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7. Saktaganova L. Ukrepljaja pozicii pravovoj konkurentnosposobnosti: Obshhestvenno-poli-ticheskaja, pravovaja gazeta «Juridicheskaja gazeta» №46 (3444) ot 23.06.2020 g. - S. 4.
8. Filosofskij jenciklopedicheskij slovar'/ Gl. redakcija: L.F. Il'ichev, P.N. Fedoseev, S.M. Kovalev, V.G. Panov, -M.: Sov. Jenciklopedija, 1983. - S. 650.
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y^K 341
APPLICATION OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS WITHIN EUROPEAN UNION LAW
Mussakhan Aishabibi
Senior lecturer of the Department of socio-humanitarian sciences of University of International Business,Master of International law, PhD candidate (KAZGUU University), Republic of Kazakhstan, Almaty, email: aishabibi85@mail.ru
Keywords: customary international law, European Union Law, international organization, international treaty, direct and indirect effect.
Abstract. The article covers the issues of application of customary international law (hereinafter - the CIL) norms within the law of the European Union (hereinafter - the EU). The Court of ^ Justice of the European Union (hereinafter - the CJEU), as many other international judicial 1 organizations, apply CIL norms in its jurisprudence. However, the application mechanism is ^ accompanied by some challenges because of the very nature of the European Community. Since s the EU is comprised from various national jurisdictions, also because of the existence of the f supranational jurisdictional European institutions, the direct applicability of mentioned CIL o norms are troublesome.
For more detailed analysis of abovementioned issues, the author briefly analyzes the role and o the place of CIL norms within the law of the EU law. Also, there is an attempt to answer to the o question of why in some cases CJEU recognizes the legal power of CIL norms and in others not? ^ Does the CJEUfollow the recognizedformula on establishing the normativity of customary rules s such as the requirement of subjective and objective elements?
Thus, the given article analyze different approaches and principles of application of CIL norms £ by relying on existing practice of CJEU. Also, article gives some examples on interaction between EU law and EU obligations towards third states in light of the CIL and ways in which international o custom can be invoked by private parties in order to review the legality of EU secondary law. As
o an outcome of the research, the author reveals his own overview. <
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ХАЛЬЩАРАЛЬЩ ЭДЕТ Г¥РЫП НОРМАЛАРЫНЫЦ ЕУРОПАЛЫЦ ОДАЦ К¥КЫГЫНДА КОЛДАНЫЛУЫ
Айшабиби Мусахан
Халыцаралыц бизнес университеттщ ЭлеуметтЫ-гуманитарлыц гылымдар кафедрасыныц ага оцытушысы, Халыцаралыц цуцыц магистр!, М.С.Нэртбаев атындагы КазацГуманитарлыц Зац Университеттщ PhD докторанты,
Алматы ц., Цазацстан Республикасы; email: aishabibi85@mail.ru
Ty^h свздер: халыцаралыц эдет цурып цуцыгы, Еуропалыц Одац цуцыгы, халыцаралыц уйым, халыцаралыц шарт, тжелей жэне жанама эффект.
Аннотация. Мацала халыцаралыц эдет гурып цуцыгыныц (будан эр1 - XdF) Еуропалыц Одац (будан эр1 - ЕО) цуцыгыныц аясында цолданылу мэселелер1не арналган. Еуропалыц Одац Соты (будан эр1 - ЕОС) басца да халыцаралыц сот органдары тэр1зд1 взтщ тэж1ри-бестде XdF нормаларын цоладанады. Алайда Еуропалыц К,ауымдастыцтыц взгеше та-бигатына байланысты цолданылу барысында кейб1р циындыцтар туындайды. ЕО эр тур-л1 улттыц юрисдикциялардан туратындыцтан, сонымен цатар, ултYстiлiк Еуропалыц юрисдикциялыц институттар бар болгандыцтан аталмыш XdF нормаларын ттелей цол-дану циындыц тудырады.
Аталмыш мэселелердi терещрек талдау мацсатында автор XdF нормаларыныц ЕО цуцыгында алатын орнын жэне рвлт талдайды. Оган цоса, ЕОС-ныц нелжтен кейбiр шешiмдерiнде XdF нормаларыныц цуцыцтыц кушт аныцтап, кейбiрiнде одан бас тартуы-ныц себептерт аныцтауга тырысады. ЕОС субъективтi жэне объективтi элементтер-ден туратын дэстYрлi танымал формуласын эдет гурыптыц нормативтштн аныцтауда цолданады ма жоц па деген сурацца жауап царастырады.
