CC BY
21
«Один пояс - один путь»: значение для развивающихся стран China's Belt and Road Initiative: implications for developing countries
Сорокин Михаил Ильич
Студент 1 курса магистратуры Экономический факультет Санкт-Петербургский государственный университет
Санкт-Петербург, РФ e-mail: m.i.sorokin@inbox.ru
Sorokin Mikhail
1st year master's student Economic faculty Saint Petersburg state university Saint Petersburg, Russia e-mail: m.i.sorokin@inbox.ru
Аннотация.
В статье рассматривается китайская инициатива "Один пояс - один путь" (ОПОП): ее концептуальная основа, теоретические предпосылки и цели, которые ставит перед собой Китая. Учитывая китайскую риторику о возможностях взаимовыгодного развития и одновременно обвинения Китая странами Запада в неоколониализме, автор делает попытку как можно более объективно проанализировать роль, которую ОПОП может сыграть для развивающихся экономик.
Annotation.
The article examines the general idea of Chinese the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): its conceptual basis, theoretical framework and Chinese goals. Given the Chinese rhetoric of opportunities for mutually beneficial development and Western accusations of Chinese neocolonialism, the author tries to as objectively as possible analize the role the BRI projects may play for the developing economies.
Ключевые слова: Один пояс - один путь, ОПОП, морской Шелковый путь, развивающиеся страны, мир-системный анализ, сотрудничество "Юг-Юг", неоколониализм, парадигма летящих гусей, соперничество Китая и США.
Key words: Belt and Road Initiative, BRI, 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, developing countries, world-systems analysis, "South-South cooperation", neocolonialism, flying geese paradigm, China-USA rivalry.
China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is considered to be the world's largest infrastructure program with promised investments reaching more than 8 trillion USD [Schulhof V, 2022]. It involves half of the world population and roughly a third of global GDP [Schulhof V, 2022], as 147 countries from Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America signed a Memorandum of Understanding and joined the BRI.
Xi Jinping proposed the concept of the Silk Road Economic Belt during his visit in Kazakhstan in 2013, and the same year Xi voiced the idea of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road in a speech in Indonesia. Later in 2015 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce issued the road map of the BRI, called "The Vision and Proposed Actions Outlined on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-century Maritime Silk Road". The document names five priorities: policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration and people-to-people connections. As the time went by, more ideas were proposed and were incorporated in the original project as the Green Silk Road, addressing ecological and climate sustainability, and the Digital Silk Road, addressing digitalization. [He A., 2020].
Taking into consideration so-called peaceful rise of China, the BRI project raises concerns in the world about its impact on world economy and developing countries' development, as they constitute most countries who signed under the treaty. Does the Chinese incentive promote mutual development or is it a new form of Chinese-centered colonialism,
as it is popular to perceive in the Western countries? What are the Chinese goals? In this essay I will try to answer these questions.
In my opinion, it is crucial to start with a broader conceptual and theoretical framework that will be used in this paper. Being guided by world-systems analysis (however, I use them as a merely descriptive models and omit the moral strive for egalitarian world order) [Wallerstein, 2004], I would argue that the very idea of ultimately cooperative, utopian-style egalitarian world order does not correspond with the reality and, therefore, is irrelevant. Adopting political realism dogmas, we can state that the countries (the governments) are ultimately selfish and pursue their one goals, which seems perfectly reasonable. Regarding China, there is no doubt this country used to be a semi-periphery country, that was dependent on the US economy and was deeply interconnected with it, remaining subordinate in terms of global value chains. However, China has been constantly strengthening and developing its economic power and ensuring economic complexity and now, due to its current development stage, its global influence, has become a rival to the US superpower [Zhang, 2017; Zhao 2021].
One of the main ideas behind the BRI and other Chinese incentives is the rivalry with the USA on the global stage. Without any doubt the BRI can be categorized as a sinocentric project and its goals must have derived from Chinese needs and strategic interests, as the very national idea is deeply pragmatic and China-centered [ra^eHOBHH, 2018]. It is clear that China ultimately seeks the role of the new "core" economy, and, in my opinion, it is reasonable to assume that China ultimately needs its own periphery (and semi-periphery as well).
