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Действия, предпринятые уставными органами Совета Европы и их влияние на развитие событий украинского кризиса (2013-2020 гг.)
Actions Taken by the Statutory Bodies of the Council of Europe and their Impact on Developments of the Ukrainian Crisis (2013-2020)
Ерёменко Денис Олегович
Студент 4 курса, ф-т международных отношений, Санкт-Петербургский государственный университет,
РФ, г. Санкт-Петербург e-mail: denis. yeryomenko@gmail.com
Denys Yeromenko
4th year student, school of international relations, Saint Petersburg State University, Russia, Saint Petersburg e-mail: denis. yeryomenko@gmail.com
Аннотация.
В статье приводится анализ действий, предпринятых двумя уставными органами Совета Европы с 2013 по 2020 гг. в ответ на события украинского кризиса, через призму официальных документов, принятых Парламентской ассамблеей и Комитетом министров. В данной работе в хронологическом порядке рассматриваются резолюции Парламентской ассамблеи и решения Комитета министров, так или иначе связанные с украинским политическим кризисом и дальнейшим территориальным конфликтом между Украиной и Россией, а также Планы действий Совета Европы для Украины, принятые в период конфликта. Мы приходим к выводу о том, что Совету Европы не удалось оказать значительное воздействие на геополитическую составляющую российско-украинского конфликта; наибольшего успеха в данный период международная организация добилась в продвижении своей повестки в сфере эффективного управления и в гуманитарных вопросах, главным образом на территории, контролируемой правительством Украины.
Annotation.
This article analyses actions taken by the two statutory bodies of the Council of Europe from 2013 to 2020 in response to Ukrainian crisis from the perspective of the official documents adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee of Ministers. In this work resolutions of the Parliamentary Assembly and decisions the Committee of Ministers related to the Ukrainian political crisis and the subsequent territorial dispute between Ukraine and Russia are reviewed in chronological order along with the Council of Europe Action Plans for Ukraine adopted during the conflict. It is concluded that the Council of Europe didn't manage to influence significantly the geopolitical dimension of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, while it was most successful in promoting its good governance and humanitarian agenda, especially on the territory effectively controlled by the Ukrainian government.
Ключевые слова: Совет Европы, Парламентская Ассамблея Совета Европы, Комитет Министров Совета Европы, украинский кризис, Евромайдан, присоединение Крыма к России, война на Донбассе, санкции.
Key words: Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, Ukrainian crisis, Euromaidan, integration of Crimea into the Russian Federation, war in Donbass, sanctions.
Introduction
This paper is devoted to the discussion taking place within the Council of Europe and the actions taken by the international organization in response to Ukrainian political crisis of 2013-2014 and the subsequent territorial dispute involving the Ukrainian government, the Russian Federation and the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk People's Republic in the Donbass region of Eastern Ukraine. The work reviews the official documents adopted by the two statutory bodies of the Council of Europe - the Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee of Ministers, namely it is focused on the 15 resolutions passed by the Parliamentary Assembly in relation to the issue from 2014 to 2019; 15 related decisions of the Committee of Ministers issued from 2013 to 2020; and 2 Council of Europe Action
Plans for Ukraine adopted in 2015 and 2018. For the sake of more precise analysis of the texts, the wording and the terms used in this paper replicate those introduced into the official documents of the Council of Europe bodies and may not reflect position of the author. The paper is mainly focused on the activity of the Council of Europe, thus it doesn't discuss in detail all the events of Ukrainian crisis, that is beyond the scope of this work. It is concluded that the Council of Europe, in spite of a large number of European states it engages, didn't itself have a significant impact on the geopolitical dimension of the conflict, which derives from the limited range of tools it can employ. However, the organization's role in governance issues in Ukraine that followed the change of power in the country in 2014 can be considered significant. Overall, the effect of the Council of Europe's actions on developments of the Ukrainian crisis until now is moderate, with its most important role of being a platform for discussion that brings together representatives of sovereign European states.
