CC BY
12ANALYSIS OF CONSCIENCE AND OF DEBT IN PHILOSOPHY
Arsenyev Yu.,
Professor, Doctor Technical Science, RANEPA, of Tula Branch Davydova T.
PhD in Pedagogic Sciences, associate Professor, Tula State Pedagogical University
Abstract
The problems of ontological and anthropological analysis of conscience in the soul of a modern Russian, as a person and a worker, on the basis of philosophical and religious views of our great ancestors, philosophers, writers and religious scholars are investigated.
Keywords: conscience of a citizen and a person, ontology, anthropology, business, values, religion, philosophy, history, debt.
In modern conditions of severe manifestation of world challenges and threats, Russia needs to respond to them adequately and proportionately, taking into account its historical mission and purpose in all spheres of activity-politics, economy, business, entrepreneur-ship, culture, education, etc. In this regard, the problem of conscience and the best qualities of the human soul and society, forgotten by many Russians, rises in full growth.
In order to explore the problem of conscience for the history of Russian philosophy, let us turn to the spiritual heritage of Russian thinkers, historians, philosophers of the second half of the XIX century - the first half of the XX century. First of all, we study the works of N. Berdyaev, B. Vysheslavtsev, F.Dostoevsky, S. Zarin, I.Ilyin, S. Levitsky, N. Lossky, V. Solovyov, L. Tolstoy, E. Trubetskoy. Also of interest are the works of A. Bronzov, A.Valitsky, N. Glubokovsky, E.Popov, G. Florovsky, I.Yanyshev, researchers of theology [122].
Conscience is the ability of a person to critically evaluate his or her actions, thoughts and actions by realizing and experiencing his or her inconsistency with proper behavior. The contradiction of duty and inclination is assessed in the cognitive analysis of conscience, its connection with the subjective ideal, the values of the highest rank. In this case, duty acts as adherence to values (ideal), and the ideal - as adherence to duty. When these categories do not coincide, there is a variability of moral choice with a focus on decisions that are adequate to the ideal of good.
Dialectical analysis of the problem of conscience requires the division of the "subject of conscience" into a feeling subject directly experiencing conscience and a reflexive subject concerning the experience. It allows revealing sensual and rational components in conscience, correlation of cognitive and rational in it. In gnoseology, one understands: a) sensual cognition as the given objects of themselves as isolated ones; b) rational cognition as everything that is cleared of external sensuality, has a universal natural character. Conscience is not reducible to pure theoretical knowledge, so in the history of philosophy there are two main directions of its analysis: a) the value of conscience is not in the mind, but in the pain of the "heart" (Blessed Au-
gustine, B. Pascal, M. Schaehler, E. Hartmann, intu-itists, emotivists); b) rationalistic direction (R. Descartes, B. Spinoza, I. Kant, G.V.F. Hegel, etc.).
The study of the works of Russian religious philosophers, historians, thinkers in the context of interdependence of the qualities of conscience and faith, duty, ideal of perfection, necessity and freedom in human life has shown:
1. F.M. Dostoevsky understood faith not so much in metaphysical terms as in ethical terms. His statements are well known that if truth without Christ is possible, he would prefer Christ instead of such truth; if there is no God, then everything is allowed. He has God as the standard of universal moral principle, the unconditional moral basis of human conscience. Dostoevsky accepts Christian metaphysics as a necessary application to the unconditional nature of the moral experience that opens up to the Christian conscience. Therefore, he did not attach much importance to reason in moral problems. When there is a conflict between the heart and the intellect, a person makes a decision for both sides. But when the intellect condemns the soul because of this, it is better to follow not the principles and maxima of the intellect, but his moral sense, because "it is the most reliable indicator of morality of action. F.M. Dostoevsky analyzed conscience adequately to the traditions of ethical sensationalism, in which the mind is secondary and value neutral or darkened, distorted by "false wisdom" [3, 4].
