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20раздел 1 сравнительный опыт экономического развития
УДК 94(480)
ББК Т3(4Фин)
Reino Hjerppe
AN ESCAPE FROM A RESOURCE CURSE: The Development of Property Rights in Finland
Key-words: resource curse, forests ownership, property rights, economic and industrial
linkages.
райно Хьерппе
избавление от ресурсного проклятия: развитие прав собственности в Финляндии
Ключевые слова: ресурсное проклятие, лесные ресурсы, право собственности, экономические и промышленные связи
Introduction
The relationship between natural resources and economic growth has been widely discussed in economics and economic history. It has been found that resource rich economies have at least sometimes grown less than resource poor economies. (Richard M. Auty (1993, 2001) and Thorvaldur Gylfason (2001)). This phenomenon has been called a resource curse.
Most of the literature of resource curse deals with minerals, oil or natural gas. Less attention has been paid to forests. However, forests are also a natural resource and we can see that many countries with abundant forest resources belong to the less developed world. Accordingly, we can study forest rich economies also in the light of the resource curse hypothesis. Deforestation is a common phenomenon in tropics today and it is a prime example connected to the natural resource curse in forests. Ill-defined or unclear property rights lead also easily to conflicts in the use of forests.
Nordic countries (Sweden, Norway and Finland) can be seen as natural resource rich economies. Two thirds of land of Finland is covered with forests. In Finland forests are even a relatively more important resource than in Sweden which has also considerable mineral
resources, and Norway which has nowadays abundant oil reserves.
In the 1860s Finland’s Gross Domestic Product per capita was about 60 per cent below the western European average. However, over the last 150 years her growth has been 2.9% per year and GDP per capita 2.1% per year, one of the fastest in the world. On the basis of these figures it appears that the resource curse was avoided in Finland. The experience of the other Nordic countries is not much different.
We can of course interpret the Finnish growth experience according to the neoclassical growth models. The acquisition of knowledge was obviously a necessary condition for development. This was connected to high capital formation with technological progress. My main argument is, however, that a crucial institutional historical factor, which initially led the country to a path which avoided the resource curse, was the longterm development of ownership structure of land and forests. The ownership was spread widely amongst the independent and relatively small farmers. This was confirmed in the so called Great Land Reform which started in 1757 and was practically completed around 1900. There was never serfdom or high concentration of land
ownership, which is typical for many plantation economies. With rising exports of forest products and rising productivity in agriculture in the 19th century, household incomes started to rise and support further industrialisation and production of consumer goods.
In our earlier paper we (Hjerppe and Hjerppe, 2010) concentrated very much on the long term growth and structural change in the Finnish economy. The focus in this paper is more on the question how the ownership rights to land were developed in the long term in Finland. Our argument accords very much with the original work of Douglass North and Robert Paul Thomas on the role of property rights in the rise of western world (North and Thomas, 1973) and also with North’s later emphasis on the importance of institutions (North, 1990).
Especially interesting is the question how Finland took a path towards small-scale private ownership of forests. This is interesting because private ownership of forests is less common in the world of today than common or state ownership. Finland’s experience differs e.g. very much from the development in tropics and tropical forests as recently demonstrated in a thorough study by Matti Palo and Erkki Lehto (2012). About 90 % of the tropical forests are in public ownership (Palo and Lehto, 2012).
At the beginning of the paper I review some of the key aspects of the resource curse literature. Then the long-term development path of Finnish land ownership is described. I also will try to explain why the realized path was chosen. The heritage of legalistic governance from the medieval Sweden has also to be mentioned in this connection. At the end - before concluding -main features of the development backward and forward linkages from forestry to other sectors of the economy are briefly considered.
Explanations for failure of resource rich economies
Resource curse
The idea that natural resources might be more an economic curse than a blessing began to emerge in the 1980s. The thesis of resource curse was first used by Richard Auty (1993) to describe how countries rich in natural resources
were unable to use that wealth to boost their economies and how, counter-intuitively, these countries had lower economic growth than countries with less abundant natural resources. For example Auty shows that from 1960 to 1990 Gross National Product per capita annual growth was 0.8% in small hard mineral exporting countries and 1.7% oil-exporting countries, while the growth in resource poor large countries was 3.5% and in small resource poor countries 2.5%. In all countries the per capita growth was 1.6%. According to Auty the fact that resource-deficient countries have outperformed the resource-rich ones appears to be a robust finding. Sachs and Warner (1995) reach similar conclusions.