Practically from the very beginning of the unrest in Ukraine, sparked by the decision of Ukrainian authorities to suspend the procedure for the signing of an association agreement with the European Union in November 2013, and until now the Council of Europe has been carefully following the unfolding events in the country, especially in Kyiv, Southern and Eastern Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders. With the tools at its disposal, the organization has been trying to influence situation in Ukraine, namely mitigate the negative consequences of transition of power in early 2014, promote adopting legislation in compliance with European standards, advocate territorial integrity of Ukraine, alleviate humanitarian outcomes of secession of the Crimean Peninsula as well as of military action in the country's East, etc. Therefore, the measures taken by the Council of Europe concerning the Ukrainian crisis can be divided into 3 thematic groups: good governance, territorial integrity and humanitarian issues. These topics have been gradually appearing on the documents adopted by the Council of Europe following the respective events in Ukraine. In the context of the two statutory bodies of the Council of Europe, these policies were mainly articulated through resolutions of the Parliamentary Assembly and decisions of the Committee of Ministers. Below, the resolutions of the Assembly are discussed in chronological order first, followed by the decisions of the Committee including the Council of Europe Action Plans for Ukraine. Such method is used in order to trace the evolution of each body' s approach to addressing the issue and measures taken by it throughout the conflict.
The Parliamentary Assembly
The first reaction of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, as a collective body, on popular unrest in Ukraine was expressed in late January 2014 and took a form of Resolution 1974 dated 30 January 2014 on "Functioning of democratic institutions in Ukraine". At that time, the Assembly, generally supporting the idea of Ukraine signing the association agreement with the EU, expressed its concern about the sudden change of policy of Ukrainian authorities. The Russian Federation was mentioned as a country to put pressure on them. The resolution condemned violence both on the side of protesters and the police. Interestingly, because of "the excessive and disproportionate use of violence by the police against protesters" it was the Ukrainian delegation that was under the threat of suspension of voting rights in the Assembly, though this was far from being implemented. So, in the early stages of the crisis the Assembly was mostly concerned about actions taken by the Ukrainian government and tried to promote its good governance agenda through a call for reforms.
At the time the next resolution was adopted in early April the situation changed and aggravated dramatically. In its Resolution 1988 dated 9 April 2014 on "Recent developments in Ukraine: threats to the functioning of democratic institutions" the Assembly directly accused Ukrainian authorities of their increasingly hard-handed approach that resulted in numerous fatalities during the so called Euromaidan protests and warned about the strengthening east-west divide in the country. On the other hand, this was the first time for the Council of Europe to express its recognition of the new Ukrainian authorities that came to power in late February and to condemn Russian annexation of Crimea in March 2014, that, as viewed by the Assembly, was in no way justified. Since then, the issue of territorial integrity of Ukraine and calls
on the Russian Federation to stop its policies on Ukrainian territory within its internationally recognized borders have been present in almost every related resolution of the Assembly, therefore, adding the second thematic topic, apart from the omnipresent good governance issue, to the discussion of the conflict.
It must be noted that, according to Article 1(d) of the Statute of the Council of Europe, "Matters relating to national defence do not fall within the scope of the Council of Europe", which might have made the discussion of the issue of Russian presence in Ukraine irrelevant to the organization. However, the Assembly managed to put it on the agenda through binding it with the principle of rule of law that was infringed, in Assembly's reasoned opinion, by the Russian Federation. Namely, the Assembly would several times be referring to the Charter of the United Nations, the Helsinki Final Act of the OSCE, the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, the Statute and basic principles of the Council of Europe and Russia's accession commitments to point at the violations of international law on the part of the Russian Federation.
The next measure taken by the Assembly, though proved to be ineffective in the end, was one of the few practical steps, as opposed to its frequent normative statements, taken by the Council of Europe to force Russia to give up its territorial acquisitions. With its Resolution 1990 dated 10 April 2014 on "Reconsideration on substantive grounds of the previously ratified credentials of the Russian delegation", the Assembly suspended the voting rights; the right to be represented in the Bureau of the Assembly, the Presidential Committee and the Standing Committee; and the right to participate in election observation missions for the Russian delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. These restrictions as well as the threat to annul the credentials of the Russian delegation, if the Russian Federation didn't de-escalate the situation and reverse the annexation of Crimea, were supposed to encourage it to enter a constructive dialogue with the other parties to the conflict based on the norms acknowledged by the Council of Europe. On the contrary, this marked the beginning of Russian distancing from the Council of Europe.