2. V.S. Solovyov in his work "Justification of goodness" investigated conscience from the point of view of the correlation between the cognitive and the emotional, as a result of the development of shame inherent in people. By virtue of this feeling, the most wild and undeveloped person is ashamed (he admits that each physiological act, which not only satisfies his own attraction and needs, but is also useful and necessary for the continuation of the family). It is this fact that distinguishes people from animals, which is not accidental: a sense of shame - a sign of difference from the inferior nature. The shame of a man divides his nature into material and non-material, higher, and he tries to separate himself from the lower animal nature: "I am ashamed, therefore, of the existence, but also morally -I am ashamed of my animal, therefore, I still exist as a man". It is not by chance that Solovyov made this con-
clusion after the description of the fall of the first people, because at that moment there was a sense of shame [14].
V.S. Solovyov regarded the feeling of shame together with pity and reverence as the primary data of morality. He believed that the virtue of courage (bravery) to a certain extent is connected with shame (here the same principle of elevation over material nature), shame "elevates man over animal instinct - self-preservation of personal". However, shame and courage are different in content: courage also occurs in animals, so it can be assessed as a natural fact, not related to self-esteem. But the meaning of human courage is different: "Courage is recognized by man not as the prevalence of only predatory instinct, but as the ability of the spirit to rise above the instinct of personal self-preservation, and the presence of this power of the spirit is a virtue, and its absence is condemned as shameful. Therefore, virtues (shyness, bravery, courage) are interrelated, and the norms of shyness are the basis for assessing courage. The fact of interrelation of masculinity and shyness separates these virtues from others - mercy, justice, humility, piety. Shame and courage separate a man from an animal: "In a man this knowledge of good and evil is not only given directly in the distinctive for him sense of shame, but also from this fundamental basis, gradually expanding and refinement of its specific and sensual form, it passes in the form of conscience to the entire field of human ethics ... Shame and conscience speak different languages and on different occasions; but the meaning of what they say is the same: it is not good, it should not, it is not worthy.
His conscience clarifies the information about shame in a new way: conscience accuses the person who has committed the wrong thing, and the wrong thing itself - evil, sin, crime. V.S. Solovyov stresses: a) "the primary basis of conscience is a sense of shame"; b) "the state of excited conscience" (repentance) is completely different from the awareness of the error made (if the first is not utilitarian, the second is based on calculation) [14].
Therefore, not every self-judgment is an indicator of conscience (loss in cards is an indicator of "hardened unscrupulousness"). A person's self-judgment is subject to the criteria of shame or shamelessness. If it meets this criterion, then there is conscience in self-judgment, and V.S. Soloviev proves that shame and conscience are mutually related categories, related only to primary or natural morality, which has a special random character: "The universal norm is not given here as a fact, and the very voice of conscience, speaking more or less loudly and persistently, can (as a fact) oblige only to the extent that it is heard in every given case .... I am ashamed, therefore, to exist.
By analogy with the principle of the identity of thinking and existence discovered by R. Decartes, V.S. Solovyov believes that there is an identity of shame and existence, points to the rationalization of shame. Shame is not an indicator of a person's idealism, the feeling of his or her damage, shame is disharmonious, but without it moral life is impossible. Shame is the emotional evidence, "remorse" of conscience. The ability to feel is the primary basis of shame; without this ability shame
is impossible. For moral consciousness, it is fair: "I can feel shame, therefore, exist. But this imperative only emphasizes the potential possibility of shame in the moral consciousness of the subject, and not some actual stay in shame. According to V. Solovyov, existence is the ability to feel shame. He reduces moral consciousness to the ability to feel, i.e. to feelings. Moral reflexion is just a superstructure over the moral senses, which may not coincide with them. Shame is a precursor to conscience, and shame is a condition of a person's self-consciousness. And conscience, as a reasonable average measure of shame affect, is an immanent development of shame. A person's attitude towards his material nature, its lower side, is embedded in a sense of shame. The effect of shame directs a person's moral life to the value elevation, evolution of the value consciousness, deviation of his animal manifestations. In this aspect, the motives of Aristotle's philosophy are traced, who considered virtue as a conscious, rationally controlled soul. Although Aristotle did not include shame in the number of virtues, V.S. Soloviev saw in shame certain mechanisms of self-limitation, highlighting the proper and undue (lower, animal manifestation of the human soul). Self-rejection, self-reflection in a feeling of shame connects human consciousness with a feeling of pity, to conscience, which allows to transfer shame into rationally designed instructions for action [14].
