Установка на общие геополитические интересы: изменение акцента в диалоге и коммуникациях между Россией и ЕС? Текст научной статьи по специальности «Социальная и экономическая география»

Томанн П.Э.

Установка на общие геополитические интересы: изменение акцента в диалоге и коммуникациях между

Россией и ЕС?

Пьер-Эммануэль Томанн — доктор политических наук, президент организации

«Евроконтинент», Брюссель, Бельгия.

E-mail: pierre-emmanuel.thomann@eurocontinent.eu

Аннотация

Нарративы взаимоотношений между ЕС и Россией часто фокусируются на различных интерпретациях существующих кризисов. Особое внимание уделяется вопросу «европейских ценностей», а также толкованию европейского и международного права. Эта информационно-психологическая война между ЕС и Россией привела к ухудшению межгосударственных отношений. Пришло время понять, что потенциальную выгоду можно извлечь, лишь фокусируясь на общих геополитических интересах. Необходимо развивать общение между исследователями, экспертами и политиками из стран ЕС и России для выявления таких интересов и установления стратегического диалога. Подобный подход может стать противовесом информационно-психологической войне. В статье анализируются недостатки стратегической коммуникации ЕС, существующие проблемы в отношениях европейских стран с Россией и насущная необходимость поиска их решения в интересах мира и процветания народов Европы.

Ключевые слова

Отношения ЕС-Россия, информационная война, информационно-психологическая война, геополитика, геополитические интересы, геополитическая картография.

Introduction

According to the EU Global Strategy published in June 2016, "managing the relationship with Russia represents a key strategic challenge"1. So far, communication among political circles and media between the EU and Russia during the current crisis has largely focused on the question of "European values" and the interpretation of European and international law. This has led to a worsening of the relation at governmental level.

From the EU side, the ideological debate on values focuses on the primacy of "transnational values" deriving from "universal principles". This approach is highly divisive as the values cannot be precisely defined nor between Russia and the EU nor within the EU itself. In a multicentred world, a growing resistance to any monopoly of definition of democracy, or of "best model of civilisation" can be observed. The interpretation of international law has also been at the centre of communication strategies to win the argument over the adversary which led to more distrust on both sides. In the past, the EU and Russia have engaged in lecturing each other on international law. However, international law remains

1 Shared Vision, Common Actions: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy // European External Action Service [Электронный ресурс]. 2016. URL: https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/regions/files/eugs review web.pdf (дата

обращения: 31.01.2018).

a matter of various interpretations and changes, which depend on the shifts in the balance of power. The "right of people to determine themselves" principle in international law, for instance, was advocated by the EU during the German unification, and the dismantling of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, but also by Russia in the case of South Ossetia and Abkhazia independence from Georgia. In the case of Crimea on the other hand, the EU is now defending the UN "territorial integrity" of Ukraine principle whilst Russia, on the contrary, defends the "right of people to determine themselves" principle.

The "narrative war" between the EU and Russia is also deriving from distinct interpretations of the different ongoing crises, as well as from rival global geopolitical representations2. Moreover, there is a generational issue because people who have experienced the Cold War have more difficulties to adopt a new way of thinking, and easily fall back into old "Cold War" visions.

However, EU-Russia relations cannot be separated from global geopolitical trends. In order to guide the political decisions of both partners, a more common diagnosis of the global evolutions would be required. This would be possible after identifying hurdles to overcome, highlighting common interests, and hopefully adopting common strategies. Today, the danger lies in the spreading of a spiralling crisis under the "sleepwalker" syndrome3, leading to confrontation caused by the absence of geopolitical knowledge on each other's interests and priorities.

To prevent further European fragmentation, it might be time to underline the potential benefit of more focus on common geopolitical interests in order to improve communication between academics, experts and politicians from EU countries and Russia. The focus on the geopolitical angle will give a different view and might thus improve knowledge of respective interests and perceptions. This approach has the advantage of moving EU-Russia relations from ideology to more focused fields of potential cooperation. Academic and expert circles have a very strong role to play in initiating new narratives, although in the end, it will depend on the political will of the different governments. It is also more fundamentally reasonable to accept respective differing geopolitical visions determined by geography and history and identify respective "red lines".

2 Deters-Schneider W., Schulze P. t Timmermann H. Die Europaische Union, Russland und Eurasien, Die Rückkehr der Geopolitk. Berlin: Berliner Wissenschaft Verlag. 2008.

3 Clark C. The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914. New York: Harper. 2012. URL: https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/regions/files/eugs review web.pdf (дата обращения: 31.01.2018).

The crisis will probably reach even higher levels of intensity, before both sides realise none of them will be able to impose their point of view on the rival partner. The reset of EU-Russia relations should not be treated as a subsidiary matter of EU external relations, but as a central question concerning the future of the European project. It should be considered as an opportunity to reform the European project with a more systemic approach, because nowadays the EU is facing a deep crisis and incremental scepticism from citizens.

First of all, it is necessary to make an austere diagnosis of the situation and to highlight the main obstacles using a geopolitical angle of analysis.

Secondly, it is useful to identify common geopolitical interests in order to engage in a strategic dialogue. This approach could help circumvent the information war based on rival ideological narratives.

I. The diagnosis: Absence of geopolitical reflexion at the EU level

The shortcomings of the EU global strategy

The current geopolitical situation is a pivotal moment because the objective of unity in the European project is experiencing more and more obstacles. Liberal and Human rights normative ideologies as the basis of the project are more and more debated within European nations. The European utopia was aimed at building peace through unity, but as a result of the multipolar tendencies in the World and in Europe, fragmentation forces are stronger. The new European Union Global Strategy4 published in spring 2016, was written to conform itself to EU competencies and policies. However, a comprehensive threat analysis and sound geopolitical diagnosis of the situation were not included in the document. The European Union is closer to a civilian and normative power5 (see figure 1) in international relations and fosters its own model of civil and military management and diplomacy. However, the absence of geopolitical reflection inside the EU leads to a worsening of its relations with Russia6, whose objectives do not match EU objectives, and further, to a degradation of its own security, in the context of a difficult Franco-German attempt to revive the European project after Brexit.

4 Shared Vision, Common Actions: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy // European External Action Service [Электронный ресурс]. 2016. URL: https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/regions/files/eugs review web.pdf (дата обращения: 31.01.2018).

5 Laïdi Z. La Norme sans la force, l'énigme de la puissance européenne. Paris: Presses de Science Po, 2005.

6 Report of IE RAS. The EU global strategy, A view from Russia, Institute of Europe // Russian Academy of Sciences [Электронный ресурс]. 2017. URL: http://en.instituteofeurope.ru/images/news/30/IERASReportJanuary2017.pdf (дата обращения: 31.01.2018).

It is not enough for the European Union to adopt a position of "empire of standards", in anticipation of a potentially growing significance of the legal factor in international relations, and in the face of geopolitical doctrines of other political entities. Geopolitical issues are either hidden in the European institutions or are deliberately removed from the eyes of citizens. A better appreciation of geopolitical issues would prove useful for the EU in its analysis and comprehension of territorial issues. It would also be beneficial for the development of a power strategy based on the control of territory and subordinated to the objective of a political Europe7. A reformed EU would have better chances to engage in the global balance of power and to obtain the status of a more autonomous geopolitical actor.

There is no credible policy in the EU Global Strategy for delivering "strategic autonomy". The growing number of political declarations on international relations rules and human rights is also inversely proportional to the collective helplessness of the European Union and its Member States to manage crises in its geographical proximity in a decisive way. This is the case in Syria, Libya and in the Ukraine but also when it comes to Islamist terrorism on European territory and the migration crisis, which are reinforcing internal EU fragmentation on the question of borders. This lack of strategic reflection leads to an opportunistic use of EU policies from external geopolitical projects. There is also a neutralisation process between rival geopolitical projects within the EU itself. EaP (EU Eastern partnership) is therefore instrumentalised by the states that are most opposed to cooperation with Russia and who are the most eager to implement a Euro-Atlantic vision, excluding Russia. We have to examine relations between the European Union and Russia in a more accurate way, because they not only impact continental European stability, but also represent major geopolitical stakes for the future of the European project.

7 EU is not a nation but an alliance of nations, when Russia is a nation: there is a necessity for more clarification on the finalities of the European project between Member States.

Figure 1. EU: euro-globalist normative power. A global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy «Shared Vision, Common Action A Stringer

Europe»

EU and Russia: two parallel visions

The European Union makes its relations with Russia dependent on legal principles declared on a unilateral basis: "Substantial changes in relations between the EU and Russia are premised upon full respect for international law and the principles underpinning the European security order, including the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter. We will not recognise Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea nor accept the destabilisation of eastern Ukraine"8. However, the criticism against Russia regarding the so-called "non respect of international law" has no legitimacy among Russian public opinion since the United Nations system has been challenged by the United States with the Iraq war, and did not respect the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia after the recognition of Kosovo as an independent entity.

