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Weintraub C.
American Revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine: An Analysis of the Role of Public Relations and NGOs in the Political Regimes’ Change in the Post-Soviet Space
I. Interference in Post-Soviet Spheres. Western public relations first emerged in the Eastern sphere amidst the 1996 Russian presidential election. In the months leading up to voting day, Communist Party leader Zyuganov showed a heavy lead in the polls1. In his memoirs Yeltsin would later admit that, when his upcoming defeat appeared imminent, he had privately drafted legislation to dissolve Parliament and ban the Communist Party2. In a last ditch effort to stay in power, Yeltsin turned to Western public relations strategists.
A coalition of Western powers, led by the United States, deployed an elite army of public relations specialists to Moscow3. Videos relating to food shortages and Stalinist brutality took over Russian television screens; paving the way for public relations engineers to transform Zyuganov into outmoded Soviet relic in a country destined for change. Yeltsin, a highly unpopular leader who many felt was neither physically nor mentally fit for the job, adopted a “Lesser Evil” campaign strategy - urging people to vote for him or else face Soviet gulags and breadlines. Due to Yeltsin’s sickly appearance, his PR strategists shielded him from direct contact with the media4.
Russian television gave Zyuganov roughly 18 % airtime, which was mostly critical, however Yeltsin’s campaign dominated the airwaves, receiving a 53 % share of airtime which was generally positive5. While remaining out of the public eye, the diligence of Western public relations specialists was evidenced by a sudden shift in Russian media coverage and, consequentially, public opinion.
Public relations strategists also did considerable work improving the international perception of Yeltsin. Far from his meticulously groomed image, Yeltsin admitted being indifferent to democracy and had an appalling track record in dealing with opposition6. In
1Mendelson S. Democracy Assistance and Political Transition in Russia: Between Success and Failure // International Security 25. No. 4 (Spring 2001). P. 85.
2 Yeltsin Admits Plot for a Dictatorship // Chicago Tribune. Oct. 8, 2000. URL:
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2000-10-08/news/0010080173_1_president-boris-yeltsin-russian-leader-current-constitution (30.06.2012).
3Sussman G. The Myths of ‘Democracy Assistance’: U. S. Political Intervention in Post-Soviet Eastern Europe // Monthly Review 58. №7 (December 2006). P. 20.
4 Yeltsin Admits Plot for a Dictatorship // Chicago Tribune. Oct. 8, 2000. URL:
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2000-10-08/news/0010080173_1_president-boris-yeltsin-russian-leader-current-constitution (30.06.2012); McFaulM. Russia’s 1996 Presidential Election: The End of Polarized Politics. Stanford, CA, 1997. P. 97.
5McFaulM. Russia’s 1996 Presidential Election: The End of Polarized Politics. Stanford, CA, 1997. P. 96.
6Rousso A. Russia’s Transformation: the Prospects for Democracy. // Brown Journal of World Affairs 7. №1 (Winter/Spring 2000). P. 109.
1993, Yeltsin attempted to dissolve parliament in violation of the Russian constitution. When parliamentarians refused to vacate the parliament, Yeltsin ordered tanks to shell the building. Nevertheless, Western media and politicians championed his victory in the 1996 elections as a “triumph for democracy7.” For better or for worse, the American vision for Russia never materialized. Yeltsin failed to implement lasting democratic reforms, and the country’s industrial and natural resources remained in Russian hands.
The Western governments would find greater success in interfering in the affairs of Russia’s neighbors. In the 2000’s, Georgia and Ukraine experienced the emergence of Western-backed “pro-democracy” movements. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in both countries would deploy an array of agitatorial tactics, centered around key elections. This would allow NATO-friendly politicians to accuse their opponents of election fraud and pave the way to regime change8.
Rose Revolution. The West sought to expand its influence into the Commonwealth of Independent States and Georgia seemed an easy target. The country suffered from a stagnant economy, widespread corruption, and high unemployment. In addition, foreign business viewed Georgia as a virtual goldmine due to its role as the region’s oil corridor9. Much to the dismay of Western politicians and business interests, Georgia’s president Shevardnadze had grown stubborn andunpredictable. Though the White House had originally lauded him as an ally in the struggle for democracy and freedom, they began considering other options when he proved unable to unify Georgia with its separatist regions and indicated a willingness to improve relations with Russia10. The White House’s tone changed sharply when it seemed evident that Shevardnadze was interested in brokering an oil pipeline deal with Russia11.
Western financed NGOs began popping up all over Tbilisi. Their goal was clear: seize on instability, topple the Georgian government, and install an anti-Russian, proprivatization regime that would be able to hold onto power for years to come. American
7 Weir F. Why Boris Yeltsin’s Legacy is Rosier in the West. // Christian Science Monitor. April 25, 2007. URL: http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0425/p06s02-woeu.html (accessed 30.06.2012).
8Sussman G., Krader S. Template Revolutions: Marketing U. S. Regime Change in Eastern Europe // Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture 5, №3 (September 2008). P. 98.
9Zunes S. U. S. Role in Georgia Crisis // Foreign Policy in Focus. August 14, 2008.
http://www.fpif.org/articles/us_role_in_georgia_crisis (30.06.2012).