Аталган сурацтарга жауап табу мацсатында автор XdF нормаларын цолданудыц тYрлi эдiстерi мен цагидараларын ЕОС-ныц цолданыстагы тэжiрибесiне CYйене отырып талдайды. Сонымен цатар, мацалада XdF аясында ЕО цуцыгы мен ЕО-тыц Yшiншi мем-лекеттерге цатысты мтдеттемелершц взара байланысына цатысты кейбiр мысалдар келтiрiлген жэне ЕО зацнамасыныц зацдылыгына шолу жасау мацсатында, халыцаралыц эдет гурыптыц жеке тулгаларга цатысты цолданылу жолдары царастырылган. Зертте-удщ нэтижеЫ реттде автор взтщ тужырымдамаларын жасайды.
ПРИМЕНЕНИЕ НОРМ МЕЖДУНАРОДНОГО ОБЫЧНОГО ПРАВА В ПРАВЕ ЕВРОПЕЙСКОГО СОЮЗА
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Мусахан Айшабиби ь
Старший преподаватель кафедры Социально-гуманитарных наук
Международного Университета Бизнеса, Магистр Международного права, >
PhD докторант Казахского Гуманитарного Юридического Университета П
им. М.С. Нарикбаева, Республика Казахстан, г. Алматы, email:aishabibi85@mail.ru О
о
Ключевые слова: международное обычное право, право Европейского Союза, между- о
народная организация, международный договор, прямой и косвенный эффект. н
Аннотация. Статья охватывает вопросы применения норм международного обычного §
права (далее - МОП) в рамках права Европейского Союза (далее - ЕС). Европейский Суд А
Правосудия (далее - ЕСП), также как и многие другие международные судебные органы, И
применяет МОП в своей практике. Однако, механизм применения идет наряду с трудно- К
стями в силу особой природы Европейского Сообщества. В связи с тем, что ЕС состоит №
из различных национальных юрисдикции, также в силу существования наднациональных (
юрисдикционных Европейских институтов, применение указанных норм МОП становит- — ся проблематичным.
Для более детального анализа вышеуказанных вопросов, автор кратко проанализировал роль и место норм МОП в системе права ЕС. Также, в статье автор пытается ответить на вопрос почему ЕСП в некоторых делах признает правовую силу норм МОП, а других не признает? Следует ли ЕСП признанной традиционной формуле по установлению нормативности обычных норм как объективный и субъективные элементы?
Таким образом, данная статья анализирует различные подходы и принципы применения норм МОП ссылаясь на существующую практику ЕСП. Также, в статье приводится ряд примеров, раскрывающих взаимосвязь между правом ЕС и обязательствами ЕС перед третьими государствами в свете МОП, а также рассматриваются примеры когда частные лица ссылаются на международные обычаи в целях рассмотрения вопросов и правомерности вторичных актов ЕС. В результате анализа вышеизложенных вопросов, автор делает собственные выводы.
Introduction. Neither the establishing treaties of the EU, nor any other provision of the EU, refer specifically to the international custom and do not therefore explicitly confirm the existence of the customary provisions within the EU legal order. The general legal obligation to respect the international law, so indirectly with regard to the international agreements and to the customary law, is stated in the Article 3(5) and in Article 21 (1) of the Treaty on the EU (hereinafter - the TEU). Article 3(5) TEU provides that: "In its relations with the wider world, the
in
8 Union shall uphold and promote its values and S interests and contribute to the protection of its ^ citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the ^ sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity s and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair ^ trade, eradication of poverty and the protection E of human rights, in particular the rights of the e child, as well as to the strict observance and ¿E the development of international law, including 8 respect for the principles of the United Nations § Charter."
c According to the abovementioned,
< international law, i.e. customary law is binding G upon the EU institutions in relations with non-5 Member States as well as another subjects of
international law. i Main part. According to the commentary § on Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
< between States and International Organizations fE or between International Organizations k (hereinafter - Convention) to the Article 2, s subparagraph 1 (g) of the given Convention "it | can happen that an organization will be bound b by legal rules contained in a treaty without 00 being a party to the treaty, either because the
DOI: 10.52026/2788-5291_2021_64_1_258
rules have a customary character in relation to the organization, or because the organization has committed itself by way of a unilateral declaration" [1, p. 834]. Consequently, it is not necessary for the international organization to provide the explicit commitment to the international customary law in the treaty. The EU is thus obliged to respect the customary rules under the international law itself.