Russia is not accepted as an equal partner, and from the EU and U.S. government points of view, has to be westernised.

At the beginning of the crisis in the Ukraine, John Kerry and Angela Merkel, the most prominent western leaders in favour of sanctions of the European Union against Russia, claimed that Russia was an actor whose behaviour was a pattern of the past.

John Kerry declared on the 3rd of March 2014, that "You just don't in the 21st century behave in 19th century fashion by invading another country on completely trumped up pre-text"9. On the 13th of March, in a declaration to the government, Angela Merkel also stressed that "the conflict in Georgia in 2008 and today in Ukraine in the middle of Europe is a conflict of zones of influences and territorial claims, as we experienced in the 19th and 20th century"10 and emphasised that they were outdated.

The European Union is not ready to consider Russia as an equal partner. From the point of view of the EU, Russia has to be westernised, that is transformed according to the normative vision of the European Union as a "superior moral force" in defending its values. Russians perceive this positioning as an unacceptable form of "moral imperialism". Their representations are in total contradiction with the ambition of the European Union to transform the world according to its image. The European Union aims to export its normative

8 Shared Vision, Common Actions: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy // European External Action Service [Электронный ресурс]. 2016. URL: https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/regions/files/eugs review web.pdf (дата обращения: 31.01.2018).

9 Kerry condemns Russia's incredible act of aggression in Ukraine // Reuters [Электронный ресурс]. 02.03.2014. URL: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-usa-kerry/kerry-condemns-russias-incredible-act-of-aggression-in-ukraine-idUSBREA210DG20140302 (дата обращения: 31.01.2018).

10 Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel, Deutscher Bundestag. // Die Bundesregierung [Электронный ресурс]. 13.03.2014. URL: https ://www.bundesre gierung.de/Content/DE/Re gierungserklaerung/2014/2014-03-13 -bt-merkel. html (дата обращения: 31.01.2018).

model based on the "interdependence theory". This ideology postulates that commerce brings peace in an automatic way11. The perspectives of Russia's westernisation are blocked by the Russian government. The government defends the concept of "sovereign democracy" and in a multipolar world, positions itself as an autonomous Eurasian pole of power, with a different geopolitical orientation, both European and Asiatic. The Russian government suggests to negotiate new European security architecture and to stop enlargement of NATO and the EU. Today, rival visions between the European Union and Russia are an obstacle to identification of common interests.

The five principles of the EU towards Russia: Isolate Russia

The European Union has outlined five principles to guide its policy towards Russia (Foreign Affairs Council of the 14th of March 2016)12:

- Implementation of the Minsk Agreements as the key condition for any substantial change in the EU's stance towards Russia.

- Strengthened relations with the EU's Eastern partners and other neighbours, in particular in Central Asia.

- Strengthening of the EU's resilience (for example energy security, hybrid threats, or strategic communication).

- Need for selective engagement with Russia on issues of interest to the EU.

- Need to engage in people-to-people contact and support Russian civil society. But these principles are clearly an attempt to isolate Russia that has an opposing

principle of Europe:

- Russia is part of the "common European house".

- The future of Europe does not consist in a transformation of Russia according to European Union principles but in a transformation of the European project where nations are placed on an equal basis13.

11 The doctrine of economic interdependence can lead to geopolitical blindness as in the case of Ukraine where free trade zone negotiations led to a geopolitical crisis.

12 Foreign Affairs Council of the 14th of March 2016 // European Council — Council of the European Union [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2016/03/14/ (дата обращения: 31.01.2018).

13 ZagorskyA. Russia-EU relations at a crossroad, Common and Divergent Interests, working paper // Russian International Affairs Council [Электронный ресурс]. 2016. URL: http://russiancouncil.ru/en/activity/workingpapers/rossiya-i-es-na-perepute-obshchie-i-raskhodyashchiesya-inter/ (дата обращения: 31.01.2018).

Regarding these five principles of the EU, the problem lies in the fact that the Ukrainian government does not implement the Minsk agreements. The federalisation process of the Ukrainian constitution to give substantial autonomy to the self-proclaimed Donbas Republics is currently blocked.

As to the cooperation between the European Union and Russia's neighbours (Eastern partnership countries till Central Asia), the policy is not acceptable for Russians because the European Union gives relations with Russia's neighbours a priority over relations with Russia itself. Ultimately, the objective of the European Union is to influence Russian civil society, which is a very sensitive topic, since Western NGOs are by Russia perceived as Trojan horses of a coloured revolution14. This assumption is not unfounded, if one considers the declarations of Jacek Sayusz-Wolski, former vice-president and currently Member of the European Parliament, during a round table in Brussels in 201415. He stresses that it is necessary to engage in a long battle to provoke a "regime change " in Russia and that this can be achieved through strategies of influence in civil society with NGOs, as well as through targeting middle classes in order to westernise Russia.

The EU's response to the information war

One of the central elements of the European Union's response to what is perceived as propaganda war and hybrid warfare between Russia and the EU is to develop its system of strategic communication. With this in mind, a new Russian counter-propaganda service has been created. The East StratCom task force is supposed to expose the misinformation of Russian officials and media in the Eastern Partnership countries16 in particular, but also in the Member States of the European Union. The service was created on the initiative of Russia's most critical Member States, with little enthusiasm from the rest of the members. France and the Mediterranean countries were initially more inclined to support a South StratCom to counter Islamist propaganda, but this part of the counter-propaganda service has not yet succeeded, although it has been supported by the European Parliament17. An inter-institutional Arab StratCom task force has been created, but it has no dedicated staff and uses

14 Avioutskii V. La Révolution orange en tant que phénomène géopolitique, Stratégies américaines // Revue de Géographie et de Géopolitique. 2008. N 129. P. 69-99.

15 Conference: Building a lifeline for freedom: Eastern partnership 2.0. // Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies [Электронный ресурс]. 07.10.2014. URL: https://www.martenscentre.eu/publications/building-lifeline-freedom-eastern-partnership-20 (дата обращения: 31.01.2018).

16 Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

17 Report on EU strategic communication to counteract propaganda against it by third parties. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Rapporteur: Anna Elzbieta Fotyga // European Parliament [Электронный ресурс]. 14.10.2016. URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REP0RT+A8-2016-0290+0+D0C+XML+V0//EN (дата обращения: 31.01.2018).

existing budget18. This reflects the differences in geopolitical priorities between Member States of the European Union.

The stated aim of East StratCom is to reveal fake news conveyed by the Russian media, and not to initiate propaganda for the European Union, which is considered counterproductive. The head of the unit is a British career diplomat, Giles Portman, who was initially under the supervision of Michael Mann, in charge of the communication strategy of the European Service for External Action (EEAS), and former spokesman for Catherine Ashton. Michael Mann has since May 2017 been replaced by Lutz Guellner, a German, and a former spokesman for Catherine Ashton. The most active Member State behind this initiative seems to be the United Kingdom, which deals with most of the security posts in the EU institutions19. Brexit might therefore reduce the camp of countries in the European Union who are mistrustful of Russia.

East StratCom methodology

Let's now focus on the way East StratCom is operating. Fake news is produced in the Ukraine, in the United States, in the EU Members States, in Russia, the Islamic State in Syria, as well in the other places of the world. It is a global trend. Rival narratives, including fake news are becoming central tools in the global geopolitical arena. East StratCom debunks Russian fake news, but not Ukrainian, nor US, or EU Member States fake news. The Russian side is being put forward as the guilty party, although all actors are using strategic communication, including fake news as tools of influence.

Since Russia is the only target in East StratCom's fight against fake news, it raises the suspicion that the target is not the news, but Russia, and that there is a geopolitical motivation.

The exclusive concentration on Russian media "fake news", or Russian supposed hacking activities, is diverting attention from the US20 and EU Member States own communication and influence strategies. During the French presidential elections, Russian media have been accused of using "fake news" and of hacking actions against the candidate Emmanuel Macron in order to influence the electoral process. However, massive infringement

18 Strategic communications, East and South. Report N 30 — July. .Paris: EU Institute for Security studies. 2010.

19 Research interview with an official of the Council of the EU, 28 November 2016 (personal interview).

20 Johnson A. NYT Prints Government-Funded Propaganda About Government-Funded Propaganda // Fair.org. [Электронный ресурс] 13.01.2017. URL: https://fair.org/home/nyt-prints-government-funded-propaganda-about-government-funded-propaganda/ (дата обращения: 31.01.2018).

from EU officials21, European22 and American foreign politicians23, calling openly to vote for Emmanuel Macron, at the same time as Russian authorities were accused of interfering in the process, has been neglected in mainstream media, which instead concentrated on Russian actions that were never proved24. Guillaume Poupard, director general of the government cyber-defence agency known in France by its acronym, ANSSI, found no trace of Russian activity behind the hacking of Emmanuel Macron electoral campaign e-mails25. When in his Senate Armed Services hearing, NSA director Admiral Rogers said that US authorities gave their French counterparts warnings about supposed Russian interference before the Macronleaks were published, Guillaume Poupard questioned NSA's "help" instead and said: "Why did Admiral Rogers say that, like that, at that time? It really surprised me. It really surprised my European allies. And to be totally frank, when I spoke about it to my NSA counterparts and asked why did he say that, they didn't really know how to reply either", he said. "Perhaps he went further than what he really wanted to say." and underlined that "if you start to accuse one country when in fact it was another country ... we'll get international chaos". "We'll get what we all fear, which is to say a sort of permanent conflict where everyone is attacking everyone else"26.