10Pope H. Pro-West Leaders in Georgia push Shevardnadze Out // Wall Street Journal. Nov. 24, 2003; Reuters. Opposition: Shevardnadze Must Resign // CNN.com. Nov. 13, 2003. URL:
http://www.cnn.com/2003/W0RLD/europe/11/13/georgia.elections.reut (30.06.2012); Antelava N. Analysis: Georgia’s War of Nerves // BBC News, Nov. 15, 2003. URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3272593.stm
(30.06.2012).
11Zunes S. U. S. Role in Georgia Crisis // Foreign Policy in Focus. August 14, 2008.
http://www.fpif.org/articles/us_role_in_georgia_crisis (30.06.2012).
billionaire George Soros alone funneled roughly $42 million through the Open Society Institute, and its associated front groups, for the purpose of overthrowing the Georgian government12.
In 2000, the Open Society Institute, and other Western-financed NGOs, had played a major role in deposing the Milosevic government in Yugoslavia. These NGOs had served as a taciturn intermediaries between the U. S. State Department and anti-Milosevic forces13. In Georgia, the Open Society Institute engendered the Kmara organization to serve as the agitatorial wing of their regime-change operation. Kmara shared identical sloganeering, tactics, and imagery with Otpor - the Open Society Institute's activist group in Yugoslavia.14Soros’ organization even footed the bill for Georgian agitators to travel to various European countries to train under their Yugoslavian counterparts15. Kmara would be tasked with performing the groundwork necessary to galvanize the Georgian populace.
The U. S. had its choice candidate ready and waiting. Mikheil Saakashvili was a handsome and charismatic politician whose Ivy League education had been financed by the U. S. State Department16. American news outlets praised Saakashvili, crowning him the rightful heir to the Georgian throne. Meanwhile, the same sources villainized Shevardnadze as a totalitarian Soviet artifact17.
As was the case in Yugoslavia, agitation efforts were centered around key elections. In the summer of 2003, the anti-Shevardnadze faction threw its first visible action by holding a small rally for electoral reform. This opened a public discourse that Saakashvili drew on in November of that year when he challenged the results of the Georgian parliamentary elections18. After official results showed pro-Shevardnadze politicians holding a majority in parliament, Saakashvili’s forces began organizing rallies in Tbilisi. Despite the Western media’s characterization of the rallies as representing widespread sentiment in Georgia, the opposition rallies gathered no more than 5,000 people during its first two weeks19. After a few
12Corwin J. East: Regime Change on the Cheap // Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty. Apr. 19, 2005. URL: http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1058543.html (30.06.2012); Swibel M. Reform, Caucasus-Style // Forbes. Jan. 10, 2005. URL: http://www.forbes.com/global/2005/0110/076.html (30.06.2012).
13Sussman G., Krader S. Template Revolutions: Marketing U. S. Regime Change in Eastern Europe // Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture 5, №3 (September 2008). P. 98.
14 Ibid. P. 103.
15 Ibid. P. 102.
16 U. S. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. Prominent Alumni. URL: http://exchanges.state.gov/alumni/prominent-alumni.html (30.06.2012).
17 See Pope H. Pro-West Leaders in Georgia push Shevardnadze Out // Wall Street Journal. Nov. 24, 2003.
18 Welt C. Georgia’s Revolution: from Regime Weakness to Regime Collapse // Center for Strategic and International Studies (Stanford University, Dec. 28, 2006). P. 15.
19 Ibid. P. 14. Numbers increased at the rallies from November 14th-17th but never brought out more than 20 000 people.
days of no significant protests, Saakashvili held a final demonstration on November 22nd outside of the parliament building. When Shevardnadze attempted to call parliament into session, Saakashvili and hundreds of supporters stormed the building. Shevardnadze fled parliament and resigned from office on the following day. Afterwards, Saakashvili’s forces were finally able to draw a crowd of roughly 60,000 people by putting on a rock concert, complete with a fireworks show20. Two months later, Saakashvili swept elections.
A New Era for Georgia. As soon as he took the reigns of the struggling country, Saakashvili began auctioning off Georgia’s public assets to the highest bidders21. To appease Western business interests, his regime abolished laws that both protected worker’s rights and preserved public assets22. Georgia currently ranks 16th in the WorldBank’s “ease of doing business index.” This score is largely based on corporate tax liability, the ability to privately own natural resources, real property, and social services, as well as the freedom to terminate employees at will23. Reports from the International Trade Union Confederation state that, while Georgia has some worker rights legislation in the books, the government does not enforce such laws24. In 2006, Saakashvili passed the “Labor Code of Georgia,” which liquidated retirement pensions, gave employers unrestrained liberty to terminate employees, and essentially criminalized organizing or joining unions25. This radically inhumane piece of legislation contributed to the World Bank naming Georgia as the “top reformer in the [CIS]26”.
20Schriek D. van der. Tbilisi Revels after Shevardnadze’s Resignation // EurasiaNet. Nov. 23, 2003. URL: http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/112403a.shtml (30.06.2012).