E.N. Trubetskoy in his work "Mirosozertsanie" [19] criticizes V.S. Solovyov for the primacy of these morals. The words "shamefully" and "conscientiously" cannot be considered as identity: "Shame is all affect, feeling, whereas in conscience shame, as well as feeling in general, no more as accompanying, may or may not be; it is no more as a consequence and symptom, often mistaken by people for the root and basis of moral attitude. E.N. Trubetskoy defines conscience as follows: "Conscience is the self-determination of the mind, its judgment on human relations in general, regardless of what feelings are caused in us by these relations. The world reigns nonsense, based on emotional-surface perception of life. Addressing the mind itself requires a lot of courage and will to overcome everyday life. In this way a person comes to understanding of his own consciousness, i.e. to conscience. E.N. Trubetskoy etymo-logically identifies concepts - conscience and meaning, meaning and truth. "Truth is such content of consciousness, which possesses an unconditional reality regardless of anything psychological. The essence of conscience as a rationalized, meaningful consciousness does not change: "I do not start from vanity by one thought, but also by will, feeling, all my being. E.N. Trubetskoy is a supporter of ethical rationalism, identifying consciousness and conscience, understood as meaning (con-scientia). At the same time, the content of conscience is not deduced from its experience, it is experienced not only by reason, but also by will and feeling, remaining objectively rationalistic [19].
4. L.N. Tolstoy in his works analyzed conscience from the point of view of the problem of correlation between rational and sensual [1, 17, 18]. In his treatise "The circle of reading" he writes: "The greatest knowledge is the knowledge of oneself; those who do
not know oneself, do not know God. He reduces conscience to self-knowledge and even to self-consciousness: conscience is the consciousness of its spiritual beginning, it can and must lead people's lives, but for true leadership, it must have the character of a spiritual beginning (an analogue of a compass, one end of which indicates good and the other - the evil). The spiritual beginning in a person, showing him the path of good, there is a conscience, its basis - a careful "search" that is good, not what people are guided by in understanding the good. Conscience - independent inquisitiveness of the soul, a person should have a conscious attitude to conscience. Conscience, according to Tolstoy, is based on the logic of the mind, rational proof: "The fact that we recognize the dignity of the very title of "man" obliges us to respect the man and how he uses the logic in the use of his mind. L.N. Tolstoy many times connected "conscience" and "dignity of man" - that spiritual beginning, called either mind or conscience, which is the "ray of Deity" in man [17, 18].
5. I.A. Ilyin introduced the concept of "conscience act" into philosophy, justified his understanding of conscience, proceeding from the activity character, unity of activity and contemplation [7, 8]. According to Ilyin, the conscious act does not require conscious weighing of all the pros and cons, attempts to foresee the possible consequences of the act. It is carried out not rationally, but in the depths of irrational feeling. Theoretical constructions and rational generalizations do not contribute to the onset of a conscientious act, but only prevent it and often make it impossible: "The researcher, sitting in his ambush, accepts a more or less suitable and plausible answer instead of and as if on behalf of his conscience, and then he will accept this answer for his instructions and assure others that it was in fact so. As a result, the act of conscience will be substituted... a person will commit self-deception and in reality will not know anything". According to I.A. Ilyin, conscience gives only a "morally better way out of a given life situation" and not a general recipe of perfection, which is generalized by the intellect. Conscience is individual and specific in morality; there are no general rules and recipes in it. I.A. Ilyin singles out an important concept - "the gate between conscience and consciously acting being", which should always be open, and the means for this - continuous prayer, because conscience, according to Ilyin, is the inner power of God in us, but is revealed to us as our own being. In general, I. Ilyin defines conscience as a conscious act or a state of moral obviousness, where there are no "judgments, no sayings, no formulas" [7, 8].