According to Thorvaldur Gylfason reasons for failure in resource rich economies are due to four factors: the Dutch disease, rent seeking, overconfidence and neglect of education (Gylfason, 2001). Here rent seeking means that producers of the natural resource seek and get favourable treatment from the government in the form of tariffs, subsidies or other privileges.
Auty also argues that it appears that it is less the production function of tropical staples or resources and more the sociopolitical system and type of the government, which determines the level of primary product exports. Harmful government policies include various interventions to control trade, prices and capital allocation. Oligarchies may have a powerful position in politics and corruption may increase the misallocation of resources. Since political states may in principle be benevolent or predatory dictatorships, democratic or oligopolistic/oligarchic, an important question is, how different states end up into these situations and how different forms of governance affect the performance of the national economy. Bad institutions and policies are now a widely held explanation for poor performance.
The Dutch disease
The concept of the Dutch disease has close connection to the resource curse literature. The concept is used to explain the apparent relationship between the increase in exploitation of natural resources and a decline
in the manufacturing industry. According to this hypothesis, an increase in revenues from natural resources will make a nation's currency stronger compared to that of other nations. This leads to the rise of the exchange rate. This will make the nation's other exports more expensive and, accordingly, leads the economy too much concentrated to the exports of the basic resource and to an internationally less competitive manufacturing industry.
The term was coined in 1977 by The Economist to describe the decline of manufacturing industry in the Netherlands after the discovery of a large natural gas field in 1959. A thorough analysis of Dutch disease can be found e. g. in Corden and Neary (1982) and Corden (1984). Gylfason (2001) presents evidence that the Dutch disease is connected with the natural resource curse.
However, it is not uniquely evident that natural resource exploitation is the primary or sole cause of overvalued currency. There may be other reasons for overvaluation. Domestic inflation obviously is one reason. Any development that results in a large inflow of foreign currency, like large inflow of foreign assistance to a developing country and/or a large inflow of foreign direct investment into a country may be behind the overvaluation. According to Raul Prebisch (1964) terms of trade of primary products deteriorates with respect to manufactured goods, the reason being low elasticity of demand and increasing use of synthetic materials to substitute for primary goods. Another argument has been fluctuations in the prices of primary goods. Australia is one example of a country where these kinds of fluctuations happen.
Conditions for the successful development of the resource rich economy
Theory of economic linkages
Albert Hirschman (1958) argues that resource industries have weak linkages to other industries. Resource industries may form an enclave, producing high incomes to resource owners (either foreign or domestic) but have a small multiplier effect on the rest of the economy. Income distribution tends to be quite skew. This
is a case also when agriculture mainly consists of large plantations (Baldwin, 1956). Palo and Lehto refer to the work by Jack Westoby (1962) concerning forestry and using the Hirscmannian theory of economic linkages. According to Westoby forest industries have higher than average forward and backward employment and income linkages into other sectors.
Dieter Senghaas (1985) describes reasons why some small resource rich countries have been able to avoid becoming peripheries in global development while some other countries have not. Senghaas uses examples of successful countries Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Norway. Unsuccessful examples are for example Uruguay, Ireland and some Eastern European countries.
Senghaas’s theory is in accordance with Hirschman’s theory of development, where both backward and forward linkages from natural resources are important. Senghaas adds to these the necessity to raise the productivity in agriculture and socio-political explanations. For him initial conditions in these have been important in explaining what kind of a development path the economy takes.
The weakness in the theory of economic linkages is that it may neglect the institutional basic structure of the economy. Linkages are important, but they become operational only if institutional preconditions are right. Senghaas emphasises the crucial role of export demand for Nordic countries including Finland, but he also makes explicit reference to the need of appropriate institutional conditions.
The Finnish model
On the basis on literature I can sketch a model for successful development for a resource dependent economy. In a small forest rich economy like Finland, there is not enough demand for the resource on the domestic market. Accordingly, the first condition for the development is exports based on the natural resource. At early stages of history forests supplied animals for furs, boards for ships and tar. In the first stages of industrialisation forests provided exports of little processed timber.
