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ISLAM IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES
2016.11.007. N. MAMEDOVA. IRAN: PECULIARITIES OF FORMATION OF POLITICAL ELITE // "Vostok (Oriens)". -Moskva, 2016, number 1. P. 121-127.
Keywords: Iran, the Shiite clergy, the power structure, Islamic funds, clan bureaucratic economy.
N. Mamedova,
Ph.D. (Economics), Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences
The author notes, that the relations between the secular and religious elites are important for the political development of the Islamic states. These relations have been extremely tense and contradictory in Iran, where secular politics supplanted the clergy in all spheres of social and political life since the reign of Reza Shah. The clergy, that initiated the proclamation of Reza Khan as the shah, hoped to provide a strong influence on the policy of the country, as it guided almost all more or less important social and protest movements of the late 19th -- early 20th centuries. Even the beginning of a war was justified by release of the relevant fatwas, i.e. religious justification of the Higher Shiite clergy (Ayatollah). The practice of ijtihad (elaboration of legal rules based on the interpretation of the Koran and the Sunna) has never been interrupted in Shia Islam, a significant role was played by the Mujahideen in the power structure in Iran and the Shiite communities in other countries, endowed with the right interpretation of Islamic norms and had a high status of "role model". They had their students, madrassas
and offices. The property was transferred to them in the form of the waqf (property, transferred to the charity from individuals), humes (income tax) was paid.
Unlike the Sunni clergy, the Shiite one had the right to determine whether the policy of the shah government met the interests of the ummah (Muslim community) in the absence of the 13th Imam, i.e. raise the question of the legitimacy of the shah government. This strengthened the social significance of the Shiite clergy as well. Reza Khan came to power through a military coup in 1921, first as the Minister of War, then the Prime Minister, and in 1925 - the Shah. Shah Reza Pahlavi became the dictator in the first half of the 20th century. Having displaced the Qajar dynasty and strengthening the position of the army, the bureaucracy and the public sector, he managed to reduce the influence of the clergy on political decision-making and the formation of the Iranian elite, like Ataturk did in neighboring Turkey. As a result, the economic positions of Islamic institutions have been undermined: not only the education system but also the traditional activities of the muslim waqf institute came under the control of the State. However, liberalization of the political life (which began during the reign of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, after the abdication of Reza Shah in 1941) has led to the emergence of the religious parties and the weakening of control over the activities of the waqf.
In 1951-1953 the clergy participated in the nationalization of the oil industry of the country. One of the leaders of this process was the Ayatollah Abol Qassem Kashani, the direct successor of the Islamic philosopher Jamal al-Din Afghani. During the 1940s Kashani became one of the founders of the party "Mujahideen Islam," that had a great influence on the formation of political organizations of the Shiite clergy and prohibited after the attempt on the Shah Mohammad in 1949. He headed the Majlis in the 1950s. Shah Mohammad initiated implementation of reforms aimed at modernization of the Iranian society and the reduction of the intervention of the clergy
in politics after the ouster of Prime Minister M. Mossadegh in 1953, who had achieved the adoption of the law on the nationalization of oil and the dissolution of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. During the agrarian reform of the 1960s, the institution of the waqf was virtually eliminated, and the waqf lands were given to farmers in the long-term lease. The clergy resisted the reforms, and the leader of the religious elite Ayatollah Khomeini was expelled from the country. Though families of large landowners and entrepreneurs have been closely associated with the religious circles of the country under the Shah regime, the political elite was mainly formed of the representatives of the business community in the 1960s -1970s.
Iran has become one of the most dynamic economies in the world by the end of the Shah rule. There were changes in the composition of the Majlis and the Senate: the representatives of the new intelligentsia and business families have come to play the leading role.
Bahais - the representatives of religious movement that was banned officially - to become influential among business and political elite more and more. The Shiite clergy, losing political and economic influence, began to use Islam and mosques actively to form a movement of opposition to the Shah's government. The purpose of the overthrow of the Shah's regime has been successfully achieved, and the process of formation of the Iranian elite has changed.
The Shiite religious leaders were supposed to participate in the governing bodies. Political power was in the hands of traditional religious clans representing some Shiite centers -Qom, Najaf, Mashhad. If Qom (in Iran) and Najaf (in Iraq) were the centers of formation of the Iranian religious elite in the Shah period, then after the revolution Qom developed into a center of attraction of Shiites from other Islamic countries as well. The Supreme Leader of Iran - Rahbar of (or wali faqih - Chief faqih) can have the highest spiritual rank for the Shiite religious leaders -marja al-taqlid. Imam Khomeini had this status - the first Rahbar
of the new state. Ali Khamenei became Rahbar after his death, not having the title of marja al-taqlid, but also the title of ayatollah before. He has gained the status of ayatollah only after his election as Rahbar, and is considered marja al-taqlid now.
