function, the staffing functions, and has budgetary implications1. Strategic communication is defined as an informational resource, building persuasive, discursive, as well as relational communication in
1 Paul Chr. Strategic Communication: Origins, Concepts, and Current Debates. Oxford: Praeger, 2011. P. 21-22.
order to achieve the mission2. In a 2011 Chatham House report, strategic communications are described as "a systematic series of sustained and coherent activities, conducted across strategic, operational and tactical levels, that enables understanding of target audiences and identifies effective conduits to promote and sustain particular types of behavior". In practice, for policy-related organizations, it includes elements of public diplomacy and "spin", media relations, advertising, recruitment and training and, most notably, situational awareness ("detect and deter"). In operational terms, it entails both a defensive ("react and respond") and an offensive ("probe and push") dimensions3.
In this article, we attempt to describe some lines of communication, cooperation and trust between Russia and the European Union, while searching for the most recent data on economy, political contacts, geography, public documents and public agreements. After analyzing them, we will give some conclusions about the necessity for peace and cooperation among the states on the European continent.
There exists a vast body of scholarship on strategic communication. A google search on the topic reveals more than 18 million results. The simple questions "what is strategic communication" or "what is the definition for strategic communication" give more than 4.8 million results. In this sense, the "power" of strategic communication has been elaborated and increasingly enlarged in the few years preceding — and the decade after — the turn of the twenty-first century. What makes strategic communication powerful is not only its informational quotient but also, at a deeper level, the modes through which it reshapes visibility, subjectivity and agency. Such transformations contribute to the processes of political and social change. The landscape in the first decade of the millennium has changed profoundly, enough to catalyze the transformative process.
When we searched for "cooperation", the same search engine reveals 240 million results; for the word "trust", 980 million results appeared. Indeed, strategic communication is a specific field of science; however, the positive outcomes of its practice are, on the one hand, an increase in trust in states' administration and state rulers, and on the other hand, a rise in cooperation between states. Therefore, it is the task of scholars to develop the principles and good practices of strategic communication, offering better perspectives for cooperation and strengthening of trust. This research is based on statistics and official documents of the World
2 Hallahan K., Holtzhausen D., Van Ruler B., Vercic D., Sriramesh K. Defining Strategic Communication // International Journal of Strategic Communication. 2007. Vol. I. No 1. P. 3-35.
3 Strategic Communications — East and South / EU Institute for Security Studies. Report No 30. July 2016. P. 5. URL: https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/strategic-communications-%E2%80%93-east-and-south (accessed: 22.02.2018).
Bank and the European Union, as well as scholarly literature from Russia, Romania, the United States, and the United Kingdom. The article presents an attempt to find arguments for cooperation and trust, while searching for a more effective strategic communication between Russia and the EU.
Mutual influence
It is not easy to analyse the relations between Russia and the European Union in today's political climate. Firstly, a human mind is not totally segmented in conceptual thinking and only few of us are able to make sense of complex problems. Secondly, the multiplicity of information transmitted via various channels (television, internet, radio) often results in a "mental chaos" and blurred understanding. In this case, the relations between Russia and the European Union are not separated into segments and very often the correct way of analysing them is corrupted by information abundance.
For some four and a half decades after the Second World War, the Cold War dominated the landscape of European affairs. However, for a few short years after 1985, Europe's economic, political and military division was overturned. The suddenness and scale of this process owes almost everything to the developments in the former Soviet Union. The opening to the West under Mikhail Gorbachev and Moscow's consent to the removal of communism in east-central Europe (ECE) were the defining events of the Cold War's end. Russia, the largest of the states to emerge from the ruins of the Soviet Union, hardly qualifies as a successor of similar stature and influence4.
The political, economic and military reconfiguration of Europe that has taken place over the last decade has, however, not occurred in its absence. Contemporary Russia — like the Soviet Union, and indeed, Tsarist Russia before it — has claimed an important role in Europe and has actively sought an involvement in the affairs of the continent. Historically, Russia's standing with regard to Europe has not been a comfortable one. Russia's status as a European state has not always been recognized, either in Europe itself or, indeed, by Russia's own leaders and opinion makers. Moreover, Russian / Soviet involvement in Europe has often been regarded as temporary, contingent or at the service of some mischievous foreign policy design5.
