CC BY
21
frequent changes in external demand; growep of external debt. In virtue of population boom economy cannot absorb millions of workers that provide sustenance for international terrorism.
Only countries specializing in hydrocarbon extraction could avoid marked aggravation on domestic economy situation and minimize economic component of opposition sentiments. Political and economic trends in the region are due to the fact that MENA region stay world reservoir of energy feedstock for access to which there is an intense competition among main centers of economic power in the name of the West and the East. In such a case counties with capital excess stay running, just as main part of the Arab world achieved a stalemate in its socio-economic development. Separation from advanced countries is compounded by consequences of the Arab spring.
At the same time geopolitical changes in future can stimulate creation of regional poles relatively growth balance: Saudi-Egyptian alliance, Kurdistan, Iran, representatives of advanced world - Israel and Turkey.
Author of the abstract - Elena Dmitrieva
2018.01.012. EVGENY BIRYUKOV. RELATIONS BETWEEN SAUDI ARABIA AND IRAN IN THE SPHERE OF SECURITY //
"Problems of National Strategy" Moscow, 2017, № 2 (41), P. 21-38.
Keywords: foreign policy of Iran, foreign policy of Saudi Arabia, Iranian -Saudi Arabian relations.
Evgeny Biryukov,
PhD (Economics), Senior Research Fellow, Research Center of Foreign Countries, Russian Institute for Strategic Studies
The exacerbated contradictions between Saudi Arabia and Iran in recent years and their foreign policy strongly influence
the situation in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, Bahrain, Egypt, and other countries in the region. The cause of these contradictions is the claim of each of them to leadership in the Muslim world.
The Islamic revolution of 1979 in Iran changed the balance of forces in the Middle East. The events of 1979 are a factor exerting a profound influence on Saudi-Iranian relations up to the present time. The United States, having lost its positions in Iran has turned to a containment strategy toward that country. Saudi Arabia, being one of the key American allies in the Middle East and one of the leaders of the Muslim world has been playing a major role in this strategy. The Islamic revolution in Iran was a threat to the national security of Saudi Arabia. The Iranian spiritual leaders headed by ayatollah Khomeini have always criticized the Saudi regime and called on all Muslims to stage revolutions in their countries, including Saudi Arabia. In order to stem the revolutionary threat from Iran Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf monarchies supported Saddam Hussein's regime during the Iranian-Iraqi war of 1980-1988. After the war and the death of ayatollah Khomeini in 1989 relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran have somewhat improved. Iran was striving to overcome international isolation and lower the level of confrontation in its relations with Arab countries. In 1990 Iran denounced Iraq for its occupation of Kuwait, which resulted in a certain progress of contacts between Saudi Arabia and Iran and the reestablishment of diplomatic relations in 1991.
In 1997 a summit meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation took place in Iran. In 1998 and 1999 Iran's President Mohammad Khatami visited Saudi Arabia and among the major problems discussed there were security in the Persian Gulf zone, concerted actions on the oil market, the situation in Iraq, and elaboration of a common approach to regional problems. In 1998 Saudi Arabia and Iran signed an agreement on cooperation in trade, economy, culture, science and technology. In 2001 a Saudi-Iranian agreement was signed in the security sphere. Thus, during the presidency of Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-1997) and
Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005) relations between the two countries improved, although they were far from friendly. They rather reflected the desire of the two regional powers to avoid sharp contradictions.