Nonetheless, some decisions have demonstrated the reluctance of CJEU to give supremacy to international law over Community law. This was clear from the well known Kadi case (Kadi I and Kadi II) which was an interplay between the United Nations (hereinafter - the UN) and the EU law. As it was stated in Kadi case "the relationship between international law and the Community legal order is governed by the Community legal order itself, and international law can permeate that legal order only under the conditions set by the constitutional principles of the Community" [2]. Thus, even if the question is related to the implementation of UN Charter, which is mirroring the imperative norms of international law, it does not have to be in contrast to the constitutional order set by the EU. In the light of this case, "the obligations imposed by an international agreement cannot have the effect of prejudicing the constitutional principles of the Treaties" and they cannot form the part of the EU legal order. Especially, the rule of customary international law inadimplenti non est adimplendum can be indicated, as contrary to the loyalty clause enshrined in art. 4(3) Treaty on European Union.
The scope of the commitment was clarified in the jurisprudence of the CJEU, stating that
the provisions of the international customary law are binding upon the EU institutions in the exercise of their powers1.
Thus, the rules of customary international law which are binding for the EU must be respected in the exercise of the powers of its institutions and they have primacy over the acts of the EU institutions. As was demonstrated by the CJEU in the Poulsen decision, the primacy of those rules means that provisions of the secondary EU legislation must be interpreted in accordance with norms of international law. It was stated by the CJEU that the Council regulation which was under the scrutiny must be interpreted, and its scope limited, in the light of the relevant rules of the international law of the sea. All of the treaties related to the law of the sea (on territorial sea and contiguous zone, on High Seas, on fishing and conservation of living resources on the High Seas) were applied as CIL norms. It has not entered into force, but many of its provisions are considered to express the current state of customary international maritime law2.
Also customary international law was referred to only with regard to the interpretation of acts adopted by EU institutions3. These are thus the questions of the great practical importance, examined by the CJEU in the abovementioned Poulsen case in a preliminary ruling concerning the scope of application of the regulation (Council Regulation (EEC) No 3094/86 and its Article 6(1)(b)) providing technical measures for the conservation of fisheries resources. The question was whether the vessel registered in Panama and flying under the Panamanian flag, but wholly owned by a Danish national can be stopped by EU Member state. The CJEU by relying on numerous customary norms on the law of the sea stated, that even though there is only an administrative formality of registration, the 'genuine link' principle will be applied4.
The Poulsen case is thus a firm confirmation that the customary international law may provide the rules of interpretation and the meaning for the EU provisions.
Another landmark case, where CJEU stated that the EU must respect the general principles of international law, i.e. CIL norms is the Firma Brita case. In Firma Brita, in which a customs dispute concealed the complex politics of the Middle East, the CJEU ruled that the EU must respect the general principle of international law, also enshrined in Article 34 of the VCLT, concerning the relative effect of treaties, according to which treaties do not impose any obligations, or confer any rights, on non-party states without their consent5.
"The CJEU observed that:
Even though the Vienna Convention does not bind either the Community or all its Member States, a series of provisions in that convention reflect the rules of customary international law which, as such, are binding upon the Community institutions and form part of the Community legal order..." [3, p.889].
In order to resolve the question whether Germany has breached the EC-IsraelAssociation Agreement by refusing to grant preferential tariff arrangements to products produced in West Bank, the ECJ stated: 'the EC-Israel Association Agreement as meaning that the Israeli customs authorities enjoy competence in respect of products originating in the West Bank would be tantamount to imposing on the Palestinian customs authorities an obligation to refrain from exercising the competence conferred upon them by virtue of the above mentioned provisions of the EC-PLO Protocol. Such an interpretation, the effect of which would be to create an obligation for a third party without its consent, would thus be contrary to the principle of general international law, 'pacta tertiis nec nocent nec procunt', as consolidated in Article 34 of the Vienna Convention'6.