The relations between the European Union and Russia are based on some special paradigms, of which one of the most important is the Westernisation of Russia. Is Russia part of the Western world? Tankers of ink have been written and entire forests have been cut down for
4 Webber M. Russia and Europe: Conflict or Cooperation? London: MacMillan Press, 2000. P. 1.
5 Ibid. P. 2.
paper addressing this issue; one of the "cursed questions" that has plagued Russian intellectuals and Western observers alike for the past two centuries. "Russia and the West" is a theme that never seems to be exhausted, a question that can never be answered satisfactorily. It seems everyone has an opinion on the matter, and the answers (from no, to maybe to yes) deploy a staggering number of criteria to determine Russia's suitability (or lack thereof) to being viewed as "Western", ranging from the geography and the linguistic specificities to the political and institutional realm6.
A google search for the phrase "Russia and the West" showed an astonishing 109,000,000 results7. Certainly, some of these were false hits, where the term picked up some extraneous subjects, but the vast majority testifies to the ease with which both Russian and non-Russian commentators are prepared to juxtapose the idea of "Russia" with that of "the West". Sometimes Russia's conditional association is expressed by the phrase "Russia is European, but not Western". The main answer to this formidable question: "is Russia a part of Western world or not", is given in terms of geography.
Russia is unique in terms of its climate, size, and location. The Russian Federation is the largest country in the world, taking up 11.5% of the world's landmass. Yet the majority of this vast land area is virtually uninhabited. 65% of Russian territory is exposed to continuous or sporadic permafrost. The average January temperature in Moscow is -10°C, but over 90% of Russia's territory is even colder. Accessibility is another problem. In the northern part of the Eurasia most of the rivers flow from south to north. There are no cheap transcontinental water transportation routes from Europe to Asia, costly land transport is practically the only option. Most of Russia's territory is not only cold, but also remote, separated from the world markets and from the main population centers in Russia itself. The physical geography presents natural constraints to the distribution of economic activity over the territory. Given such climate and land endowment, it is not surprising that the Russian population is concentrated in the areas with relatively favorable natural conditions. The western part of the country and a narrow strip along its southern border to the east of the Ural Mountains, which together constitute less than 20% of its total land endowment, host the majority of population. But even there the population density is generally low relative to international standards. It is an unusual combination: Russia's population is quite concentrated, if we consider all of its vast territory; at the same time,
6 Godsev N.K. Russia: "European But Not Western?" // Orbis. 2007. Vol. 51. Issue 1. P. 129-140. URL: http://www.risingpowersinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/Russia-European-but-not-Western.pdf (accessed: 26.08.2017).
7 Google search: "Russia and the West", consulted on 26.08.2017.
however, it is still sparse compared to the majority of other countries. This scarcity of population and economic activity on the huge territory is one of the key features of Russia's economic geography. Physical geography is also an important motor of spatial evolution of the Russian economy. Natural resources compose a bulk of the value of the Russian frontier — Siberia and the Far East. The desire to exploit them resulted in the expansion of the Russian Empire and has always been an essential determinant of state policy. Exploitation of these resources is costly. The state — either the Russian Empire, or the Soviet Union, or the modern Russian Federation — has always faced the same trade-off. On the one hand, there is the desire to reap the benefits of this vast territory; on the other, there are the enormous economic costs of development related to a hostile natural environment8.
Regardless of geographical factors, Russia's difference from Europe has also been explained in a sense of political and cultural distinctiveness characteristic of the country. This relates simultaneously to how Russia is regarded in Europe and to how Europe is regarded in Russia. In both cases, Russia is held to possess a unique set of qualities that mark it as Europe's "Other", explaining its distance from the far-reaching European movements of the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, the Reformation and the liberal-democratic transformations of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, having left the country in its own peculiar slipstream of development. Russian Orthodoxy, pan-Slavism, the evolution of Russian nationalism since the eighteenth century and even Bolshevism / Soviet communism (understood here as a unique Russian variant of Marxism) have all contributed to a Russian self-definition that is, in part, juxtaposed to, rather than in correspondence with, European influences. Also the fact that the Soviet Union spent some 70 years in the pursuit of an alternative model of political, economic and societal development of which the credentials are showcased in the ideological defiance of western Europe (and, indeed, the West more generally) only reinforced the idea that the Russia it then encapsulated had parted company with Europe9.
