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110 Соловьёвасие исследования. Выпуск 4(44} 2014
10. Solov'ev, Vl.S. Tri razgovora o voyne, progresse i kontse viemimoy istorii [War, Progress, and thé End of History: Three Conversations, Including a Short Story of the Anti-Christ], in Sochmeniya v2t., t. 2 [Complete Works in 2 vol., vol. 2], Moscow, 1990, pp. 635-762.
11. Solov'ev, VS. Sofiya [Sophia],in Sochineniya vl5t., t.2 [Complete Works in IS vol., vol, 2], Moscow, 2000, pp. 8-161.
12. Losev, A.E Vladimir Solov'evi ego vremya [Vladimir Solov'ev and his times], Moscow, 1990, pp. 11-618.
13. Florenskiy, P.A. Stolp i utverzhdenie istiny (1) [The Pillar and Ground of the Truth: An Essay in Orthodox Theodicy in Twelve Letters], Moscow, 1990, pp. 3-490.
14. Solov'ev,VI.S. Chteniya o Bogochelovechestve [Readings on God-man hood], in Solov'ev,Vl.S. Sobranie sochineniy vlO t, t. 3 [Complete Works in 10 vol., vol. 3], Saint-Petersburg, 1914, pp. 1-168.
15. Florenskiy, EA. Ponyatie tserkvi v Svyashchennom Pisanii [The concept of the Church in the Holy Scriptures], in Sochineniya v4t., 1.1 [Complete Works in 4 vol., vol. 1], Moscow, 1994, pp. 318-489.
16. Solov'ev, V1.S. Zhiznennaya drama Platona [Life drama of Plato], in Sochineniya v2t., t.2 [Complete Works in 2 vol., vol. 2], Moscow, 1990, pp. 582-625,
УДК 13(438+470) ББК 87227:86.37
FAITH IN THE DIALOGUE WITH REASON.
SOLOVYOV AND WOJTYLA ON RELATIONS BETWEEN FAITH AND REASON - A COMPARATIVE STUDY
PAWELWALCZAK Uniwersity of Zielona Gora, 71 A,A1, Wojska Polskiego, Zielona Gora, Poland E-mail: p.walczak@ifil.uz.zgora.pl
In the article we compare how ike relationship between faith and reason ispresented in Soloviov's «Faith, reason, experience» (1877) and John Paul ll's encyclical« Fides et Ratio» (1998). The comparative analysis of these documents seems to be interesting giving different historical and cultural contexts shaping the views of the respective authors and different approaches to the problem of relations between faith and reason at present in the Western and Russian traditions. The authors, however, share the main motivation for taking on this topic, which is diagnosis of the crisis of culture, science and faith. The goal they both set themselves - the rebuilding of the relationship between faith and reason - seem to bean attempt at overcoming nihilism and relativism. We point to the significant differences between the presented concepts. On the one hand the differences consist in the method of defining faith and reason, on the other hand, refer to ways of description of relationship between faith and reason and their role in the process of cognition.
Key words:/ii/rfi, reason, knowledge, faith-reason relationship, dialogue, contemporary culture, skepticism, nihilism, science, spirituality, religion.
ВЕРА В ДИАЛОГЕ С РАЗУМОМ. В.С. СОЛОВЬЕВ И К. ВОЙТЫЛА О ОТНОШЕНИЯХ МЕЖДУ ВЕРОЙ И РАЗУМОМ -СРАВНИТЕЛЬНЫЙ АНАЛИЗ
ПАВЕЛ ВАЛЬЧАК
Зеленогурскмй университет Ул. Войска Польского, 71 А, г. Зелена Гура, Польша E-mail: p.walczak@ifil.uz.zgora.pl
Дан анализ концепций соотношения между верой и разумом В.С. Соловьева и Яна Павла II на материале статьи B.C. Соловьева «Вера, разум, эксперимент» (1877) и энциклики Яна Павла II«Fides et Ratio», вышедшей в 1998 г. Сравнительный анализ этих текстов вызывает интерес в силу различия исторических и культурных контекстов формирования взглядов их авторов, а также в силу различий в понимании проблемы вера-разум в западной и русской философии. Выявлено общее положение о кризисе культуры, науки и веры, восстановление связи между которыми должно стать попыткой преодоления нигилизма и релятивизма. Указано на существенную разницу между представляемыми концепциями: с одной стороны, в способе определения веры и разума, с другой - в характеристике реляции между верой и разумом, а также в определении их роли в процессе познания.
Ключевые слова: вера, разум, знание, диалог, современная культура, скептицизм, нигилизм, наука, духовность, религия.