6. N.O. Lossky distinguishes between "mental" and "spiritual" processes of human consciousness [10, 11]. Directly and intuitively moral values are perceived by conscience. At the same time, the individual consciousness and being are inherently included in the consciousness and existence of values. Absolute values are recognized directly, a priori, as something deserving of love and realization, which is the "main moment of conscience". In general, according to N.O. Lossky, conscience is the consciousness of a direct moral assessment, and in this sense is similar to the "sense of taste"
[10, 11]. Such an understanding of conscience is contrary to the interpretation of conscience by L.N. Tolstoy and is similar to F.M. Dostoyevsky.
7. N.A. Berdyaev believed that conscience is a remembrance of God and divine (holy) life in our earthly, sinful life, calling conscience an organ of perception of religious revelation of truth, goodness, and whole truth [2, 3, 5]. Conscience, according to Berdyaev, "is at the same time a remembrance of the higher world and a reminder of what a man is, why he was created, to what world he belongs. He believed that a free conscience in society can be subjected to the state, power, church institutions, family, class, class, class and thus distorted. The main motives of conscience are in the depths of the human spirit, not determined by the outside world of objectification, which is learned in a rationalistic way. Mind is not only not connected with the direct sensual intuition of conscience, but also prevents its correct understanding. The intellectual conscience, according to Berdyaev, is corrupted and cannot lead to virtue in any way. In this sense, Berdyaev contrasts his understanding of conscience with the shame of V.S. Solovyov. N.A. Berdyaev's conscience is a deeper initial feeling, which can be revealed only partially by a sense of shame, because shame opposes a high moral spirit. From this point of view, his teachings about fear and mystical horror, which are inevitable companions of each person, are significant. All assessments and actions, according to Berdyaev, committed under the influence of fear, can not have a moral significance, testify to the degree of spirituality of man. The importance of longing and mystical horror in life is that a person discovers the desire for higher peace and dissatisfaction with the ordinary. Mystical horror, according to Berdyaev, is a feeling that "selflessly, unutilitarian, unethical, does not mean fear and concern and fear of future suffering [2, 3, 5].
An analysis of the epistemology of conscience and asceticism in Orthodoxy was carried out, which showed: a) negative attitude to ascetic exercises (which he contrasts with a creative direct relation to God as a source of conscience). Not the "heart" is the goal of conscience development, but on the contrary, the "heart" is the source of God's direct revelation of conscience, a condition of moral transformation of conscience; b) the epistemology of conscience opposes rationalism and the philosophical views of L.N. Tolstoy and E.N. Trubetskoy. N.A. Berdyaev believed that conscience is not reason or meaning, it is only "negative truth". Repentance as a verbalized, conscious conscience is possible only thanks to mystical revelation of conscience about God in the creative, ecstatic state of human consciousness, which can not be caused by a natural, logical, calculated way: "Repentance of a torment of conscience is possible only because a person has an intact conscience" [2, 3].
Defining Conscience in the Subjective Debt Reflections. Conscience can be defined as the reflection of public duty in human consciousness. Duty can be considered as two dialectical opposites: a) categories of duties; b) categories of inclinations.
These notions essentially enrich the division of conscience teachings into sensualistic and rationalistic
components. Duty denotes the inner imperative, voluntary acceptance by a person of moral obligations to himself and other people, he is the closest and related to conscience, which is understood as a control mechanism of moral consciousness, in compliance with the requirements of moral duty approving, and in case of non-compliance - judging the person as such.