It seems that the separation of Russia from Europe can easily be exaggerated by people without a decent knowledge of its geography and culture. In fact, Russia is not so distant from the continent. Notwithstanding the peculiarities of Russia's development noted above, it has been clearly linked to the development of European civilization. Its cultural contributions — not least in the spheres of art, music and literature — to a common European canon are beyond
8 Markevich A., Mikhailova T. Economic Geography of Russia / Center for Market Studies and Spatial Economics. February, 2012. URL: https://ces.hse.ru/data/2012/09/19/1244835979/Markevich Mikhailova final edit.pdf (accessed: 27.08.2017).
9Mazower M. Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century. London: Penguin, 1998.
dispute. Similarly, in historical terms, Russia has, at least since the end of the eighteenth century, been a major actor in European affairs. This was first apparent through its impact on the continent's major wars from the Napoleonic period onward; second, through its involvement in various arrangements of an attempted European order; third, in its participation in European-based alliances.
The economy speaks in international relations
Russia's connections to Europe carry certain very important implications. Firstly, Russia inherited from the Soviet Union military capabilities and treaty commitments (principally the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty) with a heavy focus on European contingencies. These have subsequently been refashioned by virtue of the withdrawal from ECE, the disintegration of the Soviet armed forces, and Russian military reforms; but in essence the Russian order of battle remains concentrated west of the Urals, even though the eventuality of its deployment in war is now a distant prospect.
Secondly, European states account for a sizeable proportion of Russian foreign trade and this share has increased during the 1990s as Russia has re-oriented its trade away from less profitable markets in the successor states. Moreover, the fact that the East Europeans have simultaneously shifted their trade patterns away from Russia means that the European direction of Russian trade has been increasingly concentrated on transactions with EU member states.
Thirdly, Russia's pretensions of preserving its role as a great power require an active engagement in European affairs. While it could be argued that Russian influence is more easily demonstrated among the successor states, such a position is problematic on two levels: the region is as much a burden as an asset in economic and military terms, and Russia's sense of status cannot be sufficiently realized by reliance on its own periphery. A great power views itself in a global context, and Europe remains in geopolitical terms still a pivotal region which demands engagement10.
The European Union has so far occupied a much less prominent place in Russian foreign policy than The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The EU has been perceived primarily as an economic organization and its aspirations to play a leading political and security role in the "new Europe" have only gradually come to be recognized, let alone accepted, by the Russian authorities.
Certainly, Russia does not appear to share the EU's own perception of itself as the other major power on the continent and has continued to regard bilateral relations with the traditional
10 Webber M Op. cit. P. 8-9.
"great European powers" such as Germany and France as the normal way of conducting relations with the EU member states. Although access to the EU's market has been seen as an important objective by Moscow, the potential benefits of a closer political relationship are only gradually being appreciated. The other major reason for the relatively low profile of the EU in Russian foreign policy has been that membership does not seem to be a serious policy option, despite occasional press statements to the contrary. Russia's huge size, Eurasian geopolitical position, global interests and the continuing perception of itself as a great power would make it very difficult to accept the constraints of EU membership11.
The 1990s, after the fundamental changes which took place in the Eastern European space, were a time of expectations, because a new world order acted to the extension of a Western style of politics. Thus, just at the end of the century, at the Cologne Council in June 1999, the EU adopted a "Common Strategy on Russia", wherein the following phrase was written: "A stable, democratic and prosperous Russia, firmly anchored in a united Europe free of new dividing lines, is essential to lasting peace on the continent. The issues which the whole continent faces can be resolved only through ever closer cooperation between Russia and the European Union. The European Union welcomes Russia's return to its rightful place in the European family in a spirit of friendship, cooperation, fair accommodation of interests and on the foundations of shared values enshrined in the common heritage of European civilization"12.