Because of Russia maintaining the status quo in Crimea and the beginning of armed conflict in Donbass region, the attention of the international community represented, inter alia, by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe switched to the East of Ukraine. Deriving from the limitations imposed by the Statute, the Assembly could only appeal to international law with regard to military action in some parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Eastern Ukraine. Therefore, in its Resolution 2028 dated 27 January 2015 on "The humanitarian situation of Ukrainian refugees and displaced persons" the Assembly mainly called on the sides of the conflict to observe the established norms of international law such as the Minsk agreements, the 1907 Hague Conventions on the Laws and Customs of War on Land, the 1949 Geneva Convention, etc. and referred to such bodies as the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Due to the military action the third - humanitarian - dimension clearly emerged in the text of the resolution and became the key aspect of the majority of further resolutions in relation to Ukrainian conflict. Resolution 2028 called on the sides to investigate war crimes, protect internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, conduct an exchange of prisoners of war and a search for missing persons, facilitate delivery of humanitarian aid. Starting with this resolution, the Assembly declared the Russian Federation responsible for observance of human rights on those territories of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders that were de facto under Russian control.
In addition to those measures taken through Resolution 1990, Resolution 2034 dated 28 January 2015 on "Challenge, on substantive grounds, of the still unratified credentials of the delegation of the Russian Federation" suspended the right of the Russian delegation to be appointed rapporteur; and the right to represent the Assembly in Council of Europe bodies as well as external institutions and organizations, both institutionally and on an occasional basis. These measures were, once again, aimed at putting pressure on the Russian Federation to abandon its policies in Ukraine, observe human rights on the territories effectively controlled by it, especially the rights of Crimean Tatar minority, fulfill
its accession commitments and engage in a meaningful dialogue with the Assembly. What is more important, the Assembly decided not to annul the credentials of the Russian delegation at that time, which was clear inconsistency with Resolution 1990 that had provided for such sanctions in case of Russia adhering to its political line in the issue. In spite of the understandable aspiration of the Assembly both to continue dialogue with Russia in the premises of the Council of Europe and to sanction it at the same time, this step displayed Assembly's weakness and unwillingness to follow its previous decisions. Such ambivalence allowed for the Russian delegation to leave the Parliamentary Assembly in 2015 on its own initiative until 2019, which deprived the Assembly of direct communication with Russia during its sittings and left it prone to make concessions in the future in order to bring the delegation back. In Resolution 2063 dated 24 June 2015 on "Consideration of the annulment of the previously ratified credentials of the delegation of the Russian Federation (follow-up to paragraph 16 of Resolution 2034 (2015))" the Assembly repeated its calls on the Russian Federation voiced in the previous resolution but at that time without the Russian parliamentary delegation in the premises of the Council of Europe. It once again demonstrated its questionable approach by repeating its decision not to annul the already ratified credentials of the Russian delegation - the statement that had no practical meaning under the circumstances.
As long as from 2015 to 2019 the range of tools with which the Assembly could potentially influence Russian policies shrank dramatically, its further resolutions, especially Resolution 2067, Resolution 2112 and Resolution 2132, were mostly focused on humanitarian and good governance issues that traditionally fall within the field of expertize of the Council of Europe, basically most likely to be taken into account by the Ukrainian government in the case. Therefore, Resolution 2067 dated 25 June 2015 on "Missing persons during the conflict in Ukraine" urged the parties involved in the conflict to cooperate and provide financial, technical and institutional support to help locating missing persons and assist their families. Resolution 2112 dated 21 April 2016 on "The humanitarian concerns with regard to people captured during the war in Ukraine" urged the parties to the conflict to cease all military operations, release all captured persons, respect the rights of prisoners of war, as well as called on the Ukrainian authorities to reform some of the legal provisions. With limited means for influencing Russian policies on the territory effectively controlled by it, the resolution, for the first time, encouraged all member States of the Council of Europe to adopt targeted sanctions against "individuals involved in the kidnapping, unlawful detention, unfair trial and conviction of Ms. Savchenko", who at that time was a member of Ukrainian delegation to the Assembly, as well as other Ukrainian prisoners detained by Russia in relation to the hostilities in Eastern Ukraine. In Resolution 2132 dated 12 October 2016 on "Political consequences of the Russian aggression in Ukraine" the Assembly mainly continued the good governance line by advocating for democratic change both on the territory controlled by the Ukrainian government and in Crimea de facto controlled by the Russian Federation.