Let us analyze the interrelation of cognitive and emotional aspects of conscience and cognition of moral duty in Russian Orthodox ethics.
1. F.M. Dostoevsky analyzes conscience and duty in many of his works. Duty is analyzed from triple positions as: a) discursive motivation, including falsely understood duty; b) remembrance of natural moral law; c) comprehensive adoption of moral law not only by reason, but also by feeling and will. In the first case, duty opposes conscience, drowning it out with argumentation and discourse. In the second case, the understanding of conscience and duty is separated, but duty is perceived as a conscious act, listening to the voice of conscience. In the third case, duty is understood in unity with conscience both in substance and psychologically, listening to conscience and correcting it. Restriction of a person's nature, feelings and desires, based on a certain understanding of duty, may not improve his morality. This duty is internally imperative, because it is accepted by the moral consciousness of a person and is an external law for a person. F.M. Dostoevsky believes that conscience is a source of moral duty, and conscience can be understood as an innate natural feeling, having an individual specific character. Debt can also be perceived only as a personal duty adequate to conscience in form and content. It is perceived naturally by reason and is realized discursively, after which it can take the character of a willful imperative, an attitude to a certain character and sequence of actions, actions, and fulfillment of obligations. People are constantly looking for the highest authority, the moral commandments of which they identify with the internal moral law. Often people obey the accepted authority (in the person of another person or doctrinal, discursive), directed against the individual conscience, may not lead to a correct understanding of duty [3, 4].
2. V.S. Solovyov studied conscience in the context of reflections of public duty, when the primary data of morality (shame, pity, reverence) must inevitably pass to the principles that form the mind, despite the primary idea of the human being's welfare as an "absolute norm of life". Shame is an ascetic beginning in morality, associated with the subordination of the flesh to the spirit, which opposes the opposite aspiration "as a result of which the ascetic principle doubles: firstly, to protect spiritual life from the seizures of the flesh and, secondly, to conquer the area of flesh, to make animal life only a potency or matter of spirit. The real process is much more complex, includes three aspects: a) the internal self-differentiation of the spirit from the flesh; b) the actual defending of the spirit of its independence; c) the achieved predominance of the spirit over nature, or the abolition of the evil flesh as such [14].
V.S. Solovyov wrote: "Subordinate the flesh to the spirit as far as it is necessary for dignity and independence. With the ultimate, hoped-for goal of being the
nearest physical force of its own and general nature, it is imperative that you set a goal: not to be enslaved, at least, by the servant of a rebellious matter, or chaos. Therefore, ascetic attitude should be not only to the manifestations of the body, but, above all, to certain spiritual states, which are associated with this and are understood as sinful affects (sweetness, intoxication, voluptuousness can turn into anger, envy, self-interest-edness). These other passions - evil, not only shameful - are subject to judgment not by ascetic, but by altruistic morality. An ascetic devoid of altruism can be characterized by evil traits, which is much worse than the shameful qualities (a simple-hearted drunkard is higher than the moral ascetic filled with pride of hypocrisy, vanity). Therefore, the requirement of shame in asceticism should be balanced by the requirement of pity.
Shame is a source of moral imperatives, pointing to specific vices to be fought. Conscience is the awareness of the normality that shame carries, raising it from the unconscious to a discursively cognizable level. Here, the idea of duty is meaningfully transformed into action. The "purity of good" in Solovyov's ethics presupposes the definition of moral dignity of a deed not as a propensity, but as an exclusive duty. Propensity, consistent with duty, does not affect the purity of the moral motive, strengthens its moral virtues [14].