The reference to an "ever closer cooperation" clearly implied a progressive evolution of the relationship. One of the principal objectives of the Common Strategy was to enable Russia to integrate into a "common economic and social area in Europe", particularly through the achievement of the free trade area and the accommodation of Russian legislation to EU norms. However, it is clear that the "vision" extended beyond the creation of a form of European Economic Area reaching from Reykjavik to Vladivostok. The partnership was now described as "strategic", and the "reinforced relationship" would include "a permanent policy and security dialogue designed to bring interests closer together and to respond jointly to some of the challenges to security on the European continent"13.
In the economic sphere, there is already evidence of growing interdependence and both parties would experience difficulties if trade was to be interrupted or reduced. In the case of Russia, the importance of the EU market is obvious: unless a future Russian leadership decides
11 Malcolm N. Russia and Europe: An End to Confrontation? London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994. P. 16.
12 Common Strategy of the European Union of 4 June 1999 on Russia // The European Council [Website]. URL: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2003/november/tradoc 114137.pdf (accessed: 20.11.2017).
13 Webber M. Op. cit. P. 68.
to retreat into autarky, trade with the EU member states is likely to continue to expand. Moreover, although statistically the EU trade appears to be much more important to Russia than vice-versa, Russia is a major supplier of energy and raw materials to the EU and also a growing market for machinery, equipment, consumer goods and food. From the EU's perspective, the 142 million Russian consumers are seen as a very promising market, nearly one and a half times bigger than the combined market of all ten of the ECE applicant states. If the Russian economy becomes more stable (in the last years the Russian currency was not so strong), then the development of a closer relationship with the EU may also contribute to a more favorable climate for direct foreign investment. However, all these positive developments are dependent on the success of continuous political and economic transformations in Russia. If all goes well, increased business contacts, the development of trans-European communications and supply networks, increased confidence and mutual trust will all make Russia an integral part of the wider European economy. If a Russia — EU free trade area becomes a reality, a genuinely pan-European marketplace could be created and Russia could expect to share in the resulting economic prosperity and stability. This growing economic interdependence which gives Russia a stake in the new European order is the surest foundation for the development of stable and peaceful political relations14.
On the website of the European Union we can read: "The EU is Russia's main trading and investment partner, while Russia is the EU's fourth. In 2014, EU exports to Russia totalled € 103.3 billion, while EU imports from Russia amounted to € 181.3 billion. The EU trade deficit with Russia was therefore € 78 billion in 2014. The EU is by far the largest investor in Russia. The total stock of foreign direct investment in Russia originating from the EU totalled € 154.8 billion as of the end of 2013. ... Russia is the EU's third biggest trade partner, with Russian supplies of oil and gas making up a large percentage of Russia's exports to Europe. The EU and Russia have a strong trade relationship. The trade volume was around € 285 billion in 2014. However, the economic downturn in Russia in 2015 and 2016 has significantly affected Russia's volume of trade with the EU and with the world". Whereas, the role of Asia, particularly the pacific countries, increased from 24% to 31% in the last four years; the role of the EU decreased drastically. The dynamics of Russian trade in 2017 can be seen here15 — we notice a great increase especially with respect to China in 2017; similarly, there has been noted
14 Ibid.
15 Быркова Е. Внешняя торговля России в 2017 году: итоги первого полугодия // ПРОВЭД [Website]. 16.08.2017. URL: http://провэд.рф/andyücs/research43722-vneshnyaya-topgovlya-possii-v-2017-godu-itogi-pepvogo-polugodiya.html (accessed: 29.08.2017).
progress with respect to the EU. "The EU has been a strong supporter of Russia's WTO membership since the start of the process to the accession on 22 August 2012. Russia's WTO membership should be a major element to further the development of economic relations between the EU and Russia. It should also introduce better stability and predictability in Russia's trade policy, limiting the scope for introducing unilateral tariff hikes or other restrictions as has been the case in the past. The correct implementation of WTO commitments is key. ... Russia is the largest oil, gas, uranium and coal exporter to the EU. Likewise, the EU by far the largest trade partner of the Russian Federation. Based on this mutual interdependency and common interest in the energy sector, the EU and Russia developed a close energy partnership and launched an EU — Russia Energy Dialogue in 2000. The EU is ready to cooperate with Russia in further developing a number of basic market principles in the energy sector, such as: an energy efficiency and saving policy, investment facilitation and protection, the right of access to energy transport infrastructure, network operators' independence from the natural monopoly producers, sector regulation, and reform of monopolies"16.
