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19Journal of Siberian Federal University. Humanities & Social Sciences 8 (2015 8) 1769-1787
УДК 130.122
Problem of Self-consciousness and Conceptual Thinking in the Theory of Vigotsky: in the Spirit of "The Phenomenology of Spirit" by Hegel and "Ethics" by Spinoza
Eiji Kamiya*
Kyoto-Tachbiana University 34 Yamada-cho Oyake, Yamashina-ku, Kyoto 607-8175, Japan
Received 16.04.2015, received in revised form 21.05.2015, accepted 30.06.2015
The article discusses the connection of the philosophy of Hegel and Spinoza in L.S. Vygotsky's theory, one of the modern psychological theories. Our study is inspired by the desire to enrich his theory, which remains unfinished due to his short life. Speaking more precisely, Vygotsky took from the philosophy of Hegel not only the dialectical way of thinking, but also the idea of self-consciousness as understanding of the concept and spontaneous thinking. The theory of Spinoza provided him with the psychophysical problem of emotions and also the link "emotions-concepts- freedom", which imply "knowledge of oneself and one's own emotions" or self-consciousness. Therefore, in Vygotsky's theory we find two big philosophers intersect in the idea of self-consciousness. This is the beginning of the enrichment of Vygotsky's theory, which leads not only from the consciousness to the birth ofself-consciousness as the second birth of man, but back from the second to the first birth of consciousness.
Keywords: self-consciousness, concept, emotions, development, dialectics.
DOI: 10.17516/1997-1370-2015-8-8-1769-1787.
Research area: philosophy.
I Spinoza - Hegel - Vygotsky
When Vygotsky (1896-1934) was developing his original theory, he considered and critically assessed the ideas of numerous psychologists, philosophers, linguists, writers etc., as though he was working on an encyclopaedia. On one hand, it provided the vital force of the theory; on the other hand, expressing his vision of other theorists and writers' opinions, Vygotsky made his theory profoundly clear to the reader. Spinoza (1632-1677) and Hegel (1770-1831) are among
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* Corresponding author E-mail address: ded.eiji@gmail.com
the mentioned philosophers; their points of view occupy significant positions in the essence of the theory by Vygotsky.
The fact that Vygotsky attempted to adopt the emotions theory by Spinoza is partially right. Vygotsky planned his research on the basis of Spinoza's studies. In one of his books, the psychologist wrote the following:
Our research of the concept on the basis of
Spinoza's studies
- 1769 -
Kruger, Köhler: emotion in perception The emotion's concept is an active state; it is freedom:
Freedom: emotion in concept. Autistic: thinking. Sch: emotion decay
The great picture of personality development: the way to freedom. Revive Spinozism in marxist psychology (2006, p. 295)
As we can see from the quotation, Vygotsky does not only adopt the emotions theory from Spinoza; he also attempts to study the relations between "concept" - "emotion" - "freedom". Well, what does "Freedom: emotion in concept" mean? When this fundamental question is clearly answered, we can understand the phrase "The great picture of personality development: the way to freedom". As it is demonstrated below, I believe that we can find the answer to this question in "Ethics".
But as Vygotsky, obviously, relied on the dialectic logic of Hegel in his studies of the concept and the conceptual thinking (see Chapter 5 "Thinking and Speech"), we cannot interpret the quotation above as a switch from Hegel to Spinoza in the psychologist's research. The question is how, according to the theory of Vygotsky, we can correlate the studies of Spinoza with those of Hegel. Disclosing the results of our study, we shall mention that the correlation point between the two philosophers can be found in their ideas of self-consciousness.
II Self-Consciousness and Conceptual Thinking in the Theory by Vygotsky
Roughly speaking, self-consciousness is defined as consciousness of one's self, not of a thing (though, however, self-consciousness encompasses things in their ideal shape as an object for ego). Consequently, self-consciousness
is associated not only with thinking alone, but also with consciousness as a whole (e.g., including emotions); but first of all, let us study its relation to thinking.
The problem of self-consciousness was pointed out by Vygotsky back in the mid 1920-s; but the problem was more profoundly studied in respect with adolescence when self-consciousness is formed, such as in "Paedology of the Adolescent" (1931 / 1984).
But if we decide to separate Vygotsky's idea of self-consciousness from his earlier works, we find two postulates of great methodological significance:
1. Self-consciousness follows the same mechanism as cognition of other people; thereby, we cognize ourselves similarly to the way we cognize others: "The mechanism of consciousness of the self (self-consciousness) and the cognition of others is the same; we are conscious of ourselves because we are conscious of others, and with the same method as we are conscious of others, because we are the same vis-à-vis ourselves as others vis-à-vis us" (1924 / 1982, p. 52).