21Swibel M. Reform, Caucasus-Style. // Forbes. Jan. 10, 2005. URL:
http://www.forbes.com/global/2005/0110/076.html (accessed 30.06.2012).
22Anti-Union Harassment: Violation of the International Law. International Trade Union Confederationand European Trade Union Confederation joint letter to Mikheil Saakashvili. Nov. 15, 2007 // International Trade Union Confederation website. URL: http://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/ituc_etuc_to_president_re_poti_port_workers_1107.pdf (30.06.2012).
23 ITUC Calls on World Bank to Complete Overhaul of ‘Doing Business’. International Trade Union Confederation Press Release. Nov. 4, 2010 // International Trade Union Confederation website. URL: http://www.ituc-csi.org/ituc-calls-on-world-bank-to.html (30.06.2012).
24Georgia: Government Must Lift State of Emergency and Guarantee Fundamental Rights. International Trade Union Confederation Press Release. Nov. 12, 2007 // International Trade Union Confederation website. URL: http://www.ituc-csi.org/georgia-government-must-lift-state.html (30.06.2012); 2012 Annual Survey of
Violations of Trade Union Rights - Georgia. June 6, 2012. // United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees website. URL: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4fd8894ec.html (30.06.2012).
25 Parliament of Georgia. Labor Code of Georgia. 2006 // International Labor Organization. URL: website.http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/SERIAL/74621/76939/F1017339662/GEO74621.pdf (30.06.2012).
26 Doing Business 07: Georgia is Top Reofrmer in the Commonwealth of Independent States and Jumps Up the
Global Rankings. Press Release. Sept. 6, 2006 // World Bank website. URL:
http://go.worldbank.org/9VFLY8KZI0 (30.06.2012).
In 2011, steelworkers in Kutaisi, Georgia organized a labor union in order to fight for decent pay and safer working conditions27. After the steel company fired the most active union organizers, the workers went on strike. Saakashvili responded by deploying an overwhelming force of heavily armed police to brutally assault and imprison the workers.28 After assaulting protestors, the police made workers sign letters renouncing their organizing efforts and went to the worker’s homes to intimidate their families29. This was one of many incidents of totalitarian assaults on human rights in Georgia. Saakashvili has dismissed widespread international criticism by accusing his victims of being Russian provocateurs. American corporations have awarded Saakashvili’s despotism by investing roughly $170 million in Georgian enterprises since 201030.
Though the country had for decades enjoyed a completely encompassing healthcare system, in 2007, Saakashvili’s regime announced a plan to completely privatize the healthcare industry31. Journalists have since reported that Saakashvili is being secretly courted by the health insurance industry32. These malevolent policies have left the country’s impoverished majority without access to even the most basic healthcare services33.
The Western press has proclaimed Saakashvili’s economic reforms a success, however his extreme laissez-faire policies have had a devastating effect on life for most Georgians. The country’s GDP has significantly increased since 2003 - almost reaching its Soviet-era numbers - but unemployment and poverty have skyrocketed. The United Nations Development Programme recently ranked Georgia 13th to last for quality of life34.
As a leader who acts so contrary to the interests of his people, Saakashvili’s political survival depends upon actively stomping out any emerging alternative to his regime. As soon as Saakashvili came to power, U. S. funding to the incipient “pro-democracy” movement
27 Georgia - 2012 // Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights // International Trade Union Confederation website. URL: http://survey.ituc-csi.org/+-Georgia-+.html#tabs-5 (17.06.2012); Violations of Human and Trade Union Rights at Hercules Steel. Letter to Mikheil Saakashvili. Sept. 16, 2011 // International Trade Union Confederation website. URL: http://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/Hercules_Letter_to_Georgia_President_16-06-11.pdf
(30.06.2012).
28 Georgia - 2012 // Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights // International Trade Union Confederation website. URL: http://survey.ituc-csi.org/+-Georgia-+.html#tabs-5 (17.06. 2012).
29 Ibid.
30 Ministry of Economic Development of Georgia // National Statistics Office of Georgia, Foreign Direct Investments, 2012. URL: http://www.geostat.ge/index.php?action=page&p_id=140&lang=eng (30.06.2012).
31Schecter K. The Privatization of the Georgian Healthcare System // Anthropology of East Europe Review 29. № 1 (Spring 2011). P. 17.
32 Saakashvili’s Top Guns Meet with Business in Secrecy // Democracy and Freedom Watch. June 17, 2012. URL: http://dfwatch.net/saakashvilis-top-guns-meet-with-business-in-secrecy-93374 (30.06.2012).
33Schecter K. The Privatization of the Georgian Healthcare System. // Anthropology of East Europe Review 29. № 1 (Spring 2011). P. 16.
34 United Nations Development Program, “2011 Human Development Report”; The Economist’s “Quality of Life Index”.
shifted to buttressing Saakashvili’s consolidation of power35. The Georgian regime holds a firm grip on political communications in the country. For example, Georgian Industrial Group, which is headed by the brother of Foreign Minister Vezhashvili and is the largest holding company in Georgia, bought a controlling share of the country’s largest independent television broadcasting company, Rustavi 236. Transparency International reported that while Georgia’s laws nominally permit an independent press, Saakashvili’s regime, for all intents and purposes, controls Georgian media by, inter alia, facilitating a monopoly by loyal elites37. Saakashvili’s regime has increasingly used threats, intimidation, and violence to subdue dissenting journalists and media outlets38. A committee of Georgian journalists recently announced that the country enjoyed greater press freedom before the Rose Revolution39.