The next step designed to promote human rights in Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders was a claim that the Russian Federation held effective control not only over the Crimean Peninsula but also over the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk People's Republic in Eastern Ukraine. Therefore, Resolution 2133 dated 12 October 2016 on "Legal remedies for human rights violations on the Ukrainian territories out side the control of the Ukrainian authorities" imputed on the Russian Federation the responsibility for protection of the fundamental rights of all inhabitants of the DPR and the LPR in addition to those of Crimea.
Three years after the Council of Europe expressed its opinion regarding the Euromaidan protests for the first time in Resolution 1974, another resolution on "The functioning of democratic institutions in Ukraine" (Resolution 2145 dated 25 January 2017) was passed by the Assembly. It generally welcomed the progress made in Ukraine in line with the norms and values promoted by the Council of Europe but, on the other hand, expressed Assembly's concern about some of the Ukrainian policies that led to excess polarization in society as well as about some questionable legislation, e.g. the law on lustration, that were the consequence of the early stages of the crisis. It stressed that Russian policies in
Ukraine "should not be used as an excuse for not maintaining the pace of, or commitment to, the imple mentation of the other reforms that are essential for the democratic consolidation of the country".
Resolution 2198 dated 23 January 2018 on "Humanitarian consequences of the war in Ukraine" summarized the humanitarian challenges of the 4 years of conflict in Ukraine. Through it the Assembly emphasized that little progress had been actually achieved in identifying the whereabouts of missing persons since the adoption of Resolution 2067, urged to take measures to mark all areas contaminated with explosive remnants of war and organize special operations for their removal, release captured persons by each side of the conflict, provide support for IDPs and other victims of war. It also, for the first time, accused Russia of illegal shifting of the demographic composition of the population of Crimea. Resolution 2198 became the highlight of negative attitude to Russian actions in Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders in terms of language used by the Assembly in its resolutions, since it was the only time when the wording "Russian war against Ukraine" was employed.
Since then, the attention of the Parliamentary Assembly had shifted from balancing between recommendations to both Ukraine and the Russian Federation to virtually sole calls on Russia for some actions. Condemnation of pressure put on minorities in Crimea as well as of some allegedly politically-motivated charges against Ukrainian citizens and mistreatment of such prisoners in Russia appeared once again on Resolution 2231 dated 28 June 2018 o n "Ukrainian citizens detained as political prisoners by the Russian Federation". The issue of illegal imprisoning was also the main theme of Resolution 2259 dated 24 January 2019 on "The escalation of tensions around the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait and threats to European security" that followed the Kerch Strait ship capture by Russian warships in disputed waters near Crimea on 25 November 2018. The call on Russia to release the Ukrainian servicemen and guarantee freedom of passage in the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait in accordance with the established legal norms was voiced in the document.
The last resolution adopted by the Assembly so far in relation to Ukrainian crisis marked total failure of the Council of Europe's strategy of sanctioning the Russian Federation for its actions in Southern and Eastern Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders. Resolution 2292 dated 26 June 2019 on "Challenge, on substantive grounds, of the still unratified credentials of the parliamentary delegation of the Russian Federation" stated that the Assembly decided to ratify credentials of the Russian delegation without any preconditions, therefore lifting all the sanctions imposed on it earlier. As long as the Russian delegation, predictably, returned to the Parliamentary Assembly thereafter, the resolution ended the 4-year-long Russian protest suspension of cooperation with the Assembly as well as Russia's refusal to pay its annual fees to the Council of Europe's budget since 2017.