Judgment of the Court of 24 November 1992. Anklagemyndigheden v Peter Michael Poulsen and Diva Navigation Corp. para
9. Electronic access: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A61990CJ0286
2 Judgment of the Court of 24 November 1992. Anklagemyndigheden v Peter Michael Poulsen and Diva Navigation Corp. para
10. Electronic access: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A61990CJ0286
3 Judgment of the Court of 24 November 1992. Anklagemyndigheden v Peter Michael Poulsen and Diva Navigation Corp. para
11. Electronic access: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A61990CJ0286
4 Judgment of the Court of 24 November 1992. Anklagemyndigheden v Peter Michael Poulsen and Diva Navigation Corp. para 12-16. Electronic access: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A61990CJ0286
5 Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 25 February 2010. Firma Brita GmbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Hafen Firma Brita. Para. 44. Electronic access: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-386/08
6 Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 25 February 2010. Firma Brita GmbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Hafen Firma Brita. Para. 52. Electronic access: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-386/08
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Despite the fact that Poulsen and Firma Brita developed the approach, according to which the EU law must be interpreted in consistency with customary international law, there are important peculiarities to this question. First of all, it has to be noted that CJEU is reluctant to apply two element approach when testing the existence of CIL. However, it has developed its own approach, i.e. test. In Intertanko case, the CJEU briefly noted the requirement to the CIL norm by stating that 'it is also necessary that it should be unconditional and sufficiently precise as far as regards the content is regarded'7.
"It should be noted in that respect that, as is demonstrated by the Court's judgment in Case C-286/90 Poulsen the European Community must respect international law in the exercise of its powers. It is therefore required to comply with the rules of customary international law when adopting a regulation suspending the trade concessions granted by, or by virtue of, an agreement which it has concluded with a non-member country"8.
It should be noted that CJEU in its jurisprudence relies on international treaties that has not come into force, but many provisions of which are regarded as customary international law norms9. This tendency is mirroring the jurisprudence of many other judicial institutions such as ICJ, ECtHR, criminal tribunals etc.
In this respect, the Court has held, inter alia, that some of the provisions of the Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties of 1969 and 1986 and of the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea, codify customary international law10.
For example, Article 26 of the VCLT, stoning the principle of pacta sunt servanda was explicitly referred by CJEU in several cases. In some of the cases, CJEU relied on the mentioned principle as principle of general international law [4, p. 12-13].
In Opel Austria judgment of the European Court of First Instance (hereinafter - Court of First Instance) and in the Racke judgment of the Court of Justice, Community courts have explicitly relied on customary international law to test the validity of acts of EU institutions. These cases have high importance also because of their connection with VCLT. First, the question arises as to what the precise position of customary international law is in Community law. Secondly, Racke and Opel Austria raise the question under which conditions rules of customary international law can be invoked in Community law in order to challenge the validity of acts of EU institutions or rules of national law. This requires a careful analysis of the reasoning followed in the judgments concerned [4, p. 5].
In both cases, the rule of customary international law concerned the law of treaties: in the first case, the obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its entry into force, in the second case the rule of rebus sic stantibus [4, p. 19].
In Racke case the claimant was incidentally challenging the validity of a Community regulation in order to rely upon rights which it derived directly from an agreement of the Community with a non-member country. Another example could be the Opel Austria case, when the Court of First Instance applied the general principle of EU law of protection of legitimate expectations which is also the corollary of the principle of good faith under customary international law. However, ultimately the benchmark for the validity of the disputed EU act was an international agreement (the EEA Agreement) rather than a general principle of EU law or customary international law11.
Such principles are, by their very nature and broad logic, by no means capable of having an effect on the legal status of individuals, unless
Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 3 June 2008.The Queen, on the application of International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko) and Others v Secretary of State for Transport. Para 45. Electronic access: http://curia. europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-308/06
8 Judgment of the Court of 16 June 1998. A. Racke GmbH & Co. v Hauptzollamt Mainz. Para. 45. Electronic access: https:// eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=ecli%3AECLI%3AEU%3AC%3A1998%3A293
9 Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 24 November 1993. Etablissements Armand Mondiet SA v Armement Islais SARL. Para. 13. Electronic access: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/HR/TXT/?uri=CELEX:61992CJ0405
10 Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 24 November 1993. Etablissements Armand Mondiet SA v Armement Islais SARL. Para. 13. Electronic access: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/HR/TXT/?uri=CELEX:61992CJ0405
11 Judgement of Court of First Instance. Opel Austria GmbH v. Council of the European Union. Para. 95. Electronic access: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf?docid=103499&doclang=EN
two conditions are satisfied. First, there must exist a principle of customary international law that is binding on the European Union. Secondly, the nature and broad logic of that particular principle of customary international law must not preclude such a review of validity; the principle in question must also appear, as regards its content, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise and with keeping in mind the exceptional position of certain rules of customary international humanitarian law12.