Over the last years, crises brought some new perspectives to the relations between the European Union and Russia. The Valdai Discussion Club, one of Russia's best think-thanks wrote about this change related to the bilateral relation's paradigm17: "Russia has long viewed Europe as an important reference point for values, a civilizational model worthy of emulation. This attitude is rooted in long-standing intellectual traditions, and following the collapse of the Soviet Union Russians genuinely considered the «European path» as the preferred scenario for the country's development. At some point, that sense of cultural and historical solidarity with Europe was transferred to the European Union as the current form of its institutional organization. However, there has always been a gap between what was declared and what actually happened in practice. Russia, despite repeating all of the necessary «mantras» for years, has always been guided by pragmatic interests in relation to Europe, and that pragmatism eventually took shape as its official policy. Russian interests primarily included the following: a fair and predictable commercial relationship in the energy field, the free movement of citizens, non-interference by the EU in the internal affairs of countries within Russia's zone of vital interests and, finally, a sufficient degree of access to the rich European market for competitive
16 The Russian Federation and the European Union // European Union. External Action [Website]. URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-
homepage en/720/The%20Russian%20Federation%20and%20the%20European%20Union%20(EU) (accessed: 29.08.2017).
17 Russia and the European Union: Three Questions Concerning New Principles in Bilateral Relations. Moscow, 2016 / Valdai Discussion Club Report. Moscow, 2016. URL: http://valdaiclub.com/files/10754/ (accessed: 29.08.2017).
Russian goods. ... These are the objectives that Russian negotiators have actually pursued since the early 1990s".
What is behind those ideas and purposes? For sure, it is the capacity of the Russian economy. Although Russia's economy is currently not in the best state, suffering from the effects of fallen energy prices and economic sanctions, it remains, in relative terms, stronger today, than it was for much of the period since the end of the Cold War. In 2016, Russia's economy was valued at US $ 1.283 trillion, placing it 12nd in the world18, with 1.81% of global GDP, up from 0.78% in 2000. Despite the current difficulties, this affords Russia a platform for some regional and global influence. Russia's reasonably large foreign currency reserves, standing at US $ 387 billion in June 2016, and moreover, its large sovereign wealth funds, amounting to US $ 111.6 billion19, have acted as a shock-absorber to the global economic shifts and more recently to the sanctions.
Russia's energy reserves and exports remain the core of its economy and constitute its largest economic strength. Moreover, it is one of its most significant diplomatic tools. As of 2015, Russia holds the sixth largest proven oil reserve in the world (6% of the global total), it is the third largest producer of oil (12.4%), it holds the second largest proven gas reserve (17.3%) and it is the world's second largest gas producer (16.1%). Russia accounts for just fewer than 20% of global gas exports, far ahead of its next two competitors Qatar and Norway on 12.1% and 11% respectively. Russia's energy reserves are in relatively more stable locations than their competitors in the Middle East and Africa, making it a relatively attractive supplier to some importers. Most recently Russia's energy strength has allowed it to negotiate huge deals with China to the east, and to account respectively for 39% and 34% of the EU's 2013 gas and oil imports20.
The biggest opportunity for Russia would be to pursue cooperation with both Europe and Asia in tandem, and become an important Eurasian hub or "bridge power" in a common Eurasian space. This would allow Moscow to demonstrate the value of its geographic reach to both its eastern and western neighbors. Russia has the potential in both arenas, and the potential to pursue a truly multi-vector foreign policy; its unique geography allows this as in no other case, except for Turkey. With the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), and its potential integration into China's Silk Road, Russia also has the opportunity for its regional
18 List of countries by GDP // Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia [Website]. 21 February 2018. URL: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List of countries by GDP (nominal) (accessed: 29.08.2017).