For exports transport infrastructure is needed. Lack of infrastructure can prevent even rich resources to be exported. Usually central or local public investments are involved to build the infrastructure. In addition other supporting measures of government often play a role here.
A country can benefit further from a natural resource basically in two ways. First, it can start to process further the natural resource in order to increase its value added. Processing needs both knowledge and processing equipment. At the beginning machines for processing usually have to be imported. However, an exporting country can start to acquire both the knowledge and can start to build the equipment itself. This will substitute machinery imports. Important linkages are built towards the investment goods producing industries.
On the other hand, exporting country can start to develop new products from the natural resource. In the case of wood, this would mean for example a move from sawn timber to plane boards, plywood, bobbins, matches or pulp and paper. This is what actually happened in Finland at the end of the 19th and the early 20th century. This path has been called a development of forward linkages.
Private ownership of forest - often on small size plots - started to spread export incomes widely to the society. Rising incomes led to the development of consumption goods industries. Consequently, building of the backward and forward linkages went hand in hand. These new stages of development expanded industrial and other production; they created more value added thus creating rising factor incomes. Capital incomes or profits were used for saving and investment purposes, whereas most of the labour income was normally consumed. But in both ways the use of increased income expanded markets both for investment and consumption goods.
Starting from sawn timber and basic pulp production in the 19th century Finland has gradually specialised to an exporter of high quality papers having currently a share of 10 to 17 percent in world exports. Also a complete cluster of forest industry has been created
around sawn goods and paper making: it includes production of machinery for harvesting and transporting trees and automated sawmills, production of chemical products as well as pulp and paper machines, where Finnish exporters also have a high share in the world. The logistics of exports have also offered ways to specialise, the most recent being the machinery for the handling of cargoes in the harbours.
Accordingly we may be interested how the country ended up to this situation in the 19th century when the industrialisation of forest products started. To this question I will turn next.
The historical development of land ownership in Finland
Traces of human settlements have been found in Finland already around 8500 BC, in spite of the fact that part of the country was still under the ice (Huurre, 2003). Hunting and gathering population moved to the area. Population remained probably quite small and the first settlers might have been pushed to the north by expanding agricultural population in the Western Europe (this kind of process is explained in North and Thomas (1973)).
There are traces of agriculture since 2000 BC and some speculation whether agriculture started already around 4000 BC when the climate was clearly warmer than today.
Early exports were based on furs. Furs were of good quality in Finland. It has been recognised that only Canadians and Russians could compete with Finnish furs in quality. The reason for this was cold winter. In Finland hunting was organised by individual farmers and peasants. It has been argued that this was a unique tradition perhaps in the whole world (Palo and Lehto, 2012, p 62.). In Canada - where the big hunting boom occurred as late as during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries-hunting was organised by business companies like Hudson Bay Company. The aboriginal Indians were the main suppliers of furs.
For hunting the land in Finland remained primarily as commons, but the firstcomer could also make a capture. On this basis the trap path was considered private property. In a similar way, whoever first came to certain fishing
grounds had the privilege of fishing there. Hunting of big animals (like bear) and some fishing were also organised by a larger group of people, so people had to learn to work together and develop commonly accepted rules for this. These rules concerned both the organisation of the teamwork and distribution of the catch. These nonwritten rules, which were regionally different, formed the basis for later common law.
During the 12th century Finland became a part of Sweden. While in most countries in Europe and in Sweden proper the king and the nobles had many privileges in hunting, such orders did not prevail in Finland. Individual hunters and peasants remained holders of hunting rights. Some formal restrictions for hunting were later raised but in practice hunting remained more or less free (Palo and Lehto, 2012, p. 65-65). Swedish kings, however, started written and unified lawmaking.
During the 16th century because of the expansion of international maritime transportation the building of ships and vessels started to become more important even in Finland. But especially important for Finland was production of tar from wood. Tar was used for ships. It was exported to the Western and even Southern Europe and Finland actually became one of the most important suppliers of tar during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Tar was produced both on private lands but also on common forests.
