CC BY
66
Liubov SOLOVIEVA
Ph.D. (Hist.),
senior research associate at the Department of the Caucasus, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow, Russian Federation).
TRADITIONS IN THE GLOBALIZATION ERA: ABKHAZIA IN THE EARLY 21ST CENTURY
Abstract
The correlation between modernization and archaism obvious throughout Abkhazia is discussed in the context of ethnographic observations; the author also relies on works published by historians, social anthropologists, and political scientists, as well as on materials that appeared in the
press. She scrutinizes various aspects of contemporary Abkhazian society’s ethnocultural makeup and identifies its development trends. The article deals exclusively with the Abkhazian population, all references to other ethnic groups are limited to the sphere of their contacts with the titular nation.
I n t r o d u c t i o n
What is happening to the traditional Caucasian societies today, in a time of change? How are they affected by the dramatic economic and political changes underway across the post-Soviet expanse? In an effort to classify societies, some ethnologists suggest dividing them into “closed” and “open” ones.1 Normally the Caucasian societies are described as “closed,” but today this has become
1 See: S.A. Arutiunov, “‘Zakrytoe obshchestvo’—al’ternativa megapolisnomu potrebitel’stvu?” in: Adat. Kavka-zskiy kul’turny krug: traditsii i sovremennost’, Tbilisi, Moscow, 2003; L.M. Melikishvili, “Otkrytye i zakrytye tipy kul’tur etnicheskikh sistem,” in: Adat. Kavkazskiy kul’turny krug: traditsii i sovremennost’.
an overstatement. Indeed, neither high mountain ranges, nor deep ravines can block information flows, which reach the region’s remotest corners through different channels. Traditions inherited from our ancestors are not immune to change: some of them become modernized by shedding their “patriarchal” features to become better suited to the changing conditions; “the recurrence of archaism” cannot be excluded either. Under the pressure of circumstances, an ethnic group may revive old forms and structures better suited to any given situation.
Abkhazia is a relatively small West Caucasian region, as far as its territory and population are concerned, with highly specific features which make it attractive for historians, ethnographers, linguists, and other experts. In the past, the stormy developments inside it spread to neighboring and even distant countries; it was a territory of active migration processes (Muhajirism—resettlement of Abkhazians to Turkey and other Middle Eastern countries, while other ethnic groups moved into the thus vacated territories, etc.). At all times there was an avid interest in the Abkhazian ethnic culture, partly because longevity was one of its hallmarks. In the last few decades, Abkhazia, an unrecognized post-Soviet state, has become known throughout the world as the seat of a smoldering ethnopolitical Georgian-Abkhazian conflict.
Abkhazia is still a polyethnic country, albeit with a changed correlation of ethnic groups. When most of the Georgians were driven away from Abkhazia, with the only exception of the Gali District (which became much smaller than before), the Abkhazians moved to the forefront as the largest ethnic group numbering 94,597 in 2003; there is approximately the same number of Armenians (44,869) and Georgians (44,041); the number of Russians dropped considerably, to 23,420, due to massive economic migration. In 2003, the republic’s total population was 214,016 (according to the all-Union population census of 1989, there were 536,600 people living in Abkhazia).2 It should be said that the 2003 figures are doubted for political reasons; they caused heated debates during the presidential campaign of 2004: A. Ankvab, one of those who ran for presidency, insisted that there were about 65,000 Abkhazians living in the republic and about 60,000 Georgians. About 40,000 Abkhazians, he argued, had gone to Russia in search of employment.3
“Globalization,” a term that has recently won popularity, is now applied to all sorts of situations. It is presented as an absolutely novel phenomenon in human history, which some people hail as benevolent, while others condemn as dangerous or even pernicious. Indeed, suffice it to mention the frequent “anti-globalist” actions. Much depends on how the term is interpreted: at times it seems that the opposing sides are talking about two different phenomena.
For my part, I think that globalization, if it is understood as overcoming, to one extent or another, all sorts of obstacles, limitations, and other impediments that perpetuate the isolation of continents, regions, countries, people, etc., is a continuous process. It emerged together with mankind and people’s settlement across the world. This is an uneven process that develops in stages: it accelerates or slows down for different reasons; there are regional or ethnic specifics as well. For obvious reasons, globalization was felt much more strongly in Abkhazia, as well as across the entire post-Soviet expanse. At the same time, this coastal region has never been completely isolated: in the 19th century, the local people grew maize, a typically American plant.