19 GDP (current US$) / The World Bank [Website]. URL: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD ?locations=RU (accessed: 29.08.2017).
20 Energy production and imports // Eurostat [Website]. URL: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Energy production and imports&oldid=291870#Further Eurostat information (accessed: 29.08.2017).
integration project to become a linchpin in a developed Eurasian space. Russia's position vis-à-vis the rest of Europe still presents a massive opportunity to secure economic relations with one of the world's largest, most stable and most prosperous markets. If partnership relations can be reached, the European Union could provide Russia with a stable energy market, a source of much needed capital, and a stable situation at its western borders. Moreover, the costs of producing and transporting energy to Europe is far lower in comparison to China, making it a far more attractive destination for Russian energy exporters in an era of low oil prices. The EU further represents a wealthy consumer market of 506 million people (and rising), worth $ 16.23 trillion (22.1% of the world's economy), a figure that will decline relatively but increase absolutely in the coming decades.
Cooperation is possible
To have a real cooperation between states we should observe some conditions: first, it is necessary that both parties truly want to cooperate not using agreements simply to create the time necessary to prepare and resume hostilities. Second, in order to obtain an effective cooperation it must bring profits to both parts, without a real disproportion between achievements.
The most sensible part of cooperation is represented by the first condition; if everyone can understand and also measure the profits of agreements, the behavior of signed contracts/treaties is more flexible, but also more dangerous. When we analyze the agreements between states (and institutions of course), we should always remember how actors fulfill their obligations; only after this observation we will be able to say: "we have trust in this state / institution".
What is trust? What are its antecedents and consequences? How should we measure it? What model best explains trust and changes in trust? Is trust the same across individuals, institutions, societies, and time?
How should we define trust? Currently, no single definition serves as a focal point for research. The intensity and scope of trust and trusting relationships are capable of variation. With respect to trust, intensity refers to the strength of an actor's perception of the trustworthiness of others. With respect to trusting relationships, intensity refers to the amount of discretion trustors grant trustees over their interests. The scope of trust and trusting relationships can vary as well, although the extent of this variation is disputed. Citizens are unlikely to trust a government willing to use lethal force arbitrarily against its own population, but citizens might trust their government to regulate health care even though it has not done so previously. In short, there are always limits to trust, but those limits are not necessarily obvious. Very often citizens compare
the situation of their rulers to the results of rulers from other states, and at that moment they might put pressure on their leaders to change their behavior in international relations, to make alliances with some states and to renounce alliances with others, as a result of the loss of social trust (as expressed in voting).
So, while analyzing the relation between the European Union and Russia we should first determine the "quantity of mutual trust" and, secondly, find the easiest steps to strengthen it; complete autarchy is impossible in the 21st century.
In mutual self-interest, there is a powerful strategic rationale for seeking a more cooperative relationship in the long-term between the European Union and Russia, however difficult that might be. If not, the costs of confrontation will increase, the threats will be less manageable, the strengths will be diminished and opportunities will be missed. Some directions for cooperation are very clear to any analyst, and are similarly identified by the European Union:
a) The EU environmental policy can only be efficient in cooperation with Russia as only together the two parties can successfully combat the consequences of trans-boundary and global environmental degradation. Confronting the global challenges of climate change, the loss of biodiversity, deforestation, and air and water pollution requires real commitment and effective cooperation on an international level. The close partnership that has developed between the EU and Russia on a number of strategic ecological issues is essential for ensuring sustainable environmental security worldwide.
b) Cooperation between the EU and the Russian Federation in the field of Justice, Freedom and Security is now a key component in the development of the strategic partnership. The EU is focused on making progress in the implementation of the roadmap for the EU-Russia Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice. The Permanent Partnership Councils (PPCs) on Justice, Freedom and Security set priorities and monitor progress during its regular meetings.
c) The EU and Russia aim at further enhancing cooperation on migration and asylum issues. For this purpose, in 2011 they decided to establish a specific EU — Russia Migration Dialogue which brings together experts to discuss issues related to international protection, irregular migration, migration and development, and legal migration. At this point we should mention the cooperation on state border management. The European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the EU (FRONTEX) has been cooperating on an operational level with its Russian counterparts on the basis of a working arrangement established in 2006; this practical cooperation comprises risk
analyses, training, and research and development related to border management, as well as possible joint operations under the aegis of FRONTEX.
