CC BY
8012.00.03 - фу;аролик ху;у;и. тадбиркорлик хуцуци. оила ху;у;и. хал;аро хусусий ху;у;
UDC: 330.322 (042)
Akhtamova Yulduz
Lecturer of Tashkent State University of Law
BALANCING INVESTMENT PROTECTION AND STATE'S REGULATORY SPACE IN THE LIGHT OF INVESTMENT TREATY REGIME ABSTRACT
Abstract. The asymmetric character of the investment treaty regime, which traditionally emphasizes state responsibility while omitting corporate accountability, has given rise to controversial debate among scholars as well as the international community. Some scholars argue that various obligations are already imposed on investors since the sources of foreign investment law are not limited to investment treaties, and there is a wide range of sources governing investor behavior such as national laws of host states, investor-state contracts, and other international norms concerning human rights, corruption, environmental protection and social rights.1 This article argues that responsible business conduct provisions should be part and parcel of investment treaties, thereby imposing obligations directly on investors rather than on states. This is due to the fact that although arbitral tribunals can employ different applicable laws to establish investor responsibility by interpreting investment treaties in an innovative way, they frequently make inconsistent decisions owing to the lack of binding precedent. Moreover, national laws of host states are not necessarily an effective tool to ensure responsible business conduct since laws of developing states can be weak, and powerful TNCs can influence their governmental decision-making. Regarding international instruments, which consist of soft norms and hard laws, the former does not impose any binding obligations on investors, while the latter is addressed to states.
Keywords: international investment agreements, investment protection, sources of law governing investment behaviour, state's regulatory space, protection of public policy objectives.
Introduction
Investment treaties are considered to be the main source of international investment law, being in different forms such as bilateral investment treaties (BITs), regional investment treaties and investment chapters embodied in free trade agreements (FTAs). In the last several decades, over 2750 BITs along with other types of investment treaties have been signed by states around the world, which are designed to promote foreign investment by providing protections to investors from one state party (home state) who make investments in the territory of another (host state). Initial rationales for the conclusion of investment treaties were to generate income for both home and host states, create job opportunities for host state
populations and improve the living standards of local people therein. Thus, the provisions of investment treaties were primarily aimed at attracting foreign investments for national development, especially in developing or least-developed countries, by granting substantive as well as procedural rights to foreign investors (typically transnational corporations (TNCs)). However, while focusing on protecting investments, treaties hardly impose any obligations on investors and are commonly silent on the standards of responsible business conduct. In this context, investment treaties entitle powerful economic actors, specifically TNCs, to protections against mistreatment by host states but fail to regulate their misconduct in host states. Yet, foreign investments can adversely impact
1 Jorge E. Vinuales 'Investor Diligence in Investment Arbitration: Sources and Arguments' (2017) 32 (2) ICSID Review 346
12.00.03 - фу;аролик ху;у;и. тадбиркорлик хуцуци. оила ху;у;и. хал;аро хусусий ху;у;
the fields of environment, human rights, labour relations and public health in host states. Accordingly, it is claimed that not only the volume of investments but also the quality of investments and their operation standards play a vital role in contributing to sustainable development. This paper argues that responsible business conduct provisions should be part and parcel of investment treaties, thereby imposing obligations directly on investors rather than on states.
The plan of this article is as follows: firstly, it analyzes the effectiveness of different sources of law requiring responsible business conduct of investor corporations; secondly, it explores the development of investor obligations by investment tribunals; finally, it examines different treaty approaches taken by states to promote responsible business conduct and proposes certain treaty drafting mechanisms for future treaties.