As regards to direct effect of CIL norms, the CJEU stated that an individual have the right to question provisions of the EU act by relying on CIL norm. This case has importance because the CJEU linked the position of an individual and an international organization by referring to CIL.
The CJEU also raised an argument that since a principle of customary international law does not have the same degree of precision as a provision of an international agreement, judicial review must necessarily be limited to the question whether, in adopting the act in question, the institutions of the EU made manifest errors of assessment concerning the conditions for applying those principles13.
This is the fundamental condition under which the rule of the customary international law may have a direct effect on individual rights. This is the criteria for direct applicability of CIL towards the individual.
In this respect the CJEU ruled:... an individual relying in legal proceedings on rights which he derives directly from an agreement with a non-member country may not be denied the possibility of challenging the validity of a regulation which, by suspending the trade concessions granted by that agreement, prevents him from relying on it, and of invoking, in order to challenge the validity of the suspending regulation, obligations deriving from rules of customary international law which govern the termination and suspension of treaty relations". Thus, an individual cannot be refused to question the validity of an EU act on suspending the trade concessions. Thus, EU must be observe weather it is breaching the CIL
norms or not while drafting the international treaty with third countries.
As regards to rules contemplated in the Vienna conventions on law of the treaties between states, and treaties between states and international organizations, CJEU took the position that although both of the conventions are not explicitly applicable to EU as an organization, since several provisions of these treaties constitute the rules of customary law, they are applicable to agreements concluded by EU.
Customary international law has been invoked and used in contested ways before the CJEU in other high-profile rulings. In the Aviation Emissions case, in which the extension by the EU of its aviation emissions regime to third country airlines which landed in the EU was challenged inter alia for violation of the jurisdictional principle of territoriality under customary international law, the CJEU confirmed that it would entertain a challenge to the validity of an EU regulation for incompatibility with principles of customary international law, although the Court found no incompatibility of the facts of the case [5, p.358].
The Air Transport Association of America serves as trade and service association of the United States. This organization asked the court to refuse the measures, which implemented the EU Directive in the United Kingdom. According to the claimant, this Directive is invalid, because it is contradicting the CIL norms, especially those elaborated by the Chicago Convention, Kyoto Protocol and Open Skies Agreement between the EU and the United States of America. The High Court of Justice of England and Wales, Queen's Bench Division decided to stay the proceedings and refer questions to the CJEU.
The Court started its analysis with a discussion of Article 216(2) of TFEU, which states that where the EU accepts international agreements, they are binding upon its institutions and, consequently, the international agreements prevail over acts of the EU. This rule is named as 'loyalty clause'. In order to determine whether the validity of an EU act may be assessed in
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Judgment of the Court of 16 June 1998. A. Racke GmbH & Co. v Hauptzollamt Mainz. Para. 84. Electronic access: https:/ eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=ecli%3AECLI%3AEU%3AC%3A1998%3A293.
13 Judgment of the Court of 16 June 1998. A. Racke GmbH & Co. v Hauptzollamt Mainz. Para. 52. Electronic access: https:/ eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=ecli%3AECLI%3AEU%3AC%3A1998%3A293.
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light of the rules of international law, the Court outlined a three part test:
(1) the EU must be bound by the rules;
(2) the validity of an EU act can only be examined in light of an international treaty where the nature and broad logic of the treaty do not preclude it
(3) where (1) and (2) are satisfied, the treaty provisions that are relied upon must be unconditional and sufficiently precise regarding their content.
Second, the Court analyzed the claims based in customary international law. The Court found that, as embodied in the current state of customary international air law:
1) each State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over its airspace;
2) no State may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty;
3) States have freedom to fly over the high seas;
4) the principle of customary international law (the existence of which is not accepted by the Defendant) that aircraft overflying the high seas are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the country in which they are registered, save as expressly provided for by international treaty.
