CC BY
74
A modal account of the initial position
3. Клочек Г. Д. “Душа моя сонця намр1яла...”: поетика “Сонячних кларнеив” Павла Тичини./Г. Д. Клочек. - К.: Дншро, 1986. - 367 с.
4. Коцюбинська М. Василь Стус./М. Коцюбинська//1стор1я укра'шсько! литературы ХХ стол1ття: навч. поаб.: у 2 кн./за ред. В. Г. Дончика. - 2-ге вид. - К.: ЛибДь, 1995. - Кн. 2. 1960-1990-т1 роки. - С. 184-193.
5. Левицкий В. В. Семантика и фонетика./В. В. Левицкий. - Черновцы, 1973. - 104 с.
6. Лггературознавчий словник-довДник; [за ред. Р. Т. Гром’яка, Ю. I. Ковалева, В. I. Теремка]. - К.: Академ1я, 2007. - 752 с.
7. Моренець В. Микола Вшграновський./В. Моренець//1стор1я укра'шсько! лзтератури. ХХ стол1ття: навч. поаб.: у 2 кн./за ред. В. Г. Дончика. - 2-ге вид. - К.: ЛибДь, 1995. - Кн. 2.: 1960-1990-т роки. - С. 124-136.
8. Радищев А. Н. Избранные сочинения./А. Н. Радищев; подгот. текста и вступ. ст. Г. П. Макагоненко. - М.: Худож. лит., 1952. - 711 с.
9. Родько М. Д. “Сонячш кларнети” Павла Тичини./М. Д. Родько//Укра'шська мова i лиература в школь - 1968. -№ 1. - С. 5-9.
10. Телия В. Н. Коннотативный аспект семантики номинативных единиц./В. Н. Телия. - М.: Наука, 1986. - 144 с.
11. Украшська мова: енциклопед1я./В. М. Русашвський, О. О. Тараненко, М. П. Зяблюк та ш. - К.: “Укр. енцикл.”, 2000. - 752 с.
Cipriani Enrico, University of Turin (IT), Department of Philosophy, PhD Student E-mail: enrico.cipriani@edu.unito.it
A modal account of the initial position
Abstract: Rawls’s thought experiment of initial position is one of the most discussed topic in philosophy, ethics and social science, and has been presented and criticized in different ways and by different approaches. In this paper, I will provide two criticisms against Rawls’s hypothesis, and I will express them by using modal logic and possible world semantics. My aim is to show how Rawls’s experiment is “computationally impossible” and how modal logic and possible world theory can be useful in social choice theory.
Keywords: Initial position, Veil of ignorance, Modal logic, Possible worlds computation, Relevant fragments, Rigid-designator.
Introduction
The thought experiment of initial position, proposed by Rawls in A Theory of Justice, has been criticized from several points of view. One of the firmest opponent to Rawls’s hypothesis is Sandel, who, in accordance with communitarian criticisms to Rawls [2; 3], thinks that the notions of veil of ignorance and of original position cannot be accepted, in virtue of the fact that it is not possible for an individual to abstract completely from her beliefs and her conceptions. A stronger, and maybe more dangerous, criticism can be advanced against Rawls’s thought experiment by using possible world logic. This criticism wants to point out that Rawls’s experiment is not impossible only for reasons concerning the individual beliefs about and knowledge of the world, but also in virtue of the fact that the individual will not be able to compute and judge all the possible situations in which she could find herself. Furthermore, this criticism will show that Rawls’s proposal does not shed light on the contradictory situations which are determined by the abstracting process that the author suggests. Modal approach to Rawls’s hypothesis will not be developed in details here; I will instead point out how much modal logic can be useful in social choice theory.
Rawls’s argument and Sandel’s criticism
In his A Theory of Justice [1], Rawls argues that if individuals who compose a society found themselves in an original position where they are covered by the veil of ignorance (where they do not know which role they will have in the society, and which characteristics), and if those individuals should establish the social norms for the future society in which they will be born, so their choice would consist in the best one, in the sense that they would choose those norms which would grantee social justice in the future society, and which would favor inequalities only to help the weakest [4]. The original situation to which Rawls refer is not only a theoretical notion which has no effect on reality: according to Rawls, in fact, real individuals in the real world, all of us, could use his thought experiment to converge on right social norms and rules.