Since the early 1990s, local society has lived through many hardships (ethnic clashes, war, radical changes in the republic’s ethnic composition, postwar isolation, etc.), which strongly affected the local ethnocultural specifics—the family, clan, religious, linguistic, and other everyday realia.4
2 See: Abkhazia v tsifrakh, Sukhum, 2005. The article uses the figures of the republican population census of 2003.
3 See: N.A. Dubova, A.N. Iamskov, “Sotsial’no-demograficheskie osobennosti abkhazskikh populiatsiy v dolgozhitel’skikh seleniiakh,” in: Sovremennaia sel’skaia Abkhazia, Moscow, 2006, p. 40.
4 Here is an interesting example. The post-war years changed the order of toasting, one of the most stable cultural elements: today the toasts for those who fell while fighting for the freedom of Abkhazia and for those who fell in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 follow one another. They are rarely blended into one: the tragic events are obviously still fresh in people’s memory (see: Field materials gathered by the author. Interviews of 2004-2006, the villages of Chlou, Jgerda, Duripsh, the city of Sukhumi).
More than that, globalization impulses, which largely affect the younger generation, came mainly from Russia and Turkey (there are very close contacts with the latter; Turkish college, which teaches in Turkish and English, is very much popular in Abkhazia). Under the spell of mainly Russian as well as Turkish TV channels, the Internet, etc., young people accept contemporary behavior patterns, acquire different value systems, and follow life strategies of their own. When those who are currently attend school grow up, Abkhazia will be a different place: more open to outside influence with a much smaller share of traditional structures in the Abkhazian ethnic culture. It will be affected by professional and mass culture to a much greater extent than today. We have already seen this elsewhere in the post-Soviet expanse. There are several important factors in the ethnocultural makeup of contemporary Abkhazian society, which greatly affect its contemporary condition. They will be discussed below.
Economic and Demographic Aspects of Abkhazian Society’s Ethnocultural Development
Postwar years and the consolidation of the Abkhazian ethnos. For several reasons recent decades were marked by an accelerated consolidation of the Abkhazian ethnos. In the post-Soviet era, Abkhazians have established contacts with the large Abkhazian diaspora in Turkey and elsewhere in the Middle East, from which there was a trickle of repatriates. The hardships of wartime (1992-1993) drew the people even closer together: only a closely-knit society, in which everybody helped each other, could survive. According to eyewitnesses, in some houses, 30 to 40 refugees lived with the families of friends, relatives, or even totally unknown people. Many of them came from the Ocham-chira District, which had turned into a battlefield. There was a particularly large number of them in the villages of the Gudauta Region (Bzyb Abkhazia) living with blood relatives, those acquired through marriage, or with people they had never met before.5 Recently marriages between Abzhu and Bzyb Abkhazians became much more frequent, which naturally brought the two groups closer together (ethnographers have already registered mutual influences in rites and rituals, dialects, etc.). Massive post-war migration altered the republic’s ethnic map: the Abzhu and Bzyb Abkhazians are becoming much more united territorially. Central Abkhazia is being settled by those who had to leave their destroyed homes behind and those who felt it wise to move away from their outlaying villages. Muhajir descendants who were allowed to move back to their historical homeland also opted for Central Abkhazia. If the process continues, the territorial disunity that survived for over a century will disappear. Later, the still existing distinctions among individual groups will also vanish. So far they affect not only the everyday, but also the political life of Abkhazia.6
Problems of economic development. The old agricultural structures have not yet been replaced with new types of agricultural enterprises. Meanwhile agriculture will remain the key economic branch for a long time to come: the salaries in the budget sphere are too low, which means that practically the entire population (in the villages and cities) survives on what it can produce itself. For their survival, those who live in cities rely on their village relatives, who supply them with homegrown products. Many of the city dwellers have plots of land in the countryside where they grow maize, beans, fruit, grapes, etc.7 Primitive implements require hard physical labor,
5 Field data gathered by the author. Interviews of 2004-2006 (the village of Lykhny, the cities of Sukhumi and Gudauta).
6 See: A.B. Krylov, “Traditsionnye instituty abkhazov: proshloe i sovremennost’,” in: Identichnost’ i konflikt v postsovetskikh gosudarstvakh, Moscow, 1997, p. 191.