As mentioned before, the strategy of procedural sanctions of the Assembly against Russia proved to be totally ineffective and even harmful for the Council of Europe. Several outcomes of this policy point at the fact that it was erroneous. First, besides some minor concessions under international pressure, such as release of several prisoners who were connected to the armed conflict in the East, none of the basic requirements about its actions in Ukraine that were initially set as prerequisites for lifting the sanctions were ever fulfilled by the Russian Federation. Second, the Assembly lost the opportunity to have a meaningful dialogue with Russia as a result of its sanctions. Third, the image of the Council of Europe as a Pan-European platform for international dialogue was undermined. Fourth, disproportionate representation of Russia in the Council of Europe emerged, when it was present in one statutory organ, the Committee of Ministers, while being absent in the other, the Assembly. Fifth, the strategy led to a severe budgetary crisis threatening the Council of Europe's key activities when Russia ceased paying its annual contributions. The origins of such a mistake made by the Assembly can be viewed in the fact that it overestimated the value of participation in its sittings for Russia. It expected the Russian Federation to give up its policies concerning Ukraine under the threat to lose some privileges of full membership in the Parliamentary Assembly, which was not the case. This misconception in the end resulted in the situation when it was the Assembly that showed its weakness, didn't adhere to its earlier decisions and made concessions
in order to return the Russian parliamentary delegation to the premises of the Council of Europe. It can be said that the crisis demonstrated that the Council of Europe needed the Russian Federation more than the Russian Federation needed the Council of Europe.
Summing up the contribution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe to resolution of the Ukrainian crisis, it must be said that the Assembly's toolkit to influence the situation appeared to be quite limited, which originates from the scope of powers granted to it by the Statute. In the texts of its resolutions, most of the time the Assembly confined itself to declarations, calls and condemnations that the parties involved were frequently reluctant to take into account. The only concrete practical measure taken, namely procedural sanctions against Russia, proved to be ineffective, as shown above. Among the three dimensions into which activity of the Assembly can be divided, the good governance and the humanitarian ones, that were aimed at tackling the consequences of the crisis, were the most salient. Nevertheless, there are two features that helped the Assembly make a substantial contribution to influencing the conflict. First, it, indeed, was the platform for Pan-European dialogue among nations that helped coordinate those further political decisions that were made at the national level by the European governments as regards the situation in Ukraine. Second, the Assembly was the body to effectively transmit to the national delegations the findings, opinion and field data from other bodies acting within the Council of Europe, such as the Monitoring Committee, the European Commission for Democracy through Law (the Venice Commission), the International Advisory Panel, etc. So, the Parliamentary Assembly's main role in the Ukrainian crisis lay in the field of information and communication among the European sovereign states.
The Committee of Ministers
Generally, the Committee of Ministers followed the same strategy, within its competence, as the Parliamentary Assembly in responding to the events of the Ukrainian crisis. Probably, due to a smaller number of members (47 ministers or their representatives as opposed to 324 delegates in the Assembly) and therefore easier coordination among them, the Committee of Ministers was normally able to express its opinion and take certain action concerning the situation in Ukraine faster than the Assembly. The Committee's decisions, that are the subject of analysis, were more concise in their nature and contained much less background facts and calls for action compared to resolutions of the Assembly. This demonstrates the fact that the resolutions were designed for broader publicity and expansion of outreach of the Council of Europe's position beyond the premises of the organization. On the contrary, the decisions of the Committee of Ministers, that is the major decision-making body of the Council of Europe, were designed for a much smaller number of people but contained the most important executive directives.
Unlike the Parliamentary Assembly, the Committee of Ministers didn't clearly take the side of protesters that challenged the sudden change of policy of Ukrainian authorities concerning the association agreement with the EU in 2013. The Committee's statement dated 18 December 2013 simply advocated peaceful and democratic resolution of the emerging crisis in Ukraine and comprehensive dialogue between the government and the opposition. And following the change of power in Ukraine in February 2014 the deputies tried to draw attention to the need for deepening reforms in a democratic manner and in compliance with international law. In Committee's decision dated 26 February 2014 the body also expressed readiness of the Council of Europe to assist Ukraine by means of its legal expertise, activity of the Secretary General and the International Advisory Panel as well as by starting to prepare the new Action Plan for Ukraine.