The Effectiveness of Different Sources of Law Governing Investment Behavior
Investment treaties are not primary sources of law regulating environmental, social, corruption and human rights issues arising from investment processes. Rather, domestic laws of host states play a vital role in regulating the business conducts of investor corporations in these areas. Moreover, international instruments such as human rights treaties, labour conventions, along with different international soft-laws, set standards of behaviour addressed to investors.2 Furthermore, different applicable laws can be coordinated by interpretation principles of international conventions such as the Vienna Convention, which requires tribunals to take into account "any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties".3 However, it cannot be claimed that national laws along with international norms, can
effectively regulate investor misconduct, and investor responsibility can successfully be established by the interpretative approach in investment arbitration. There are certain factors that undermine the application of national laws, especially in the area of public interests. Also, there is no international legal principle yet, which explicitly imposes binding obligations on corporations.4
Effectiveness of National Laws in Regulating Investor Behavior
When an investment is made, it usually assumes a number of duties toward the host country and local stakeholders, who are likely to be affected by investment processes. The national legal framework of host states imposes various obligations on corporations operating in their territory, classic examples of labor laws, environmental protection, local consultation regulations, tax laws, and specific protections for indigenous populations.5 It is generally acknowledged in investment treaty jurisprudence that the host state is entitled to enforce these duties of the investor without sustaining international liability.6 However, there are a number of factors, which not only do undermine the effectiveness of existing national laws protecting the interests of local stakeholders but also influence new laws promoting public purposes.
Certainly, most of the investments are carried out by large TNCs that own substantial financial resources, technology and manufacturing know-how, which make them key players in host states. Specifically, developing and least-developed countries need these resources, namely capital and technology in order to exploit national resources and implement different projects, which can grant significant bargaining power to TNCs.7 Accordingly, one author described TNCs as entities that 'are inherently difficult domestic regu-
2 Lorenzo Cotula 'Raising the Bar on Responsible Investment: What Role for Investment Treaties?' (2018) IIED <http://pubs.iied. org/pdfs/17454IIED.pdf> accessed 20
3 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), Article 31 (3) (c)
4 Markus Krajewski 'A Nightmare or a Noble Dream? Establishing Investor Obligations through Treaty-Making and Treaty-Applications' (2020) 5 Business and Human Right Journal 106.
5 George K Foster, 'Investor, States, and Stakeholders: Power Asymmetries in International Investment Treaties' (2013) 17 (2) Lewis & Clark Law Review 373.
6 Ibid.
7 Todd Weiler ''Balancing Human Rights and Investor Protection: A New Approach for a Different Legal Order' (2004) 27 (2) Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 433.
latory targets, with enormous economic and political strength and the ability to move assets and operations around the world'.8 Moreover, it has been alleged that intense competition for attracting foreign investments among developing states has led to the relaxation of national regulatory standards such as human rights to the detriment of the host state's population.9 Thus, when a host state cooperates with TNCs, and effectively couples its strength with that of the TNCs, the consequences for local stakeholders can be troubling.10 For instance, host states entitle TNCs to exploit natural resources and carry out different projects through concluding investment contracts without acquiring informed consent from local stakeholders, who are highly likely to be affected by investment operations.11 In Saramaka People v. Suriname, the land rights of indigenous people were violated by the Republic of Suriname, which concluded concessions with foreign corporations and entitled them to mine in the territory of Saramaka people without any consultations that led to protests by the local community.
Furthermore, there are a considerable number of cases demonstrating that TNCs carrying out investments in developing states have been involved in human rights, environmental, and labor abuses. For instance, a subsidiary of Enron Corporation, which is one of the world's giant energy corporations, has exercised an immense influence over India's regional governments that have been supposedly complicit in the violent and illegal suppression of local protesters against the implementation of a hydroelectric project, which had adverse impacts on the environment and the livelihood of the local community.12 Thus, the financial motives of the developing host states to
promote the investment may be powerful enough to confirm that state authorities support TNC's alleged legal rights in spite of any opposition by local stakeholders and may even use military force to suppress local protests against TNC's operations.
