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Вестник Челябинского государственного университета. 2019. № 2 (424). Философские науки. Вып. 51. С. 12-18.
УДК 140.8 DOI 10.24411/1994-2796-2019-10202
ББК 87.2
A TENTATIVE ANALYSIS OF CONSCIOUSNESS: IDEALEMA A.B. Nevelev, A.Ya. Kamaletdinova
Chelyabinsk State University, Chelyabinsk, Russia. filos@csu.ru
A notion of the idealema and a method of its specific study is contained in K. Marx's methodological research. An objective cogitative form constitues the structure of the "idealema".
Key words: consciousness; property of being ideal; property of being material; subjectivity; activity; cogitative form; relations; idea; idealema.
Cognitive actions of an epistemological subject with respect to an object of knowledge have their own specificity, but ultimately they are determined by objective grounds and rooted in social-and-historical practice. What are the bases of those procedures that we perform for studying consciousness and its relative independence?
Proceeding from some ultimate grounds, let us turn to consequences which logically result from them. The subjectivity of the world created by man is based on a form of being. The subjectivity of the world being created by man is a living process of formation. In both cases, we deal with material subjectivity which has removed or removes the objectivity of the material world, while denying the latter's independence from human goals but not the latter's materiality. In a process of labour, a a human forms the surrounding material reality according to their needs. They transcend their subjectivity outwardly, materially asserting themselves, overcoming the resistance of objective natural forces, and benefiting from these forces "mutually exhausting" one another.
A formation of being of an order higher than the natural one is taking shape. A set of social relations is developing. The objective nature of this set is another own manifestation of mutual subjective orientation in activities of humans, when everyone pursues their goals. But a result of the aggregate movement appears to be independent from individual subjective intentions. Subjectivity becomes its opposite due to "collisions of volitions". And a human subordinates eventually objective laws of the social development to their own will, asserting subjectivity at a new level. Ideal subjectivity reflects the material subjectivity of a human (D.I. Dubrovsky identifies it with the ideal), i. e. a directed activity of consciousness is carried out in the tideway of the material activity of humans who possess this consciousness. K. Marx considers the interdependence of external material activity and internal
ideal activity (in the Introduction to his labour "Zur Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie" ["The Criticism of Political Economy"]), while characterising production in its connection with consumption, when production supplies consumption with a product in the latter's external form, whereas consumption supplies production with a product in the latter's internal form (an ideal need). An intention of consciousness, set by a need, is determined by an object and method of consumption and in principle it cannot achieve "absolute self-will". Consequently, ideal subjectivity also reflects the objective resistance of natural and social forces that a a human tries to overmaster materially. Therefore, even in the sphere of their consciousness, they cannot "do" "anything they like" with the reality. The material subjectivity of a human, taken as their transformation of nature/labour is implemented when they "build their movement according to the form" of a natural body [5, p. 34]. Material subjectivity which treats of humans in their social connection, "builds its movement in the form" of a public "body".
Accordingly, ideal subjectivity of the first kind reflects the transformation of nature by man. Ideal subjectivity of the second kind reflects the transformation of society by man. Human consciousness reflects two series of objective laws. These series can be separated from one other only in abstraction. Hence, the relative independence of consciousness in the unity of its aspects depends on a measure of the use of these objective laws in practical and spiritual activities.
The concept of subjectivity (in its material and ideal forms) is a maximally general reflection of the mediating motion between the material and the ideal. The material, when specified, is disclosed as social material conditions under which a human activity is performed, and the ideal — as a socially determined reflection of an activity in consciousness. Subjectivity itself is exposed as a socially-and-culturally stipulated activity. The categories of the material and the ideal,
while continuing to be ultimate philosophical-and-methodological guidelines of the objective and the subjective give way to concepts that permit investigating the phenomenon of the relative independence of consciousness within the framework of socio-practical and historical specialisation. In due course, D.I. Du-brovsky came forward with a criticism of the reduc-tive-and-object-related approach to consciousness, which found expression in "an extreme schematism of a historical description in which it is bare event-fulness that dominates, whereas humans who make history are presented there either as portrait images and well-simulated mannequins that mark out events (but not as a humanalities creating these events) or as interchangeable ghosts barely showing through in an event line of " [4, p. 212].