Michael Sandel has criticized the notion of veil of ignorance, by pointing out that it is not possible for a individual to prescind from her identity in real world. Sandel attacks Rawls’s model by arguing that the American philosopher takes for granted the notion of Me, while actually such notion should be better defined. According to Sandel, the Me is at the same
55
Section 4. Linguistics
time disembodied and radically placed, and this paradox entails a confutation of Rawls’s theory [5, 195-6].
Sandel’s criticism is based on the fact that ethical norms that we approve and values which characterize us depend radically on our knowledge of the world and on our point of view. It is sufficient to consider the multiplicity of cultures — in some ofwhich activities which are repudiated in other societies are instead accepted and socially shared — to understand that what is true or acceptable cannot be determined a priori, unless we do not assume, as Rawls seems to do not too surreptitiously, that there exists a sort of natural justice and right; however, such an assumption should be discussed in details. Furthermore, even if such natural rights and a natural law existed, they would not be sufficient to contemplate and govern all the possible contrasts in which individuals can find. For example, multiculturalism can be in contrast with occidental modesty norms, as when we think that there are societies where sons have sexual relations with mothers before than with their wives. In this case, a smart individual in an original position should on the one hand propose norms which defend multiculturalism, while on the other hand deny some forms of multiculturalism, in virtue of some ethical principle. The denial of some forms of multiculturalism, however, would represent a prejudice against a culture and a population.
If Rawls’s proposal is difficult to accept for contradictions to which it leads, it is rejectable also for the fact that it is not possible for an individual to compute the infinite situations in which she could find: in other words, given the infinite situations which could characterize an individual, that individual should be able to compute all of them to solve the contradictory situations and beliefs which are due to the observations of all counterfactual situations.
A modal criticism
Criticisms that I have just pointed out can be expressed by a modal account, namely by using possible worlds logic and metaphysics. To proceed in this direction it is necessary to introduce three relevant notions. The first one is that ofpossible world: if we consider any situation which is different from the real one (as it happens when we utter and interpret a conditional sentence), we are considering a possible world. The notion of possible world, originally proposed by Leibniz [6] and introduced in logic and philosophy by Wittgenstein [7] and Carnap [8], was fully defined by Kripke and his school in sixties: a possible world is defined as a collection of entities which is potentially — but not actually — definable by listing all the true (elementary) sentences in the world. The second notion is that of rigid-designator: a rigid-designator is represented by a constant which denotes the same individual in all possible worlds (Even if there are some opponents, the hypothesis that proper names correspond to rigid-designator in almost universally accepted in philosophy of language and mind, and in these years such hypotheses has been empirically (psychologically) tested). So, r denotes Rawls in every possible world, and so denotes Rawls whatever his properties are (there are worlds where Rawls is an engineer or other where
he is a Formula 1 driver) [9] [10]. The third and last relevant notion is that of accessibility between worlds: given a world W1, from that world it is or not possible to access to another world W2. By these notions it is possible to describe and criticized Rawls’s thought experiment and his idea of the veil of ignorance; furthermore, modal reflections will show that Sandel’s criticisms are very strong.
Let’s consider Rawls’s experiment. Let’s imagine that an individual, s, carries out Rawls’s thought experiment: s tries to prescind from her beliefs and her experience in real world (in Wr ), and imagines to be in the original position, without knowing what properties will characterize her in the future world where she will be born. We say that, given an hypothetical situation a, if s imagines to be characterized by a, s will imagine to be in the corresponding world Wa, and so in the world where she has property a. It is clear that relevant possible worlds are infinite, because there are many worlds as single properties that s can imagine to have are: this is a source of great perplexity, because it is not sure that the number of the world does not exceed the mathematical countability. The problem of mathematical countability is even more evident if one considers that the worlds vary not only for the properties a1, ..., an which are attributed to s, but also on the basis of the infinite combinations between elements which compose possible worlds W1, ..., Wn.