According to some case studies and empirical analyses, investor behavior can manipulate low-income and middle-income host states' decision-making in the public interest. Interviews have been conducted with government officials of eight developing states, who have directly or indirectly participated in the process of enacting, executing, or applying international and national laws relating to the in-vestment.13 The respondents recounted particular incidents when foreign corporations sought to affect the desirability and the principles of environmental, public safety and planning policies of host states. 14 For example, interviewees from five states recounted instances when senior government authorities opted not to insist on the incorporation of provisions promoting public policy in their investment agreements because of the fear of discouraging the potential in-vestor.15 Another case study reveals how a transnational tobacco corporation has sought to prevent the adoption of new tobacco control policies in the host state.16 In particular, the tobacco industry of Uzbekistan was privatized in a closed negotiation allowing British American Tobacco (BAT) company to create a monopoly.17 Meanwhile, the Ministry of Health had adopted Health Decree 30, which prohibited smoking and tobacco advertising in public places, including universities and colleges.18 When BAT learned about the Decree, it halted the execution of the investment claiming that these restrictions "interfered with its
8 Beth Stephens 'Corporate Liability: Enforcing Human Rights Through Domestic Litigation' Hastings International & Comparative Law Review' (2001) 24 (9) 401
9 Weiler (n 7) 433
10 K Foster (n 5)
11 Ibid
12 'The Enron Corporation: Corporate Complicity in Human Rights Violations' (Human Rights Watch) < https://www.hrw.org/ reports/1999/enron/index.htm > accessed "22 April 2020
13 Mavluda Sattorova, The Impact of Investment Treaty Law on Host States: Enabling Good Governance? (Hart Publishing 2018) cited in Sattorova (n11) 23
14 Ibid
15 Ibid
16 Anna B Gilmore, Jeff Collin, Martin McKee 'British American Tobacco's erosion of health legislation in Uzbekistan' (2006) 332 British Medical Journal 355
17 Ibid
18 Ibid
commercial freedom" and aggressively responded to the government officials requiring a suitable amendment of the Decree.19 Consequently, the proposed advertising prohibition was replaced by a voluntary code, and the smoking prohibition in all public places was restricted to the institutions concerning health and children.20 Indeed, investor TNCs exercise significant political and economic power over the host state's policy-making and can frequently be drafters as well as beneficiaries of national laws.
Also, foreign investors' complicity in bribery and corruption has been frequently observed and discussed in a number of investment arbitrations. However, when an investor's involvement in corruption or bribery has been a subject of the dispute, arbitral tribunals have effectively applied domestic laws. For instance, in World Duty Free v Kenya, the investor attempted to enforce a concession obtained by paying a bribe to the Kenyan President.21 The tribunal dismissed the claim noting that under laws governing the concession, namely, Kenyan law and English law, bribery was a crime, and concessions obtained by bribery were deemed to be void. 22 Accordingly, when the investor attempted to mitigate the consequences of its criminal offence by emphasizing the criminal conduct of the Kenyan President and requested the tribunal to make a balance between both, the tribunal stated that 'the idea... is not to punish one part at the cost of the other, but rather to ensure the promotion of the rule of law, which entails that a court or tribunal cannot grant assistance to a party that has engaged in a corrupt act'.23 Moreover, in Metal-Tech v. Uzbekistan, the tribunal dismissed its jurisdiction owing to the corruption associated with the investment of Met-al-Tech.24 The tribunal based its decision basically on the interpretation of the relevant BIT, under which the "investment" was defined as 'any kind of assets,
implemented in accordance with the laws and regulations of the Contracting Party in whose territory the investment is made.' 25 The tribunal interpreted this definition, as it required the investment to be consistent with Uzbek law at the time of the establishment in order to benefit from BIT protection.26 Thus, tribunals employed national laws along with "investment" definitions of treaties so as to establish investor responsibility, which has been left unaddressed by investment treaties.