It is necessary to replace "bare eventfulness" with historically-specific eventfulness. A return to a particular a human is not a case of penetration into their corporeal existence, it is an exit leading to other humans surrounding them, taken in their specifically-historical connection. We share V.A. Lektorskiy's view about consciousness and cognition. "A scientific understanding of a cognitive relation involves a consistent advancement of a view regarding a unity of reflection and activity. However, this only becomes possible, in its turn, provided that both a subject and their activities are understood in their socio-cultural and historical conditionality, if it is recognised that a subject's object-related-and-practical and cognitive activity are mediated by their relation to other subjects" [8, p. 306].
In other words, humans are "authors" and "characters of their own drama" [12, p. 138]. "The drama" calls them into existence both materially, when they "write" it, entering into relations, and ideally, when the relations are fixed on the surface of a social system, at a phenomenological level, in the consciousness of humans, in ideal motives of their activities. Their relation to the reality is twofold: on the one hand, humans keep in a directly-sensual connection/cohesion with natural and social things, and on the other hand, they stay in a direct connection with other humans by means of these things. In this regard, every a human reflects these material relations in their consciousness.
Both in the case of a connection "man — thing" and a relation "man — man" a collective acts as a mediator, or a cohesive link, which is a certain internally coherent totality of other humans different from participants of a direct connection. The collective's material subjectivity falls into the mainstream of certain socio-historical subjectivity and socio-objective forms
of activity, which act as a limit of analytical penetration into specifically-historical consciousness.
Let us turn to some basic verities of the reductive-and-object-related analysis of consciousness, which were discovered by L.A. Feuerbach, and to the methodology of this analysis (K. Marx) [13; 17]. The methodology of the reductive-and-object-related analysis of consciousness was, in our opinion, one of the most important methodological "fulcrums" by means of which scholars of Marxism made a revolutionary upheaval in philosophy. The revelation of an objective mental form — a means of theoretical "work" with mass and individual consciousnesses in their interdependence — is a result of the application of the methodology of reductive-and-object-related analysis of consciousness. Dissatisfied with the scholastic theorising of abstract thinking, L.A. Feuerbach puts forward some principles of a philosophy of the future: "What is absolutely impossible for one human to do alone, is possible for two humans" [13, p. 149]. Other humans' activities are incorporated into a human's activity, both in a living and a materialised form. Any activity of a human is a joint activity, although they can do it sometimes without the direct involvement of other humans [2, p. 116]. When "a human acts according to historically formed ways of activity", then they act like other humans. Humans' activity is an example of a human's activity [10, p. 52], a human's activity is an example of humans' activity.
While D.I. Dubrovsky interprets public-and-object-related forms of activity as frozen schemes, as something that is solely "having become", M.K. Mamar-dashvili noted — by further developing the understanding of consciousness — that "... Marx produces the following abstraction: he incorporates a special link, a coherent system of content-rich social relations, relations of the exchange of activities [the italic type is applied here by the authors of the present paper], which results in a differentiated and hierarchical structure into the space between two members of the relation 'an object (a material body, a sign of social values) — human subjectivity', which are the only entities given on the surface" [10, p. 17]. An exchange of activities between humans is properly a process of continuous becoming, and living personalities are direct participants of the becoming, from whom it is impossible to abstract in applying the reductive-and-object-related approach to consciousness. In a lifeful activity, in an activity-oriented cohesion with the environment, they are creators and carriers of social-and-object-related forms of activity, which they display in their consciousness. Their social-and-object-related activity is
a social-and-object-related form of the consciousness of everyone of them.