The EU narrative focussing on Russian actions is voluntarily neglecting the context of a global geopolitical fight for influence between all great powers. Russia of course, but also the USA, China, France, Germany... As the Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz27 underlined, a war is like a duel, and requires at least two actors with rival visions and rival strategies. Their fight is a dialectic leading to reciprocal actions. Strategic communication from one actor leads to strategic communication from rival actors. Russia's actions in the

21 Hayden J. Juncker backs Macron for French president, EU says // Bloomberg [Электронный ресурс]. 24.04.2017. URL: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-04-24/juncker-backs-france-s-macron-in-fundamental-choice-eu-says (дата обращения: 31.01.2018).

22 Von Der Burchard H. Germany's Steinmeier warns French voters against Lepen // Politico [Электронный ресурс]. 15.04.2017. URL: https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-frank-walter-steinmeier-warns-french-voters-against-le-pen/ (дата обращения: 31.01.2018).

23 Borger J, Chrisafis A. Obama backs Macron in last-minute intervention in French election // The Guardian [Электронный ресурс]. 04.05.2017. URL: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/04/barack-obama-backs-macron-in-last-minute-election-intervention (дата обращения: 31.01.2018).

24 Maté A. Ingérence russe, de l'obsession à la paranoïa // Le Monde Diplomatique [Электронный ресурс]. 12.2017 URL: https://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2017/12/MATE/58207 (дата обращения: 31.01.2018).

25 Leicester J. AP interview: France warns of risk of war in cyberspace // AP News [Электронный ресурс]. 01.06.2017. URL: https://www.apnews.com/b605ac78b54549d092dd9dfea32dfd9a/AP-Interview:-France-warns-of-risk-of-war-in-cyberspace (дата обращения: 31.01.2018).

26 Ibid.

27 Clausewitz C. (von) De la guerre, traduit de l'allemand et présenté par Nicolas Vaquet. Paris: Editions Payot et rivages, 2006.

cyberspace are as much a result of Russian power as of its adversaries28. The increasing presence of Russia in the European strategic communication landscape is also a result of the desire of the Russian government since the mid 2000's to offer a much more attractive image and to counter the relaunch, in the western media sphere, of a fabrication of images of a hostile, threatening and reactionary Russia29.

Russia was able to become a major actor in European debates since the EU Member States have no numerical sovereignty and are under monopolistic dependence of the GAFA (Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft) owned by the US. The Snowden affair has also helped legitimise Russian contestation of American hegemony. Russia can therefore enlarge its digital sphere of influence in the EU, as well as increasingly meet the expectations of European citizens to alternative narratives and information, because its digital economy and specificity is outside the control of big American corporations and therefore the American state30.

The very reason East StratCom is only targeting Russia is that they are more preoccupied with the strength and durability of the transatlantic link and the complementarity with NATO, than the "strategic autonomy of EU". In the European Parliament Report on EU strategic communication to counteract propaganda against it by third parties, this is prominent in the first paragraph. It "underlines that hostile propaganda against the EU comes in many different forms and uses various tools, often tailored to match EU Member States' profiles, with the goal of distorting truths, provoking doubt, dividing Member States, engineering a strategic split between the European Union and its North American partners and paralysing the decision-making process, discrediting the EU institutions and transatlantic partnerships, which play a recognised role in the European security and economic architecture, in the eyes and minds of EU citizens and of citizens of neighbouring countries...". In the paragraph dedicated to the EU strategy to counteract propaganda, the report also "stresses that cooperation between the EU and NATO in the field of strategic communication should be substantially strengthened"31.

28 Gérard C., Limonier K. Guerre hybride russe dans le cyberespace. Géopolitique de la Russie. // Hérodote, Revue de Géographie et de Géopolitique. 2017. N 166-167. P. 145-163.

29 Raviot J.R. Le prétorianisme russe: l'exercice du pouvoir selon Vladimir Poutine. Géopolitique de la Russie. // Hérodote, Revue de Géographie et de Géopolitique. 2017. N 166-167. P. 9-22.

30 Audinet M., Limonier K. La stratégie d'influence informationnelle et numérique de la Russie en Europe // Hérodote, Revue de Géographie et de Géopolitique. 2017. N 164. P. 123-144. URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REP0RT+A8-2016-0290+0+D0C+XML+V0//EN (дата обращения: 31.01.2018).

31 Report on EU strategic communication to counteract propaganda against it by third parties. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Rapporteur: Anna Elzbieta Fotyga // European Parliament [Электронный ресурс]. 14.10.2016.

The priority given to Russian activities over ISIL/Daesh's (*) Islamist propaganda in the Report is also striking. The treatment of Russia and ISIL/Daesh (*) as third parties on the same footing equates to fallacious intellectual and strategic reasoning. This report initially written in the Committee on Foreign Affairs with Reporter Anna Elzbieta Fotyga, has sparked some controversy as a Minority Opinion tabled by GUE/NGL MEP Javier Couso rejected the report and declared that it was " irresponsible to place a State like Russia at the same level of threat as ISIL/Daesh*" and demanded "a strict separation of EU from NATO"32.

Let's now focus on the sources East StratCom uses for its investigations. The East StratCom claims to debunk Russian propaganda but it uses unreliable sources like Bellingcat. Information products spread by Bellingcat are incorporated in mainstream media without any critical distance, and informational experts have criticised the methods and tools of analysis used by Bellingcat33.

East StratCom also relies on media very often financed by the US, like Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Polygraph.info, a fact-checking website produced by Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, NGO's such as Stopfake (Ukrainian NGO), but also the US Department of State, the US Senate, media like the New York Times, and US think tanks like the Brookings Institution and the Atlantic Council. These organisations and media are openly defending the US vision of the World or are close to it, and often use fake news cases to push their own narrative. There is no systematic independent assessment of fake news cases by independent experts or academics.

East StratCom also tends to consider "fake news", anything that is not in line with the EU narrative. It mixes factual examples of fake news in a very narrow sense, and at the same time fosters its own narrative, which is only a result of its own interpretation and representations. As we underlined before, it does not take into account the geopolitical context of the situation, neither the geographical and historical factors. In proceeding that way, East StratCom also wants to promote its own policies through its narrative. Therefore the EU plays the role of both judge and party since it has its own interests to defend.

URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A8-2016-O29O+O+DOC+XML+VO//EN (дата обращения: 31.01.2018). * Terrorist organization, prohibited in the Russian Federation.

32 Ibid.

33 Simons G. The Role of NGOs in Knowledge Management of Conflicts // School of Public Administration, Lomonosov Moscow State University, Public Administration E-Journal. 2017. N 64. URL: http://ee-journal.spa.msu.ru/vestnik/item/64 2017simons.htm (дата обращения: 31.01.2018).

The Eastern Partnership policy is a good case to underline this claim. On the occasion of the 5th Eastern Partnership (EaP) Summit in Brussels, East StratCom published a document on its website, entitled "Myths about the Eastern Partnership"34 supposed to counter false information about this policy. According to its website, the East StratCom Task Force "develops communication products and campaigns focused on better explaining EU policies in the Eastern Partnership countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine)"35. The document pretends to counter the myth that participation in the Eastern Partnership (EaP) leads to EU membership. It underlines that this claim is "false" and that the Eastern Partnership initiative "is not a EU accession process". "Its aim is to build a common area of shared democracy, prosperity, stability and increased cooperation".

The situation is however much more ambiguous. The document omits to mention that although the accession is not mentioned in EU or other Eastern Partnership documents, further EU enlargement to Eastern Partnership countries is an objective of some countries in the European Union. EU enlargement has to be approved by Member States at unanimity and Member States are today divided on the issue. However, the pro-enlargement countries think the situation can change in the future. This is why Ukrainian think tanks in Brussels are pushing for future enlargements after a process of Europeanisation through the Eastern Partnership program. East StratCom omits to inform about the implicit sides of this policy. The EaP policy is from its origins, used both by the EaP countries36 and some EU Member States to push for further EU enlargement in the longer term.