2. Self-consciousness is the consciousness of consciousness [to a thing]: "as Plekhanov has correctly established, self-consciousness is the consciousness of consciousness" (1927 / 1982, p. 413).
We would like to point out immediately that these two postulates were included into the self-consciousness ideas expressed in "The Phenomenology of Spirit" by Hegel (1807 / 2002).
Moreover, in "Paedology of the Adolescent" Vygotsky expresses another important idea directly associated with the correlation between self-consciousness and thinking. The new postulate is the following:
3. Self-consciousness and conceptual thinking are inextricably intertwined; without
self-consciousness, conceptual thinking would not exist, and without the latter, the first would not exist either. Therefore, self-consciousness is the pre-requisite and the consequence of conceptual thinking.
Besides, we shall demonstrate how Vygotsky understood conceptual thinking as a form and contents. From the point of view of form, conceptual thinking in general is thinking by concepts. Before that, during its development, thinking operates some "concept equivalents". At first, an equivalent is a syncretic image that transforms into a complex later. Therefore, the forms of thinking are developed as image -complex - concept.
Of course, there are specific contents of thinking related to each form. According to Vygotsky, the contents typical of conceptual thinking forms are the following:
1. The contents of thinking are usually related to cognition and understanding of the surrounding world. But conceptual thinking leads to "revelation of the deep connection underlying reality, to the cognition of relations governing reality, to the systematization of the cognized world with a grid of logical relations" (1931, p. 301 / 1984, p. 65-6).
2. Conceptual thinking becomes a means of understanding others and cognizing social consciousness: "a concept does not only systematize the surrounding reality and serve as the main means of cognition. It is also the main means for understanding the other, for adequate digestion of the historically developed social experience of the humankind. Concepts are the first things used by an adolescent to systematize and cognize the world of public consciousness" (ibid, p. 301-2, p. 66).
3. Self-consciousness develops along with the formation of concepts: "A word is just as much a tool for understanding others, as it is a tool for self-understanding. From the moment of birth,
a word is a tool the speaker uses to understand himself, to apperceive his perceptions. Therefore, the intensive development of self-perception, self-observance, intensive cognition of internal reality and the world of one's own emotions only happens when the concepts are formed. As W. Humboldt rightfully remarked, a thought becomes clear in a concept only, and an adolescent becomes capable of understanding himself and his inner world for real only when the concepts are formed. Otherwise the thought cannot achieve clarity or become a concept" (ibid, p. 300-1, p.65).
Therefore, self-consciousness and understanding of the self only become possible through the formation of concepts, but there occurs the reverse dependence: with no clear self-consciousness, concepts are impossible either. A concept becomes clear only due to the development of self-consciousness. It is the newest contents of the conceptual thinking form.
It raises a theoretical problem that requires a profound study. How is such single, individual, subjective thing as self-consciousness can be transformed into a common, objective one, which is conceptual thinking and a true concept? The answer to this question is hidden in the process of movement or development of self-consciousness.
III Why Do We Need "The Phenomenology of Spirit" by Hegel?
Putting two theories against each other and comparing themselves to each other is not usually productive. The intention to regard the theory of Vygotsky through the prism of Hegel's philosophy, especially "The Phenomenology of Spirit", needs to be justified. Indeed, just like Hegel's philosophy, the theory of Vygotsky is dialectic, but it is not enough. The comparison should be based at least on the contents of the theory by Vygotsky.
Thoroughly studying "The Phenomenology of Spirit" we can find certain intersections
and parallels with the theory of Vygotsky. It really contains certain postulates underlying the psychologist's theory. But where are the intersection points, the tangent lines, the parallels? We can find them in Hegel's theory of consciousness (before self-consciousness) expressed as the following development pattern: "sense-certainty" - "perception" - "mind".
1
First of all, let us study the first element of the pattern, sense-certainty, as the lowest level of consciousness. Sensually, knowledge cognizes the single "This", located "here and now", and the subject of such knowledge is a single "this person", also being "here and now". Therefore, sense-certainty "has not missed anything of the object, seeing it in its wholeness" and consequently, this knowledge demonstrates "the richest cognition", "the cognition of endless richness" (1807 // 2002, p. 51). However, it is just an illusion of cognition. Because if "now" with time transforms into a new "now", a person also changes from "here" to "right here" (a new "here") and so on, and attempting to abstract something from the totality of the numerous "here and now", e.g. in the sense of sense-certainty, we get "the most abstract and the poorest of the truths": the immediate "existence" (ibid). Hence, on one hand, Hegel wants to speak of an "illusion" of cognizing the rich world to the full, and on the other hand, he speaks of the essence of sense-certainty which can never encompass anything but the poor and pure "existence".