E.N. Trubetskoy defines conscience as a true consciousness of good, which is an unconditional duty separating a person from the lowest feelings common with animals [19]. A person's mind is a source of morality and therefore can be imputed as an imperative. Everyone from birth has an a priori particle of this mind, which he must and should be. Realizing the innate nature of the mind, a person comes to conscience and morality. Reason is secondary to conscience and morality, which are interpreted as identical elements. Voluntary acceptance and formation of this mind within a person is an absolute duty, the source of all morality, because it is to comprehend the transcendental meaning of life, opposing the world empirical meaninglessness. Such understanding of conscience and duty is similar to that of Socrates, Plato, Stoics, I. Kant. Rationally understood duty opposes and opposes sensual tendencies. From this point of view, E.N. Trubetskoy's criticism of V. Solovyov's ethics and his understanding of conscience and duty is clear [19].
4. The position of L.N. Tolstoy is in many respects close to the analysis of conscience and duty in the philosophy of E.N. Trubetskoy. It is the duty of man to listen to the individual mind, which in its true manifestations is identical to the universal, the source of all morality. Duty, according to L.N. Tolstoy, opposes the propensity, which is a consequence of irrationality, when a person pays attention to his animal passions, follows established customs and authorities. The criterion of true conscience is personal conviction and willingness to sacrifice, renunciation. It can also be a source of responsibility [17, 18].
5. I.A. Ilyin assesses the consciousness of duty as a less valuable state of morality than a conscientious act [7, 8]. Duty for him is some "remnant of the call of conscience", and the act of conscience is a kind of mystical unity of mind and affect, duty and inclination. A man is
not divided at this moment, he is holistic, so he does not reflect, he can act only in a certain way - only according to the moral law, because the "higher law" coincided with the desires of his heart. In the conscious act, according to I.A. Ilyin, "duty and love coincide; love grows out of affect and is combined with the rationally understood obligation of deed; the rationally understood duty is strengthened by the sympathetic and promoting affect of love. In order for the "conscience to succeed, it is necessary to have a rather long internal asceticism, i.e. the concentration of the affect "by means of its accumulation, concentration, and burnout". This process takes place unconsciously for a long time in the presence of a conscious will to do justice to it - a rational understanding of duty precedes the accumulation of "affective charge", which forms a sympathetic propensity, which appears as a result of self-education, the long-term work of man on himself; active compassion for others. At this moment, the human being receives the sacred right to act, because he became one with the divine power, at this moment the human act can only be a victim, not an obligation, and a victim of compassion. Man's consciousness at this moment is not fragmented into a duty; the duty has dissolved in good will. An "act of conscience" is understood as the highest moral level for a person [7, 8].
A person can feel the sense of duty only when the duty is unpleasant to him, when the propensity to resist the duty. The human mind understands the need to accept the imperative of duty and makes a willful effort in relation to the sensual sphere, overcoming the affect that counteracts it. Here, according to Ilyin, only an internal split is possible, because the duty performed despite the propensity means a guilty conscience. Unlike I. Kant, I.A. Ilyin here does not trace the motive of a person's inner dignity, but he offers a psychological mechanism to overcome this situation: it is necessary not to counteract this conscience brunt, but to take it into account "to the end". At the same time, a conscious act cannot fail to appear, because will will begin to heal - an act according to the brunt of conscience returns "freedom, rest, integrity and balance of the suffering soul" ... But then the duty will sink in the elements of conscience; and if it appears, it is no longer as a "cursed", but as desired and gracious.
Speaking about the distortions of the conscious act, I.A. Ilyin notes its intellectualization [7, 8]. This is a mistake of waiting for judgment from conscience in the form of a sentence. The consequence of this may be a wrong understanding of duty. Loss of the conscious act, undoubtedly, according to Ilyin, will lead to distortion of the sense of duty. There will be degradation of professionalism, labor activity will cause dislike and disgust. This will lead to the loss of shame and responsibility. Conscience induces a sense of duty to counteract the motives of self-interest and serve the interests of the cause. The task of a Christian is to learn to properly experience the act of conscience, to form it with his feelings and thoughts, thus overcoming the burden of duty and discipline.