In a WikiLeaks cable from 2008, an American diplomat wrote about the Eastern Partnership policy that "Polish analysts tell us having a pro-Western buffer zone in Ukraine and Belarus would keep Poland off the front line with an increasingly assertive Russia. By offering former Soviet republics the prospect of free trade and visa-free travel to the EU, the Eastern Partnership can spur the reforms needed for eventual EU membership and stem growing Russian influence"37. In the cable, the diplomat is referring to this Polish approach as the "Sikorski doctrine".

34 Myth about the Eastern Partnership — Factsheet // European External Action Service [Электронный ресурс]. 20.11.2017. URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/35712/myths-about-eastern-partnership-factsheet en (дата обращения: 31.01.2018).

35 Questions and Answers about the East StratCom Task Force // European External Action Service [Электронный ресурс]. 08.11.2017. URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/2116/questions-and-answers-about-east-stratcom-task-force en (дата обращения: 31.01.2018).

36 Prospects for EU enlargement after 2019 // Ukrainian Think Tank Liaison office in Brussels [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://ukraine-office.eu/en/prospects-for-eu-enlargement-after-2019/ (дата обращения: 31.01.2018).

37 Poland, a natural ally on Eastern policy // WIKILEAKS [Электронный ресурс]. 12.12.2008. URL: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08WARSAW1409 a.html (дата обращения: 31.01.2018).

If the WikiLeaks cable gives a different light on the origins of the Eastern Partnership, let's have a look at the opinion of a EU diplomat from the European External Action Service (EEAS). The ongoing EU ambassador to Russia, Vygaudas Usackas, declared in October 2017: "We need not only to acknowledge Ukrainians' European aspirations but at some point grant them a path towards EU membership. We know from experience that the prospect of membership works as a stimulus for reforms. Uncertainty about Ukraine's geopolitical position also leaves it exposed to further destabilisation by Russia, which in turn has a negative impact on EU-Russia relations. A successful Ukraine will contribute to stability in our region and represent a powerful example for the Russian people"38.

In their Joint Declaration of the Brussels Eastern Partnership Summit, as agreed by the Summit participants on 24 November 2017 in Brussels39, the EU Member States stressed that "the Summit participants acknowledge the European aspirations and European choice of the partners concerned, as stated in the Association Agreements". The Netherlands was especially reluctant to talk of the Eastern partners' "European aspirations". In 2016, it negotiated changes to EU's association agreement with the Ukraine, after Dutch voters rejected the original version in a referendum, but the term was maintained, although it falls short of "accepting" these aspirations.

At the summit, the EU Member States also stressed that "the Eastern Partnership aims at building a common area of shared democracy, prosperity, stability and increased cooperation and is not directed against anyone"40. The words "not directed at anyone" are aimed at reducing Russia's suspicion about the EaP, in contradiction with the origins of the EaP, which can also be interpreted as a tool of the "Sikorski doctrine", as revealed by a WikiLeaks cable.

Geopolitical analysis is about highlighting the implicit objectives of actors. In this respect, the ongoing EU ambassador to Russia has unveiled his support for EU enlargement to the Ukraine. Unsurprisingly, this is in line with the posture of Poland and Baltic countries, but also more recently Romania and Croatia41, who are openly in favour of further EU

38 Usackas V. The West must defend its values against Putin's Russia // The Guardian [Электронный ресурс]. 01.10.2017. URL: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/sep/30/west-must-defend-its-values-against-putins-russia (дата обращения: 31.01.2018).

39 Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit // Council of the European Union [Электронный ресурс]. 24.11.2017. URL: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31758/final-statement-st14821en17.pdf (дата обращения: 31.01.2018).

40 Ibid.

41 Morgan S. Romania and Croatia declare support for more EU enlargement // Euractiv [Электронный ресурс]. 15.05.2017. URL: https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/romania-and-croatia-declare-support-for-more-enlargement/ (дата обращения: 31.01.2018).

enlargement and this is precisely why they support the Eastern Partnership policy. The President of the European People's Party (EPP) Joseph Daul also underlined "we must offer concrete European prospect to Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. And we must offer them the hope that one day they can join our family"42.

The EU narrative on the Eastern Partnership is therefore partially biased since it does not explain the complete picture and maintains ambiguity about future enlargement. This ambiguity is reducing trust, not only with Russia, but also with EU citizens. To resolve this crucial problem, as part of this reform, the EU needs to fix its frontiers in order to preserve its cohesion, strengthen its identity and facilitate the identification of its interests.

Biased or fake narratives like the rewriting of history or omitting the historical and geopolitical context are a much bigger problem than the narrow definition of fake news. This EU posture is also a distraction from the real challenges. These include the reform of the EU in order to position the European project in a more realistic way in the emerging multicentred world and the renewal of trust from its citizens.

Think tanks in Brussels: a negative climate for debates on the issue of EU-Russia relations

The information war, which is growing on both the Russian and Western sides, has led to a very negative climate for debates on the question of relations between the European Union, the United States, and Russia. If we limit ourselves to the think tanks funded by the European Parliament, which are based on the major political groups of the EU, the EPP (European People's Party) and the PSE (Party of European Socialists), the debates will overwhelmingly focus against Russia.

The Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies is the think tank of the EPP Group in the European Parliament. Of the seventy-four publications of the Martens Centre between 2014 and November 2017, nineteen articles deal with the issue of relations with Eastern Europe, twelve of which are directly on Russia. The remaining ten are on Eastern Partnership countries. In total, four articles deal with security in the Mediterranean, only one paper is devoted to the crisis in Syria. Two others deal with threats to EU security in its geographical neighbourhood.

The Foundation for European Progressive Studies, FEPS, is the think tank of the Party of European Socialists (PES) in the European Parliament. This organisation is above all

42 Prospects for EU enlargement after 2019 // Ukrainian Think Tank Liaison office in Brussels [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://ukraine-office.eu/en/prospects-for-eu-enlargement-after-2019/ (дата обращения: 31.01.2018).

dedicated to economic and social issues and much less to Russia. At FEPS, out of seventy-two "policy briefs", only one is devoted to Russia, and out of the 162 "studies", two are devoted to Russia, while one of the studies focuses on security issues including Russia.

With the worsening of the Ukrainian crisis, the Martens Centre has multiplied articles that are very critical of Russia. Thus, an article by Roland Freudenstein from February 2015 is entitled "The Renaissance of the West: How Europe and America Can Strengthen by Confronting Putin's Russia"43. In the analysis of threats to EU security, Christian Deubner of the FEPS equally speaks of "Russian aggression"44. Another example is Karsten Voigt, of the FEPS and a former German MP, who in his article on Russia, speaks of "a new phase of Russia and Ostpolitik"45.

The fact that these publications were written by German authors in the think tanks of the two main political groups in the European Parliament also reveals the preponderance of the German point of view in the debates on Russia in Brussels. In the different points of view expressed by the two German authors, we can identify the national division between the CDU and the SPD parties. The CDU puts forward the notion of the West and supports an exclusive Euro-Atlantic geopolitical vision vis-à-vis Russia as long as the latter refuses westernisation. The SPD, on the other hand, although critical of the Russian attitude, advocates a more conciliatory attitude. The French are absent during the Brussels think tank debates and their point of view is therefore not taken into account.

In this context, one of the publications of the Martens Centre devoted to Russian propaganda46 accuses two French think tanks, IRIS and IFRI, of relaying on Russian propaganda and receiving funding from Russia in a non-transparent way. According to this publication, IRIS "is not completely transparent". To prove its point, the Martens centre publication refers to an article in the French newspaper Libération. This newspaper underlined that "the raison d'être" of the think tank is to promote a Russian agenda given that it is dependent on the Kremlin ". In this report, the authors rely on interviews with anonymous

43 Freudenstein R., Speck U. The renaissance of the West, how Europe and America can shape up in confronting Putin's Russia. Research Paper. // Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies [Электронный ресурс]. 2015. URL: http://www.martenscentre.eu/publications/putins-russia-and-the-west (дата обращения: 31.01.2018).

44 Deubner C. New developments of EU external security policy // Foundation for European progressive Studies [Электронный ресурс]. 2016. URL: http://www.feps-europe.eu/assets/bcb09908-9c09-46db-aaa2-4fd195d6cd12/new-developments-of-eu-external-policypdf.pdf (дата обращения: 31.01.2018).

45 Voigt K. A new phase of Russia and Ostpolitik has begun, // Foundation for European progressive Studies [Электронный ресурс]. 2014. URL: http://www.feps-europe.eu/assets/1b124257-5061-4cf5-9309-83e33aee57affkarsten-paperpdf.pdf (дата обращения: 31.01.2018).