At the moment when the Russian Federation just started being involved in the events of the Ukrainian political crisis the Committee of Ministers acted immediately but carefully by stressing the need to check the legality of the referendum about the status of Crimea to be held on the peninsula. However, as early as 20 March 2014 it passed the decision condemning the referendum conducted by the Crimean local authorities, that at that time was already characterized as contradicting Ukrainian legislation, as well as the decision of the Russian authorities to admit the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (an entity with special status, located on the Crimean Peninsula) into the Russian Federation. The Committee's decision became the basis for the Council of Europe's further position concerning Russian presence in Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders. The next two decisions dated 3 April 2014 and 16 April 2014 reiterated Committee's disapproval of the referendum in Crimea and its subsequent integration into the Russian Federation. They called on Russia and Ukraine to "abide... without delay the with the interim measure granted by the European Court of Human Rights following the Inter-State application lodged by Ukraine" as well as invited the Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities to continue to closely monitor the situation of national minorities throughout Ukraine.
In the decisions dated 17 September 2014 and 24 October 2014 the Committee of Ministers shaped the position of the Council of Europe regarding the armed conflict that broke out in Eastern Ukraine and the role of Russia in it. The Committee drew on the report of the Secretary General on his visits to Kyiv and Moscow in early September and called on Russia to influence the armed groups in the East to de-escalate the conflict. Like the Assembly, the Committee saw respect for the Minsk agreements as the core step to resolution of the conflict. With advancement of the conflict the humanitarian issues both in Crimea and in the East started appearing on the Committee's agenda at that time.
It can be seen that 7 of the 15 decisions of the Committee of Ministers related to the Ukrainian crisis were adopted in 2014 - the year of the highest level of tensions in Ukraine. They were addressing the most urgent events, mainly focused on the issue of territorial integrity of Ukraine and expressed the Council's opposition to Russian policies in Crimea and Donbass. They also initiated the humanitarian agenda that would become the key issue for further discussion within the Parliamentary Assembly. This characterizes the Committee as the body within the Council of Europe that reacts most rapidly to pressing issues and transmits the impulse to other bodies designed to fulfill more specific tasks concerning the problem, such as the Secretary General, the Commissioner for Human Rights and the International Advisory Panel. And after shaping the agenda on the key points of the issue the Committee of Ministers leaves it for these bodies to implement its decisions as well as for the Parliamentary Assembly to hold further, more detailed, discussions of the issue.
The decision of the Committee of Ministers dated 21 January 2015 approved the Council of Europe Action Plan for Ukraine 2015-2017. This document as well as its successor became the Council's major contribution to promotion of its good governance agenda in Ukraine at the time of severe political and military conflict. The Action Plan wasn't basically designed to tackle humanitarian issues and was mainly focused on constitutional, judiciary and decentralization reforms, fight against corruption and respect for human rights, with total budget of €45 million originating from ordinary budget of the Council of Europe and voluntary contributions. The authors of the document defined its aim as support for Ukraine "in fulfilling its statutory and specific obligations as a Council of Europe member state and [contribution] towards addressing fundamental issues of human rights and rule of law in Ukraine". Nevertheless, for obvious reasons, the Plan also contributed to humanitarian assistance and mitigation of the consequences of war in the East, namely in the field of IDPs protection. Decision of the Committee of Ministers dated 15 April 2015, inter alia, welcomed some of the first reforms conducted in line with the Action Plan. The final report on the Action Plan 2015-2017 stated that, despite security, economic and political constrains relating to annexation of Crimea as well as the conflict in eastern Ukraine, the country was rather successful in implementing the key aspects outlined by the Plan.
The two following decisions dated 27 April 2016 and 3 May 2017 appeared to be so far the latest ones directly related to the conflict between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. The Committee focused its attention on some alleged violations of human rights by the Russian authorities in Crimea that were effectively controlling the peninsula. In particular, the Committee expressed its concern about freedom of media, NGOs and rights of minorities and called on the Russian Federation for action in this respect.