The problem of faith and reason has been one of the most fundamental questions of European philosophy, since Christianity became one of the main sources inspiring the development of culture. Both, Western and Eastern philosophies we see the history of development of notions and ideas trying to answer the question of the relation between the two in various ways, and each tradition can offer its unique and specific approach to the problem Hence, it seems interesting to compare the ideas of Vladimir Solovyov with the views of John Paul II presented in the Fides at Ratio encyclical letter Solovyov's ideas on the subject are to be found in his early publication entitled Wiara, rozum i doswiadczenie, from 1877. This document was created during the time when Solovyov attacked radical empiricist ideas and Hegel's radical idealism alike. Solovyov's aim was to create his original metaphysical and gnoseological system and to formulate certain methodological postulates, expressed in the model of integral knowledge, which combined philosophy, theology and science in one, consistent system.1
Fides et Ratio is an encyclical letter, an official papal document, published nearly a hundred years after Solovyov's article. The author of the letter, late pope John Paul II -Karol Wojtyla, was a philosopher, and the knowledge of philosophy and the use of philosophical methods is visible throughout the encyclical letter. Moreover, the main
1 Vide:Teresa Obolevitch. О relacji miQdzy wiaraa wiedz^w mysli Wlodzimierza Solowjowa. Uwagi thunacza. Logos i Ethos. 2012. N 2(33). P 215-221; ObolevitchT. Nauka w poszukiwaniu metafizyki. Aspekty poznania naukowego w teorii wiedzy integralnej Wtodzimierz Solowiawa. Tarnow, 2003; Obolevitch T. Nauka w poszukiwaniu metafizyki. Mysl Solowjowa. Semina Stientiarum. 2003. 2. E 45-50; Lilianna Kiejzik. Wlodzimierz Solowiow. Zielotia G6ra,1997.
problem and the subject of the letter is truly philosophical - hence the document is a good example of contemporary attempt at tackling the problem of relations between faith and reason, as indicated in the title. Despite the fact that these authors represent different traditions and cultural context, and perhaps because of these differences, a comparison of these two propositions can be interesting.
Solovyov starts with the statement that faith and reason are autonomous and independent spiritual forces of man belong to different realms of knowledge and are mutually irreducible. The author describes this relation referring to the mathematical category of incommensurability: „(...) faith and reason, despite being constantly and unavoidably correlated, are in fact, to use the language of mathematics, incommensurable quantities and as such unable to replace each other or swap places. To replace faith with reason or science seems to be equally impossible as to replace mathematics with history or music with sculpting. Hence, between reason and faith as such, there can be virtually no quarrel"2.
Incommensurability of mathematical quantities means the lack of common measure, the opposite of proportion. Diagonal of the square is incommensurable with its side, similarly the circumference of the circle with its radius, meaning that there is no unit of length that can be applied to measuring both these lengths in a direct and precise way. No unit of measurement fits in them without remainder integer number of times - that is these do not have a common measure. Solovyov, using this notion in reference to the relations between faith and reason emphasises their autonomous character, defending faith and its place in the structure of knowledge. For, if faith cannot be replaced with rational knowledge, it is a necessary element of knowledge.
Next, Solovyov explain the essence of this incommensurability. According to him, rational act has a strictly formal character, since its goal is not to deliver positive data but merely understanding, that is „comprehending this, what is already given independently of reason" [2, p. 206]. Solovyov writes: „We merely single out from data using the senses the specific and contingent features of facts and construct certain general notions - specific, individual relations between these we raise to the level of general and necessary relations, i.e. laws. (...) We analyse the data coming from experience and separate or reject contingent and changeable element obtaining certain general image, i.e. a notion that has no content in itself"3.
The task of reason is therefore to derive general from particular. Solovyov defines the action of reason as the negation of the situation when universality and necessity form is provided for this, what is individual and contingent. The function of reason in relation to faith is analogous to this played by reason in relation to experience. Reason filters the data provided by faith from contingency and arbitrariness and gives it the form of universality and necessity. Hence, according to Solovyov „reason can reject a given interpretation of faith, i.e. religion, but cannot reject religion as such. Similarly, rejecting contingent objects of our experience, it cannot reject the essential contents of this experience" [2, p. 207].
