14DOI: 10.24412/2181-1385-2022-2-194-200
ANALYSIS OF THE BASIC STRUCTURES THAT DETERMINE THE ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE OTHER IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ZH-P.
SARTRE
Mahabbat Kasymovna Tanatarova
M. Auezov South Kazakhstan University, Shymkent, Kazakhstan
ms.clevergirl @mail .ru
Burkhan Zhunusbekovich Eltay
South Kazakhstan Medical Academy JSC, Shymkent, Kazakhstan
Nuradin Berdiyarkhanovich Beken
South Kazakhstan Medical Academy JSC, Shymkent, Kazakhstan
The radical turn that took place in the 20th century in the analytics of intersubjective relations forms a different paradigm image of the Other. This article discusses the view on the problem of the other in the philosophy of J.P. Sartre. The French thinker distinguishes two structures of being: being for oneself and being in oneself as an ontological basis, which will be decisive in relation to the Other. With the double structure of the cogito, J.P. Sartre renounces reflective consciousness in favor of non-reflexive consciousness, which he considers the basis of our consciousness, and it is in this sphere that he decides to find the existence of the Other in the world. He describes the relationship with the Other using the structures of being for oneself and being for the other. The article also analyzes such concepts as lack, value, project, choice, situation, goal. A special place is given to the understanding of absolute freedom and responsibility, since they are the most important in relations with the Other. The analysis of the above structures and concepts reveals not only the subject, but also makes it possible to understand how its relations with Others will be realized and to assess the possible prospects for practical attitudes towards the other in the philosophy of J.P. Sartre.
Keywords: Other, being for oneself, being for another, freedom, responsibility, choice, situation, goal, disadvantage, value, project.
The problem of relations with the Other has been touched
ABSTRACT
upon in one way or another by many contemporary philosophers:
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DOI: 10.24412/2181-1385-2022-2-194-200
M.Heidegger [Heidegger, 1991; Heidegger, 1997], J.P. Sartre [Sartre, 1989; Sartre, 2009], E.Levinas [Levinas, 1998; Levinas, 2000], G.Marcel [Marcel, 2004], A.B. Sartre [Sartre, 2009]. Sartre [Sartre, 1989; Sartre, 2009], E. Levinas [Levinas, 1998; Levinas, 2000], G. Marcel [Marcel, 2004], A. Badiou [Badiou, 2006], P. Ricoeur [Ricoeur, 2008], K. Jaspers [Jaspers, 2012], with this problem being substantially actualized in the philosophy of existentialism. In this article we will try to reveal and analyze the view of the problem of the Other in the philosophy of J.-P. Sartre, carrying out a semantic explication of the basic notions used by the French philosopher to solve this problem.
J-P. Sartre views his philosophical work Being and Nothingness as a continuation of Heidegger's fundamental ontology (Heidegger, 1997), but at the center of Sartre's philosophy is the sphere of the For-Other (Heidegger's Mit-Sein), which is never fully clarified. Sartre uses a different terminology than Heidegger: the title "existential" refers to roughly what Heidegger calls the present, while he refers to Dasein as being-for-itself (see Heidegger, 1951; Heidegger, 1993). In considering the problem of the Other, Sartre follows Heidegger's ontological position, that is, he takes the basis of the ethical in man himself and develops it.
To understand what is central and defining about the Other in Sartre's philosophy, we need to clarify the following concepts. First, the "ontological structure" of being, which he modifies in two forms: the structure of For-Self Being and the structure of B-Self Being. These can be said to relate to each other as compression and decompression - the complete compression and decompression of human existence. Being-in-itself is the absolute density of being: it is what man already is, his past as the result of all his actions. It is a static structure of being that is only replenished with each successive act. In contrast, the structure of being-for-itself is dynamic because in this case being is constantly creating itself, and is therefore the source and meaning of life. This is temporally always realized as the future. The structure of being-for-itself can be characterized by the concepts of deficiency and value. The fact is that it is from them that a person forms the project of realization of the self in which the two above-mentioned structures of being coincide. Secondly, Sartre points to absolute freedom as the system-forming factors that constitute the necessary condition for any action. Thirdly, responsibility as a consequence of freedom. Fourthly, the choice that is realized in absolute freedom. And fifthly and finally, the correlate of purpose and situation. All these notions are decisive in Sartre's definition of the relation to the Other.