A representative of the highest clergy - is the head of the Supervisory Board of 12 members, consisting of six fakihs -experts in Islamic law. The Supervisory Board, which is called the Council of Guardians of the Constitution in the media sometimes -is one of the most powerful state authorities that votes for the laws adopted by the Majlis and approves candidates for the presidency and members of parliament positions. A representative of the highest clergy is the head of the judiciary and, as a rule, is Minister of Internal Affairs. The clergy, received a significant portion of the nationalized property, has become an integral part of not only political, but also economic elite. Nationalized property was transferred not to individual religious leaders: the clergy received it through specially created Islamic funds. In addition, de facto ban on the establishment of a new waqf was withdrawn, and the acting waqfs, were expanded through donations. The largest in the Middle East waqf "Godsey Astana" in Mashhad has received the right to establish a free economic zones - "Sarahs", built its own airport, bought a number of industrial companies and educational institutions.
After 1990 the government began the formation of the liberal economic model, and the impact of new business groups with the participation of private entrepreneurs - representatives of the clergy - has increased significantly. The privatization was carried out considering the interests of persons closely connected with the administrative and religious elite by family and other ties, which led to a consolidation of the position of individual family clans. In the 2000s, the role of the military elite, especially the representatives of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) has grown. During the reign of M. Ahmadinejad, the IRGC has been given the opportunity to participate in a large number of projects in the construction, oil and gas, aerospace and
other fields (2006-2013), and the company "Khatam al-Anbiya", owned by the Corps, has become one of the largest in the country.
Although Islamic rule is carried out in Iran for more than 35 years, the problem of the formation of the political and economic elite and the relationships between its various factions have a significant impact on the development of the country, on the production lines of its internal and external policies. Differences between individual clans and groups of political elites are aggravated at times then weakened, leading to the change of governments, changes in economic policy and in relations with the outside world. You can see the extent of these contradictions on the example of the most powerful Iranian family of Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, that was subjected to various kinds of repression in anticipation of a possible change of leadership of the country: his daughter, grandson and son found themselves in detention, although the family has been closely associated with the well-known religious and commercial clans, and Rafsanjani himself is almost the only living companion of Imam Khomeini.
In 1989, after the death of Khomeini, Khamenei became Rahbar, connected with a number of influential families by ties of kinship. It is he who is a trustee of the main Islamic funds. Not only is the supreme political power, but also real economic power concentrated in his hands. Clan Ali Khamenei - an ancient Azeri clan that is closely related to big business and the clergy. Clan members are actively involved in politics, but not always are like-minded.
Clans and families that make up the backbone of Iranian political and economic elite, linked by ties of kinship, based on belonging to the highest Shiite clergy. This explains the support of Iran to the Shiite movements in neighboring countries, led, as a rule, the pupils of Qom or Tehran.
The author notes that the current Iranian leadership seeks to reduce the level of corruption, for more transparency and
openness of the economic sphere of political life. And this is possible only if the influence of the religious and political elite, that has ruled the country during more than 35 years, will weaken.
The author of the abstract - V.N. Schensnovich.
I. DOBAEV, A. DOBAEV. SOURCES AND FACTORS OF MODERN ACTIVATION OF TERRORISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST // The article is written by the authors for the Bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World" on 30.05.2016.
Keywords: Islamism, terrorism, the Middle East.
I. Dobaev,
Dr. Sc. (Philosophy),
Professor, Southern Federal University,
Rostov-on-Don
A. Dobaev,
Ph. D. (Economics), Regional Studies Center expert (Southern Federal University), Rostov-on-Don
The authors identify the causes of terrorism in the Middle East, reveal the internal and external factors of the conflicts that feed its modern activation. The modern terrorism, mostly based on the ideology of the radical Islamism, in the past two decades has become the subject of research of many domestic and foreign scientists [1]. It seems, however, impossible to understand the complex intricacies of its evolution and transformation without definition of the origins of terrorism in the very heart of the Islamic world - in the Middle East. The present article dwells upon this problem.
The origins of the modern Islamic terrorism, especially in the center of the Moslem world - in the Middle East - should be attributed to the time when establishment the colonial and semi-colonial systems in the region was completed, i.e. to the end of