A human processes nature "as others", they conceive nature as "this", and themselves as "these" who handle "this" nature. It is a lifeful way of the existence of consciousness, a form of consciousness. An individual human is a carrier of consciousness, but society and other humans in their active cohesion are a means of understanding. Since consciousness act here as an object-matter of thought, so its social-and-object-related form is kind of pushed to the periphery, as if framing it. We deal here with an objective mental form [11, p. 386-389]. Actual relations in this form are "obliterated" up to very abstract schemes. For an individual, the public-and-object-related activities of other humans, which has stipulated the former's consciousness, may eo ipso seem to be (and seems to be) an immanent activity of consciousness. However, fixing the relative independence of an objective mental form, a philosophical analysis of relations of cognitive procedures cannot and should not be confined with a scheme of real human relations. It must be sublimated to qualitatively specific real social relations, as to a limit of a analysis of consciousness.
If we sum up some preliminary results, we will get the following: firstly, the ultimate foundation of consciousness and of its relative independence is a material object-related-and-sensual activity of each individual human, which is performed by them jointly with other humans. In the course of this activity, an individual human, a carrier of consciousness, always take a certain position in relation to other individuals. This position is the drawing the "bare subjectivity" [3, p. 69] of an individual, a means of their interaction with nature and other humans and their place in a historically specific system of social activity. Secondly, other humans, taken in their connection with nature, with natural and social things, as well as in their association with one another relative to the consciousness of this human, act as a form of consciousness. This is an objective mental form.
The enumeration of objective bases of cognitive procedures in the study of the relative independence of consciousness with the use of the reductive-and-object-related analysis enabled to draw a conclusion that the first cognitive action is the reduction of the consciousness of individuals to specific socio-historical relations. In the heritage of scholars of Marxism, we find the first step of this cognitive procedure. Well-known are, for example, such statements and notes of theirs as: " .. a relation, what philosophers call the idea****"; "Forphilosophers, a relation is equivalent
to an idea. They only know the relation of "Man" to himself, and therefore all real relations become ideas for them" [14, p. 64]; "the bringing-together of all the philosophical categories or names of these relations," [14, p. 84]; "... and did not affect these thoughts, because they express actual relations" [14, p. 113].
K. Marx makes some very valuable remarks shedding light on his understanding the mechanism of "the transplantation" of the material to a human's head in his work "Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie" [An Essay of the Criticism of Political Economy, Economical Manuscripts of1857-1859 (the Russian title)]. "I equate each commodity to something third, i. e. I consider it to be unequal to itself. This is the third, different from both the commodities, since it expresses a certain relation only existing at first in the mind, in vision, as generally relations can only be mentally imagined, if one wants to fix them as distinguished from those individuals who maintain some or other relations with one another" [the italic type is applied here by the authors of the present paper] [15, p. 84]. A relation "outside" of related parties is an objective mental form.
Before being abstracted from some interacting parties, a relation should be a material cohesion of these parties. Oftentimes repeating and universalising itself, an interaction is fixed in relatively stable "figures" which present themselves as parties of a material interaction to an individual. Each of the parties outside the direct interaction presents this relation to the individual and "transplants" it into the human's head. A relation in this case more often exists as an imagination "weighed down" by the body of a related party. Here lies a contradiction of "inequality to itself ": a relation as such should be fixed in its definiteness specifically, outside of related parties. Therefore, while material relations of individuals develop, "a lift-off" of a relation from related parties and the its "fusion" with an objectively "chosen" thing are prepared [11, p. 387]. The contradiction is resolved by presenting itself in a new form: something is singled out from the entirety of specific being as "the third" which performs a function of expressing and manifesting the relation as such.
A reduction of consciousness to relations is highlighting the identity of consciousness and relationship, but just as one cannot but take the specific way of the being of consciousness into account, so consciousness and relations are immediate and different. Consciousness is a relation that has acquired holistic relative independence from parties entering into a relation, it is an idealised relation. Related parties are "obliterated"
in it, systematised and condensed to simple variants of a relation "broken away" from them. Thus, the differentiation of consciousness and relations is the next cognitive procedure after identification.
As it follows from the methodology of reductive-and-object-related expression of mass consciousness in an objective mental form, a material relation which forms in the real life activity of individuals acts as a specific basis of its objective mental form. The formation and development of a material relation as a basis of an objective mental form specifies levels of the relations and development of this form.