Sartre's ontology of Being-for-itself includes three concepts
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- nothingness, lack and freedom. This means that these notions define man's being in the world. Consequently, it is necessary to proceed from them in determining possible attitudes toward the Other, which is exactly what Sartre does.
By defining nothingness as the disintegration of being, Sartre reveals the essence of being as a lack of being itself. The lack appears in the world only with human reality, and suggests a trinity: that which is lacking, that which is lacking, and the wholeness "which has disintegrated through lack and which will be restored through the synthesis of the lacking and the existing" [6, 173].
Moreover, human reality itself is lacking because we are always lacking something. And this is why we always have an exit beyond ourselves to that being that we are not, but to which we aspire as our meaning, as our wholeness. And against the backdrop of this wholeness we are deficient. It is not surprising, then, that man is always looking for a meeting with himself, to restore the integrity of being, but he does not always succeed. This is the tragedy of human existence, which is therefore "unhappy consciousness by nature.
The identity of the structures of being-for-itself and being-in-itself is possible, but only at the cost of destroying the structure of being-for-itself, resulting in the freezing of being-in-itself. Thus man eventually comes to either death or the state of God. In either case, however, human reality, in its attempt to possess itself but haunted by wholeness, is constantly defeated.
Sartre understands wholeness as a value that comes into the world through human reality. A value that has its basis in itself is what being exalts itself to. It is given with a "non-thematic translucency for itself," for it is itself its own foundation. However, for itself is contingent in relation to in itself, so "nothing makes value exist, were it not for freedom; which immediately makes myself exist - and within concrete facticity, since as the ground of its own nothingness for itself cannot be the ground of its own being. There is, therefore, a total contingency of being for value, which then passes on to all morality..." [1]. Meanwhile, in order to achieve value and coincidence with oneself in the cycle of the self one needs a project that will be built on the basis of absolute freedom.
For the self is being defined by action, and freedom is the first condition of all action. To act means to "change the face of the world," to have a goal and the means to achieve it, which must lead to a projected result. The project involves the unity of the motive, the action and the goal. The motive of action as a driving force cannot emerge from factuality, because no state of
affairs "can motivate in itself any action..." [2]. Consequently, we
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can say that it is not enough to understand a state of affairs as a "lack of something.
Action is intentional because it must have a goal, which in turn refers to a motive, which "is in fact the unity of the three temporal ecstasies: the goal (or temporalization) of my future presupposes a motive or a driving force, that is, points to my past, and the present is the appearance of action. To speak of action without motive is to speak of action, which would lack the intensional structure of all action..." Intention thus acts as a choice of purpose, and, proceeding from such an intensional choice of purpose, the world is revealed to us, one way or another, in accordance with the chosen purpose. Intention realizes a rupture with the given, a "rupture of continuity," by which we evaluate the given and can choose, otherwise there would be completeness of the present and impossibility to project the future.
Sartre defines action as an expression of freedom because freedom becomes action. I learn about freedom through my actions, and it is the "content of my being. So we can say that man is condemned to be free. He is always free, and in his freedom there are no limits other than its own, from which it follows that man is not free to "cease to be free. This totality and absoluteness of freedom comes from the incompleteness, the lack of human reality. The fact is that if there were a coincidence of structures for itself and in itself, that is, if we had a being that was what it is, then being could not be free. "Freedom is precisely the nothingness that is contained in the human heart, which forces human reality to make itself instead of being. We have seen that for human reality to be is to choose itself; nothing comes to it from outside, nor also from within, so that it can receive or receive. It is completely abandoned, without any help of any kind, to the intolerable necessity of being made to the smallest detail" [3]. Human reality chooses itself as it wishes, but it cannot not choose itself and cannot refuse to be either. Hence the contingency of being, its absurdity, since initially there was no possibility of refusing to choose. This means that freedom is a constant departure from chance, and it turns out to be so because it is in fact "the interiorization, nullification, and subjectivation of chance, which, thus modified, passes into the arbitrariness of choice" [4].