7 Field data gathered by the author. Interviews of 2004-2006 (the villages of Duripsh and Khuap, the city of Sukhumi).
which means that this situation cannot last for long. No professional, be he a doctor, teacher, or academic, can waste his time and strength tilling the land. If the economy revives, this practice will disappear.
Demographic problems. It has been noted that the republic’s agricultural population is shrinking: people are leaving the country or migrating within the republic for several reasons. There are no longer collective or state farms in the villages, there are no longer stable or adequate wages (in the past, tea and tobacco brought good earnings; today these crops have essentially disappeared from the Abkhazian countryside). Farm labor has lost its appeal, especially among the younger people. They want to learn urban professions: in the tourist and recreational business, services, computers, etc.8 In the postwar years, a large share of villagers moved, temporarily or permanently, to cities inside the republic and to the south of Russia. This accelerated the urbanization process.
There was another factor behind it: people moved into abandoned Georgian flats and houses.9 Sukhumi, Gagra, and Pitsunda are the most attractive cities; a considerable number of migrants go to the cities of the Krasnodar Territory. Abkhazian researchers believe that in the future this will negatively affect the entire situation: the countryside “is the center of the traditional way of life and ethnocultural image.”10
There is another problem. In polyethnic cities the Abkhazian language of the monoethnic villages cannot compete with the Russian as the language of communication. Parents have to work hard to teach their children their native tongue: they send them to Abkhazian kindergartens; speak at home in Abkhazian, and send them to spend their summer holidays with their village relatives. Polyethnic groups of children and teenagers in Abkhazian cities (Sukhumi, Gudauta, Gagra) use Russian, which I can confirm as an eyewitness.11
Accelerated urbanization has created another, no less grave, problem. The majority of young girls leave their native villages for towns, where they study or work, and normally do not return, while tradition forbids young men (mostly younger sons) to abandon their parents and their homes. This makes it hard for them to start a family of their own: today’s girls do not find hard work on the farm and around the house tempting enough. In nearly all the villages there are men who remained single until the age of forty, a very disturbing factor. Girls, in turn, find it hard to marry; they remain single and become old maids. This is a grave and painful problem, especially for the older generation. Not infrequently, concerned parents invite older and highly respected relatives to talk to unmarried sons in the hope of persuading them to marry. Sometimes things go too far: in one village a father stopped talking to his son until he married.12
It should be said that the numerical strength of the titular nation has developed into a political issue, since other ethnic communities, particularly Armenian, in the republic are swelling. In August 2006, this caused heated polemics on local TV: it was said that the Abkhazians might become an ethnic minority in their own homeland once more if they became outnumbered by the Armenians. It was also said that Armenians illegally move to Abkhazia from the Krasnodar Territory and are registered by corrupt local bureaucrats.13 This adds tension to the already tense demographic issue.
8 Field data gathered by the author. Interviews of 2004-2006 (the villages of Chlou, Duripsh, Kulanyrkhva, the city of Sukhumi).
9 See: N.A. Dubova, N.I. Grigulevich, L.T. Solovieva, A.N. Iamskov, “Sotsial’no-kul’turnye i demograficheskie osobennosti sovremennogo sel’skogo abkhazskogo naselenia,” in: Polevye issledovania Instituta etnologii i antropologii. 2004, Moscow, 2006, p. 19.
10 D.A. Kandelaki, A.Sh. Khashba, “Transformatsia polovozrastnoy struktury sel’skikh abkhazov v postsovetskiy period,” in: Sovremennaia sel’skaia Abkhazia, pp. 66-67.
11 Field data gathered by the author. Interviews of 2004-2006.
12 Field data gathered by the author. Interviews of 2004-2006 (the villages of Lykhny, Duripsh, Kulanyrkhva).
13 See, for example, relevant materials in “‘Armianskiy vopros’ v Abkhazii glazami gruzinskikh SMI,” available at
[http://www.regnum.ru/news].
Traditions and the Ethnocultural Development of Abkhazian Society
Modernization and traditionalism. As late as the 20th century, Abkhazian society carefully preserved many of the traditional institutions and customs, even though the extent of their devotion should not be overestimated. A comparison with neighbors—Georgians, Armenians, Greeks, and Russians—threw the archaic nature of many everyday traditions into bolder relief. This is especially true of socio-normative culture—demonstrative respect of elders, hospitality, dedication to the pre-Christian and pre-Islamic religious cults, gender stereotypes, etc. This is probably explained by the fact that until recently the Abkhazians were mostly village dwellers; by the late 1980s, when the share of urban dwellers had become large enough, they still retained close contact with their village relatives.