The studies show that current Chinese practice with developing world does not manifest itself as a "South-South cooperation" type, but as a "North-South" one (which implies dependency in the logic of world-systems perspectives), which in an oversimplified manner means that China is seeking markets for its manufactory goods and is looking for raw materials supply [Ca$p0H0Ba, 2018]. Sure, the rhetoric of China as a global South leader, "one of their own kind", that shares similar values with other developing countries, Xi's idea of the "community of shared future for mankind" and other concepts that correspond with the developing world's (and China's as well) strive for multipolarity, may mislead, however, to my mind, these concepts should be perceived as mostly rhetoric. Thus, it must be stated that perceiving the BRI as a charity project which first aim is to alleviate other countries from poverty and to promote development is a faulty logic, that can lead to false expectations, as China is guided by its selfish, but legitimate interests.
In the very beginning the practical goal of the BRI was to create demand for excessive production capacities of Chinese manufacturers in spheres connected with infrastructure construction and to ensure economic growth in both China and in countries along the "Belt and Road" using infrastructure investment and cooperating in terms of industries. Simultaneously, it corresponded with the next stages of its "opening-up" policy, as China started to pay more attention to firstly neighboring and then other countries. Data shows that the Chinese investments prioritise transportation connectivity (about 22 billion USD in 2021) mainly to facilitate trade between China and other countries, energy projects (over 16 billion) and metal sector (roughly 7 billion). Another important issue is Xinjiang stability, as large projects and better connectivity with other regions helped promote prosperity and mitigate national security risks connected with local separatist movements, while the region itself is of a major importance as a transit one, as trade flows and, even more important, energy supply from Central Asian go through it. The trade volume between China and countries along the BRI has been constantly increasing and reached 1,8 trillion USD, whereas Chinese FDI these these countries totaled 161 billion USD. Overall, the BRI initiative is supposed to meet Chinese goals in solving overcapacity problem and in other policies regarding investment, trade, energy and national security [He A., 2020; Zhang, 2017].
One of the main features of the BRI project as it is mostly (up to 80%) financed through Chinese state-owned banks and institutions. The rising concern is debt sustainability of recipient countries, as these projects are driven by economic security and geopolitical logic, rather than financial one. Such approach also means lower returns and
potentially might result in financial losses for China. The project is often criticized for unsustainable financing, non-transparency, corruption and insufficient efficiency. The measures are being taken, as new stricter rules and norms of agreements are introduced, however, some analysts suggest that it is unlikely to make any substantial difference, as China is seemed to stick with its state-investment model and these drawbacks are considered to be inherit to a such model. Some diversification of sources is still needed: the share of capital market in financing may be increased [He A., 2020].
Because of objectively existing debt problem, as countries, which China deals with, are often poor, China is often accused of so-called "debt trap policy", as this country is believed to enforce its financing, that the recipient country cannot repay, and then seizures its assets. This is proved to be a myth popularized by Chinese rivals, as actual practice is not that harsh and unfair: Chinese banks are willing to restructure debt and it have never been proved to intentionally set up "debt trap", the only "asset seizure" (when a Chinese company's acquisited a majority stake) was the Sri Lanka's case of Hambantota port, however, it has not been proved to be a planned from the beginning outcome [Deborah, 2021; He A., 2020].
Thus, I would consider such accusations of neocolonialism and "debt trap policy" as politically biased. The context of China-US rivalry is causing this political, not sicentific backlash of the BRI. In fact, the USA and allied countries are trying to keep up with China and propose their own infrastructure initiatives as Build Back Better (G7), Blue Dot Network (the US, Australia and Japan) and others to counter Chinese expansion [Khumancha, 2021]. However, as it was said, China is not is guided by its own interests and behaves as other superpowers (or great powers in terms of international relations theories), willing to be the leading force and to go up in the dominance hierarchy. Anyway, China is not revolutionizing the very essence of the core-periphery structure of the world economy, and the developing world should perceive it as a mere alternative core country. In this sense every core country (great power) can be perceived as a neocolonial power, not only China, as it not a new practice.