The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime have changed the balance of forces in the region. The occupation of Iraq brought risks to Iran, inasmuch as a powerful armed grouping of the United States has come close to its land borders. On the other hand, new opportunities have now opened for Iran, inasmuch as under Saddam Hussein Iraq came out as a strong regional rival of Iran. Sixty percent of the Iraqi population are Shi'ite Muslims, just as most Iranians. This is one of the factors contributing to interaction of the two countries. After the overthrow of Saddam Hussein Iran was able to bolster up its regional influence. Saudi Arabia was greatly worried by the U.S. military operations in Iraq. The Saudi authorities refused to give its territory for dealing blows at Iraq. This was due to a change of the U.S. policy in the Middle East into a direct military interference and a possible growth of Iran's influence. Iraq in the conditions of the U.S. occupation has become a place of a proxy-war between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
Prior to the coming to power of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran (2005-2013) relations between these countries began to deteriorate. Under Ahmadinejad the confrontation has increased in various places of the Middle East. In Lebanon countries supported the rival forces. Ahmadinejad criticized Saudi inactive position on the Palestine-Israeli conflict. In Yemen in 2009 Saudi Arabia took part in the conflict with the Kushites in order to prevent the strengthening of this group receiving Iranian assistance. For its part, Iran accused Saudi Arabia of financing the Baluchis living along the Iranian-Pakistani border. The "Arab spring" events of 2011 led to clashes of the interests of the two countries in new regions - Egypt, Syria and Bahrain.
Under President Hassan Rouhani (since 2013) the confrontational trend of Iran's foreign policy became weaker as
compared with the time when the conservative leadership was in power in the country. At the press conference after the election victory he declared that an improvement of relations with Saudi Arabia would be a key priority for him. The change of the leadership of Saudi Arabia after the death of King Abdallah bin Abdel Aziz has given hope for a possible détente in Saudi-Iranian relations. However, these hopes were not destined to materialize. Moreover, soon after the enthronement of King Salman bin Abdel Aziz Al Saud and the change of the order of appointment of the heir apparent as a result of which Muhammed bin Nayef and Muhammad bin Salman became heirs to the throne, Saudi Arabia began a military campaign in Yemen. The main reason was to prevent the increasing Iranian influence in the south of the Arabian Peninsula. Thus, a whole number of factors, among which the U.S. position on the Iranian nuclear program, the change of American Middle East policy, the new leadership of Saudi Arabia, and others, have resulted in a considerable worsening of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran in recent years.
The author of the article states that Saudi Arabia has noticeably changed its foreign policy. Traditionally, it was conservative in the latter part of the 20th century. The Saudites did not claim leadership openly, preferring to solve problems with the "soft power" methods and considerable financial means. This was revealed in the Arab-Israeli conflict, in interaction with Iraq for containing Iran, and in relations with the United States. By now the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia has become more active. In recent years the kingdom has been drawn in conflicts outside its borders - in Yemen, Syria and Iraq.; in 2011 on an invitation of Bahrain's leadership army detachments of Saudi Arabia were involved in suppressing antigovernment, mainly Shi'ite, demonstrations in that country. One of the main reasons for the change of Saudi Arabia's foreign policy is the strengthening of the geopolitical role of Iran and also the change of power in Er Riyadh in 2015. The overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime has given Iran greater opportunities for a
geopolitical onslaught in the Middle East. Iran is now strengthening its influence on Lebanon, Syria, Afghanistan, Bahrain, the eastern province of Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. From the Saudi point of view, the regional role of Iran is growing to the detriment of Saudi Arabia.
Coming across the gradual lowering of its geopolitical role in the region Saudi Arabia has chosen the strategy of containment of the growing Iranian influence. In strategic documents elaborated by Saudi Arabia Iran is interpreted as the key threat to its national security. At the beginning of 2016 the Center of Study of Gulf Problems in Jeddah submitted a report on security problems. Its authors assert that the Arab states of the region should build up a joint system of strategic containment aimed against Iran's interference in the affairs of the Arab countries. Apart from that, Saudi Arabia feels its inadequacy to protect its own security independently. In this connection it is forced to seek interaction with strong countries, primarily the United States.