Saakashvili had been groomed to implement a neoliberal agenda in Georgia. While his laissez-faire economic policies have worked to strip the country of any encumbrance to corporate pillaging, his tenure as president has been marred by brutal suppression of dissent and a swelling atmosphere of civil unrest. Though the U. S. and its allies continue to triumph Saakashvili’s regime as democratic, it is becoming increasingly difficult to tout this image.
The Orange Revolution. The more sophisticated a propaganda mechanism is; the harder it is to identify. To understand how public relations and NGOs serve as operational tools of socio-political maneuvering, it is crucial to analyze structural patterns. Hungry for more after a successful regime change crusade in Georgia, Western forces turned to Ukraine. Ukraine and Russia have enjoyed an amicable relationship for most of their history as independent nations. Severing the tightly-knit bond between these two neighbors, while convincing Ukrainians that they are better suited forging an alliance with NATO, would present a much greater challenge than had been the case with Georgia40. In a 2012 poll, 86 % of Ukrainians said they viewed Russia in a positive light; compared to only 9 %o who believe
35Schellinger A. What has Washington Don’t?: Adverse Effects of State-Building on Democracy in Georgia. // Journal of Politics and Society 20, No. 1 (Spring 2009). P. 69.
36 Civil Georgia. TVs Submit Ownership Papers // Civil.ge, Dec. 17, 2007. URL: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=16597 (30.06.2012).
37Urushadze E., Ryan C. Georgia National Integritty System Assessment 2011. Expert brief // Transparency International, Georgia, 2011. URL:
http://transparency.ge/sites/transparency.ge.nis/files/TIGeorgia_NISReport_en.pdf (30.06.2012).
38 Committee to Protect Journalists. Attacks on the Press 2009: Georgia // Committee to Protect Journalists, Feb. 16, 2010. URL: http://cpj.org/2010/02/attacks-on-the-press-2009-georgia.php (30.06.2012).
39Anable D. Role of Georgia’s Media - and Western aid - in the Rose Revolution // Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, Dec. 2005. URL:
http ://boizebueditorial.com/wordwork/sites/default/files/roserevolution.pdf (30.06.2012).
40Ray J., Esipova N. Ukrainians Likely Support Move Away from NATO // Gallup, World. Apr. 2, 2010. URL: http://www.gallup.com/poll/127094/Ukrainians-Likely-Support-Move-Away-NATO.aspx (30.06.2012). (40% of Ukrainians believe that NATO presents a threat to their country).
this relationship is negative41. Just as was the case in Yugoslavia and Georgia, the Western NGOs in Ukraine would attempt to divide the country around a key election.
The 2004 Ukrainian presidential elections pitted Russian-friendly Yanukovich against NATO darling Yushchenko42. Months before the elections, Western public relations specialists and NGOs dug into Kiev. Whereas control over domestic television broadcasting had been key to regime change in Georgia, effective utilization of web-based communications would be essential to success in Ukraine. Rock Creek Creative, a Washington D.C.-based public relations firm, proved to be the key player in developing web-based propaganda campaigns in Ukraine43. Though the firm initially boasted of its heavy involvement in the Orange Revolution, it would later claim to have merely consulted a nascent Ukrainian nonprofit44. If the Ukrainian public became aware of heavy Western involvement in the Orange Revolution, the movement would lose credibility and be hard-pressed to elicit ample public support.
The internet-based newspaper Ukrainska Pravda was the most indispensible media tool in the success of the Orange Revolution45. Months before the election, the newspaper relocated to Washington D. C. There, it would be closer to its chief financial patrons: the National Endowment For Democracy, a nominally private organization that receives basically all of its funding from the U.S. State Department46. Ukrainska Pravda bolstered the pro-NATO social movement by being the go-to voice for international journalists. The newspaper also served Yushchenko’s domestic needs by discrediting his opponents and lauding the NGO-orchestrated movement as a homegrown, grassroots initiative47.
41 Poll: Ukrainians Still Positively Disposed to Russia // Kyiv Post. Mar. 2, 2012. URL:
http://www.kyivpost.eom/content/ukraine/poll-ukrainians-still-positively-disposed-to-russi.html#.T-eOpStYviQ
(30.06.2012).
42McFaul M. Ukraine Imports Democracy: External Influences on the Orange Revolution. // International Security 32. №2 (Fall 2007). P. 55. (Yushchenko was given the nickname “Bushenko” - a pejorative arising from his strong ties to the White House).
43WilsonA. Ukraine’s Orange Revolution. New Haven, CT, 2005. P. 187.
44Shin A. Local PR Firm Caught in Worldwide Web of Bad Press // Washington Post. Mar. 7, 2005.
45McFaul M. Ukraine Imports Democracy: External Influences on the Orange Revolution // International Security 32. №2 (Fall 2007). P. 81.