2 Wlodzimierz Solowiow. Wiara, doswiadczenie i rozum. Logos i Ethos. 2012.2(33). E 205-206.
3 Ibidem. E 206.
Author repeats this thesis many times and expresses it in various ways, and the conclusions he draws from these ideas are quite interesting. Solovyov states that from the point of view of reason and science, which is based on experience, there is virtually no difference between truthfulness and falsehood and, consequently, between this, which is normal and this, which is not. This surprising thesis is justified by him in a number of ways. He claims that since the action of reason is related to reshaping the necessity of a fact into the necessity of a law and all that is a fact is necessary in the same way, then there is no place for the question of obligations related to an event. Consequently, there is no basis for the question of either normality or truthfulness of an event. Even if we attempted, in the area of experience, to interpret falsehood as this, which never occurs or does not exist, having a counterpart on the side of reason as the category of falsehood as this, what is impossible to think, then in fact we do nothing less than talk about existence or non-existence as „non-existent and impossible is nothing, not a falsehood" [2, p. 209]. Analogously, if the truthfulness or falsehood predicate is referred to the cognition itself as the act of the subject, we conclude also that, from the point of view of experience and reason, the distinction between truthfulness and falsehood is groundless. Each statement uttered by the subject is just a fact, a psychological phenomenon, which is unconditionally necessary in terms of experience. Reason, based on experience, has no point of reference allowing the determination of what is given using the criteria of truthfulness, normality or beauty. Hence Solovyov states: „The difference between normal and abnormal lies not in what occurs or does not occur but precisely in the area of what occurs. (...) However, from the point of view of experience and reason, the difference in terms of the occurrence itself is impossible as both reason and experience do not transcend the boundaries of what occurs, since it is the sole source of their content. Hence, these are devoid of principle and criteria allowing rejection of something as not normal, despite it occurring, as in order to reject it this way, the boundaries of what occurs must have been transcended (...)"4.
Solovyov goes even further in his argumentation. He claims that the very function of reason is to change contingency into necessity. By doing this, what seems false and not normal, is true, necessary and normal. Hence, from the point of reason „all is true and normal and there is nothing false and not normal, so this entire distinction disappears" [2, p. 210].
Solovyov aims at showing the fundamental importance of faith in cognition and to justify the thesis about the incommensurability of faith and reason. From the point of view of reason and sciences we are unable to transcend the boundaries of experience to see the difference between what is true and what is false, what is normal and what is abnormal. And yet the entire spiritual life of man and his orientation in the world is based on this distinction. One of the consequences of limiting oneself to the worldview based solely on reason and experience is the impossibility of morality, the important part of which is related to the beliefs about what „should be',' the reduction of science to genetic explanation of every view and
4 Wlodzimierz Solowiow. Wiaia, doswiadczenie i rozum, P 207
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not deciding about the truthfulness or falsehood of theories. Then - according to Solovyov „both the outstanding ideas of a great thinker and gibberish of a madman, as equally necessary and natural events, are equally justified to exist" [2, p. 211]. Similarly, in terms of aesthetics, the difference between the beautiful and ugly is reduced to purely subjective question of taste. All human action become impossible in the world devoid of aims, the aims are set by man, taking into account the perceived differences between the beautiful and ugly, true and false, good and evil, normal and abnormal. The naturalist viewpoint - according to Solovyov - can lead the human world to the state, described in the physical world as the thermal death of the universe. He writes: „If the forces or actions responsible for movement of the spiritual cosmos, determined by the various forms of truth, good and beauty - as a result of indifference in that respect - were to disappear from human consciousness, then the spiritual world of humans would become rigid, that is, it would cease to exist"5.
This, what is found by man beyond the boundaries of experience and reason, these criteria, principles and points of reference allowing us to perceive and distinguish truth, beauty, good and all the values, are possible thanks to faith and religion based on it. Faith, resp. religion provide one not with facts but with foundations. The facts of the philosophical reason, that is general notions and laws described as principles and foundations are merely abstract, hence negative,principles. Whereas the principles based on faith are the „integral and positive" principles [2, p. 211].
Given the above, we clearly see that there are no theoretical grounds for the naturalistic worldview trying to push religion outside the boundaries of rationality and subjects it to philosophical analysis and empirical verification. According to Solovyov, scientific analysis of faith and religion is impossible, since reason and faith belong to various realms and are incommensurable. These intellectual areas do not overlap, and are independent cognitive powers of man;hence they cannot be replaced, despite being in constant correlation creating „unity in the entirety of the spiritual organism" [2, p. 214].
From the point of view of philosophy, the argumentation presented in the encyclical letter is not homogeneous: it contains elements of a kind of both pre-philosophical and philosophical (in a narrower sense) anthropology, metaphysics and undeniably meta-philosophy, yet it is evident that the main stress is put on theology. The tetter is a document of theological character and, at the same time, a typical document of the Magisterium of the Church. Taking all this into account, it would have been a mistake to expect from the letter to present a solid, strictly philosophical argumentation, methodology or accuracy in terms of argumentation structure. The encyclical is not a philosophical treatise and one should keep it in mind while analysing its contents.