Nevertheless, not all tribunals have taken into consideration the legality of an investment in determining the right of investors to benefit from treaty protections. For example, in Fakes v. Turkey, the tribunal noted that "an investment might be 'legal' or 'illegal' or made in good faith or not, it nonetheless remains an investment" and accordingly rejected the applicability of legality and good faith principles to the interpretation of investment definitions.27
Analysis of International Instruments
There are several international instruments, including hard norms and soft laws, which set standards of behavior for investor corporations requiring them to maintain responsible business conduct. Although soft laws are commonly addressed to business entities, thereby imposing obligations directly on them, the same cannot be said about binding international sources such as Human Rights Treaties, which are addressed to states. Particularly, although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 1948 includes the language, which indicates that "every organ of society" and "every individual" can be a bearer of human rights obligations,28 human rights treaties do not impose any express obligations on corporations or individuals.29 However, some commentators pro-
19 Ibid 356
20 Ibid
21 Word Duty Free Company Limited v Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No ARB/00/7, Award (4 October 2006) para.105
22 Ibid
23 Ibid para.389
24 Metal-Tech Ltd v Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No ARN/10/3, Award (4 October 2013) para.423
25 Ibid para.193
26 Ibid
27 Saba Fakes v. Turkey, ICSID Case No ARB/07/20, Award (12 July 12, 2010) para.112
28 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 Preamble
29 Krajewski (n 4) 111
pose that it can be interpreted in such a manner as it includes obligations for non-state actors. 30 For example, in Urbaser v. Argentina, the tribunal recognized the human rights obligations of corporations by noting that fundamental human rights "...are complemented by an obligation on all parts, public and private parties, not to engage in activities aimed at destroying such rights.'31
Also, there are ongoing attempts to create binding human rights obligations of corporations at an international level. Specifically, the Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group (OEIGWG) on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights was established in 2014, which is supposed to develop an international legally binding human rights treaty to regulate the operations of TNCs. 32
Obligations of business entities are explicitly embodied in several Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) sources, including the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the UN Global Compact, which contain exhortatory language and do not penalize for violations of CSR principles.33 Therefore, the effectiveness of these instruments is very limited. For instance, activities of Royal Dutch Shell have given rise to a number of lawsuits concerning its non-compliance with CSR standards, even though it has been a signatory to the UN Global Compact since its establishment.34 Another principle source of CSR is the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, which is developed by the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD). The Guidelines include "recommendations jointly addressed by governments to multinational enterprises", covering broad areas of issues including environmental protection, human rights, social rights,
and corruption. 35 Adherence to these Guidelines by TNCs of signatory states is "voluntary and not legally enforceable".36 Thus, although international soft laws strongly encourage TNCs to operate in compliance with CSR standards and directly impose obligations on them, these obligations cannot be practically enforced due to their voluntary nature.
Development of Investor Obligations by Investment Tribunals
Awards made by arbitral tribunals to settle disputes between investors and states under the relevant investment treaties or concessions are one of the main sources of international investment law. It is worth noting that before arbitral tribunals can develop recognition of investor responsibility as part of international investment law, responding states must allow them to do so by seeking a decision on investor responsibility.37 Accordingly, respondent states should counter-claims by alleging investor infringements of international law rather than national law in order to enable tribunals to assess the international responsibilities of investors. 38 However, states have not been generally inclined to bring such counter-claims, 39 which restricted the scope of tribunals' analyses concerning investor responsibility.
Since specific investor obligations are not commonly incorporated in investment treaties, tribunals have not had a strong legal basis for establishing investor obligations in the context of investment treaties. Therefore, different treaty interpretation approaches have been taken by arbitral tribunals in order to develop the human rights obligations of investors in investment arbitrations. Urbaser v. Argentina is the first case, which established that investor cor-
30 Ibid
31 Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partuergoa v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award (8 December 2016) para.1199
32 Human Rights Council Resolution 26/9 (2014)
33 UN Global Compact 2000; the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 2011
34 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 569 U.S. 108 (2013); HRH Emere Godwin Bebe Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell [2018] EWCA
191
35 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 2011 Annex 1; Corporate Social Responsibility mechanisms such as the UN Global Compact, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights . Chapter I, para.1-4
36 Ibid
37 Jean Ho 'The Creation of Elusive Investor Responsibility' (2019) 113 AJIL Unbound 12
38 Ibid
39 Ibid . Copper Mesa Mining v. Ecuador PCA Case No. 2012-2 Award UNICTRAL (15 March, 2016)
porations have human rights obligations under international law.40 The tribunal employed a reference to "general principles of international law" incorporated in the applicable BIT and imported international human rights treaties as applicable external laws to BIT to establish human rights obligations of investors.41 Moreover, the tribunal noted that investors can be subjects of international law and accordingly bear international obligations as they are "entitled to invoke rights resulting from international law".42