However, the Court held that there was not enough evidence to establish the principle that aircraft flying over the high seas are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the State in which they are registered.
Then the Court analyzed whether and under what circumstances the former three customary international law principles could be relied upon. The Court held that because a principle of customary international law 'does not have the same degree of precision' as that of an international agreement, the judicial review of the principle must be limited to the competence of the EU in adopting Directive 2008/101 and whether in adopting Directive the responsible EU institutions made 'manifest errors of assessment'.
The case was very important for the development of the doctrine of the EU law, since, as advocate general Kokott noted in her opinion, the CJEU was asked for the first time to determine the criteria for principles
of customary international law to serve as a standard providing grounds for the judicial review of secondary EU law [6].
Since the EU plays an important role in development of environmental law, the jurisprudence of CJEU had also faced legal questions related to environmental issues, i.e. precautionary principle. One of the landmark case is Danish Bees case (Case C-67/97, Criminal Proceedings against Ditlev Bluhme [1998] ECR I-8033). This case, in view of the author has interesting outcomes as to the evolutionary interpretative approach of the CJEU, which led to the application of customary norms.
According to the final decision, the Court ruled in favour of the prohibition on the Danish Minister for Agriculture keeping, on the island of Laeso, nectar-gathering bees other than those of the subspecies Apis mellifera mellifera (Leaso Brown Bee). In the absence of scientific evidence, the CJEU concluded that preservation measures for an indigenous animal population contribute to the maintenance of biodiversity [7, p.826]. Thus, although there was no definitive ruling on the status of the precautionary approach and the case law of the CJEU itself lacks the precise principles on this issue, the CJEU unlike WTO rulings, 'ignored' the lack of the scientific evidences.
From the point of view of such conservation of biodiversity, it is immaterial whether the object of protection is a separate subspecies, a distinct strain within any given species or merely a local colony, so long as the populations in question have characteristics distinguishing them from others and are therefore judged worthy of protection either to shelter them from a risk of extinction that is more or less imminent, or, even in the absence of such risk, on account of a scientific or other interest in preserving the pure population at the location concerned14.
More recent, in 2000, the CJEU ruled on question of product safety. The CJEU held that the member states have the right to deny permission for the introduction of genetically modified food products provided they have new scientific evidence that these food products can cause harm to health or the environment15.
^ 14 Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 3 December 1998. Criminal proceedings against Ditlev Bluhme. Para 34. Electronic access: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A61997CJ0067
LU 15
m Judgment of the Court of 21 March 2000. Association Greenpeace France and Others v Ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Pêche and Others. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A61999CJ0006
Conclusion. Considering the
abovementioned, the CJEU does not identify the customary norm, rather apply it in a specific manner. The CJEU follows the particular stages in application of CIL in its jurisprudence. First, it identifies whether EU is bound by those rules. Second, if the EU is not bound explicitly by that norm, CJEU test the community legislation on its conformity with CIL. However, the CIL norm must be precise. In case, if the CIL norm is in contrast with the constitutional order of the EU, the European law prevail over the CIL.
It is therefore concluded that even though the international law forms an integral part of the EU, there is at the same time a selective approach within the EU law towards agreements and customary law. Ultimately, the CJEU is more cautious in granting direct effect of the customary international law, which makes the EU law not totally open to the international law. These shortcomings in the conditions of the EU legal regime seem to be compensated by the harmonious interpretation that very often can come very close to direct effect.
Thus, in general, we have witnessed that the CJEU is open for international law even though with some implications. As the Poulsen case illustrated, the European Union must respect international law in the exercise of its powers.
But in many instances due to the sui generis nature of the organization, the CJEU has elaborated the certain approach according to which EU seems to accept the CIL norms. Although the EU as an international organization has exclusive competence in deciding the question whether to apply international norms or not and has effective control over such
questions, the objectives and aims of the EU and the legal personality of the organization itself pays due attention to CIL. The strict analysis of the case law of the CJEU has demonstrated the imperfection of the secondary legislation of the community law, which is why CJEU had to invalidate some of the EU provisions because of the contradiction to the customary law.
When customary norms are vague itself and difficult to apply, the CJEU does not take responsibility for defining the normativity of that norm. It limits its activity by judicial review and answers the question whether there was manifest errors of assessment by the EU institute which adopted the legal provision.