The most serious problem that Rawls’s theory must face is expressible in the following terms. The original position entails that s detaches form all her beliefs and convictions, and that she projects herself in a possible world where her life is different. Let’s imagine that from real world s goes in W1, where she is the member of a tribe where what is commonly defined incest is not so, but instead it is a propitiatory practice. There are two possible situations. If s, by accessing from real world (where she considers the incest a pathology and an indecent assault) to possible world W1, looses her knowledge of herself in real world, so in W1 s will sustain the incest, and would like all other members of every society to accept and practice it. If then s carried out another thought experiment, by displacing in another world W2, where s is a catholic observant, so she would like the incest to be condemned by the Church and by the society, and to be cured as a disease of the mind and the body, contrarily to her desires in W1. Let ß be the property to accept the incest: on the basis of what just said, s would be pushed to approve and disapprove ß at the same time. This criticism is even stronger if we imagine that from W1 and W2 s passes to other possible worlds, where her beliefs and moral convictions change radically. The problem could be solved by saying that s would desire that ß in W1 and that ~ ß in W2 , but there would not be any world in which she wants that (ß a ~ ß): so, s would not be in contradiction. This objection would not be efficacious, since Rawls’s thought experiment entails that s must be able to look at all possible worlds while being conscious to be in the real world, or, better, in the world which correspond to the original position. Rawls’s experiment requires instead that
56
A modal account of the initial position
one accesses in all possible worlds while being able to look and analyze all those worlds at the same time, so to choose the synthesis enclosing her moral desires and beliefs in all the worlds. However, this operation requires God’s eye. Furthermore, a more serious problem would consist in the fact that even if s could compute the choices on all the worlds that she contemplates, s should judge a lot of situations — maybe infinite — where both a and ~ a are accepted: in these situations, she could not decide. The only way to proceed would be to distinguish between significant fragments [11] on the basis of the distinction between a and ~ a: in other words, given two equally acceptable choices for s, s should distinguish between those worlds where one or the other one is chosen, and should act on both the fragments, namely on the two sets of worlds chosen by distinguishing between a and ~ a.
It is however sufficient to reflect for a while to understand that this approach is not plausible at all: given the infinity of worlds and of choices that s would provide in those worlds, for every choice у there would be worlds where s wants that у and worlds where she rejects y. The only way to solve this contradiction would be to assume that there exist some a priori moral principles such that, given two relevant fragments у and ~ у, s is able to exclude a priori у or ~ y. However, this assumption would be completely arbitrary, and would lead to consider Rawls’s argument a petitio principii. It seems so more reasonable to suppose (as an inference to the best explanation) that justice and equity principles cannot be universal in any way, but depend instead on the context where they are contemplated [12], as the meaning of the words depends on the context where they are uttered.
References:
1. Rawls J. A Theory ofJustice. - Cambridge (MA): Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971.
2. Caniglia E., Spreafico A. Comunitarismo o liberalismo? - Roma: LUISS University Press, 2003.
3. Ferrara A. Comunitarismo e liberalismo. - Roma: Editori Riuniti, 2000.
4. Rawls J. Justice as Fairness. - Cambridge, London: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
5. Sandel M. Liberalism and the Limits ofJustice. - New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
6. Leibniz G. W Saggi di teodicea, Mathieu V (a cura di). - San Paolo, 1994.
7. Wittgenstein L. Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung, Annalen der Naturphilosophie. - 14. - 1921. - Р. 185-262 (tr. 1922. Tractatus logico-philosophicus, London: Kegan).
8. Carnap R. Meaning and Necessity. - Chicago-London: University Chicago Press, 1947.
9. Kripke S. A. Identity and Necessity, Munitz, M. K. (eds.), Identity and Individuation. - New York: New York University Press, 1971. - Р. 135-64.
10. Kripke S. A. Naming and Necessity. - Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1980.
11. Lewis D. Truth in Fiction.//American Philosophical Quarterly. - 1978. - Vol. 15, No. 1, - Р. 37-46.
12. Walzer M. Spheres ofJustice: in Defense of Pluralism and Equality. - New York: Basic Books, 1983.
57