While gaining the power of prejudice, an objective mental form, preserves the specificity of a material social connection that has formed it, of the real life activity of individuals, whereas the latter develops meanwhile, preparing new forms of relations and their comprehension. A change of objective mental forms and forms of consciousness is determined by material changes in the basis of the consciousness of individuals. An objective mental form (which has become a mass prejudice, an automatism of consciousness), on the one hand, has some socio-psychological mechanisms of dissemination by simulating a sample, contamination, suggestion, and on the other hand, it can be expressed at the level of both intellectuality and mind.
Therefore, an analysis of the relative independence of consciousness according to objective mental forms, which presupposes the consideration of the genesis of its independence, should be a study of the interconnected forms and basis of consciousness. Objective mental forms taken by themselves have no history. An initiative which develops them proceeds from the change of a place of individuals in the system of a real life activity. This yields a need for such a methodological procedure as the combination of a form and basis of consciousness which are studied. Only in this case there appears an opportunity for considering an objective mental form historically. As a result of methodological procedures of the identification of material relations and consciousness, of their differentiation according to a way of being, of the combination of a form and basis of consciousness, the relative independence of consciousness presents itself as an idealised object.
The combining procedure needs to be explained. Its sufficient foundations are rooted in a real life activity of individuals. An individual identifies themselves with some humans and distinguishes themselves from others with the help of a foundation of consciousness in the course of their joint activities with other humans.
Those humans with whom an individual identifies themselves — while performing a role of one of aspects concerning a form of their consciousness — represent an active, actively relative and initiative pole of a form and the embodied knowledge of an individual about themselves.
In a human's directly-joint activity (directly-social) involving other humans, the activity of others has not only some tangible outcome, but also an ideal result in the form of an act of man's consciousness. Other humans make up a living form of his consciousness. In an indirectly-joint activity, other humans' activity is presented in a materialised form, as a scheme, as a stark form. In this case, man himself acts as a revitalising form of his thinking, acting "as another one" despite the fact that this is a form of his consciousness. It has the well-known independence from man. This is clear from the above-described way of the being of consciousness. It is also clear that consciousness can only develop in accordance with the evolution of its basis and its form.
An idealised object obtained as a result of applying procedures of reduction, deduction and combination covers the conjugation of consciousness and being that is reflected in it within the sphere of the reality. In case that the identification of a permissible interval of abstraction imposes epistemological and logical limitations on the problem of the relative independence of consciousness, then a basis of consciousness and a form of consciousness, taken together, impose categorical restrictions on the relative independence of consciousness, outlining the space-time continuum of consciousness.
In this regard, judgments about the relative independence of consciousness obtain object-related verity through establishing its material prerequisites. Boundaries of theorising get both logical and historical conditionality. An advantage of the reductive-and-object-related approach to consciousness consists in this. As we have noted, M. K. Mamardashvili for one, who refers to K. Marx as the creator of this methodology, is elaborating the methodology of the reductive-and-object-related approach in his works. In this respect, it is insufficient only to understand the role of objective mental forms in Marx's analysis of consciousness. These forms, taken in isolation from a basis of consciousness, do not "hold water". A basis of consciousness individualises a form of consciousness and allows one to explore the consciousness of this individual. Thus, an organic unity of social consciousness and individual consciousness is achieved. The material specificity of an individual's place in the
system of the life activity of individuals is removed in material relations, and the specificity of relations is withdrawn in an objective mental form which does not soar outside of the consciousness of individuals but modifies itself depending on the material specificity of an individual's place in the system of their life activity. Conjugating a basis and form of consciousness, it is possible to close the cycle of the said metamorphoses, i. e. to investigate the relative independence of consciousness as a whole. Aspects of this form as an idealised integral object making up its content are a basis of consciousness and a polarised form. The poles of the form are the following: a relative form of consciousness and an equivalent form of consciousness.