Much has changed in this sphere. While it is still declared that every Abkhazian should follow the “apsuara” norms (be loyal to his Abkhazian nature), which can be described as a code of moral standards inherited from hoary antiquity, real life, described above, is different.
In recent years, especially during the war when many of the family traditions were broken (gender roles, social roles of the older and younger groups, etc.), the traditional norms and bans were likewise undermined especially in the eyes of the younger generation. It has been observed that “educated Abkhazians are frequently skeptical about the traditional Abkhazian institutions and cults.” Many of the researchers went on to say that “during the war everything was decided by the young people,” who acted confidently and were guided by their own judgment, very often “contrary to the will of the older people and irrespective of their vacillations.”14
Disdain for the traditions and customs of their ancestors is best illustrated by the stealing of wine from sacred vessels prepared for communal feasts or prayers; this became frequent after the war. To avoid this, people bring wine directly before the feast or prayer. In the Lykh-nykha sanctuary, wine is not poured into the ritual vessels (akhapshchshch’a) until the Sunday before the Easter Sunday prayer service.15
Abkhazian society has become much more modernized in the last few decades. This is confirmed by the considerable changes in the marriage rites (concealment of the bride and bridegroom has been discontinued—today they are placed at one table with the guests; the same can be said about the recent ban on the bride’s parents visiting the bridegroom’s house on the wedding day). The terms of avoidance, a tradition that prohibited the bride from talking to her husband’s older relatives, have become shorter (this change has reached Bzyb Abkhazia where until recently the daughter-in-law hardly ever spoke to her father-in-law). Parents and children can now freely communicate in public: today it is not unusual to see fathers carrying their small children in the presence of older relatives, etc.16
Even the outer appearance and clothes worn by people today speak volumes about the social changes in Abkhazia. This is especially true of the women’s dress code. Whereas back in the 1980s, slacks were only worn by teenage girls, while young girls and women never risked appearing in trousers in public, today only very conservative-minded people in distant villages condemn the new fashions. Today no one objects to daughters-in-law appearing before their relatives without stockings or
14 A.B. Krylov, “Abkhazskoe sviatilishche Dydrypsh: proshloe, nastoiashchee i ustnaia traditsia,” Etnograficheskoe obozrenie, No. 6, 1998, p. 26.
15 See: A.B. Krylov, Religia i traditsii abkhazov, Moscow, 2001, p. 303; idem, “Traditsionnye instituty abkhazov: proshloe i sovremennost’,” p. 196.
16 Field data gathered by the author. Interviews of 2004-2006 (the villages of Chlou, Duripsh, Jgerda, Lykhny, Ku-lanyrkhva, the city of Sukhumi).
in a sleeveless dress. Beauty contests have become a regular feature, most of those who run for the Miss Abkhazia title are Abkhazians.17
The centuries-old rules of division of labor between the mother-in-law and daughter-in-law and even between men and women are disappearing fast. In the summer, women from mountain villages go down to the coast to earn money working in health resorts, cafes, and hotels, while the husbands and in-laws look after the children and the household. During the hardest years, when Abkhazian men (mainly young and middle aged) were not allowed to cross the border into Russia, it was the women who had to carry the heavy loads of fruit, nuts, and other products grown on their farms across the border to earn money for the family. There is the more or less widespread opinion among Abkhazian women that, despite the changes, men still expect their wives to earn money, which contradicts the traditional idea of man as the “breadwinner.”18
Modernization, which has reached all aspects of social life in Abkhazia, is accompanied by the state’s obvious intention to revive and strengthen archaic structures and institutions and its heightened interest in this stratum of folk traditions.
Statesmen and bureaucrats of all ranks are obviously willing to use the traditional institutions to cement the nation, prevent criminalization, and promote self-administration.