Interpreting the conscience and duty in the ethics of L.N. Tolstoy, I.A. Ilyin notes in it two opposite trends: a) Ilyin's personal position is in line with his
teachings about the act of conscience, which is evidence of Tolstoy's personal lightness; b) Tolstoy was not holistic in his act of conscience, as much preached and denounced, "acted as a prophet and public denouncer. Imperiality, in which Tolstoy's thoughts were denounced, was too universal, universal in nature, which was an excessive intellectualization of the conscious act, the distortion of the mind in relation to affect, so it was not holistic, not harmonious in its conscious act. And since the experience of conscience, according to I.A. Ilyin, is a criterion of correct understanding of the Divine will, L.N. Tolstoy could not know this will [17, 18].
6. N.A. Berdyaev analyzes conscience and duty in the aspect of the categories "moral law", "creativity", "freedom", believing that a person should not bind himself with any normality cognizable from outside through the involvement of a person in real practice [2, 3]. Such a falsely understood duty leads to distortions of conscience, and the conscience of a believer can be subjected to violence from the church public opinion. On the other hand, the church can be understood as a spiritual soberness, helping a person to appear before God directly, intuitively, mystically. This problem is solved by N.A. Berdyaev through the "principle of creative ethics", the correlation of free conscience and sociality. He writes: "Your conscience should never be determined by sociality, social groups, the opinion of society, it should be determined from the depths of spirit, i.e. be free, be standing before God, but you should be a social being, from the spiritual freedom to determine your attitude to society, social issues. We should go from spirituality as the primary one, in sociality, and not from sociality as the secondary one, to spirituality. Conscience is distorted by the social environment, not determined by it. And, perhaps, conscience is most distorted by economic dependence.
Another distortion of conscience N.A. Berdyaev considers fanaticism, which is a rebirth under the influence of initially good motives of human consciousness, which eventually turned into an obsession: "Fanaticism is a certain insanity caused by the inability to accommodate the fullness of truth. Christianity, according to Berdyaev, also did not avoid fanaticism. Covering themselves with the good idea of duty and accepting it consciously, such people implement in their actions subconscious cruel instincts, so the correct idea of duty is formulated on the basis of the principle of tolerance, and the duty of man - to overcome the legal understanding of duty. According to Berdyaev, the feeling of the immediate Revelation of God, as an essential characteristic of conscience, forms certain moral imperatives: the preservation of individual freedom, creative overcoming of everyday sociality, which can be covered by the ethics of the Law. The idea of duty, as well as conscience, cannot but be individual, subjective: it is perceived as "my duty", "my conscience", so any discursive ideas about duty and conscience, their attitude will be inaccurate and approximate; they are based on thinking as an objective tool of human communication. Therefore, reason cannot but understand the duty as universal, objectivized, and this, according to Ber-dyaev, leads to a distortion of the essence of duty and
conscience in the phenomena of fanaticism, ecclesiastical orthodoxy, indiscriminate struggle against heresies [2, 3, 5].
In general, Russian philosophers analyze conscience in the context of gnoseology of Good. The knowledge of duty depends on the knowledge of the moral ideal and is not always carried out by the intellect. The perfection of conscience in relation to the ideal is comprehended through the sublimation of the emotional propensity of a person. Couples of categories in the analysis of conscience (mind - feeling, duty - inclination) are connected with the problems of consciousness, self-consciousness and cognition.
In the historical-philosophical tradition the analysis of conscience is made on the basis of: a) approximation to the moral ideal; b) the ideal in its basis. This happens because conscience is defined as the ability to critically evaluate one's own deeds, desires and thoughts, to experience imperfections, and to strive for an ideal. At the same time, two approaches to determining the normative status of the ideal in the history of philosophy are possible: a) the ideal is understood as the supreme good and defines the moral duty; b) the moral ideal is secondary to the duty that defines the ideal.