Agriculture was initially largely based on slash and burn technique, which is one form of shifting cultivation. Slash and burn was important still through the 19th century and prevailed to some extent even to the 20th century. Permanent cultivation was also practiced already in the early Middle Ages, but it is not exactly known, what its relative significance was compared to shifting cultivation.
An early way to acquire agricultural land was also based on seizure or reclamation of land for cultivation (capture). This was possible because there was plenty of unoccupied land available. When population increased, individual peasants formed villages. The land for cultivation in the village was divided into small strips and
pieces of land, which were distributed to different peasants in order to achieve equitable distribution of different types of land for each farmer. It has been estimated that at the end of Middle Ages 95 % of all farms in Finland were owned by independent farmers and peasants. (Palo and Lehto, 2012).
As to the ownership rights of land, the first were based on oral tradition before the written laws. Regional rules of ownership were developed, based on convention. The conflicts of land and forest uses were solved at provincial gatherings, called provincial tings. In 1347 Swedish King Magnus Eriksson introduced first written rules concerning common forests in villages and illegal uses of forests. In 1442 King Kristopher started the ownership of state forests, legislated on control of hunting and protection of forests products. But important change happened only in the year 1542 when the Swedish King Gustavo Vasa announced that all the land outside villages - the so called wilderness - belonged to the state. This was the start of the formal state ownership of land in Finland. The law was strengthened in 1683 by King Karl XI by specifying that the state had full property rights to forests that could not be proved to belong to anybody else.
According to historians the Finnish situation during the Middle Ages, that majority of cultivated land was private property, was quite exceptional in Europe and even compared to the other Nordic countries.
Over the next two hundred years the share of independent farmers declined, when the nobles achieved more political and economic power. This was due to numerous wars carried out by the Swedish kings. The king established manors on state lands or sometimes to lands taken from peasants-in the case they were not able to pay taxes-mainly in order to provide supplies and men to the army. Manors which provided a man and a horse to the army gained freedom from taxation. They were called ralssi, and formed a basis of nobility. Some feudalistic features appeared in the eighteenth century, following the pattern of European feudalism. Peasants had to work on these manors - this was in fact a labour
tax. Manors also had some service personnel. The number of manors in the whole country remained, however, limited, and nobility’s share of land ownership was only few percentages. Accordingly, in spite of these developments, independent farmers remained more important in Finland than in Europe in general. Finland never adopted a really extensive feudal system.
From 16th to 18th centuries many farms also fell into state ownership because of neglected land tax payments. This, in fact, did not mean significant changes in the position of most farmers, not even many of those who neglected the tax payments. The statute of Act of Unification and Security (Forenings-och sakerhetsakten) of 1792 of King Gustavo III of Sweden guaranteed the farmers freedom from evictions from the farms, which had fallen into government ownership, and also a possibility to buy the lands back to their ownership.
A key legal act concerning the development of property rights to land was the Great Land Reform. It started in 1757 and was practically completed in 1900. Then practically every piece of land in Finland had an owner. The ownership rights are recorded in a central land register, which nowadays is fully computerized and contains all important information concerning property rights to land. Similar registers exist in all Nordic countries. A major feature of this reform was the establishment of clear borders between private and state ownership of land. In private land an important aspect of the Great Land Reform was also the creation of unified fields for farmers. Earlier private farmland was split in small separate fields which from the productivity point of view was inefficient. Unified fields facilitated improvement of productivity in agriculture.
Finland was a part of Sweden since the 12th century. When Finland became an autonomous Grand Duchy of the Russian empire in 1809 the legal system remained on the earlier Swedish foundation. During the autonomic period 1809 - 1917 under the tsar Finland was able to develop her own legislation. Russian legislation was actually never adopted. Commercial law was from the 18th century, and
in the second half of the 19th century liberalised economic legislation was introduced. Respect of law and order remained high. This reflects a high level of social capital. These institutional features can also be seen as important preconditions for favourable economic development - an aspect emphasized by modern theories in economic history.