Late in the 20th century, pagan rites at numerous Abkhazian sanctuaries were revived after a long hiatus (under Soviet power, Dydrypsh was the only functioning sanctuary). The state is obviously promoting its authority by exploiting the more or less widespread belief in the sacred places. When the war ended, practically all top executives, including President Vladislav Ardzinba, took part in the thanksgiving ceremony at Dydrypsh (in the Achandara village). In the summer of 1996, the Abkhazian president and all of the republic’s leaders asked Dydrypsh “to bring people to their senses to stop criminal activities” and promised annual sacrifices if the wave of crime subdued.19
Local and district bureaucrats frequent Lykh-nykha, the sacred place of the Shakryl family. It is one of Abkhazia’s seven main sanctuaries that were closed in the 1930s when the local Komsomol members smashed the ritual wine vessel buried at the Church of the Dormition of the Mother of God dated to the 10th century. The rituals were revived in 1992.20
There are attempts to restore the social institutions’ traditional role (the council of elders being one of them). Under Soviet power, their role remained purely formal. They are expected to deal with issues belonging to the village community’s unofficial, traditional sphere, such as the eviction of members guilty of adultery, reconciliation of those involved in blood feuds (blood feud still survives in Abkhazia), and changes in traditional marriage, burial, and other rituals.21 In some villages (the village of Khuap, Gudauta District), young people set up youth councils made up of the most respected young men from all families to deal with the misbehavior of their contemporaries. The problems that defy settlement are related to the council of elders.22 There are also district councils of elders that function under the Council of Elders of Abkhazia set up in 1993 to promote national traditions and customs and to “uproot everything that contradicted the Abkhazian spirit.”23
The family-clan system among the Abkhazians is living through a period of renaissance, which can be described as the “revival of archaism.”24 There is a “return to the custom of building social
17 See: E. Tsyshba, “Krasivaia i smelaia na ‘Moda-teks’ zashla,” Ekho Abkhazii, No. 31, 2006, p. 5.
18 Field data gathered by the author. Interviews of 2004-2006 (the villages of Duripsh, Jgerda, Lykhny, Kulanyrkh-va, the city of Sukhumi).
19 See: A.B. Krylov, “Abkhazskoe sviatilishche Dydrypsh: proshloe, nastoiashchee i ustnaia traditsia,” p. 26.
20 See: A.B. Krylov, Religia i traditsii abkhazov, pp. 299-302.
21 See: R.Sh. Kuznetsova, I.V. Kuznetsov, “Voina, mir i obshchestvo v abkhazskoy derevne Lidzava,” in: Bulleten: Antropologia. Men’shinstva. Mul’tikul’turalizm, New series, Issue 1, No. 1-3, Krasnodar, 2006, p. 102.
22 Field data gathered by the author. Interviews of 2006 (Khuap village).
23 A.B. Krylov, “Traditsionnye instituty abkhazov: proshloe i sovremennost’,” p. 199.
24 The term was suggested by V.A. Tishkov (see: V.A. Tishkov, Rekviem po etnosu. Issledovania po sotsial'no-kul’turnoy antropologii, Moscow, 2003, p. 8).
networks based on blood kinship,”25 which is having a great effect on the social and political situation in the country. Today, the nation is divided into about 600 extended families (azhvla)—some of them small, others quite large. The Kvitsinia (Kutsnia) family united about 320 smaller families with the total number of 1,200 members. The extended families are divided into clans (abipara) with a common ancestor. Large azhvlas are inevitably amorphous; their members are found everywhere across the country; in such cases, the clan serves as the core of a closely-knit collective. During the tragic war years and after the war when the state was fairly weak, these structures helped the nation to survive by shouldering the most important social and economic functions: they protected their members, extended material support to the poorer members, and settled conflicts. The clan is always ready to defend the honor of its members.26
This cohesion has a negative side as well: the interests of the clan and the family come to the fore when one of the members commits an offence. The militia in Sukhumi complained that as soon as it detained an offender, his relatives crowded in front of the precinct in an effort to convince the officers to let their relative go. In some cases, relatives (or those who fought together with the offender) used force to remove the prisoner from the Drandy prison, the only one in Abkhazia. Some time ago the press discussed the possibility of sending Abkhazian prisoners to serve their terms in the Russian Federation.27
Academic circles believe that closely-knit clan structures, which divide society into extended families and lineages, and the rivalry among them are the main contradictions of present-day Abkhazian society and weaken the state.28 I am convinced of the opposite: it was the weak state and its social institutions that forced the family-clan structures to shoulder the responsibilities normally carried by the state. Under Soviet power, they remained alive for the same reason. The present revival of some of the archaic institutions (clans and patrilineages) are the result of the war, economic devastation, and unemployment, as well as the state’s inability to take responsibility for the social and physical protection of its members.