The practical outcomes of the Action Plan for Ukraine 2015-2017 were discussed in the decision dated 8 November 2017 - at the time when the next steps concerning promotion of the values of the Council of Europe in Ukraine had to be approved shortly. Generally, the Committee demonstrated its satisfaction with the pace of constitutional and judicial reforms as well as institutional dimension of fight against corruption in Ukraine. Therefore, the Council of Europe Action Plan for Ukraine 2018-2021 was approved on 21 February 2018. It kept its strong focus on promoting the Council of Europe's values in Ukraine. With its amended structure of goals, the Plan was divided into three parts that were designed, respectively, to strengthen observance of human rights, rule of law and democracy in Ukraine. Once again, the Plan also indirectly aimed at overcoming the consequences of humanitarian crisis that followed the active phase of the armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine. On 1 July 2020, having taken notes of the progress review report on implementation of the Action Plan for Ukraine 2018-2021, the deputies of the Committee of Ministers decided to extend the Action Plan until the end of 2022 "to enable all the objectives set therein to be achieved". The latest Action Plan is currently in force and its effectiveness is still to be proved by further reports.
So, generally the Committee of Ministers was acting in line with the Parliamentary Assembly throughout the period from 2013 to 2020. Its decisions constituted rapid reaction to pressing issues in Ukraine and preceded further more detailed discussions within the Assembly. This demonstrates a high level of coordination and complementarity between the two statutory bodies of the Council of Europe. Unlike the Assembly, the Committee of Ministers paid considerably less attention to humanitarian issues in Ukraine in its official documents. Among the three thematic dimensions of agenda on the Ukrainian crisis the Committee was most active in the field of territorial integrity and good governance questions. The former was expressed through its numerous decisions in 2014 following that year's d ramatic developments. The latter was mainly enshrined in the 2 Action Plans for Ukraine that were adopted during the crisis. These Plans turned out to be the most salient direct contribution of the Council of Europe to promoting reforms and rule of law as well as to alleviating some consequences of humanitarian crisis in Ukraine in 2015-2020. The Committee of Ministers vastly relied on several subsidiary bodies of the Council of Europe in collecting field data, delivering it to the deputies, implementing its directives and providing necessary communication with the parties involved in the conflict. Cooperation of the Committee with the Secretary General, the International Advisory Panel, the Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the Venice Commission appeared to be the most active and fruitful in the case.
Conclusion
Analysis of the documents adopted by the two statutory bodies of the Council of Europe in relation to the Ukrainian crisis since 2013 showed that both of them took active part in trying to find the solution to the issue, with the decisions of the Committee of Ministers preceding the corresponding actions of the Parliamentary Assembly, as a rule. However, both the Committee and the Assembly proved to have a limited toolkit to practically defend its position that implied full solidarity with Ukraine and opposition to Russian policies on the Ukrainian territory within its internationally recognized borders.
The Council of Europe's agenda on the Ukrainian crisis can be divided into 3 thematic sections, namely good governance, territorial integrity and humanitarian issues. The Parliamentary Assembly in its resolutions mostly emphasized the good governance and the humanitarian components, while the Committee of Ministers in its decisions mainly focused on territorial integrity and good governance. Overall, the Council of Europe's good governance policies, accelerated by the change of power in 2014 and reshaped by the Russian strategy as regards Ukraine, were the most salient on the agenda, mainly because of the Action Plans for Ukraine that were constantly in force and were several times actualized over the course of the crisis.
In their activities both the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly relied on the Council of Europe's subsidiary bodies, such as the Venice Commission and the International Advisory Panel in terms of legal consulting, the Monitoring Committee and the Commissioner for Human Rights in terms of monitoring and reporting, the Secretary General in terms of decision implementation. They also demonstrated their aspiration for broader cooperation with other organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, etc.
Generally, the actions of the Council of Europe had moderate effect on mitigation of the consequences of the Ukrainian crisis events. They appeared to be the most helpful in the field of consulting the Ukrainian government on reforms and treatment of IDPs as well as other victims of war; monitoring, collecting field data and spreading it among the Council of Europe member states; lifting the importance of the issue to the Pan-European level; drawing up and financing Action Plans for Ukraine. On the other hand, the Council's efforts to influence geopolitical dimension of the conflict proved to be totally unsuccessful, and sanctioning Russia within the Parliamentary Assembly turned out not only to be ineffective but also to some extent harmful for the Council of Europe itself.
Therefore, it can be concluded that the Council of Europe has a limited potential for resolving such political and territorial crises as the one broken out in Ukraine in 2014, with its most important role of being a respected platform for discussion of the broad range of issues and for coordination among the European governments.
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