46 Vojtiskovâ V., Novotny V., Schmid-Schmidsfelden H., Potapova K. The bear in sheep's clothing, Russia's government-funded organisations in the EU // Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies [Электронный ресурс]. 2017. URL: https://www.martenscentre.eu/publications/bear-sheeps-clothing-russias-government-funded-organisations-eu (дата обращения: 31.01.2018).

sources and focus on experts and organisations that do not comply with the Euro-Atlantic dogma. These assertions come from anonymous whistleblowers and this fact raises the question of the reliability of these "think tanks" and their influence.

Another feature of the debates in the think tanks of the European People's Party is the platform offered to the United States and their representatives for the promotion of a strengthened transatlantic relationship against Russia. One of the roundtables organised by the Martens Centre, had Jeffrey Gedmin, former president of Radio Free Europe, as a keynote speaker. He expressed the idea that Putin wanted a weak Europe divided into zones of influence and that Americans and Europeans, today divided, should in this situation, act united. The roundtable was entitled "The kidnapping of Europe, yesterday and today". On the occasion of the anniversary of the Hungarian revolution against the Soviet occupation in 1956, the discussion focused on the degree of loyalty of the formerly Communist European Union members to the European model. Focusing on continuity with the "anti-Western, populist" and "pro-Putin" rhetoric of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Jeffrey Gedmin pointed out that, if there was a kidnapping, there was also a kidnapper, victims and accomplices. According to him, the European Union was increasingly victim of the agendas of external powers that do not share the same values, and that this was among other caused by an attitude of complacency and a loss of confidence. Manfred Weber, German MEP and Chairman of the EPP Group, also, once again underlined the difficult context of Russia who is "using war as a means of politics".

Another EPP think tank, the European Ideas Network (EIN), devoted one of its round tables to Russia47. The panel was exclusively composed of personalities notoriously hostile to Russia, without a single Russian or expert from a Member State of the European Union being able to offer another point of view. Steve Nix, director of the Eurasia department of the International Republican Institute (IRI), a think tank close to US Senator John McCain, called for stronger EU sanctions against Russia.

This representation of a "New Cold War" between Russia, the European Union and the West does not, however, seem to be shared by all European citizens and varies greatly between Member States. The acquisition of Crimea and the conflict in the Donbass between the Ukrainian army and the pro-Russian rebels had a particular resonance in the neighbourhood of Ukraine and in Eastern Europe, in Poland, and in the Baltic countries. These countries fear an extension of this so-called hybrid war, mixing irregular militias and cyberattacks, on their territory. The perception of the threat is, on the other hand, non-existent in the Member States further to the west. Due to disagreements, EU sanctions were only

47 EIN Summer School, «The Mediterranean - Geopolitics and European integration. Challenges and opportunities». Split, Croatia, 29 June-2 July 2016. Programme. URL: http://www.ein.eu/sites/default/files/EIN%20Split%20last.pdf (дата обращения: 31.01.2018).

targeted at politicians and members of the administration in Russia supporting the acquisition of Crimea, Donbass rebels, and private companies. There was no mention of military support at the EU level. These sanctions were mainly promoted in Washington and Berlin, while the other Member States aligned themselves.

It is interesting to observe the perceptions of citizen safety, highlighted by a survey48 of the Pew Research Centre. In most of the countries surveyed, the threat of the Islamic State is considered most important, especially for Spain and France. Tensions with Russia are not perceived as a major threat in the surveyed countries except for Poland (71%). Due to the lack of geopolitical reflection and the contradictory representations between the Russian government and the European Union, relations between the EU and Russia have reached a situation where positions have become immutable. Neither side will give way. The election of Donald Trump on the 8th of November 2016, however, initially introduced great uncertainty about the future of transatlantic relations and the position of the European Union vis-à-vis Russia, but led so far to a worsening of the situation49.

A group of states within the EU will hopefully position themselves as a stimulus to improve relations with Russia and break the deadlock. Faced with an enduring crisis, bilateral relations between EU Member States and Russia might become a leverage to shift the relative geopolitical power rank within the EU. This challenge has to be addressed in order to contain the growing polarisation within the EU itself.

The negative consequences of the geopolitical unthought for European security

The sidestepping of the geopolitical dimension of the EU-Russia relationship threatens the security and stability of Europe, and makes it subject to the instrumentalisation by the United States and their geopolitical objectives. Is the EU the Trojan horse of the United States against Russia?

Regarding the European project, the posture of Americans has not fundamentally changed since the equilibrium of the Second World War. According to Pierre Vimont50, former Secretary General of the European External Action Service, for the Americans, NATO enlargement has to be in phase with the enlargement of the European Union and has to happen according to a global vision of the European continent which extends itself to the Eurasian space. "American Europe" is therefore an enlarged European Union for all members of the Council of Europe, except Russia. This vision contradicts German and French

48 Stokes B., Wike R., Poushter J. Europeans face the world divided // Pew Research Centre [Электронный ресурс]. 13.06.2016. URL: http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/06/13/europeans-face-the-world-divided/ (дата обращения: 31.01.2018).

49 National Security strategy of the United States // White House: Donald Trump [Электронный ресурс]. 2017. URL: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf (дата обращения: 31.01.2018).

50 Research interview with Pierre Vimont, Brussels, 2010. (Personal interview).

governments' plans, which are holding back the European Union's policy of expansion in the face of public scepticism and fear of a deterioration of relations with Russia. As the EU does not define its borders, Russia assumes that the process of enlargement has no limits, even on the Eurasian continent, since Turkey is a candidate. Despite the refusal of Germany and France to engage in further future enlargements, there is an ambiguity in the European institutions and some Member States such as Poland and the Baltic States still support the enlargement of the EU to Eastern Partnership members. The Russian government is accusing the EU of trying to establish a sphere of influence in the shared neighbourhood to the benefit of some of its Member States.

The European Union is seen as a proxy for US and NATO strategies, rather than as an entity with autonomous strategic interests. Russia is thus tempted to negotiate major issues primarily with the United States and to move EU Member States aside, in a configuration reminiscent of the Cold War.

II. Geography matters: Security and Prosperity issues on the Eurasian Continent from the Spatial Perspective

The a-territorial approach of the EU

How to find a way around the current mode of communication that focuses on ideological and negative aspects? The challenge now is to circumvent the current mode of communication centred on the negative aspects of the relationship between the EU and Russia, but also on a falsified and fake narrative of events.

As long as the political leaders of the EU Member States and Russia don't overcome the crisis, the information war will continue. This is why it is important for the community of researchers and experts to express alternative opinions and points of view. It is their role to convey a different message, to encourage a different angle of analysis and to spread it in the widest way possible, in academic publications, but also in think tank reports for specialists, as well as in the media, to reach civil society.

The EU policy on the support of think tanks should also be questioned more critically. The publication by the European Values Think Tank of a list of "useful idiots"51 who accepted an interview on TV channel Russia Today shows a disturbing return to the McCarthyism of the 1950s during the Cold War. These methods should be avoided, especially in the academic and expert world. The European Values Think Tank is based in Prague. It is funded by the United States and United Kingdom Embassies, Georges Soros' Open Society, but also by the European Union. The above mentioned incident was heavily criticised by

51 Richter M. The Kremlin's Platform for 'Useful idiots' in the West: An Overview of RT's Editorial Strategy and Evidence of Impact // European Values [Электронный ресурс]. URL: http://www.europeanvalues.net/rt/ (дата обращения: 31.01.2018).

some experts but the media in the EU Member States did not mention the absurdity of this report. The European Union should revise its criteria for awarding grants to think tanks whose actions are likely to aggravate the crisis. It is therefore also the role of experts and researchers to criticise EU policy in this area more openly.

A greater focus on geopolitical issues, geopolitics in its use, as applied geopolitics, offering solutions, might be useful in order to circumvent the obstacle created by the information war and to identify the issues that Russia and the EU Member States could face together. This new focus would allow identifying common interests.

By changing the scale of analysis, this approach would moreover allow to emphasise more strongly the pan-European civilizational convergences. The Member States of the European Union and Russia used to have extremely rich economic, cultural and scientific exchanges in the past and these should continue in the future52. It is therefore important to remember this during academic or diplomatic conferences, as well as during cultural events. Cultural diplomacy should be an integral part of a geopolitical strategy of rapprochement. The exhibition at Versailles "a Tsar in France" is a good example53.

Geopolitical issues are however today hidden in the European institutions or are deliberately removed from the eyes of the citizens. The questions of territory are indeed very sensitive and that is why a taboo with respect to the geopolitical questions can be observed in the institutions. It is precisely the role of researchers and experts to break this taboo in order to deepen the debate. This should also be carried out within the different European nations, because the support of the populations is needed to initiate a reorientation of the European project, and to make it reach continental size. Without a free debate on these issues, the old geopolitical representations of the Cold War will remain and will again be instrumentalised by the opponents of a re-set in relationships between EU Members States and Russia.