Lynching is not infrequent: the victims have to take justice into their hands because the militia shirks its duties for various reasons (corruption or kinship with the offender). In Sukhumi, for example, when the militia “failed to find the killer,” the father of the victim gathered all the necessary evidence and presented it to the militia, which remained passive. Then the father tracked down the killer, murdered him, and pled guilty.29
The religious factor. The Abkhazians follow traditional religious cults described as “pagan” or “earliest monotheism.” At the same time, all Abkhazian families are either “Christian” or “Muslim.” Christianity has been practiced in Abkhazia since ancient times, while Islam arrived much later from Turkey. According to the sources of the 19th and 20th centuries and my own, more recent, field studies, the two religions at no time divided the nation or created problems: there were no obstacles to marriage, sworn brotherhood and foster families, or to everyday communication.30
During the war with Georgia, certain politicians tried to exploit the religious factor by accusing the Abkhazians of “Islamic extremism;” they went as far as describing the conflict as a war being waged by the Muslims against the Christian Georgians. The accusation stood mainly because numerous volunteers from the North Caucasian republics (Kabardins, Adighes, Cherkess, Abazins, Chechens, nearly all of them Muslims), as well as Abkhazians with Muhajir ancestors from Turkey and other countries fought together with the Abkhazians.
25 K.S. Mokin, “Abkhazia. Identichnost’ nepriznannosti. Opyt sotsiokul’turnoy antropologii,” Etnopanorama, No. 3-4, 2006, p. 28.
26 See: A.B. Krylov, “Traditsionnye instituty abkhazov: proshloe i sovremennost’,” pp. 192-193.
27 Field data gathered by the author. Interviews of 2006 (Sukhumi).
28 See: R.Sh. Kuznetsova, I.V. Kuznetsov, op. cit., p. 103.
29 Field data gathered by the author. Interviews of 2004 (Sukhumi).
30 Field data gathered by the author. Interviews of 2004-2006 (the villages of Chlou, Duripsh, Jgerda, Lykhny, Ku-
lanyrkhva, the city of Sukhumi).
During the war and after it, the interest in religion (the traditional cults, Islam and Christianity alike) became even stronger. This is easily explained by the tragic events. Little by little the former balance was restored: today the traditional beliefs patronized to a certain extent by the state structures remain in the center of religious life. The nation never embraced Orthodox Islam, mainly because the strict rules demand the abandonment of some basic elements of the local ethnic traditions and stereotypes. Suffice it to say that in Abkhazia wine is more than an alcoholic beverage, it is a sacral drink devoted to the memory of ancestors and to the gods; it is used to bless the newly weds, greet a guest, or remember a dead relative, etc. There are two mosques in the republic—in Sukhumi and Gudauta— attended mainly by repatriates, people from the Northern Caucasus; locals are rarely seen in them.31
Christianity is a different story. Under the impact of recent developments in the Russian Federation and in connection with the events in the Northern Caucasus and all over the world, Christianity has become a “more prestigious” religion, especially among the youth. It is frequently said that Christianity has been practiced in Abkhazia since the times of the apostles (there are holy places associated with the names of St. Simon the Zealot and St. John Chrysostom). Not infrequently young men from “Muslim” families and extended families are baptized. It seems that Christianity is supported at the state level to “improve the country’s image.” Several years ago, a seminary was opened to train Abkhazian priests; and pilgrimages to the holy places in Abkhazia are gaining popularity. At the same time, certain traditional ideas prevent further consolidation of Christianity: a bearded priest in black is taken for a man in mourning, therefore he might be banned from the places of traditional religious rituals. We were told that probably for this reason a career in Church does not look attractive.
Traditions and the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. So far Georgians remain the “enemy.” This will go on until the Georgian refugee issue is finally resolved, the republic’s future becomes clearer, and the unending incidents on the border and in the Gali District end. It is very strange to hear from a teenager born after the war that he hates Georgians—he has had no chance to meet any of them personally. Older people who lived side by side with Georgians are less categorical: they recollect many positive things about them. The fierce armed conflict destroyed the centuries-old ethnic contacts between the Abkhazians and the Georgians, the culturally closest neighbor in the southeast. The Georgians live compactly in the Gali District, there are few of them in other areas. Today, they are all held responsible for what happened.
This serves as the background for the thesis that the Abkhazians and the Georgians are not as closely related as the Abkhazians and the Adighes. This newly invented myth holds no water—everyone who is more or less aware of the closeness of the Georgian and Abkhazian traditions and everyday culture knows this. In fact, the only thing that divides them is language.