46Anable D. Role of Georgia’s Media - and Western aid - in the Rose Revolution // Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, Dec. 2005. URL:
http://boizebueditorial.com/wordwork/sites/default/files/roserevolution.pdf (30.06.2012). P. 4; McFaul M. Ukraine Imports Democracy: External Influences on the Orange Revolution // International Security 32. №2 (Fall 2007). P. 78; Lowe D. Idea to Reality: NED at 25 [n.d.] // National Endowment for Democracy website. URL: http://www.ned.org/about/history (19.06.2012).
47McFaul M. Ukraine Imports Democracy: External Influences on the Orange Revolution // International Security 32. №2 (Fall 2007). P. 63.
Despite the Yushchenko campaign’s immeasurable financial and technical support, the second round of elections showed Yanukovich as the winner by a roughly 3 % margin48. However, the two primary organizations conducting exit polls declared Yushchenko as the victor. Both of these organizations, the Razumkov Center and the Democracy Initiatives Foundation, were heavily financed, as well as trained, by the National Endowment for Democracy49. For Yushchenko and his Western allies, the exit polls served, “not so much to guarantee clean elections but as a mechanism for instigating ‘orange revolution’ protests50.”
On the day following Yanukovich’s apparent electoral victory, demonstrators materialized in Kiev’s central “Independence Square” with orange flags, buttons, and posters that had effectively been pre-packaged by the Open Society Institute. Pora, an agitatorial organization conceived and financed by the Soros Foundation, facilitated the Independence Square occupation. On the eve of the election, they transformed Independence Square into a small-scale tent city; complete with food supplies, protest materials, as well as professional lighting and stage equipment51. Pora shared almost identical tactics, imagery, and sloganeering with Soros’ other agitatorial pet projects: Yugoslavia’s Otpor and Georgia’s Kmara. In preparation for the upcoming Ukrainian elections, Pora activists even received training from members of Otpor and Kmara52.
The international press coined the NATO-backed agitation campaign as the “Orange Revolution”. Western media overwhelmingly endorsed Yushchenko’s campaign and its associated activists53. Images of crowds in Independence Square dominated American television54. The Ukrainian Supreme Court caved to both external and domestic pressure and set a final round of elections for late December. After Yushchenko appeared to have come out victorious in that round, Yanukovich admitted defeat and stepped down.
48Zavalevska V. Notice of the Ukrainian Presidential Election Results // Central Election Commission of Ukraine. Kiev. November 24, 2004. URL: http://www.cvk.gov.ua/postanovy/2004/p1265_2004_d.htm
(30.06.2012).
49Sussman G., Krader S. Template Revolutions: Marketing U. S. Regime Change in Eastern Europe // Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture 5, №3 (September 2008). P. 97.
50 Ibid.
51McFaul M. Ukraine Imports Democracy: External Influences on the Orange Revolution // International Security 32. №2 (Fall 2007). P. 64.
52McFaul M. Ukraine Imports Democracy: External Influences on the Orange Revolution // International Security 32. №2 (Fall 2007). P. 78; Sussman G., Krader S. Template Revolutions: Marketing U. S. Regime Change in Eastern Europe // Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture 5, №3 (September 2008). P. 103.
53KatchanovskiI., MorleyA. US Television Coverage of Post-Communist Countries: Politics of Miscommunication [n.d.] // Harvard Faculty of Arts and Sciences. URL:
http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~postcomm/papers/2009-10/Katchanovski%20&%20Morley%20Post-Com%20paper.pdf
(30.06.2012). P. 15.
54 Considering the large-scale involvement of the U.S. in the Orange Revolution, it is somewhat symbolic that Independence Square is now decorated with the world’s largest Coca-Cola advertisements.
Similar to events a year prior in Georgia, the West had built an agitation campaign around a key election which led to a regime change. Evidence of Western financial and tactical support threatened to undermine the image of Yushchenko and the Orange Revolution. Thus, insiders were keen to conceal any evidence of external interference55. Most of the external support came by way of nominally private organizations that are sustained almost entirely by U.S. government funding. Due to the necessarily discrete nature of these organizations, it is difficult to measure the amount of control that the local “pro-democracy” groups that the West engendered had independent of Washington D.C.
In the cases of Yugoslavia, Georgia, and Ukraine, this regime change strategy effectively replaced pro-Russia governments with politicians who would court NATO and introduce varying degrees of Western reforms. However, following the Rose Revolution, Saakashvili’s program severely curtailed the freedoms that the common Georgian had before enjoyed, while providing business elites with the unfettered freedom to pillage the country. Western interference in post-Soviet spaces does not stop once their “democratic” candidate assumes power - it continues to control the direction of those countries, even at the expense of their native populations. The challenge for Western policy-makers becomes one of managing the image of an allied, however totalitarian, leader such as Saakashvili.
II. Ossetian War: Public Perception becomes Mightier than the Sword. A new era of warfare arrived in 2008. The pen, paper, and video camera would become the principal weapons. Hostilities would be secondary; serving as fodder for the video cameras. Late in the evening on August 7th of that year, Saakashvili ordered an attack on South Ossetia. Contrary the spontaneous appearance of the assault, war preparations began years in advance. Saakashvili had a public relations war chest ready and waiting.