In the longer term, if a paradigm shift in relations between the EU and Russia should occur, it would only be solid and lasting if it is combined with a rapprochement of the geopolitical representations of the different nations that make up Europe, Russia included, with respect to their own role in the world. This requires trying to bring the perception of global geopolitical developments closer as well.

52 Interview with the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Union, Ambassador Vladimir Chizov // Diplomatic Wold. 2017. N 52. P. 21-23.

53 Pierre le Grand, un Tsar en France 1717. 30 Mai to 24 September 2017/ Exhibition. URL: http://www.chateauversailles.fr/actualites/expositions/pierre-grand-tsar-france-1717 (дата обращения: 31.01.2018). The exhibition has been organized in the Palace of Versailles in partnership with the St Petersburg State Museum.

Geography matters and this is why the spatial angle54 is here favoured in order to identify the major geopolitical issues that European nations will have to face. Emphasis on the spatial angle is the way to deconstruct negative communication strategies. It allows to take a step back from divisive discourses on values and norms, as well as not to lock oneself into sterile legal exegeses about international law, the political system, or economic model, which are imbued with ideology.

Figure 2. Alliances and major instability zones in a multicentred world

54 See the Atlas: Marchand P. Atlas géopolitique de la Russie, Le grand retour sur la scène internationale. Paris: Autrement. 2015.

The missing link of global security: New Eurasian geopolitical architecture

Konrad Adenauer, the first Federal Chancellor of West Germany, insisted on the primacy of foreign policy objectives over national domestic policy agendas55. Following this adage, let us first examine issues of global scale before we look at more regional issues.

There are missing links in the security architecture of the European, Eurasian and Central Asian spaces that need to be fixed in order to avoid a further fragmentation of the European continent between Euro-Atlantic and Euro-Asian alliances56 (see figure 2: Alliances and Major Instability zones in a Multicentred World ). The EU can neither represent the whole of Europe in an exclusive way, nor can it extend itself to the Eurasian continent. It would therefore be interesting to imagine a new netting of treaties and institutions, resembling the "Olympic circles", which would allow maintaining stability on the whole Eurasian continent. What could this new geopolitical architecture look like? The following map illustrates the need for a new European security treaty with a Eurasian reach, and a new "Central Asian Partnership and cooperation treaty" in the context of an emerging global and European multipolar features (see figure 3: Overlapping Circles of World stability and Peace). Synergy is needed between the various actors to achieve geopolitical stability on the Eurasian continent. On a long term basis, a new Eurasian geopolitical architecture based on a new doctrine of overlapping circles of international organisations would be a major factor for developing and improving Eurasian.

We also have to assume that an enlargement of Euro-Atlantic institutions (NATO-EU-OSCE) to the whole of the Eurasian continent is impossible. Firstly, the individual EU and NATO Member States disagree on further enlargement. Secondly, it would be impossible for these Euro-Atlantic institutions to manage the geopolitical diversity of the Eurasian continent.

This new security architecture is based on the "geographical tightening" principle in the context of NATO's and EU's overstretched capacities. Geographical proximity would be a central criterion to build regional alliances in order to foster stability and prevent any further Eurasian fragmentation.

55 Adenauer K. Erinnerungen, 1945-1953. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlag-Anstalt. 1965.

56 Thomann P.E. Russie et Union européenne: Le chaînon manquant en matière de défense et sécurité. // Revue défense nationale. 2013. N 762. P. 127-134.

Figure 3. Overlapping Circles of World Stability and Peace

A new "security space" from Lisbon to Vladivostok would be the inner circle of a wider Euro-Atlantic security space from Vancouver to Vladivostok, based on a balance of interests and not anymore on the westernization of Eurasian space (see figure 4; New European security space).

In this configuration, we would find the EU as a pivot/political centre and Russia as a neighbouring pivot/political centre at the crossroad of overlapping security spaces from Vancouver to Vladivostok (NATO and OSCE, USA-EU-Russia), Lisbon to Vladivostok (UE-Russia), St Petersburg to Peking (OCS) and Minsk-Dushanbe (OTSC). Stabilisation policies and "non-aggression agreements" would need to be negotiated between these geopolitical spaces. This netting of institutions resembles "Olympic circles". The described configuration

would be adapted to the emerging multipolar world to maintain a balance between the different states, alliances and political as well as security institutions. This architecture is aimed at promoting synergies between interleaved organisations like NATO, EU, OSCE, CIS, CSTO, EEU, OIC, SCO57 and should lead to greater levels of stability. In-between spaces between these structures would be subject to common stabilisation policies or "nonaggression agreements".

This new doctrine of "overlapping circles" supposes the acceptance by international actors of the emergence of a variety of international organisations whose objectives are contributing to Eurasian and world stability. For example, the strengthening of the SCO should not be perceived in the West as a geopolitical rival, but as a future partner to manage multipolar world. It is in the long-term interests of Euro-Atlantic structures, EU, OSCE and NATO, to be complemented by other international organisations like CIS, CSTO, EEU OIC, SCO in order to stabilise the Eurasian continent.

Russia is promoting multipolar features58, and this is compatible with a European project striving for more strategic autonomy. Within a new Eurasian security architecture, a reset of relations between a reformed European project and Russia is aimed at assigning to the EU and Russia a moderating and restraining role so as to avoid a global US/China confrontation and further fragmentation between Euro-Atlantic and Euro-Asian alliances. The idea is to avoid being drawn into this confrontation and forced to choose a camp, and avoid a US/China condominium (G2) sidelining the EU and Russia in global affairs.

57 North Atlantic Treaty organization (NATO), European Union (EU), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Community of Independent States (CIS), Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

58 Romanova T. Russia and Europe: Somewhat Different, Somewhat the Same? Policy brief // Russian International Affairs Council. 2016. N 5. URL: http://russiancouncil.ru/common/upload/Russia-Europe-Policybrief5 -en.pdf (дата обращения: 31.01.2018).

173

Figure 4. New European Security Space

Geostrategic issues

When having a closer look at immediate security issues, it becomes clear that the question of Russia's perception of encirclement59 by NATO bases and the missile defence shield is central (see figure 2).

The lack of discussion about geopolitical issues over the missile defence shield, the positioning of US bases and NATO, as well as NATO enlargement is particularly damaging to the security interests of the European Union. Russia's perception of encirclement is a result of the location of the missile defence shields, NATO bases, and US bases abroad. The map on Russia's perception of encirclement shows the location of the missile defence shields, NATO bases, and US bases abroad. The belt that makes the bases and elements of the shield appear as a continuous space ensemble around Eurasia, and reinforce the perception of encirclement of the Russians and Chinese (although the stated purpose of the shield is to protect against missiles from Iran and North Korea).

59 Tchernega V. Repenser les relations avec la Russie // Revue Défense Nationale. 2015. N 776. P. 97 -.104.

For the Russians, the answer to the question of why NATO needs new members is simple: "NATO seeks to cover as much geopolitical space as possible and encircle countries that somehow disagree with NATO, like Russia and Serbia for example"60. Russia considers that the policy of enlargement of the Atlantic Alliance supported by the United States and its allies aims at its encirclement. Whether this perception is seen as exaggerated or irrelevant does not change the fact that it must be taken into account. It is deeply rooted in the Russian vision because of geography (the vastness of the territory without natural barriers) and history (invasions)61.

The Iranian nuclear threat has so far been the main justification for the NATO missile defence project. The United States has not only begun to redeploy its forces to the Asia-Pacific region, but is also strengthening its strategic presence in Europe through the missile defence shield, which has been adopted as the "keystone" of NATO. The European territory becomes an element of the device intended to protect the American territory, thus prolonging the function of rimland of Europe vis-à-vis the Eurasian continent. This reminds us of the geopolitical representations of the American Nicolas Spykman, inherited from Britain's Sir Halford Mackinder. The project lost its main justification with the agreement on Iran's nuclear power but the US administration, under Trumps and Obama's presidencies, has steadily advanced the missile defence plan. In retaliation, the Russians announced the installation of Iskander class missiles in Kaliningrad and in Crimea. The geographical space of the EU becomes a territory at stake of the rivalry between the United States and Russia. This issue prevents negotiations on disarmament and EU Member States see their sovereignty and margin of manoeuvre reduced. They will have no real impact on decisions regarding the use of the system because the NATO missile shield is directly linked to the American missile shield. It is therefore in the interest of both the EU and Russia to avoid a worsening of the crisis around the NATO missile shield project. Exerting pressure on the US to provide proof that this system is not directed against Russia, would be useful.

The eventual withdrawal of the United States from the INF Treaty, in order to develop a new missile of short and medium range and install it on the European territory or military vessels, would also aggravate the security of the European Union62. The territory of

60 NATO greedy for geopolitical space, wants to encircle those who disagree — Lavrov // Russia Today [Электронный ресурс]. 29.04.2016. URL: https://www.rt.com/news/341378-lavrov-sweden-nato-russia/ (дата обращения: 31.01.2018).