d) In the last few decades, the fight against organized crime became very important. There are some agreements between the EU institutions and Russia. The fight against human trafficking, money laundering, terrorism financing, and cybercrime represent potential fields of strengthened cooperation between the EU and Russia; the control of drug precursors is also very important. The EU and Russia hold regular consultations on counter-terrorism issues and anticorruption activities.
e) Educational cooperation between Russia and the EU is guided by the principles of the Bologna Process of the Council of Europe which seeks to improve the quality, transparency, comparability and competitiveness of educational systems. The EU and Russia agreed at the St. Petersburg Summit of May 2003 to establish a "Common Space on Research and Education, including cultural aspects". A road map agreed on in 2005 sets out objectives and areas for cooperation for short and medium-term. The implementation is ensured, most notably, through joint working groups and Permanent Partnership Councils. The overall objective of the Common Space for Research and Education is to deepen scientific and technological cooperation and to enhance education cooperation in line with the Bologna process.
The European Union's policy aims in research are21: structuring a knowledge-based society in the EU and Russia; promoting a high rate of competitiveness and sustainable economic growth by modernization of the national economies and implementation of advanced scientific achievements for the benefit and well-being of citizens, strengthening and optimizing the links between research and innovation, maintaining small and medium size entrepreneurship in the field of research and innovation, addressing global challenges and reinforcing people-to-people contacts.
The EU's policy aims in education are22 adopting comparable higher education degrees, introducing a credit system in line with the European Credit Transfer System (ECTS), promoting academic mobility, cooperating in the area of quality assurance, updating and modernizing curricula at the level of higher education institutions, notably with a view to increasing their relevance to the labor market needs, promoting lifelong learning, reforming university governance, increasing the attractiveness of the higher education systems in Russia and in the EU, helping young people acquire knowledge, skills and competencies, recognizing the value of
21 Busighina I. Bridge Analysis of the EU — Russia Relations. Moscow: MGIMO, 2012. P. 74.
22 Ibid.
such experiences, promoting intercultural dialogue and enhancing cooperation with neighboring partner countries.
Conclusion
The geographic position has a significant influence on Russian foreign policy. Not only does it reaffirm the importance of an Asian dimension (with regard to China, the Indian subcontinent and East Asia), it also draws attention to a whole new category of relations with the Soviet successor states. Such concerns do not need to rule out a European direction. They do, however, imply that Russian interests are balanced between Europe and other regions around its periphery. This position has been rationalized in Russia through ideas associated with "Eurasianism" and "multipolarism". The former identifies Russia's unique position as a bridge between Europe and Asia. The latter points to the need for a foreign policy that is not unidirectional (i.e. fixated on the US) but one that is focused on multiple centers of power — Europe, but also China, India and so on23.
If no change in political direction occurs in Moscow, or in the EU (not speculating about the prospects of the EU after Brexit, with rising financial problems etc.), the EU — Russia relationship will be muddling through, or rather "muddling down". This is the most probable scenario, as Moscow does not seem to be ready yet to change its line. In this case, both sides will continue to "manage" the current political and diplomatic conflict. Economic interdependence will continue playing a certain stabilizing role. Meanwhile, however, mutual diversification of energy flows may accelerate, and several European countries will make an effort to overcome their critical energy dependence on Russia. A normalization and gradual improvement in EU — Russian relations can occur if Russia comes to realize that the current stalemate does not serve Russia's interests and gradually weakens its options / positions — in other words, if it decides that time is not on Moscow's side and that it would be better off making trade-offs earlier rather than later. Economic and financial considerations have a role to play, as do the views of those Russian elites who want to stay connected to Europe24. The same can be said about the EU, keeping in consideration the rising ties between Russia and China among other strategic relations. Meanwhile, the North Korean crisis is not good for the EU, Russia or Asia, and we don't know if it will result in an actual war with substantial consequences, or if it will remain a "rhetoric of war" with more possibilities for negotiations leading to a final agreement.