In the years since coming to power, Saakashvili’s image as a proponent of democracy and human rights had split at the seams. His “business-friendly” economic program had led to disastrous unemployment and poverty levels56. To make matters worse, his regime had also stripped the Georgian people of any social safety net that had before been available. These factors contributed to a mounting climate of civil unrest in Georgia.
In the many instances that the Georgian people have taken to the streets to demand respect from their government, Saakashvili has responded with Stalin-esque brutality -greeting protestors with violence and terror. His regime desperately needed to refurbish its
55 Ibid. P. 72.
56Klussman U. Poverty and Powerlessness Fuel Growing Rage // Spiegel Online. June 5, 2009. URL: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/seething-in-georgia-poverty-and-powerlessness-fuel-growing-rage-a-623245.html (30.06.2012).
image so that allied nations could continue to justify their support. Furthermore, Saakashvili desperately needed to forge political unity amongst the increasingly unstable populace. Reigniting tensions with Russia would accomplish both goals.
Aspect Consulting, a Belgium PR powerhouse, disembarked for Tbilisi with the goal of restoring Georgia’s image as a force for democracy and freedom.57In the year leading up to Georgia’s attack on South Ossetia, Western media outlets frequently ran stories depicting Georgia as a democratic little guy and Russia as the neighborhood bully58. In Georgia, such depictions of the relationship with their neighbor to the north helped to instill in the Georgian populace a fear of Russia and served to develop political unity in Georgia.
Following Saakashvili’s surprise attack, Russian defensive forces moved into South Ossetia to protect the defenseless civilian population. Georgia ambushed Russia with a mass media assault. Western media outlets likened Russian tanks entering the region to the Soviet tanks that had plowed through the Prague Spring. Without hesitation, these media sources named Russia as the initial aggressor in the conflict59. The White House issued a call-to-arms, announcing that the U.S. had deployed Secretary of State “to rally the free world in the defense of a free Georgia60”.
Once the dust settled, it became undeniably evident that the Georgian regime had initiated the conflict by firing rockets into South Ossetia61. Backed into a corner, Western media developed a theory that is almost as comical as it is absurd. These media outlets rationalized Georgia’s undeniable act of aggression as a reasonable reaction to an accumulation of Russian proto-warfare tactics. Even when the European Union’s independent investigation later confirmed that Georgia was the initial aggressor, the report placed ultimate blame on Russia for “provocations”62. Saakashvili’s friends in the West seemed to be coming
57Heinrich H.-G., Tanaev K. Georgia & Russia: Contradictory Media Coverage of the August War // Caucasian Review of International Affairs 3. №3 (Summer 2009). P. 245.
58Katchanovski I., Morley A. US Television Coverage of Post-Communist Countries: Politics of Miscommunication [n.d.] // Harvard Faculty of Arts and Sciences. URL:
http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~postcomm/papers/2009-10/Katchanovski%20&%20Morley%20Post-Com%20paper.pdf
(30.06.2012). P. 24.
59King Ch. The Five-Day War: Managing Moscow After the Georgia Crisis // Foreign Affairs. 87, No. 6 (November/December 2008). P. 3.
60Bush G. W. Remarks on the Situation in Georgia // Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 44, №32 (August 13, 2008): 1130. URL: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-2008-08-18/pdf/WCPD-2008-08-18.pdf
(30.06.2012).
6lHeinrich H.-G., Tanaev K. Georgia & Russia: Contradictory Media Coverage of the August War // Caucasian Review of International Affairs 3. №3 (Summer 2009). P. 246.
62 Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia. Report, Volume II. Sept. 2009. URL: http://www.ceiig.ch/pdf/IIFFMCG_Volume_II.pdf (30.06.2012).
to his aid by maintaining the myth that Georgia had once again fallen victim to Muscovite aggression63.
The South Ossetian conflict introduced the Eastern sphere to a new form of communications during times of crisis. Saakashvili’s public relations strategy relied heavily upon importing highly sophisticated and obsessively methodical mass communications systems from the West. Russia, on the other hand, employed an archaic media strategy that was, for all intents and purposes, obsolete and ineffective64. The Kremlin disseminated official press statements; hoping international news outlets would reiterate its position. Prime Minister Putin simply accused Georgia of instigating hostilities and pointed fingers at the U.S. as the mastermind behind the conflict65. Though it is now clear that Georgia was the first aggressor, and there is ample evidence of American influence in Georgian affairs, a lone Russian government official speaking into a camera has nothing on Saakashvili’s pandering to a roaring crowd in central Tbilisi - playing the part of the victim who promises to stand his ground until the last man falls. Russia quite simply did not have a media strategy that could compete with Saakashvili’s public relations monolith.
The Georgian public relations strategy was polished and calculated. Aside from The Guardian, every major Western media outlet took an unwaveringly pro-Georgian stance66. Hours after Russia deployed forces to South Ossetia, CNN featured a segment in which Saakashvili spoke directly to viewers in perfect English. He asserted that in anticipation of the conflict, Russia had amassed its forces just across the border and had been waiting for the opportunity to invade his country. CNN interlaced Saakashvili’s address with images of Russian tanks and smoldering buildings67. Although Western media, at least ostensibly, tends to provide “both sides” of any story, the South Ossetian conflict was treated as a struggle of good verses evil; mighty, barbaric Russia against tyrannized but courageous Georgia68.