61 Tchernega V. Repenser les relations avec la Russie // Revue Défense Nationale. 2014. N 775. P. 93 -101.

62 Gromyko A. How to reduce risks of military confrontation? Working paper N2 // Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences. 2017. N 28. URL: http://en.instituteofeurope.ru/ (дата обращения: 31.01.2018).

the EU Member States becomes a geopolitical issue between Russia and the United States, as it was the case during the Cold War.

The EU Member States and Russia have a common interest of avoiding a revival of the nuclear arms race in Europe. It is therefore necessary to maintain the nuclear disarmament programs in connection with the anti-missile shield. In the case of an absence of a substantial rapprochement on short-term security issues, it is important to at least not aggravate the situation. It would also be useful to coordinate the preservation of the Iran nuclear deal between Russia and the European Union.

On the scale of geographical proximity of the EU and Russia, Russia remains a strategic partner for the EU and the states it is made up of63. It would be helpful to break the confinement of the European Union between two arcs of crises (one in the South and the other in the East) through a rapprochement with Russia in order to engage in a shared management of the oriental instabilities and the identification of common interests vis-à-vis the arc of crisis in the South64 (see figure 5: EU and Russia, main crush zones). Common geopolitical interests vis-à-vis radical Islam65 originating from the southern arc of crisis are intertwined with home-grown terrorists and should prevail over the current perception propagated by the EU that Russia is considered to be the most important foe in comparison to ISIL/Daesh (*)66, as is suggested in a European Parliament resolution adopted in 2016 "on EU strategic communication to counteract propaganda against it by third parties"67.

63 Raviot J.P. La Russie: une Menace ou un partenaire pour l'Europe? // Diplomatie. 2017. № 40. P. 55-58.

64 For an analysis of Russian interests, see : Delanoë I. Russie, Les enjeux du retour au Moyen-Orient. Paris: Les carnets de l'Observatoire, L'inventaire, 2016.

65 Le TorrivellecX. 1917-2017: Où va la Russie? Une puissance eurasienne dans un nouveau monde, Géopolitique de la Russie // Hérodote, Revue de Géographie et de Géopolitique. 2017. N 166-167. P. 81-96.

(*) terrorist organization, prohibited in the Russian Federation

66 Pashentsev E. The geopolitical role of strategic communication between Russia and the EU, interview // Association of Studies, Research and Internationalization in Eurasia and Africa [Электронный ресурс]. 12.06.2017. URL: http://www.asrie.org/2017/06/the-geopohtical-role-of-strategic-communication-between-russia-and-the-eu-interview-with-professor-evgeny-pashentsev/ (дата обращения: 31.01.2018).

67 Report on EU strategic communication to counteract propaganda against it by third parties. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Rapporteur: Anna Elzbieta Fotyga // European Parliament [Электронный ресурс]. 14.10.2016. URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REP0RT+A8-2016-0290+0+D0C+XML+V0//EN (дата обращения: 31.01.2018).

Figure 5. EU and Russia: Main Crush Zones — Geopolitical diagnosis and solutions

Geo-economic issues

Russia and the EU would need to anticipate consequences from continental interconnection projects initiated by China's New Silk Road and its compatibility with Russia's Eurasian Economic Union project, and the EU. The energy and transport infrastructure will provoke a spatio-logistical reconfiguration68 that should be anticipated (see figure 6: One Belt — One Road initiative).

It would also be useful to anticipate jointly the challenges of robotization, particularly on networks. The effects of robotization and technological innovation on the territory will require a rethink of territorial control, but also a necessity to consider the well-being of populations that will face changes in employment. There will be massive job losses but also a creation of new jobs. A new industrial geography and new development zones will materialise, at the scale of the Eurasian space from Lisbon to Vladivostok, because the economies will remain interdependent, especially in terms of energy supply, transport connections, but also information flows.

Further cooperation on the new geopolitics of flows could be initiated. Reflection on land-use planning at the continental level is therefore needed so that the EU, the Russian project of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Chinese project of New Silk Road can be built in synergy and not in rivalry.

68 Radavanyi J. Quand Vladimir Poutine se fait géographe..., Géopolitique de la Russie // Hérodote, Revue de Géographie et de Géopolitique. 2017. N 166-167. P. 113-132.

Figure 6. «One Belt — One Road Initiative» (OBOR) in Eurasia and Major Zones of

Geopolitical Tensions

Europe's variable geopolitical constellations: The Franco-German axis and Russia

It is an illusion to think that the EU can quickly overcome its antagonism towards Russia, because its paradigms are difficult to reconcile with Russia's foreign policy principles.

One way to overcome the EU stalemate is to focus on bilateral initiatives, and narrow alliances based on purpose and theme. The European Union is becoming more and more multicentred and it would be useful to proceed in the same way with regard to foreign policy. Among this Europe of "variable geopolitical constellations", the Franco-German axis remains central. After the French and German elections in 2017, the governments of both countries announced a reform of the functioning of the European Union, but also of its foreign policy. They will hopefully gradually resume the dialogue and exchanges. The visit of the German President Steinmeier in Moscow and the visit of Vladimir Putin in Paris are a sign of this new approach.

Another aspect of the difficulties of the European Union in the face of multiple crises is the unthought of the new Franco-German geopolitical rivalry69. Behind the Brexit hides a more significant geopolitical crack in the heart of the European Union: the new Franco-German geopolitical rivalry. The French and German governments fear Brexit first and foremost for reasons of balance of power within the European Union. The United Kingdom has so far allowed France to rebalance the weight of Germany and allowed Germany to hide the Franco-German asymmetry. What lies behind this issue are the divergent aims of the two nations regarding the European project. On the German side, a study of their vision of Europe since its inception shows that it is a space of flux70 and a subset of the liberal and democratic globalisation that allows Germany to strengthen its economic power. For the French, on the other hand, the European Union should follow the model of Europe as a great power with a strong integrated Eurozone for integrationists, or the model of Europe of Nations for the Gaullists, but still offering France a lever to have an impact on the international scene. The perception of security and geopolitical priorities is different from one country to another. The French intervene militarily in the arc of crisis in the South71 whereas the Germans are more concerned with the arc of crisis in the East72. The crisis with Russia pushes the Germans to act as a central power73 in Europe and promote reassurance measures in NATO to support their allies in Central and Eastern Europe.

A new Franco-German geopolitical balance within the European project also involves a new Franco-German policy towards Russia (see figure 7: The Franco-German axis in a reformed European project). From a Franco-German core, a continental rapprochement could be initiated to reduce European fractures. A rapprochement with Russia would also help to rebalance the Franco-German relationship that suffers from a growing asymmetry after German unification and EU's eastern enlargement.

69 Thomann P.E. Le couple franco-allemand et le projet européen: représentations géopolitiques, unité et rivalités. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014.

70 Martens S. La représentation géopolitique de la position centrale de l'Allemagne, perceptions allemandes // Allemagne d'Aujourd'hui. 2000. N 153. P. 26-51.

71 Revue stratégique de Défense et de Sécurité nationale. Paris: Ministère des armées, 2017. URL: https://www.defense.gouv.fr/dgris/presentation/evenements/revue-strategique-de-defense-et-de-securite-nationale-2017 (дата обращения: 31.01.2018).

72 Weissbuch zur Sicherheitspolitik und zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr, Berlin: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung [Электронный ресурс]. 2016. URL: https://www.bmvg.de/resource/blob/13708/015be272f8c0098f1537a491676bfc31/weissbuch2016-barrierefrei-data.pdf (дата обращения: 31.01.2018).

73 Baumann R. Deutschland als Europas Zentralmacht / Ed. By S. Schmidt, G. Hellmann , R. Wolf. Handbuch zur deutschen Aussenpolitik. Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. 2007. P. 62-72.

Germany and France could therefore develop a new Franco-German "Ostpolitik" in order to rebalance the European project towards a constructive agenda with Russia. In this regard, France and Germany should ensure that the Three-Seas Initiative project does not lead to further fragmentation of the European continent between East and West (See figure 8: EU and Russia between geopolitical rivalry and interdependence). This project focuses on North-South infrastructure between the three seas, the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea and the Adriatic Sea. The support given to this initiative by Donald Trump during his trip to Warsaw reinforces questions about this project. He stated "the Three Seas Initiative will transform and rebuild the entire region and ensure that your infrastructure, like your commitment to freedom and rule of law, binds you to all of Europe and, indeed, to the West. Three Seas Initiative will not only empower your people to prosper, but it will ensure that your nations remain sovereign, secure, and free from foreign coercion. The free nations of Europe are stronger, and the West becomes stronger as well. The United States is proud to see that we are already helping the Three Seas Nations achieve much-needed energy diversification. America will be a reliable and reliable partner in the production of high-quality and low-cost energy resources and technologies"74.