Problems of the commons
Because of sparse population common lands could provide sustainable subsistence for quite a long time. But in the course of time overuse of common lands created, however, even in the Finnish circumstances, serious problems. Many animals were hunted close to extinction. Examples in history are reindeer, sable, moose, bear, and wolf. Reindeer has now had a revival because it has become an important domestic animal. Moose has also experienced a strong revival during recent decades, and is still even nowadays quite an important hunting target. Extensive tar production threatened the forests on the western coast during the 18th and 19th centuries. The slash and burn agriculture became a serious threat to sustainable forestry during the 19th century. With strong legislation forests resources have now recovered and the growth of wood clearly exceeds its use today. Hunting is strictly regulated by timing and quantities. These revivals would not have been possible without strong central legislation and the Great Land Reform, which defined the property rights. Obviously, the rise of the value of timber, because of increased demand in the 19th century has had an effect, too.
These problems of commons can be compared to the situation in tropics today: Vast majority, probably 85-90 per cent of forests are commonly owned. What happened in Finland in the past in common land is now happening in tropics: people over utilize this common property for their survival. Common ownership, even in Finland, tended to lead to overhunting, overfishing and deforestation.
Why the peasant did prevailed independent?
Factors which made possible for Finland to proceed to a sustainable path were the following. First the population was small compared to the
land area. For a long time common land could be freely utilized for hunting, fishing, gathering, and tar production and slash and burn agriculture. For example in slash and burn agriculture the burnt fields could revive naturally in about 30 years. With abundant available land, this kind of slow circulation was possible: people could leave the burnt fields for long enough time for revival. In this way even the slash and burn cultivation could be sustainable.
But sparse - and relatively equal - population also helped to create private ownership rights. As was mentioned above even trap paths became to be considered as private properties according to the customs based on capture. By capture private ownership by small farmers and peasants became also a dominant form. The Swedish kings even encouraged the spread of inhabitation to the previously unoccupied lands. While kings also granted tax freedom for those big land owners who could provide a horseman to the army, the number of large manors and nobility practicing feudalism, remained, however, quite small.
The Great Land Reform confirmed the property rights of individual farmers. But it was also a key thing on a path to sustainable forestry. During the 18th century a belief, that private owners would be the best to take care of their forests, became dominant political view. In 1900 practically all land had found an owner, 50 % of land was private, 40 % belonged to the state and the remaining 10 % belonged to companies.
When in the 19th century exports of sawn timber started to grow fast, the newly established forest industry companies realised the future value of forests as raw material suppliers and started to buy them. Similar development had started somewhat earlier in Sweden where companies were prevented from buying forests with restricting legislation in the early 20th century. A similar restrictive law was decreed in Finland in 1915. This legislation has had a significant effect on the distribution of forest ownership. Only less than 10 percent are in the hands of companies.
In this context one has to consider also the fact that during the 18th and 19th century - partly as a result of population growth - a considerable
landless population emerged in the countryside, many of them becoming tenant farmers on the backwoods of the land-owning peasants. They paid their rents mainly by working for the owner. Even larger number of landless, however, became just farm labourers owning a small cottage but no agricultural land (called cottagers) or acted as independent servants and farm workers. This was due to restrictions to divide existing farms into smaller plots and idle land for new capture was coming to an end. The division restrictions were gradually abolished since the end of the 19th century. Tenant farmers were granted a right to buy the land they had cleared and farmed at relatively favourable terms. This led to a distribution of farm land in relatively small plots. Many of them were too small to support a family relying only on agricultural production and, accordingly, required outside incomes. Many of these small farmers had to work in forests as loggers.
One of the key features on a path to sustainable forestry was also the creation of the state central forest administration during the 19th century. It was formed to control the state forests, to separate state forests from the private forests and also introduced some control of private forestry. The establishment of this administration was not, however, obvious. Central state administration and control of state forests was politically strongly resisted. In a way there was an ideological “forest war” concerning the establishment of the state central state administration. When administration was finally established it remained still very weak in the middle of the century. It had to start from quite a narrow knowledge base. Much of the knowledge base for the administration came from foreign countries mainly from Germany but also to some extent from Russia. The first Finnish Forestry College was established only 1858. But for the future the most important thing was that in the administration was noncorrupt. There are plenty of examples of state administrations in the world today which fail in this (Palo and Lehto, 2012).
Development of economic linkages
When forests started to have increased selling value in the middle of the 19th century the
advantages of the independent peasant ownership became visible. The incomes from timber selling spread widely into the society and also contributed to raise productivity in agriculture.