Another interpretative approach to promote human rights obligations of investors was taken by the Partial Dissenting Opinion of Professor Sands in Beer Creek v Peru. 43 This case involved Peru's revocation of the authorization given to Beer Creek for its mining project due to the protests by the local communities. 44 The tribunal held that Peru's revocation of authorization constituted indirect expropriation and accordingly awarded the claimant compensation for its losses.45 However, Professor Sands suggested that particular activities of the investor, which contributed to the social unrest, should be taken into account when calculating the compensation, and it should be reduced by applying the contributory fault principle.46 Although he agreed that ILO Convention 169 imposes obligations on states, he argued that 'the fact that the Convention may not impose obligations directly on a private foreign investor as such does not, however, mean that it is without significance or legal effects for them'.47 Also, he highlighted that the investor was obliged to comply with the requirements embodied in this applicable Convention since it would reduce its own damage.48
The issue of whether investors could have obligations under international law has been the subject of the recent Aven v Costa Rica case. Referring to the Urbaser case, the tribunal endorsed that investors can
be subjects of international law.49 However, the tribunal argued, it only happens "when it comes to rights and obligations that are the concern of all States, as it happens in the protection of the environment.' In this respect, it considered such obligations as erga omnes norms.50
Thus, it can be concluded from these three cases that the tribunal in Urbaser sought to establish direct investor obligations under international human rights law, while Professor Sands in Beer Creek did not seem to suggest that non-state actors could have explicit obligations under human rights law. He alleged that investors are obliged to comply with human rights laws so as to minimize any prospective losses that they could have. As regards Aven v Costa Rica, the tribunal suggested that investors bear only erga omnes obligations under international law.
Treaty Approaches Taken by States to Promote Responsible Business Conduct
Incorporating responsible investment provisions in newly emerging investment treaties can be considered as an important step in reforming the traditional investment-protection-oriented treaty regime. States have recently started to include certain provisions in their model or actual treaties designed to address investor responsibility. Those provisions can be divided into three groups: provisions imposing obligations on states to promote responsible business conduct; provisions imposing direct binding obligations on investors; provisions imposing voluntary codes of conduct on investors. For example, the CARI-FORUM-EU Economic Partnership Agreement requires the contracting states to adopt any national measures and cooperate to ensure that investors are prohibited from bribing public officials.51 However,
40 Urbaser v Argentina (n 47)
41 Ibid para.1192-1193
42 Ibid para.1194
43 Beer Creek Mining Corporation v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Partial Dissenting Opinion of Philippe Sands (30 November, 2017)
44 Beer Creek Mining Corporation v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Award (30 November, 2017) para.202
45 Ibid para.661
46 Partial Dissenting Opinion of Philippe Sands (n 44)
47 Ibid para.10
48 Ibid para.11
49 David R Aven and Others v Republic of Costa Rica ICSID Case No.UNCT/15/3, Final Award (18 September 2018) para.738
50 Ibid para.739
51 Economic Partnership Agreement Between The CARIFORUM States and the European Community 2008 Art.72
this approach can be ineffective in preventing investor misconduct since responsibility is still placed on states.52
The majority of investment treaties that include references to investor obligations use voluntary standards of business conduct. For example, the Brazilian Model Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Agreement states that 'the investors and their investment shall endeavor to comply with the following voluntary principles and standards for a responsible business conduct and consistent with the laws adopted by the Host State receiving the investment'.53 The language used in this provision is quite interesting. It starts with "shall", demonstrating obligatory meaning but continues with "endeavor", which implies that at least investors must attempt to follow these standards. The effectiveness of this provision is very limited because, although investors fail to comply with these standards, they do not violate this clause as long as they can demonstrate their attempts.54
Morocco-Nigeria BIT 2016 is the first investment treaty, which includes a provision establishing binding human rights obligations of investors by stating that 'Investors and investments shall uphold human rights in the host state'.55 Accordingly, article 18 is
devoted to address "Post-establishment Investor Obligations," requiring investors not to circumvent international obligations of host and home states.56
Model investment treaty drafted by the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) can be considered as an effective template to address investor responsibility. "Obligations and duties of investors and investments" constitutes one part of the treaty, which includes investor's binding obligations relating to anti-corruption, corporate social responsibility along with other duties.57 Conclusion
In conclusion, investment treaties are the best instruments to coordinate all relevant sources and promote responsible business conduct. As sources of investor obligations are analyzed in-depth, it can be concluded that there is no any legal instrument, which imposes binding obligations on investors except domestic laws of host states. Yet, TNCs considerably exercise their power over developing states' decision-making, thereby contributing to poor governance in host states. Incorporation of responsible business conduct provisions provides more clarity and predictability by addressing the asymmetrical character of the investment treaty regime.