This support seems to correspond to the American project of geopolitical fragmentation of the Eurasian continent75, in order to preserve their supremacy in the world and to slow down the emergence of a multicentred world76. It also has the advantage for the United States to promote the export of its own shale gas resources with the LNG technology, to the detriment of European energy companies involved in resource exploration in Siberia, Russia, and the Nord-Stream II gas pipeline project. The Financial Times has pointed out that : "Donald Trump is engineering a sharp shift in US energy policy by using natural gas exports as an instrument of trade policy, championing sales to China and other parts of Asia in an effort to create jobs and reduce US trade deficits. In an attempt to unleash US energy resources, Mr. Trump is trying to promote more liquefied natural gas exports and not just use LNG as a geopolitical weapon aimed at nations such as Russia, as was the stance of his predecessor Barack Obama"77.

74 Remarks by President Trump at the Three Seas Initiative Summit, Royal Castle, Warsaw, Poland. // White House Press [Электронный ресурс]. 06.07.2017. URL: http://whitehousepressbriefings.com/speeches-and-remarks/remarks-president-trump-three-seas-initiative-summit-july-6-2017/ (дата обращения: 31.01.2018).

75 Brzezinski Z. The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives. New York: Basic Books, 1997.

76 FoucherM. La bataille des cartes, Analyse critique des visions du monde. Paris: François Bourin Editeur. 2011.

77 Barney J., Demetri S., Crooks E. Trump looks to lift LNG exports in US trade shift // Financial Times [Электронный ресурс]. 22.06.2017. URL: https://www.ft.com/content/c5c1958c-5761-11e7-80b6-9bfa4c1f83d2 (дата обращения: 31.01.2018).

Figure 7. The Franco-German axis in a reformed European project

Figure 8. EU and Russia between geopolitical rivalry and interdependence

Conclusion

The focus on geopolitical stakes is a way to disentangle EU-Russia relations from negative and rival communication strategies, leading to the extensive use of fake narratives. However the current trend shows a deepening of the crisis in strategic communication, as the East StratCom is receiving more funding78. The EU commission appointed a high level of expert groups79 to tackle fake news and the French president Emmanuel Macron proposed a new controversial law80 against fake news to defend "liberal democracy".

78 Rankin J. EU anti propaganda unit gets €1m a year to counter Russian fake news // The Guardian [Электронный ресурс]. 25.11.2017. URL: https ://www.theguardian. com/world/2017/nov/25/eu-anti-propaganda-unit-gets-1m-a-year-to-counter-russian-fake-news (дата обращения: 31.01.2018).

79 Experts appointed to the High-Level Group on Fake News and online disinformation // European Commission [Электронный ресурс]. 12.01.2018. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/experts-appointed-high-level-group-fake-news-and-online-disinformation (дата обращения: 31.01.2018).

80AlemannoA. Macron fake news law will threaten democracy // Politico [Электронный ресурс]. 07.01.2018. URL: https://www.politico.eu/article/macron-fake-news-law-will-threaten-democracy/ (дата обращения: 31.01.2018).

Russia is relentlessly accused of interference in elections everywhere in the world although these claims have so far never been proven81. These accusations are now made before the elections82. The objective of the EU and western media strategic communication is also to contain criticism of the EU system and its "liberal democracy" ideology from its own citizens, who are less and less convinced of its added value for their security and prosperity. This worsening of the situation is diverting attention from the need to resolve real structural problems in the EU-Russia relationship.

Therefore, it is of utmost importance that the EU moves towards a more balanced view on strategic communication. In this respect, the EU would benefit from acting in a more autonomous way from NATO and the US. The EU should also select its sources for recognising fake news more carefully, spend less time on cases of secondary importance and instead dedicate time to trying to bring Russian and EU narratives closer. A more cooperative approach from both sides would require the creation of a common EU-Russia expert group on strategic communication to avoid unilateral interpretations and actions from the EU and Russia. This could lead to an improvement of the debate climate and the emergence of more diverse think tanks, which will be able to offer analysis in terms of geopolitical perspectives rather than ideological controversies. Finally, the EU and Russia would both benefit from fighting Islamist propaganda together and be able to focus more on their common interests.

The multiple crises highlighted the limits of European governance and the weakness of the European executive power, as well as the lack of clear leadership and competition between institutions and states, in the face of Westphalian states like Russia, the United States and China, who are building their own geopolitical strategy. They undoubtedly have the advantage of being nations, unlike the European Union which has to rely on "constitutional patriotism" to ensure its unity, but might seem weak against the assertion of the powers in the world. EU-Russia relations are not merely a subsidiary issue of the European Union's external relations, or a subset of the European Union's normative expansion strategy, but a fundamental geopolitical issue for the future of the project and the internal balance of power within the EU. These relations have entered a serious crisis, because there is a rivalry on the model of the European construction. This requires the European Union to launch a debate on its own geopolitical goals.

81 Intel Vets challenge 'Russian hack' evidence // Consortiumnews [Электронный ресурс]. 24.07.2017. URL: https://consortiumnews.com/2017/07/24/intel-vets-challenge-russia-hack-evidence/ (дата обращения: 31.01.2018).

82 Stone J. Russia disinformation campaign has been 'extremely sucessful' in Europe warns EU // Independent [Электронный ресурс]. 17.01.2018. URL: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/russian-fake-news-disinformation-europe-putin-trump-eu-european-parliament-commission-a8164526.html (дата обращения: 31.01.2018).

The European project needs to be consistent with the shifting geopolitical environment. After the Brexit, the EU should focus more on "Realpolitik" principles since it will be less and less in a position to impose its paradigm based on its normative ideology. The European project should be considered as the latest form of the different successive historical European security architectures, such as the "Westphalian peace"83 or the "Congress of Vienna", and thus give more prominence to the concept of equilibrium84 .

If the Member States of the European Union and its institutions elaborated a strategy of power in the multipolar world, with the prospect of a strategic awakening of the European project, the rapprochement with Russia would be an indispensable option. The United States and Russia are the keys to security and stability for the European Union in order to launch an organised strategy along its maritime and continental axes. The priority should be to achieve a security area from Vancouver to Vladivostok. New security architecture between the European Union and Russia would complement it. A rapprochement with Russia along a continental axis leading to a rebalancing of the Euro-Atlantic alliance would be advised so that the European Union can organise itself according to its own priorities.

Without Franco-German rebalancing and an open dialogue on European aims, including the question on the role of borders, territorial control and the notion of sovereignty, Brexit can become the catalyst for a geopolitical process potentially as important as the fall of the Berlin Wall. The result might be an acceleration of European geopolitical reconfigurations with repercussions leading to a continuous regression of the European Union, but also a decomposition of multinational states (United Kingdom, Spain, Belgium...). This could become a plausible scenario, especially since fragmentation is the global trend. In history, it is rare for an empire or an international entity to have survived a process of territorial regression.

It is necessary to bring the geopolitical debate to the citizens of the European Union, rather than confine it to the political, diplomatic and military levels, in order to make progress on a legitimate political Europe. This would avoid geopolitical issues and public opinion opposing each other, bridging the geopolitical gap would help filling the democratic deficit by giving more meaning to the European project.

83 This approach is more compatible with the "neo-Westphalian" vision of Russians. See in this regard:

Raviot J.R. Le prétorianisme russe: l'exercice du pouvoir selon Vladimir Poutine. Géopolitique de la Russie. // Hérodote, Revue de Géographie et de Géopolitique. 2017. N 166-167. P. 9-22.

84 Foucault M. Sécurité, territoire, population, cours au Collège de France 1977-1978. Paris: Gallimard, Seuil, 2004.

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Thomann P.E.

Focusing on Common Geopolitical Interests: Changing the Focus in EU-Russia Dialogue and Communication?

Pierre-Emmanuel Thomann — DSc (Political Sciences), President of Eurocontinent, Brussels, Belgium.

E-mail: pierre-emmanuel.thomann@eurocontinent.eu Annotation

The competing narratives between the EU and Russia revealed parallel interpretations of the different ongoing crises. They have largely focused on the question of "European values" and interpretations of European and international law. This "narrative war" has so far led to a worsening of relations at governmental level. It might be time to highlight the potential benefit of greater focus on common interests in order to improve communication between academics, experts and politicians from EU countries and Russia, and identify common geopolitical interests in order to engage in a strategic dialogue. This approach could help circumvent the psychological warfare based on rival ideological narratives. The article analyzes disadvantages of strategic communication of the EU, the existing challenges in the relations of the EU with Russia and the urgency of finding solutions for peace and prosperity of the peoples of Europe.

Key words

EU-Russia relations, communication narratives, geopolitics, geopolitical interests, geopolitical cartography.