It also can be concluded that the CJEU relies on evolutionary interpretation of international treaties, as a result applies norms customary in nature, which were not explicitly mentioned in EU legislation. The given position of CJEU is different for example from WTO Dispute settlement regime, which follows strict interpretative rules.
In general, the EU displays a certain 'openness', either through accepting international obligations or by referring to international agreements in its own Treaties. As Bruno Simma and Dirk Pulkowski states, "the more a system's operation is 'closed' towards its international law environment, the less likely it is to fall back on the rules on state responsibility.." [8, p. 483].
The practice of the CJEU has revealed the intention of the CJEU to find some balance between the autonomy and reception. Which is why it is impossible to appertain the EU system to monist or dualist system of law.
REFERENCES
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1. Arthur Watts, The International Law Commission 1949-1998: Volume Two: The Treaties Part Ii, p.834.
2. Opinion of Mr Advocate General Poiares Maduro, delivered on 16 January 2008 on case 'Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities', Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 3 September 2008, para.24. Electronic access: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A 62005CC0402
3.O.Corten, P.Klein, The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary, Vol.1, ed.by Oxford Univ.Press, 2011, p.889.
4. J.Wouters and D. Van Eeckhoutte, Giving the Effect to Customary International Law Through European Community law. Working paper No. 25, June 2002. Electronic access: https://www.law. kuleuven.be/iir/nl/onderzoek/working-papers/WP25e.pdf
5. Paul Craig and Grainne de Burca, EU Law: text, cases and materials, 6th ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 2015, p. 358.
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6. Opinion of advocate general Kokott, delivered on 6 October 2011 on case 'The Air Transport Association of America and Others', para 109. Electronic access: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A 62010CC0366
7. Simon Marr, The Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases: The Precautionary Approach and conservation andManagement of Fish, EJIL 11 (2000), p. 826. Electronic access: http://www.ejil. org/pdfs/11/4/555.pdf
8. Bruno Simma and Dirk Pulkowski, Of Planets and the Universe: Self-contained regimes and International Law The European Journal of International Law Vol. 17 no.3 EJIL, 2006, p. 485. Electronic access: http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/17/3/202.pdf
ПРАВО НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ В МЕЖДУНАРОДНОМ ПРАВЕ
Абирбек Саурык Темирланович
Магистр юридических наук, докторант Высшей школы права АО «Университет КАЗГЮУ имениМ.С. Нарикбаева», г. Нур-Султан, Республики Казахстан e-mail: sa_abirbek@kazguu.kz
Ключевые слова: непризнанные государства, право непризнанных государств, применение иностранного права, признание иностранных документов, апостиль, коллизионные нормы, апостилированные документы, признание государства, декларативная теория, конститутивная теория.
Аннотация. В данной статье рассматриваются проблемы касательно признания юрисдикции непризнанных государств, признания их индивидуальных документов и судебных £ решений согласно международному праву. Актуальность данной проблемы заключается в 8 возможности признания права непризнанных государств, учитывая не урегулированность S их статуса согласно международному публичному праву. Существование непризнанных ^ государств является большим препятствием в урегулировании многих споров, поскольку ^ международное публичное право не в силах определить их правовой статус. Однако, не-s обходимо также учитывать, что данные государства в свою очередь прогрессивно раз-з1 виваются, создают внешние сношения. Этим самом можно предположить, что данные Е объединения удовлетворяют все требования предусмотренной в Конвенции Монтевидео о е правах и обязанностях государства от 1933 года. Но все же решение проблемы касатель-^ но статуса непризнанных государств по международному публичному праву упирается в 2 тупик, но тем не менее поднимаются другие вопросы в сфере международного частного права. Должны ли государства признавать юрисдикцию, документы и судебные решения с непризнанных государств?! По этому поводу, в научной среде идут большие дискуссии по
< решению данной проблемы. Данная статья будет рассматриваться с применением на-Ь учных методов всеобщего и сравнительно-правового анализа, которые дадут ответы о 5 возможности признании юрисдикции, документов и судебных решений непризнанных государств. В заключении данной статьи автор констатирует что в международном праве
§ отсутствуют договорные нормы и международный обычные нормы касательно приме-§ нения права непризнанных государств, также автор предлагает свод рекомендаций для
< решения данной проблемы с применением доктрины международного права и судебных |Е прецедентов.
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