Increasing export incomes were distributed widely into the economy both because of the ownership structure and because of the incomes from logging. This supported the rise of consumption above the subsistence minimum and was a basis for the expansion of domestic manufacturing, when rising money incomes were partly spent on goods produced by emerging consumption goods industries.
While many natural resource rich countries remain as primary producers, Finland, however, was able to diversify her economy in several directions. Wide ownership of forests played probably also important role why forest industry started to develop its processes and products on the basis of increasing application of foreign know-how for industrialisation. Different companies had to compete for the raw material which led to innovations. If forest ownership had been monopolized to a narrow enclave, it is possible that owners could have been satisfied to the export income from raw materials and the diversification process could have been slower.
First sawmill industry became one of the growth engines of Finland's 19th century early industrialisation, and it reached its highest share, about one fifth of industrial value added between the 1880s and the early 20th century In 2007 the share of sawmill and other wood industry was 4,2 percent in all manufacturing.
Wood based paper industry started its fast growth in the 1870s. It has since been the fastest growing industry in Finland, with an annual average growth of 7 percent in 1870-2010. In spite of this, its share in all manufacturing industry was only 10 percent in 2007.
In production and exports the paper and pulp industry bypassed sawmill and other wood industry in the 1930s and it has had a higher share since.
Processing advances went hand in hand with product development. Companies started to develop also machinery, which they needed in their production processes. Most of the technical
knowledge and know how had to be imported. Finnish companies were able also to acquire the necessary new knowledge and knowhow for management of firms for modern industrial development - things which were in very scarce supply in a small peripheral country (Fellman, 2000). Crucial for later development was the ability even to make own innovations on the acquired knowledge basis. For this it was also necessary to develop extensive and qualified educational system.
Accordingly much of Finnish metal industry has developed as a response to the demand from the forest industries. 19th century wood processing used imported machinery. But towards the end of the 19th century sawmill machinery, parts of steam engines and water turbines were also produced in Finland. First paper machines were built at the beginning of the 20th century, although this production did not continue before the 1950s again.
Since the 1950s paper machinery production has taken giant leaps, and Finnish paper and pulp machinery are on the technological front and important export items. Also constructions of complete paper and pulp factories in different parts of the world have been on the agenda since the 1970s. Paper making requires chemicals, production of which also started at the beginning of the 20th century. These chemical factories formed a foundation of today’s considerable chemical industry.
Conclusions
Forests are the most important natural resource in Finland. The Finnish economy seems to have avoided the so-called resource curse by diversifying the structure of the economy, which during the early industrialisation was based much, but not only, on this ample forests resource.
In this paper I argue that it was actually the ownership structure of the forests and land which was an important initial condition for the development. The private ownership of forests by independent peasants - often with small or modest ownership - since the late 18th century, helped to spread export earnings widely over large segments of the economy. Wide ownership of the resource
prevented also the appearance of an oligarchic and corrupt power structure - the structure which so often can be seen behind the resource curse.
Five conclusions for the resource curse issue follow. First: it is important that, the income from the resource must spread widely to the domestic economy. This can be realized either - most naturally - through private ownership or because of successful state policies. Second: profits have at least to some extent to flow back to the local economy through useful investments. Third: it is important that backward and forward linkages to other domestic sectors can evolve. Fourth: local knowledge creation is important. This presupposes the development of educational system. Fifth: the avoidance or absence of corruption in the public sector must be avoided.
The government can create favourable conditions for the economic development by good legislation. In Finland the institutional and legal system based on the Swedish, and more generally Nordic, tradition can be seen as an important element for success. But there are, however, plenty of evidence - especially from tropical forests - that successful state forest policies are rare, corruption prevails and policy failures are common. Lack of well defined property rights is crucial here.
While the argument here is that ownership rights are crucial, their formation is very much historically path dependent and cannot be easily changed. Accordingly, a conclusion could also be a pessimistic one: the country cannot easily escape the curse if it has one.
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Поступила в редакцию 20.12.2012.
Сведения об авторе
райно Хьерппе - профессор Университета Хельсинки (г Хельсинки, Финляндия). e-mail: riitta.hjerppe@helsinki.fi