Today there are people who say that the custom of keeping wine in jugs is “Georgian, not our tradition.” The tradition of the first new-year customer hitherto popular in Abzhu Abkhazia is being dismissed as “not ours.”32 Everything “not ours” is doubted and rejected. The council of elders of the Lid-zava village ruled to “purify” the Abkhazian traditions of Georgian influence: cheese was banned from the funereal repast together with other “excesses.”33 At the same time, although some of the Abkhazian rites and mythological characters have Georgian (Mingrel) names (such are khech’khvama, adgyl de-dupal, etc.), this never causes any problems with their observance and veneration. The Abkhazian language abounds in borrowings from the Georgian, which in turn contains borrowings from the Abkhazian. All political cataclysms notwithstanding, we cannot ignore the contacts rooted in hoary antiquity and the ties that have connected the two peoples throughout many centuries.
There is any number of family names shared by those who regard themselves as Abkhazians and by Georgians. This is true mainly of the Gali District of Abkhazia and Mingrelia in Georgia. Not in-
31 Field data gathered by the author. Interviews of 2004-2006 (the villages of Chlou, Duripsh, Jgerda, Lykhny, Ku-lanyrkhva, Khuap, the city of Sukhumi).
32 Field data gathered by the author. Interviews of 2004-2005 (the villages of Chlou, Jgerda, Lykhny).
33 R.Sh. Kuznetsova, I.V. Kuznetsov, op. cit., p. 102.
frequently this is explained by assimilation: there are stories about the ancestors of these families coming to Abkhazia 150-200 years ago. According to folk traditions, the members of such families (Dochia—Abkhazians and Dochia—Georgians, for example) are believed to be relatives. Marriages between them are banned, while the members of both families are regarded as brothers and sisters. In the past, before the 1990s, such families frequently communicated: they visited each other’s homes, especially in the event of death in the family. The war disrupted all of this, but the feeling of kinship remains and is acknowledged.
Twenty years ago, marriages to Georgians (especially to Mingrel Georgians) were extremely common, particularly in the Ochamchira District, while today there are very few of them. At the everyday level, ethnic contacts, some of them very interesting, have survived. Here is one example: in the event of a so-called God’s illness (according to the local people, it frequently affects young girls), people go to a Georgian (Mingrel) healer. He lives in Ochamchira, but his fame as the best expert in the necessary rituals has traveled far and wide: people come from all over the republic, even from the remotest corners.34
Traditions and external influences. In recent decades, the vector of economic, political, and ethnic contacts of Abkhazian society changed its direction: Russia has become its main partner. This is a new situation for the Abkhazians: the centuries-old ethnic contacts with its culturally closest southeastern neighbors were grossly disrupted. The new vector is looking to the northwest: this will change the course of the social processes, as well as the family and clan structures, which will probably be modernized at a fast pace.
This, plus the fact that many Abkhazians go to Russia to study or to work, as well as tend to leave the countryside to settle in the cities (Sukhumi, Gagra, Novy Afon, etc.), has stirred up transformations in culture and everyday life and has already increased the role of the Russian tongue.
The structure of mixed marriages has changed: there are many more marriages between Abkhazians and Russians and Abkhazians and North Caucasian peoples than before. Men marry outside their ethnic group; there is also a recent, even more striking phenomenon: Abkhazian girls are marrying Russians, Adighes, etc.
C o n c l u s i o n
Field studies and ethnographic observations testify to the fact that the events of the last decades have had a strong influence on the development of the Abkhazian ethnos: the contacts inside it have become more intensive (between the Abzhu and Bzyb Abkhazians); there are stronger ties with the Abkhazian diaspora abroad; much has changed in the Abkhazians’ religious awareness; the family-clan structures are changing fast; and the same applies to gender roles.
Much of what is going on in the Abkhazian society speaks of its modernization. There is an opposite trend toward archaism of certain aspects of social life: decentralization of agricultural production has forced people to revive the traditional methods of farming on their personal plots; the role of traditional communal and kindred structures has increased against the background of the weaker state institutions; the traditional pagan beliefs have been revived together with the restored institution of pagan priests, etc.
34 Field data gathered by the author. Interviews of 2004-2005 (the villages of Jgerda and Lykhny, the city of Sukhumi).