23 Mandelbaum M. The Dawn of Peace in Europe. New York: Priority Pr. Pubns., 1996. P. 171.
24 MoshesA. EU — Russia Relations: Quo Vadis? Muddling, Normalization, or Deterioration // PONARS Eurasia [Website]. 01-2017. URL: http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/eu-russia-relations-quo-vadis-muddling-normalization-or-deterioration (accessed: 03.08.2017).
The year 2017 has proven to be historic. A lot of interesting actions took place ranging from the Kurdish referendum for independence, to an interesting outcome of the Austrian parliamentary elections. One of the most important political events however, has occurred in Spain, where the autonomous region of Catalonia has expressed their will to become independent from the Spanish state, while remaining inside the European Union. This situation has not been welcomed by the EU member states and the officials from Brussels who, in a brief statement, have declared their opposition to Catalan independence25. During the (at this time) ongoing crisis, lots of articles in the Western European and American press have appeared regarding the Russian influence or interventions in the latest political events in Spain. A google search26 shows that there are more than 25 million results that can be considered as a "real theme for debate" among both the people and politicians. The rhetoric expressed on the matter is not a friendly one (it ranges from the involvement of hackers, to actions against the European Union with the purpose of its destruction, etc.) and will potentially affect the political negotiations of tomorrow, slowing down the cooperation between European states. Unfortunately, a divided continent will be an economic victim of other big states that can defeat every country one by one, resulting in a change of hierarchy with respect to the economy and — at the end — in politics.
Both sides — the European Union and Russia — need each other. Basically, geography is both irreplaceable and a good argument for strengthening bilateral relations. However, at the same time, history cannot be forgotten and we are forced to study its lessons. The future always belongs to those who cooperate, under two conditions: to be sincere, with the real purpose of respecting each other's interests. Nowadays, those conditions are understood by everyone and impossible to ignore. Today's society is more transparent than ever, and every wrong runs high. Mutual respect is the best argument for cooperation and wisdom must be shown every day in order to find a new direction for development. In a few years, we'll be happy to say that both sides were clever enough to choose the right path for a better future for their citizens.
Through statistical analysis, we can observe that there are more opportunities to cooperate, than to have a rough dialogue. In a world where positions in the top global economies and military powers are shifting, it is more important than ever to implement the principles ofsolid strategic communication, as it enables us to considerably reduce dangers imposed upon us. It is maybe a dream to imagine a world free of conflict, but it is necessary to reduce tensions among continents and states; as there has never been a higher interconnectivity before and since
25 Statement on the events in Catalonia. Brussels, 2 October 2017 // European Commission. Press Release Database [Website]. URL: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release STATEMENT-17-3626 en.htm (accessed: 05.10.2017).
26 Google search: "Russia Catalonia independence", consulted on 12.10.2017.
all regional crises have become global. However, at the same time, many crises emerge not only because of different interests but because political leaders ignore the knowledge of strategic communication. By respecting the rules of strategic communication, we could prevent many of its problems and it will be easier to distinguish the real differences from mere rhetoric. The relations between Russia and the European Union have much more to offer than is the case today, and we consider that the future will be brighter.
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Vacarelu M.
Cooperation and Trust: When Russia and the European Union Listen to Themselves
Marius Vacarelu — Ph.D., Lecturer, National School of Political and Administrative Studies,
Bucharest, Romania.
E-mail: marius333vacarelu@gmail.com
Annotation
The European Union and Russia need each other. Basically, geography is impossible to ignore and it is a good argument for strengthening bilateral relations. At the same time, we cannot forget history and we are forced to study its lessons. The future always belongs to those who cooperate, under two conditions: if they cooperate honestly honest and with the real purpose of respecting each other's interests. Nowadays, those conditions are understood by everyone and impossible to ignore. Today's society is more transparent than ever and the cost of every wrong step runs high. This article aims to analyze the crisis in the relations between the EU and Russia and find the ways of mutually beneficial cooperation, using the tools and techniques of strategic communication.
Keywords
Russia, European Union, cooperation, agreements, trust, citizens, economy.