The will, which has its basis in freedom, is a "deliberate decision" relating to specific goals. It does not create goals, but is a way of being in relation to the goal, and is therefore defined within the goals that one assumes in one's project. However, since the motive is An "objective understanding of the situation," which is defined in the project, that is, it is an evaluation of the situation itself and the location of the goals, so only when it takes place does choice
emerge. Choice and consciousness, as Sartre thinks, are one and
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National University of Uzbekistan
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DOI: 10.24412/2181-1385-2022-2-194-200
the same, my choice is constantly renewed.
For its part, the goal is "the temporalization of the projections of our freedom. Man chooses goals, thereby giving them existence as the "as the external boundary of his projects." This means that he defines his being by goals.
Thus, "our singular projects, relating to the realization in the world of the singular goal, are integrated into the global project that we are. But precisely because we are all choices and actions, these partial projects are not defined by a global project. They must be choices themselves, and, to a certain extent, randomness, unpredictability, and absurdity are left to each of them. Although each project, as it is projected, being a detailing of the global project in relation to the individual elements of the situation, is understood always with the integrity of my being in the world in mind" [5]. Since the detailing of the project depends on the contingency of the world, this "factual situation" imposes certain "boundaries" on my free choice of myself.
To summarize the above, freedom "reveals itself as a nonanalyzable whole; motives, motivating forces, and ends as well as the way of comprehending them are organized uniformly within this freedom and must be understood from it" [5].
"Being in the situation" characterizes For itself because "it is responsible for its way of being without being the basis of its being". According to Sartre, one exists among others, and by choosing to be in the way one is, one realizes one's existence "among" others. In doing so, by understanding himself as "surrounded" by what exists, one determines the goal, which is the choice of what "does not yet exist. Being in the situation is precisely this position "in the middle of the world," which will be determined by the attitude of "instrumentality or hostility of realities. In other words, one encounters dangers, obstacles or facilitation in one's factuality on the way to the goal, which, however, happens only from the perspective of the person who has freely set the goal.
The situation is the position one understands For the self and in which it finds itself. It is inseparable from the "elevation of the given to the goal. The situation is neither objective nor subjective. It is always mine and only mine, it reveals and emphasizes my factuality by the fact that I find myself ("am") here among things, and they simply exist ("are") here without the possibility of another existence. Having the meaning of the given, the situation reflects in man his freedom. "The situation," says Sartre, "is the whole subject (there is nothing else but the situation) as well as the 'thing' in its entirety (there is never anything else but things). It is the subject illuminating things by its exaltation, or, if you like, it is things sending their image to the subject. It is the integral
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facticity, the absolute contingency of the world, my birth, my place, my past, my surroundings, my loved ones; and it is my infinite freedom that creates for me the presence of facticity". The purpose in the situation unifies and explains all the available facts, assembling them into a coherence instead of a "disorderly nightmare.
The analysis of the ontological structure of the For-itself reveals not only the subject, but also makes it possible to understand what his relations with the Others will be based on and how they will be realized. These relations will therefore be formed on the basis of a constantly changing project of unattainable coincidence with oneself through the invention of one's own values, under conditions of total freedom and responsibility not only for oneself, but also for others in a certain situation of constant choice and changing goals. The attitude toward the Other in Sartre's philosophy is not something static and normative, but constantly changing depending on the structures discussed above. Because of this dynamism, the relation to the Other cannot be exhaustively revealed. The French philosopher leaves unexplained how freedom will be projected in the situation.
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