References
1. The Saramaka People v. Suriname [2007] Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Judgment.
2. Word Duty Free Company Limited v Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No ARB/00/7, Award (4 October 2006) para.105.
3. Metal-Tech Ltd v Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No ARN/10/3, Award (4 October 2013).
4. Saba Fakes v. Turkey, ICSID Case No ARB/07/20, Award (12 July 12, 2010) para.112.
5. Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partuergoa v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award (8 December 2016) para.1199.
6. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 569 U.S. 108 (2013).
7. HRH Emere Godwin Bebe Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell [2018] EWCA 191.
8. Copper Mesa Mining v. Ecuador PCA Case No. 2012-2 Award UNICTRAL (15 March, 201 Beer Creek Mining Corporation v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Partial Dissenting Opinion of Philippe Sands (30 November, 2017).
52 Mavluda Sattorova 'Investor Responsibilities from A Host State Perspective: Qualitative Data and Proposals for Treaty Reforms' (2019) 113 AJIL Unbound 23.
53 Brazilian Model Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Agreement 2015 Art.14 (2)(b).
54 Krajewski (n 4)115.
55 Morocco-Nigeria BIT 2016 Art.18, para.2.
56 Ibid.
57 Model international Agreement on Investment for Sustainable Development IISD 2005.
9. David R. Aven and Others v Republic of Costa Rica ICSID Case No.UNCT/15/3, Final Award (18 September 2018).
10. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969).
11. ILO Convention 1989 No.169.
12. CARIFORUM-EU Partnership Agreement, 2008.
13. Morocco-Nigeria BIT 2016.
14. Japan-Mozambique BIT 2013.
15. OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 2011.
16. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948.
17. The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 2011.
18. Model international Agreement on Investment for Sustainable Development IISD, 2005.
19. Economic Partnership Agreement Between The CARIFORUM States and the European Community, 2008.
20. Brazilian Model Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Agreement, 2015.
21. Bernasconi-Osterwalder N. and others. Investment Treaties and Why They Matter to Sustainable Development: Questions & Answers, 2012, IISD 3. Available at: http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2011/investment_trea-ties_why_they_matter_sd.pdf (accessed 20.04.2020).
22. Foster G. K. Investor, States, and Stakeholders: Power Asymmetries in International Investment Treaties, Lewis & Clark Law Review 364, 2013, 17 (2).
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24. Cotula L. Raising the Bar on Responsible Investment: What Role for Investment Treaties?, 2018. Available at: http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/17454IIED.pdf (accessed 20.04.2020).
25. Ho J. The Creation of Elusive Investor Responsibility, 2019, 113 AJIL Unbound 10.
26. Sattorova M. Investor Responsibilities from A Host State Perspective: Qualitative Data and Proposals for Treaty Reforms, 2019, 113 AJIL Unbound 23.
27. Vinuales J. E. Investor Diligence in Investment Arbitration: Sources and Arguments, ICSID Review 346, 2017, 32 (2).
28. Weiler T. Balancing Human Rights and Investor Protection: A New Approach for a Different Legal Order, Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 433, 2004, 27 (2).
29. Stephens B. Corporate Liability: Enforcing Human Rights Through Domestic Litigation, Hastings International & Comparative Law Review, 2001, 24 (9) 40.
30. The Enron Corporation: Corporate Complicity in Human Rights Violations (Human Rights Watch). Available at: https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/enron/index.htm (accessed 22.04.2020).
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32. Gilmore A. B., Collin J., McKee M. British American Tobacco's erosion of health legislation in Uzbekistan, 332 British Medical Journal, 2006, 355.