Apart from a theological context and strong anthropological assumptions, the author formulates certain statements of epistemological nature. The truth is the fundamental category, used throughout the document. The pope does not define this category in any point of the encyclical, yet it can be noted that his reflexion on
5 Wlodzimierz Sotowiow. Wiara, doswiadczenie i rozum. P 212.
the truth occurs on two levels. On the one hand the category of truth shows up in its classical guise, as the correspondence of thought with the objective state of affairs. There exists an objective reality and the destiny of man is to try and discover the truth to the fullest extent and to understand the surrounding world and himself. Man is naturally equipped with the urge to discover truth and the ability to do so. The other level is related to the discussion of „truth as Secret',' the pope also points out the cdetheic character of truth, especially when he talks about the „truth in its fullness',' to be revealed at the end of times and provides man with meaning: „every truth attained is but a step towards that fullness of truth which will appear with the final Revelation of God" [1, a. 2].
The author begins with an analysis of the situation of contemporary reason. He critically approaches those trends in modern philosophy that have led to the crisis of faith in reason and its possibilities. The author believes that reason focused on only one side related to the search of knowledge about a man as an object, seem to forget that the call of man is to seek the truth that is transcending himself. Without the reference to the truth, everyone is subjected to the arbitrariness of human judgement, and their existence as a person is evaluated purely on pragmatic criteria predominantly based on experimental knowledge, shaped by a false conviction that all should be subservient to technology. The result is that - instead of expressing as beautifully as possible the search for the truth - reason tends to be more and more focused on itself, under the strain of such extensive knowledge and day by day it becomes less able to focus on higher reality and would not dare to reach for the truth of being. The contemporary philosophy, instead of using the ability of man to learn the truth, prefers to emphasise his limitations and constraints. According to the pope, this has led to the creation of "different forms of agnosticism and relativism which have led philosophical research to lose its way in the shifting sands of widespread skepticism" [1, a. 5].
The pope - together with the Church - worries about the universal lack of faith in the existence of truth and in the cognitive capabilities of man. This also results in the crisis in philosophy, as the contemporary man has lost hope that philosophy will provide him with final answers for certain questions. We should always remember however, that the pope's teaching are always focused on a man, not as an idea but as a specific person. According to the pope, this crisis of reason has its bearing on everyday-life of the contemporary man - and this is the main reason for the analysis of the topic. According to the pope:
"The need for a foundation for personal and communal life becomes all the more pressing at a time when we are faced with the patent inadequacy of perspectives in which the ephemeral is affirmed as a value and the possibility of discovering the real meaning of life is cast into doubt. This is why many people stumble through life to the very edge of the abyss without knowing where they are going"6.
The document deals with two types of relations between faith and reason: dichotomic and integral. Many statements suggest the dichotomic type - symmetric separateness of faith and reason, full mutual autonomy and a setting with two realms
6 John PauE II. Encyclical letter „Fides et RatioVVatican. 1998, a. 6.
of knowledge. Especially the fist famous words coming from the letter seem to indicate such understanding of faith-reason relation: "Faith and reason are like two wings on which the human spirit rises to the contemplation of truth"7.
In yet another place we read: "There exists a twofold order of knowledge, distinct not only as regards their source, but also as regards their object" [1, a. 9]; and: „there exists a knowledge which is peculiar to faith, surpassing the knowledge proper to human reason" [1, a. 8].
Yet, taking the entirety of the text into account, it seems the integral character of this relation is being emphasised. There is no contradiction between the search for a meaning using reason and faith: "Therefore, reason and faith cannot be separated without diminishing the capacity of men and women to know themselves, the world and God in an appropriate way" [1, a. 16].
The pope assumes that "there are in the life of a human being many more truths which are simply believed than truths which are acquired by way of personal verification. (.. .)This means that the human being - the one who seeks the truth - is also the one who lives by belief,s.
Later on, the author emphasises the interpersonal aspect of faith: man could not have learnt anything ot know anything without trusting others. Hence, it is important to pay attention to the crucial role played by tradition in shaping the correct form of knowledge. Trust in other is, in effect, an agreement to participate in some tradition, as without a tradition reason cannot function. Hence faith - in the sense of this trust - belongs to the very essence of rationality. Man embarks on „a search for the truth and a search for a person to whom they might entrust themselves" - and it is there, where „Christian faith comes to meet them, offering the concrete possibility of reaching the goal which they seek" [1, a. 33]. Faith turns out to be an act of reason, as reason seeks absolute explanation and foundation, and in that search must trust and allow to be shaped by some tradition.