Iran is interested in a gradual withdrawal from isolation and in greater involvement in the Middle Eastern affairs. In this connection its confrontation with Saudi Arabia is to its disadvantage. People in Er Riyadh realize that using peaceable rhetoric Iran is expanding its influence in the region. Due to this the attitude of Saudi Arabia toward Iran is harsher and oriented to containment and isolation of Tehran. The latter is not interested in direct military confrontation with Saudi Arabia. This can be explained by several reasons. Iran has just begun to emerge from international isolation. A considerable part of the Iranian elite was bent on tackling the tasks of economic development and drawing foreign investments and technologies, whereas a major armed conflict could throw the country several years backwards and worsen its image. During the past several years Iran has increased its influence in a number of countries of the region, and a direct armed confrontation with its neighbors will probably cause a strong reaction on the part of strong foreign countries, which could weaken Iran. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia
will avoid a direct military conflict. However, proxy-wars will continue, bleeding white not only these two countries, but mostly neighboring states (Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen), and preventing the establishment of peace and stability in the region.
In 2016 contacts have strengthened between Saudi Arabia and ethnic and religious groups which can influence Iran from within. On July 9 a conference of the Iranian opposition group "Mujahadin-e-Khalq" took place in Paris. This organization was banned in Iran. The author states that the crisis in Saudi-Iranian relations is entering a new phase when Er Riyadh begins to meddle in Iran's internal affairs for reaching its aims and support a grouping which is described by the Iranian leadership as "terrorist." Saudi Arabia acts together with the Kurdish groupings opposing the Iranian authorities. In June 2016 armed clashes took place between the militants from the Democratic party of Kurdistan and the government troops of Iran, which signified a violation of the truce signed in 1996. In general, there is no revolutionary situation in Iran, Saudi Arabia's stake on the Iranian émigré opposition and its allies cannot destroy the present political system in Iran. There are problems with ethnic minorities in the country, but they are not critical for national security.
At the same time the bolstering up of opposition groupings in Iran by Saudi Arabia may bring about a new round of the Iranian-Saudi confrontation. An example is the strained situation in the Eastern province of Saudi Arabia and in Bahrain. So far the Shi'ite majority in Bahrain and Shi'ite community of Saudi Arabia are loyal to their royal regimes and only demand equal rights, which shows that there is no revolutionary situation. However, in an event of an exacerbation of the situation in bilateral relations or in case of the emergence of economic problems in Saudi Arabia, Iranians may create cells of Shi'ite underground cells, destabilizing the situation in the Persian Gulf States.
In recent years Iranian-Saudi rivalry in the Middle East has assumed more acute forms. After the beginning of the "Arab spring" the confrontation arena between the two countries has
included Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen. In these regions the war between Iran and Saudi Arabia is waged by the forces of their allies. The major theaters of hostilities for Er Riyadh are Yemen and Syria. The former has a long common border with Saudi Arabia, and the situation in Yemen is of crucial importance for the national security of Saudi Arabia.
The Arab revolutions of 2010-2011 threatened the interaction of Saudi Arabia and Iran with a number of countries in the region. However, both Er Riyadh and Tehran made attempts to change the results of the "Arab spring" for their benefit: the former supported the As-Sisi regime in Egypt, prevented a revolution in Bahrain, prompted resignation of A. Salekh from the post of the President of Yemen, and carries on anti-Assad policy in Syria. Iran, too, has strengthened its positions in Syria and Yemen. On the whole, the "Arab spring" has resulted in growing rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran in the Middle East. There is hardly any possibility that Saudi Arabia will succeed to set up an effective system of containing Iran with the help of Arabian monarchies, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkey and Egypt. Pakistan and Turkey develop interaction with Iran on a broad range of problems. Besides, the Persian Gulf monarchies have historically built their relations with Iran directly.
Saudi Arabia, even jointly with other countries, will hardly be able to effectively contain Iran, hence Er Riyadh's policy toward Tehran will not lead to desired results, and Iranian influence in the Middle Eastern region will continue to grow, the researcher believes.
Author of the abstract - Elena Dmitrieva