References
1. Asmus V.F. Tolstoy's Worldview. Elected Philos. Trudy. T. 1. M., 1969.
2. Berdyaev N.A. About the appointment of a person. Moscow: Republic, 1993.
3. Berdyaev N.A. On the appointment of a person. Moscow: Republic, 1993.
4. Dostoevsky F.M. Notes from the underground. Complete SOBR. Op. V 30 t. T. 5. L., 1972-1990.
5. Ermichev A.A. Three freedoms of Nikolai Berdyaev. Moscow, 1990.
6. Florovsky G.V. Ways of Russian theology. Vilnius: Viltis, 1991.
7. Ilyin I.A. Path of spiritual renewal / I.A. Ilyin op. in 2 vols. 2. Religious philosophy. Moscow: Medium, 1994.
8. Ilyin I.A. Axioms of religious experience. In 2 T. M.: Papor, 1993.
9. Levitsky S.A. Essays on the history of Russian philosophy. Op. In 2 vols.1. Moscow, 1996.
10. Lossky N.O. History of Russian philosophy. Moscow: Soviet writer, 1991.
11. Lossky N.O. Conditions of absolute good. Fundamentals of ethics. Moscow: Republic, 1991.
12. National readings on Orthodox and moral theology ... in 2 hours Archpriest Evg. Popov. Saint Petersburg: Izd-e Knigorod. I.L. Tuzova, 1901. 1087 p. (repr.).
13. Sarin S.M. Asceticism according to Orthodox Christian doctrine. Moscow: Pilgrim, 1996.
14. Solovyov V.S. The Justification of the good. Moral philosophy. In 2 T. M.: Thought, 1988.
15. Stelletsky N.S. With. The experience of moral Orthodox theology in an apologetic light. In 3 vols. Kharkiv, 1914.
16. The Orthodox Christian doctrine of morality. From lectures on moral theology given ... Protopresbyter Yanyshev I.L. St. Petersburg, 1906.
17. Tolstoy L.N. Circle of reading. Vol. 1, part 2. Moscow: Our heritage, 1991.
18. Tolstoy L.N. The End of the century. Complete SOBR. Op. V 90 t. M.-L.: Fiction. 1958.
19. Trubetskoy E.N. The Meaning of life. Anthology. Issue II. Moscow: Progress, 1994.
20. Vysheslavtsev B.P. The Eternal in Russian philosophy //Ethics of the transfigured Eros, Moscow: Respublika, 1994.
21. Thomas K. Age and authority in early modern England // Proceeding of the British Acadamy. 1976. Vol. 62. Pp. 297-309.
22. Itzin C. As old as you feel // Don"t Feel Old: Understanding the Experience of Later Life / Ed. P. Thompson, C. Itzin, M. Abendstern. L., 1999. Pp. 107136.
ФОРМИ ТА НАПРЯМИ eyenrnbHOÏ РЕЛIГIЙНОÏ КОМУН1КАЦП ЯК ОСНОВА РОЗВИТКУ
РЕЛ1Г1ЙНОГО ТУРИЗМУ
Зацетна Н. О.
кандидат педагоггчних наук, доцент, доцент кафедри туристичного, готельного та ресторанного бгзнесу, Нацюнальний унгверситет «Запоргзька полтехнжа»
FORMS AND DIRECTIONS OF PUBLIC RELIGIOUS COMMUNICATION AS A BASIS FOR THE
DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGIOUS TOURISM
Zatsepina N.
Zaporizhia, National University «Zaporizhia Polytechnic»
Анотащя
В статп розглянуто основш форми та напрями суспшьно1 релтйно1 комушкацп. Визначено, що туризм, як воображения проекту майбутнього розвитку суспшьства, вщграе головну роль у формуванш культурних, релшйних та щеолопчних комушкацш, тому що з практикою туризму змшюеться свггогляд, порушуються небажаш стереотипи, формуються важливi принципи, так як толерантшсть, ввдкрипсть, ствпричетшсть щодо загальних культурних та релшйних цшностей. Також за статистичними даними визначено, що шльшсть релшйних мас-медiа в Украш зростае, особливо електронних, що сввдчить про те,