Yet, the activity of reason does not end with the moment Revelation is accepted, since the truth presented by Revelation is at the same time the truth that should be understood in the light of reason. Faith, as the acceptance of Revelation, is an act of an entire person, it also encompasses the activity of reason, is in a way the activity of thought, since reason can and should when faced with the secret conduct independent analyses in accordance with its own principles but remaining in the context of Revelation. The signs present in the Revelation make this task easier by „setting within history a point of reference which cannot be ignored if the mystery of human life is to be known" [1, a. 16]. Hence, reason working in the area of Revelation lacks none of its attributes. On the contrary - only there it finds its complement, where it can fully make use of its capabilities.
As we can see, the integral model does not allow for the dichotomic distinction between the natural reason and faith, between natural knowledge and knowledge based on revelation. Integrity means that these realms depend on each other and
7 John Paul II. Encyclical letter „Fides et Ratio? Preambula. s Ibidem, a. 31.
overlap. This is summarised in the letter as follows: „Faith asks that its object be understood with the help of reason; and at the summit of its searching reason acknowledges that it cannot do without what faith presents" [1, a. 42].
Hence the pope speaks of "The drama of the separation of faith and reason" and that „another of the many consequences of this separation was an ever deeper mistrust with regard to reason itself" [1, a. 45]. It turns out however that "It is faith which stirs reason to move beyond all isolation and willingly to run risks so that it may attain whatever is beautiful, good and true. Faith thus becomes the convinced and convincing advocate of reason" [1, a. 56] as the courage of reason should be the answeT to the courage of faith. This is the pope's answer to the question of the ways in which the proper place of reason can be restored. It is often forgotten that it was Christianity and faith that made culture and philosophy did not become solidified in overly self-assured systems. Philosophy has the disadvantage of paying too much attention to its own discoveries. The faith in a philosophical system, in a grand, final theory can effectively muffle up intellect, weaken intelligence and fool reason. Hence the author points out the mistakes related to the excessive trust in reason, to the dogmatism of all those -„who delude themselves that they possess the truth, when in fact they run it aground on the shoals of a system of their own devising" [1, a. 23]. Faith in our knowledge, reason, principles and beliefs that at a closer look or from the perspective of time appear to be merely the banalities repeated in a given era, serve as the superstition of our times. Christianity teaches the cognitive and moral humility. But at the same time faith stimulates reason, does not let it stop at too modest a result.
A cursory analysis of the notion of relation of faith and reason in Solovyov and John Paul II could have led to the conclusion that their positions are in general comparable. Both authors argue for the autonomous character of faith and reason, emphasising their functions and roles played in the process of cognition and human development. There are, however, certain differences I would like to point out.
Most importantly, it seems the authors are using the notions of reason and faith giving them different meanings. None defines these notions explicitly but the meanings can be inferred looking at the contexts in which these categories are used. The notion of reason in not free from ambiguities and there is a number of ways one can try to define it. In the broader sense, reason can stand for all natural cognitive powers of man, hence e.g. the senses, memory and reason in the narrow sense as opposed to other human powers e.g. the will, feelings etc. The reason in the narrow sense is one of the cognitive powers: the one responsible for reasoning, i.e. performing various inferences, e.g. the so-called intellectual cognition. In this approach, perception and remembering are not included as parts of reason. And finally, in the narrowest sense, reason is just a selected „part" of the reason in the second sense; hence it can be a reason responsible for (1) „creating sciences" - such as mathematics, natural sciences, social sciences; or (2) the so-called speculative reason, responsible for metaphysics; or (3) the so-called practical reason, responsible for ethical knowledge.
The author of the encyclical letter Fides et Ratio does seem to use the notion of reason neither in the second sense, nor in the first aspect of the third sense. He does use, however, the notion of reason in the first sense - as a symbol of man's cognitive powers. Most often, however, he uses the second and third aspects of the third sense, e.g. speculative
and practical reason creating metaphysics and ethics. Solovyov's use of the notion of reason is a narrower one. By reducing the function of reason to the negation of contingency and giving the act of reason a purely formal character, Solovyov reduces it to something similar to Aristotle's notion of reason. The passive reason is receptive, acts with the material delivered by senses; its function is just to abstract away the notions from the sensory input.
One encounters similar situation when analysing the notion of faith: it seems that John Paul II also defines faith in a much broader sense compared to Solovyov. The encyclical focuses mainly on the relation between God and man, which has a clear interpersonal character, is an act of man's faith and reason when entering into the relation with God. This act is in a form of answer to God's Revelation, which is directed predominantly to reason - that is it requires to be understood. Faith is the answer that man gives to God, who reveals Himself to man, at the same time providing man with a broad light helping him to find the final sense of his life. Faith is understood as the opening of man to the transcendental dimension of reality; hence to believe acquires a meaning close to „to trust" contains an element of dialogue by assuming the existence of someone one believes in and trusts.