63KatchanovskiI.,MorleyA. US Television Coverage of Post-Communist Countries: Politics of Miscommunication [n.d.] // Harvard Faculty of Arts and Sciences. URL:
http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~postcomm/papers/2009-10/Katchanovski%20&%20Morley%20Post-Com%20paper.pdf
(30.06.2012). P. 24.
64King Ch. The Five-Day War: Managing Moscow After the Georgia Crisis // Foreign Affairs. 87, No. 6 (November/December 2008). P. 9.
65Chance M. Putin Accuses U. S. of Orchestrating Georgian War // CNN.com, Aug. 28, 2008. URL: http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/08/28/russia.georgia.cold.war/index.html (30.06.2012).
66Heinrich H.-G., Tanaev K. Georgia & Russia: Contradictory Media Coverage of the August War. // Caucasian Review of International Affairs 3. №3 (Summer 2009). P. 249.
67 Georgian President Speaks. Aug. 8, 2008. Video clip // CNN.com. URL:
http://www.cnn.com/video/#/video/world/2008/08/08/intv.saakashvili.cnn?iref=videosearch (30.06.2012).
68 King Ch. The Five-Day War: Managing Moscow After the Georgia Crisis // Foreign Affairs. 87, No. 6 (November/December 2008). P. 3.
During the conflict, Saakashvili handled domestic media much differently than he had with international press. While issuing an disproportionate number of “official reports” to international outlets, he rarely appeared on Georgian television. Saakashvili deliberately avoided appearing in domestic press in order circumvent the stigma associated with state-controlled press. For Georgians, this would furnish a certain degree of credibility in the purportedly “independent” news reports. For Western audiences, Georgia’s press appeared independent of state control; reinforcing the illusion that Georgia is a free and open society. In reality, Saakashvili was hard at work behind the scenes, ensuring that the Georgian press parroted his line.
Saakashvili emerged from hiding just as Russian tanks entered the outskirts of Tbilisi. Domestic media called upon all Georgians to rally in the city center69. At a painstakingly choreographed rally, Saakashvili made a speech reminiscent of the last stand at the Alamo - comparing the conflict with Russiatomid-20th century Czech and Hungarian resistance to Soviet invaders70. The international press recycled images from the rally to appear as if Georgians had gathered around Saakashvili en masse. Where the Yushchenko PR engineers had offered food and shelter to draw crowds to a central location, Saakashvili depended upon the fact that war hostilities had left Georgians in fear and isolation. This spectacle created a powerful image - Saakashvili’s sentiments now appeared to emanate from the Georgian people.
What is unique about this conflict is how inconsequential the fighting was in relation to the large scale media assault. Hostilities in this conflict were only incidental to Saakashvilli’s goals of distorting Russia’s image and providing grounds to justify his consolidation of power. Georgia certainly lost the military battle, but it won the public relations war. Saakashvili had no hopes of sustaining a conflict with one of the largest militaries in the world. Instead, the violence, carnage, and casual ties served as mere props and characters in his propagandistic narrative. While Saakashvili had spent years developing a media weapon to be fully realized after attacking Ossetia, Russian public relations was relatively unprepared. Vladimir Putin acknowledged this by congratulating the Georgian-hired PR strategists on their media victory71.
69 Wertsch J., Karumidze Z. Spinning the Past: Russian and Georgian Accounts of the War of August 2008 // Memory Studies 2. №3 (2009). P. 384.
70 Ibid. P. 386.
71Jugaste A. Communicating Georgia: Georgia’s Information Campaign in the 2008 War with Russia // Stockholm University. May 30, 2011. URL:
http://www.ut.ee/ABVKeskus/sisu/publikatsioonid/2011/pdf/Jugaste_MA.pdf (30.06.2012).
III. Looking Forward. The propaganda of yesteryear is the joke of today. When we see American anti- Communist films from the 1950’s or Soviet anti-drinking posters, we don’t clear the hurdle of laughter to even reach skepticism. As people develop and become adapted to different forms of propaganda, mass media in turn tends to evolve. The West and its allies have successfully advanced increasingly sophisticated political communications systems. However, the Eastern Bloc is in many ways still depending on outmoded communications paradigms. Russia and its allies will need to overhaul their mass communications systems in order to insulate themselves from another situation akin to the information warfare surrounding the South Ossetian War.
Mass Mobilization Matters. Mass mobilizations can function to impute in the spectator a sense that the assembly presented represents a broader societal consensus. Regardless of actual scale, an effective communications system will marginalize opposition, but amplify congregations which are in harmony with one’s position.
Until the last moment, the White House ardently supported the Mubarak regime in Egypt. Once images of millions converging in Tahrir Square flooded international media outlets, President Obama finally suggested that Mubarak should consider the “grievances of those who seek a better future72.” It was quite simply impossible for the White House to continue touting Mubarak as the legitimate leader of Egypt. The effect of mass mobilizations on observers should not be underestimated.