In fact, I believe that the rise of China may benefit the developing world, as the competition within the core increases its bargaining power and the number of opportunities to maneuver whether to choose China-backed infrastructure projects, the West-backed ones or even both. The regional incentives as ASEAN may help to defend countries' interests even more efficiently. Moreover, the rise of the new core may lead to the rise of the new semi -periphery. The flying geese paradigm, based on dynamic comparative advantage, used to be the Japanese concept to economically organize the East, promoting an unequal (not in negative sense) economic cooperation, as other countries align successively behind the advanced nation in the order of their different stages of growth in a "flying geese pattern" (V). This top-down model supposes continual development and outsourcing of outdated (more labor intensive) industries of the leader to the less advanced economies, whereas the latter ones do the same to the even less developed ones, etc., thus, relatively cementing the existing hierarchy and simultaneously ensuring the constant economic progress and development of all participants. Nowadays, China is seemed to be the new "leading goose" [Kasahara, 2013]. In this sense China and its BRI does promote development, however, not equalizing one.
Sometimes, BRI is claimed to become a foundation of the new world order, as a global counter-project to the USA hegemony [Zhou, 2018]. To my mind, it is not in China's strategic vision. China is deeply sinocentric and is not expanding power in terms of politics and ideology, as the new idea of the dual circulation economy with major emphasis on inner (domestic) circle proves [Yifu, 2021]. The project serves the Chinese interests and facilitates the connection between China and the other world, it is pragmatic and non-ideological in its nature, and it should not be a global multilateral organization, as China is not willing to become a world hegemon and completely replace the US. It is merely promoting Chinese power status and creating new ways and norms China itself is dealing with its partners, which, however, might set an example to other, but not singlehandedly reshape the current world order.
Answering questions stated in the beginning of the essay, the BRI helps China solve its own problems, such as economic and national security and overcapacity issues, and promote trade and finance flows between itself and other countries, as China is seeking to exploit new markets. China is not willing to equalize the world, as some might suppose, given its communist origins, and it is not deeply concerned about others' development (and there is no moral obligation to do so). Other countries may participate in this initiative and, consequently, diversify their economic relations, reducing the dependency on other core economies, however, they will stay the "junior partners", which does not necessarily mean that they cannot benefit from it and develop relatively to themself. The accusations of neocolonialism can only be reliant in the terms of the whole world economy structure and its inherit inequality and should not be aimed exclusively at China in a politically biased manner, as it is often done. I believe that nations can win from participating in the BRI projects and can conclude a mutually beneficial agreements with their Chinese partners
Список используемой литературы:
1. Deborah B., Rithmire M. "The Chinese Debt Trap Is a Myth: The Narrative Wrongfully Portrays Both Beijing and the Developing Countries It Deals With." The Atlantic. URL: https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2021/02/china-debt-trap-diplomacy/617953/
2. He A. The Belt and Road Initiative: Motivations, financing, expansion and challenges of Xi's ever-expanding strategy //Journal of Infrastructure, Policy and Development. - 2020. - Т. 4. - №. 1. - С. 139-169.
3. Kasahara S. The Asian developmental state and the flying geese paradigm. - 2013.
4. Khumancha O. G. The Great Schism of Geo-politics in 21st Century //Electronic Journal of Social and Strategic Studies (ISSN Online: 2582-9645). - 2021. - Т. 2. - №. 3.
5. Schulhof V., van Vuuren D., Kirchherr J. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): What will it look like in the future? //Technological Forecasting and Social Change. - 2022. - Т. 175. - С. 121306.
6. Wallerstein I. World systems theory //End of Capitalism Garner & Hancock. - 2004. - С. 611-616.
7. Yifu L. J., Wang X. Dual circulation: A new structural economics view of development //Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies. - 2021. - С. 1-20.
8. Zhang X. Chinese capitalism and the maritime silk road: A world-systems perspective //Geopolitics. - 2017. - Т. 22. - №. 2. - С. 310-331.
9. Zhao M. The Belt and Road Initiative and China-US strategic competition //China International Strategy Review. - 2021. - Т. 3. - №. 2. - С. 248-260.
10. Zhou W., Esteban M. Beyond balancing: China's approach towards the belt and road initiative //Journal of Contemporary China. - 2018. - Т. 27. - №. 112. - С. 487-501.
11. Галенович Ю. М. Коммунистическая партия Китая после своего XIX съезда. Китай и остальное человечество// Новая эпоха: Китай после XIX съезда КПК .- 2018 .- С. 58-69.
12. Сафронова Е. и др. Китай и развивающийся мир: концепции и актуальная практика отношений. -Общество с ограниченной ответственностью" Издательство" Форум", 2018.