It is much harder to reconstruct the meaning of faith in Solovyov's publication. Solovyov does indicate however, its place in the structure of cognition. It is an autonomous, incommensurable to reason; element of the cognition process and a necessary phase that cannot be omitted. This also leads us to an important difference in terms of relations between faith and reason according to Solovyov and John Paul II. Solovyov positions faith, next to experience and reason, as a part of every act of cognition. According to him, each and every act of cognition consists three phases. During the first phase the object conceives a thing as existing, which is given precisely in the act of faith, as we believe that the thing exists. Next, owing to reason, the intellectual cognition of what the thing is takes place, revealing its essence. The third phase, using empirical experience, we discover how the thing appears, treating it as a phenomenon9. The essence of the system of integral knowledge is well described by Teresa Obolevitch: „External experience and the act of reason are related to the phenomena and their internal foundations, respectively (to essence, res p. to ideas) and allow the generation of universal, abstract concepts with the act of faith perceiving the subject itself as objectively existing, independent being. (...) In this very sense faith is a fundamental and crucial part of every process of cognition. Faith is not reserved for religion but is present in every area of human cognition"10.
From the methodological point of view, Solovyov treated faith, reason and experience as correlated to religion, philosophy and science. He argued for the unification of faith, reason and experience and theology, philosophy and science respectively into the system of integral knowledge. The separation of these elements
9 Vide: Obolevitch T. Pmhlematyczny konkordyzm. Wiara i wiedza w mysli Wlodzimierza S. Sotowiowa i Siemona L. Franka. Tkrnow; Krakow, 2006. P 71-76.
10 Obolevitch T. O relacji miqdzy wiar^ a wiedz^w mysli Wlodzimierza Sotowiowa. Uwagi ttumacza. Logos i Ethos, 2012. N 2(33). P 220.
leads on the one hand to extreme fideism, whereas on the other to radical rationalism and empiricism.
While Solovyov postulates a far reaching integration of faith and reason and theology, philosophy and science, the author of Fides et Ratio is not that radical in his conclusions. His intention is rather to encourage the deepening of collaboration between the scientists, philosophers and theologians, noticing the possibility of mutual benefits that can be gained from this and appreciating the role each of these plays in terms of culture. The pope's call has more moral than methodological character. His analysis reveals the image of man that is forced to believe: he is forced, as he is not able to confirm the accuracy of the knowledge he acquires himself, he is forced to trust others. Obviously, man during his development verifies this knowledge using reason, in consequence eliminating the faith that is has been based on. Yet, we should not approach this original faith as unwanted, since in comparison with the reason-based cognition it appears as"belief often humanly richerthan mere evidence,because it involves an interpersonal relationship and brings into play not only a person"s capacity to know but also the deeper capacity to entrust oneself to others, to enter into a relationship with them which is intimate and enduring" [1, a. 32].
This, what from the epistemological point of view is considered imperfect; the pope interprets as the beginning of ethics. Ethics is then the condition on which the balance between faith and reason depends. For mutual trust assumes responsibility, honesty and reliability. In this sense, the pope emphasises the moral aspect of cooperation of faith and reason and its meaning for creating a man. The concern about the restoration of philosophical ratio and directing the act of thinking at developing wisdom was also dictated by the principal requirement of contemporary culture: the requirement of dialogue, especially inter-denomination and inter-faith dialogue. The pope's words are reminiscent here of the call of the Second Vatican Council: „Philosophical thought is often the only ground for understanding and dialogue with those who do not share our faith. (...) Such a ground for understanding and dialogue is all the more vital nowadays, since the most pressing issues facing humanity - ecology, peace and the co-existence of different races and cultures, for instance - may possibly find a solution if there is a clear and honest collaboration between Christians and the followers of other religions and all those who, while not sharing a religious belief, have at heart the renewal of humanity"11.
The pope is convinced that in this process of shaping of the global civilisation and of the European humanism based on the human rights becoming more universal, an important role is to be played by the Christian philosophy. Against the often quoted opinion that the notion of truth is dangerous - as it breeds totalitarianism and intolerance - the pope justifies that the truth is a source of dialogue: "It must not be forgotten that reason too needs to be sustained in all its searching by trusting dialogue and sincere friendship" [1, a. 33].