It would seem that the categories that Marx used in characterising a form of value (and in fact — a form of the consciousness of commodity producers) have a general philosophical meaning, which goes beyond proper political and economic problems in analysing any form of consciousness. Drawing an analogy between a form of value and a form of gravity, a form of subordination, K. Marx himself gives rise to an expansive interpretation of the methodology of studying of consciousness, developed by him. A form of value is also a form of thinking. All procedures relating to the polarisation of a form of value as a form of thinking are applicable to other forms of thinking, consciousness. They are applicable both to social forms and natural forms. In analogies which K. Marx adduces he shows the universatility of the developed methodology of the analysis of consciousness based on objective mental forms.
The content of the relative independence of consciousness as an idealised object, as we have seen, is not covered by the content of the concept of "objective mental form". An essential feature of the conjugation of an objective mental form with a basis of consciousness is added. Therefore, in this case we deal with a new concept, the content of which is close to that of the concept of "idea". V.I. Lenin noted that the idea is a unity of a notion with the reality [9, p. 151] when making notes of Hegel's works. "The most complete coincidence of the content of a thought with the objective reality occurs in the idea" [6, p. 201]. "The idea is an end of knowledge and a beginning of a thing" [7, p. 249]. In the idea, theoretical knowledge develops up to a threshold of self-denial, up to a transition to the practical sphere. As far as an idealised object is concerned, it presupposes, in its development, "checking by means of facts... by means of practice... at every step of an analysis " [9, p. 302]. It implies its "threshold of denial", its objectively determined border.
In this regard, an analysis of "the Napoleonic ideas", which is performed by K. Marx in the work "Der Achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte" [The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon], is very indicative. The specifically-historical consciousness of the epoch of bourgeois revolutions does not act as an independent element of an analysis. In the idea, as Marx takes it, all essential aspects of social life are presented, and the development of a certain form of ownership appears as a leading point of the evolution of ideas.
"Napoleon's ideas" originated from aparcella. "... All "Napoleonic ideas" are those of an undeveloped and youthfully cheerful parcella; they are meaningless for an antiquated parcella, nothing more than a hallucination of its mortal agony, words that became phrases, spirits that became ghosts" [16, p. 213]. An objective mental form which removed the specificity of a basis of consciousness (of a parcella) is grasped here both from the side of incipiency and from the side of transiency. It is clear that the quintessence of Marx's methodology — establishing the conjugation of an objective mental form with a basis of consciousness: an arisen idea is associated with a basis (with " a youthful cheerful parcella") and a dying idea is associated with a basis (with "an antiquated parcella"). Each step of the analysis here is verified by way of referring to the specifically-historical practice.
If one tries to single out the methodology used here — in a general philosophical form — then the idealised object in question is revealed as a result of the application of this methodology. An advantage of the methodology consists in that K. Marx fractio-nises a unified whole, that is the consciousness of a specifically-historical epoch of a country's development, into such units, blocks, which retain properties of the whole in their main essential features. Such a dissection is an inorganic interference that disrupts the life of consciousness. K. Marx's unit of analysis, according to E.G. Yudin, "provides reference both to empirism and to available means of an analysis" [18, p. 308]. L.S. Vygotsky identified a similar type of analysis as "... an analysis that dismembers a complex unified whole into units. Under a unit we mean such a product of an analysis which unlike elements possesses all the main properties inherent to the whole and which represents some further unrealisable living parts of this unity" [1, p. 15].
In our case, the integrity of an idealised object is characterised by a unity of an objective mental form and a reflection over the form's bases. The dissecting-away of an objective mental form from its basis deprives it of life inherent to the whole. Thus, K. Marx's
resorting to a specifically-historical form of private property, to a specific form of private property and to a specific form of the social division of labour [14, p. 31] represents a reflection over the basis of "the Napoleonic ideas". This reflection immediately offers a clue to the dissection of such an object as the comprehension of an epoch in the object's development.
K. Marx's fixation of a material basis of this variety of consciousness is a decisive step towards penetration into the consciousness of an epoch. It is an objective mental form representing such a basis that determines "the Napoleonic ideas", and the objective destruction of this basis leads to the transformation of the objective mental form (correspondingly, the ideas) into nonsense. An analysis of consciousness and its relative independence is doomed even to a greater deal of nonsense in case of some principled assumption which takes intervals of abstraction beyond permissible limits. A unit of an analysis of consciousness in the latter's relative independence is determined by the objective differentiation of a basis of consciousness. So, individual private property that specified the relation of exchange, determines the relation's specific character and the specificity of exchange as an objective mental form (the specificity of economic consciousness).