In Ukraine, methodical coverage of Orange activists in Independence Square worked to convince international audiences that NATO enjoyed widespread support amongst the populace, and that Ukrainian public opinion strongly disfavored Russia. The spectacles that took place in Georgia in 2003 accomplished the same goal. When Saakashvili stood with a small, however strategically-presented, group of Georgians in Tbilisi during the South Ossetian War, Western media was able to present this in a way that compelled the spectator to assume that the Georgian public had united around his battle cry. Regardless of its scope and nature, an effective political communications campaign will be able to reframe a mass mobilization according to its agenda.
Self-Censorship and Selective Coverage in American Mass Media. More recently, the Western media has characterized demonstrations surrounding the 2012 Russian presidential elections as an anti-Putin insurgency. One American media outlet even attempted to emphasize civil unrest in Russia by masquerading violent footage from the Greek anti-
12Dreyfuss R. Obama and Egypt’s Revolution // The Nation. Feb. 14, 2011. URL: http://www.thenation.com/blog/158533/obama-and-egypts-revolution# (30.06.2012).
austerity riots as anti-government actions in Moscow.73While fervently promoting demonstrations in Russia, the American press essentially ignores civil unrest and antigovernment protests at home (and in other nations when civil unrest impedes U. S. foreign policy)74.
Beginning with the Rose Revolution, the American media has diligently covered political events in Georgia - as long as they are harmonious with U. S. foreign policy interests. Between 1998-2009, 79 % of mainstream American press coverage devoted to Georgia pertained to the South Ossetian conflict, US-Georgian relations, and the Rose Revolution75. Georgia is a small country that is thousands of miles from the U. S., however pro-Saakashvili reports seem to regularly make their way onto American television sets. This phenomenon shatters the common misconception that mainstream media outlets select content according to the market principles of supply and demand, or are otherwise free of regulatory guidance. On the contrary, self-censorship and selective coverage in Western media illustrates the tremendous influence of public relations and effective lobbying.
In the past year, the United States has witnessed arguably the greatest period of civil unrest since the civil rights actions of the 1960’s.However, the U.S. media has framed these mass mobilizations of working people, families, disgruntled soldiers, and immigrants as being organized and populated by privileged students and professional activists. Mainstream media avoids disseminating footage of larger rallies, and, if anything, tends to provide brief clips of smaller gatherings. This characterization works to marginalize the movement and inhibit both domestic and international audiences from recognizing that civil unrest in the U.S. today looks very similar to that which spread across the Arab world in 2011. Jules Boykoff notes:
“By selecting certain aspects of dissent and rendering them salient, the media play a key role in political power machinations. By focusing on the superficial, personalized, dramatic, and novel aspects of social movement adherents rather than on the socio-political
73Osborn A. Fox News Uses Athens Riots Footage for Russian Protests // The Telegraph. Dec. 9, 2011. URL: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/8947476/Fox-news-uses-Athens-riots-footage-for-Russian-protests.html (30.06.2012); It is worth noting that, outside of clips used as subterfuge to characterize Russia, coverage of the anti-austerity riots in Greece was nonexistent in mainstream American media.
14Sussman G., Krader S. Template Revolutions: Marketing U. S. Regime Change in Eastern Europe // Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture 5, №3 (September 2008). P. 94.
15KatchanovskiI.,MorleyA. US Television Coverage of Post-Communist Countries: Politics of Miscommunication [n.d.] // Harvard Faculty of Arts and Sciences. URL:
http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~postcomm/papers/2009-10/Katchanovski%20&%20Morley%20Post-Com%20paper.pdf (30.06.2012). P. 31.
ideas and opinions these dissidents support, the mass media are making a decision that can often undermine dissent76.”
The primary purpose of Otpor, Kmara, and Pora was to agitate resident populaces and facilitate large-scale public gatherings. Western media characterized each of these operations as an organic, spontaneous social movement that represented a broad consensus of the native public. At the same time, the same media outlets do not embrace more organic social movements in America, or other countries where recognizing the legitimacy of such a movement would impede U. S. foreign policy.
Due to advances in technology, political and business elites cannot as easily sweep mass mobilizations under the rug. The widespread availability of filming apparatuses and ease of sharing videos over the internet has empowered those outside of established media structures to create and disseminate effective propaganda. As a result, mainstream media has shifted from ignoring unsanctioned social movements to reframing them.
IV. Conclusion. Russia appears to be the next target for a Western-choreographed social movement in line with the Orange and Rose revolutions. Coverage of the 2012 Russian presidential election mirrored that which surrounded the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election. However, Western-backed agitatorial NGOs did not have the opportunity to gain a foothold in Russia. After witnessing the events in Yugoslavia, Georgia, and Ukraine, the Russian government passed legislation that provides for greater regulation of NGOs in order to curb the importation of Western-backed, anti-government maneuvering77. In addition, the Kremlin has come to recognize the importance of public relations and has hired consultants to assist in developing its image in Russia and abroad78. The ability of Russia and its allies to curb Western interference in their internal affairs depends upon their building effective political communication systems that counter invasive propaganda while promoting relationships with the resident populaces and regional neighbors.
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