The postulate of a deeper integration between faith and reason is common to both Solovyov and the pope. Also, no doubt in both cases we clearly see the concern
13 John Paul II. Encyclical letter „Fides et RatioVa. 104.
about man and contemporary culture. Despite the fact that the authors are separated by nearly the entire twentieth century, they indicate similar threats and worrying phenomena in culture that are caused by breaking the original link between faith and reason and the attempts at degrading the meaning and role religion plays in human life. Both analysed texts are a response to a situation of crisis, where the authors try to find an inspiration for overcoming scepticism and nihilism, against which both reason and faith should be defended. The question of inspiration is important for everyone dealing with philosophy and no serious arguments presented should be ignored: the ones ready to follow the call present both in Fides et Ratio, and in Solovyov's work, do not have to be irrational, uncritical and opportunistic and the ones with doubts do not have to be nihilists, the destroyers or authorities and personal enemies of faith and God. The effort put into a detailed analysis is required to understand the philosophy itself and its relations with religion, theology and faith, with the contemporary culture and to comprehend what kind of tasks it requires the contemporary man to undertake.
The final, beautiful, words of the encyclical express the belief that „this can never be the grandeur of the human being, who can find fulfilment only in choosing to enter the truth, to make a home under the shade of Wisdom and dwell there. Only within this horizon of truth will people understand their freedom in its fullness and their call to know and love God as the supreme realization of their true self"12.
References
1. John Paul II. Encyclical letter „Fides et RatiovVatican, 1998.
2. Solowiow, W Wiara, doswiadczenie i rozum [Faith, reason, expiemce],in Logos i Ethos,It) 12, 2(33), pp. 202-214.
3. Obolevitch,T. O relacji mis-d/y wiar% a wiedz% w myili Wlodzimierza Solowjowa. Uwagi ttumacza [On relationship between faith and knowledge in the thought of Vladimir Solovicv. The interpreter notes], in Logos i Ethos, 2012, no. 2(33), pp. 215-221.
4. Obolevitch, T. Nauka w poszukiwaniu metafizyki Aspekty poznania naukowego w teorii wiedzy integrainej Wlodzirnierz Sotowiowa [Science in search of metaphysics. Aspects of scientific cognition in the Soloviov's theory of integral knowledge],Tarnow,2003,p. 138.
5. Obolevitch, T. Nauka w poszukiwaniu metafizyki. Mysl Solowjowa [Science in search of metaphysics. Hie Soloviev's thought], in Semina Scientiarum, 2003,2, pp. 45-50.
6. Kiejzik, L. Wlodzirnierz Solowiow [Vladimir Soloviev], Zielona Gora 1997, p. 198.
7. Obolevitch, T. Problematyczny konkordyzm. Wiara i wiedza w mysli Wlodzimierza S. Solowiowa i Siemona L. Franka [Problematic concordism. Faith and knowledge in the thought of Vladimir S. Soloviev and Siemon L. Frank],Thrnow; Krak<Sw, 2006, p. 360.
12 John Paul II. Encyclical letter „Fides et Ratio','a. 107.
SUMMARY
In my paper I compare two views on the relation between faith and reason, that are characteristic for the cultures of the east and the west, namely views presented by Vladimir Solovyov and Karol Wojtyla - John Paul II. The issue of faith and reason has been one of the fundamental problems in European philosophy since Christianity became one of the dominant factors that inspires the development of the culture. In the history of coping with this problem within these two traditions we find different kind of stipulations that are characteristic for each of them and unique. This is why it is interesting to compare the concepts proposed by Solovyov with ideas expressed by John Paul II in his encyclical Fides at Ratio.
A shallow analysis of their ideas may lead to the conclusion that there is a substantial agreement between their positions. They both proclaim an autonomy of faith and Teason, at the same time they stress their important role in the way in which a man gets to know the world and the development of a man. However, there are some differences between these two authors that I stress in my paper. The most crucial one is that they use different meanings of the terms faith and reason. In the encyclical Fides et Ratio the author identifies the reason with the cognitive powers of a man, as well as theoretical reason and practical reason, that constitute the metaphysics and ethics. Solovyov's idea of reason is narrowed. Interpreting it as just negation of accident, seeing its act as only formal, Solovyov reduces it to something like Aristotelian passive reason. It is alike with the concept of faith. John Paul's II concept seems to have much broader meaning than that used by Solovyov. In the encyclical its main meaning is the relation between God and the man, an interpersonal character of the relation is stressed; it is an act of will as well as of reason of the man being in special relation with God. According to Solovyov, faith is autonomous, incommensurable to reason element of the cognitive process; it is an essential and indispensable stage of that process. Solovyov postulates strong integration of faith, reason and theology, of philosophy and science. Instead, the author of the encyclical Fides et Ratio is not so radical in his conclusions. His intention is rather to enhance a deeper cooperation between scientists, philosophers and theologians by perceiving the possibility of mutual enrichment of these domains and their role in the development of the culture. The Pope's goal is rather moral than methodological. According to his vision of the man, it is necessary for the man to believe since he must trust other people in the process of mastering knowledge. Something that is a flaw from epistemological point of view the Pope interprets as the beginning of ethics. Hence, ethics is a condition of harmony between faith and reason. The common trust implies responsibility, fairness, and honesty. In this sense the Pope indicates for moral aspect of cooperation between faith and reason and its role in forming of the man.