The content of an idealised object, although it is close to that of an idea as a concept, has its own specificity. While an idea is a unity of concept and the reality, an idealised object representing a phenomenon of the relative independence of consciousness is a unity of an objective mental form and the latter's specific material basis. An objective mental form may be summarised in a concept, depending on a level of development, or it may only determine pre-conceptual forms (a perception, a presentation). A new content of an idealised object requires a special concept and a new term for its designation. Considering the proximity of a new concept to that of an idea, we call it an idealema.
An idealema is, on the one hand, a designation of a fundamentally stable set of thoughts and social feelings of humans, generated by a homotypic material basis of a mode of their life activity and intended to assert and validate this mode, and, on the other hand, it is a means of performing the most adequate analysis of the relative independence of consciousness of a specifically-historical epoch. An analysis of the relative independence of consciousness based on idealemas as units of integrity allows one to correctly state and theoretically solve a problem of studying the relative independence of consciousness as an organic whole, in a unity of its aspects. "A basis of an idealema", "a relative form of an idealema", "an equivalent form of
an idealema" represent aspects of an idealema as an idealised object which synthesises in it an objective mental form and a basis of consciousness. The relative and equivalent forms are a result of the polarisation of an objective mental form. A mode/a scheme of an individual's active relation/activity, which is determined by a basis of an idealema, is summarised in a relative form of an idealema. A result of an individual's active relation/activity, determined by a mode of activity, is summarised in an equivalent form of an idealema.
A basis of an idealema, its relative and equivalent forms form together its structure. Some inner "anxiety" is objectively inherent to an idealema as a holistic unit of an analysis, which determines its life. It is a unity of opposites. A relation of contradiction/an internal tension exists between its basis and a polarised form. In its basis, an idealema is rigidly defined by a place of an individual in a material specifically-historical developing process. A continuous change is intrinsic to a basis. A polarised form, on the contrary, is conservative, while fixing a certain invariant of changes. As "a figure" of these changes, it contains an aspect of independence from them and is objectively transferred and extrapolated from one change to another.
It is important not only to understand the structure of an idealema, but also how to operate with it. A theoretical operation with an idealema as an idealised object is determined by this internal contradiction. An idealema is a dynamic reflection of a developing process, and since it necessarily involves reflection over its basis and self-renewal in accordance with the latter's development, it is constantly aimed either at the future, being the latter's prediction, or at the past, becoming a way of the latter's theoretical reconstruction. Many scholars call a general mechanism of prediction, which they study, extrapolation. Not only a prediction but also the lagging-behind of consciousness is grasped by a mechanism of extrapolation, when an obsolete objective mental form which no longer corresponds to objective conditions continues to play an active role, influencing minds of humans. Extrapolation, therefore, is a single mechanism of incipient and transient reflection over the relative independence of consciousness. And with respect to the content of an idealema, extrapolation represents a form of the former's evolvement. A process of constituting an idealema is the latter's extrapolation.
The structure of the content of an idealema determines that of a form of the latter's evolvement, extrapolation. A basis of an idealema determines a basis of extrapolation, the initial knowledge of which may not be realised by an individual and which may continue
to be implicit knowledge [8, p. p. 251-256]. A relative form of an idealema determines the extrapolation of a mode of activity. An equivalent form of an idealema determines a measure of extrapolation. Since there is an organic connection between components of the content structure of an idealema, the same connection exists between components of the extrapolation structure of an idealema.
No analysis of the relative independence of consciousness based on idealemas as units of its integ-
rity cannot be performed outside of the specifically-historical consciousness. This is a requirement of the latter's nature. An analysis based on idealemas can be implemented with respect to any consciousness — political, moral, economic. Since every kind of consciousness rises above corresponding relations, so it is possible to determine the latter's mental form through a study of relations, and obtain an idealema of a given type of consciousness by correlating these forms with relations.
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