РЕФЕРАТ
Предпринимается попытка сопоставления взглядов на соотношение между верой и разумом двух мыслителей, концепции которых можем принять как определяющие для философской культуры Востока и Запада: Владимира Соловьева и Кароля Войтылы. Проблема веры и разума является одной из фундаментальных в европейской философии с тех времен, когда христианство стало одним из главных источников развития культуры. Как в западной, так и в восточной философии можем проследить историю развития идей и концепций, по-разному решающих вопрос об этом соотношении. В каждой из этих традиций подход к проблеме является специфичным и неповторимым. Поэтому кажется оправданным сравнение концепции B.C. Соловьева со взглядами Иоанна Павла II, выраженными в его энциклике «Fides et Ratio».
Поверхностный анализ концепции соотношения веры и разума у B.C. Соловьева и Иоанна Павла II мог бы привести к выводу о совпадении их точек зрения по этому вопросу. Они оба выступают за автономию веры и разума, одновременно подчеркивая их функции и роль в процеосе познания и развития человека. Однако существуют определенные различия, на которые следует обратить внимание. Прежде всего, оба автора по-разному пользуются понятиями веры и разума. В энциклике «Fides et Ratio» автор видит в разуме символ познавательных способностей человека. Спекулятивный и практический разум учреждает метафизику и этику. B.C. Соловьев ограничивает понятие разума. Сводя функцию разума к отрицанию определений, придавая актам разума чисто формальный характер, B.C. Соловьев редуцирует разум к чему-то наподобие пассивного разума Аристотеля. Похожее мы наблюдаем в отношении понятия веры. Кажется, что Иоанн Павел II шире, чем русский философ, понимает веру. В свете его энциклики вера является, прежде всего, соотношением Бога и человека, имеет выраженный межличностный характер, это волютивный акт и акт разума человека, который входит в реляцию с Богом. Для B.C. Соловьева вера автоматична, не соизмерима с разумом, это элемент процесса познания, одновременно необходимый его этап. Если B.C. Соловьев требует сильной интеграции веры с разумом, а также с религией, философией и наукой, то автор энциклики «Fides et Ratio» не делает таких радикальных выводов. Его интенцией является, быстрее всего, поощрение углубления сотрудничества между представителями науки, философии и богословия, возможности обогащения этих областей и их роли в строении культуры. Призыв Папы Римского имеет характер более моральный, чем методологический. Из рассуждений автора выделяется образ человека, который должен верить по необходимости (именно по необходимости), ибо не будучи в состоянии самостоятельно проверить достоверность знаний, которые получает, он должен поверить другим. Нечто, что с точки зрения эпистемологии можем признать несовершенным, Папа Римский представляет как начало этики. Следовательно, условием гармонии веры и разума является этика. Ибо взаимное доверие предполагает ответственность, честность, добросовестность. В этом смысле Войтыла указывает на моральный аспект содействия веры и разума, а также на его значение для построения человека.
lb, что объединяет B.C. Соловьева и Иоанна Павла И, это намерение выступить с требованием более глубокой интеграции веры и разума. Без сомнения, в обоих случаях это забота о человеке и современной ему культуре. Хотя их разделяет почти целое XX столетие, они указывают на похожие опасности и волнующие их явления в культуре, которые стали следствием разрыва первостепенной связи между верой и разумом, а также попыток уменьшить значение и роль религии в жизни человека. Оба текста - это ответ на кризисную ситуацию, в которой авторы стараются найти вдохновение для преодоления скептицизма и нигилизма, от которых необходимо защищать как разум, так и веру. Это фундаментальный вопрос для каждого, кто занимается философией, и нельзя отрицать аргументы в пользу того или иного его решения. Все, кто следует призывам Иоанна Павла II и B.C. Соловьева, - это не нерациональные, конъюнктурные, некритические апологеты, а те, кто заявляет о своих сомнениях, нигилисты, крушители авторитетов и непосредственные враги религии и Бога. Нужно распознать и обозначить проблему, чтобы понять как саму философию, так и ее соотношение с религией, богословием и верой, с современной культурой и заданиями, которые она ставит перед современным человеком. •