At the point of intersection between the ideas of Vygotsky and Hegel we should pay attention to the idea of mediation. Hegel deals with mediation from the negative point of view. He wrote that as sense-certainty was "knowledge... immediately composing the object", e.g. "the knowledge of the immediate or the existent", then studying this certainty we can never do it without "the help of a
concept" (ibid). From the negative point of view, at the moment of grasping an object a concept (and further, the image and the idea) works as a mediator. Moreover, Hegel believes that within the context of sense-certainty the immediate object cannot be expressed with words, speech and language. What does it mean? Here is what Hegel wrote:
They "mean" this bit of paper I am writing on, or rather have written on: but they do not say what they "mean". If they really wanted to say this bit of paper which they "mean", and they wanted to say so, that is impossible, because the This of sense, which is "meant", cannot be reached by language, which belongs to consciousness, i.e. to what is inherently universal (ibid, p.58).
Let us clarify the quotation. Imagine that I have written something on a bit of paper. If, pointing at this single paper being "here and now" I ask anyone what it is, I am likely to receive the answer that it is a bit of paper. But at the moment the paper meaning "paper in general" abstracts the "This" being "here and now", they go beyond the dimension of sense-certainty. They enter the dimension of perception, which relies on universality as its core principle.
Hegel gives an interesting remark: speech has "the divine nature of directly turning the mere "meaning" right round about, making it into something else" (ibid, p. 58). Following Hegel, the "divine" action of turning the sense-certainty as pure singularity into perception as pure universality can be performed through the mediation of word, speech and language. Vygotsky points out that mediated with words, perception tends to generalize the object, and, moreover, take this speech mediation for the main principle of understanding human
psyche. This is a profound point of intersection between the theories of the philosopher and the psychologist.
2
Speaking of the parallel between them, we should say that it becomes especially clear in the understanding of self-consciousness. Let us quote a text where Vygotsky directly points at Hegel's idea of self-consciousness.
[Concerning that the pattern of self-consciousness development is a certain historical stage in the development of personality]. This concept corresponds to the pattern of development that we find in Hegel's philosophy. In contrast to Kant, for whom a thing in itself is a metaphysical entity not subject to development, for Hegel, the concept itself "in oneself" means nothing over than the initial moment or stage of development of the thing. Specifically from this point of view, Hegel considered a seedling as a plant in itself and a child as a man in himself. All things are in themselves from the beginning, Hegel said. A. Deborin ... considers it interesting that in formulating the question in this way, Hegel inseparably connects the knowability of a thing with its development or, using a more general expression, with its movement and change. From this point of view, Hegel justifiably pointed to the fact that the ego serves as the closest example of "life for oneself". "It can be said that the man differs from the animal and, consequently, from nature in general mainly by the fact that he knows himself as ego.
The concept of self-consciousness as developing definitely liberates us from the metaphysical approach to this central fact of the transitional age (1931 / 1984, p. 232).
As in "The Phenomenology of Spirit" Hegel philosophically presents the dialectic movement (development) from "self-consciousness in itself" to "free self-consciousness", then, considering the foregoing, we can believe that Vygotsky did consider Hegel's studies. Later we will point at the parallel relations between the two researchers.
3
Let us make one more remark. In "The Phenomenology of Spirit" there are the same concepts that act as a tangent line between Hegel and Vygotsky: "in oneself", "for others" and "for oneself". Taking pointing gesture as an example, Vygotsky characterizes the gesture in the three mentioned stages (failed act of grasping, same action perceived by an adult, birth of the pointing gesture) and, moreover, refers the three stages to the general pattern of cultural development of a child (1929 / 2003, p. 1021, 1931 / 1983, p. 143-4). At the same time, pointing out at the "differentiation of Hegel" (1931 / 1983, p. 143), he hints at the fact that the mentioned three stages are inspired by the philosopher. Even though Hegel does not use the expression "for others", he writes "for another" speaking of the process of self-consciousness development described in "The Phenomenology of Spirit". Partially, the expression "for another" used by Hegel is similar to "for others". But let us speak about it later.
IV Mind - Self-Consciousness - Reason
A great peculiarity of the ideas of self-consciousness, expressed in "The Phenomenology of Spirit" by Hegel, is the differentiation between mind and reason, setting self-consciousness within the process of evolution from mind to reason, and seeing self-consciousness as a developing phenomenon.
But before considering self-consciousness we need to emphasize that in "The Phenomenology of Spirit" everything is described as flowing, 1773 -
moving, and developing. The dialectics itself and even the truth, which is obviously a permanent thing, are also moving. Such significant patterns as establishment (determination) - denial (cancellation) - denial of denial (cancellation of cancellation) are always found; but, for instance, the expression "dialectics of sense-certainty" (1807 // 2002, p. 57) means "dialectics specific of it [being]" in the dimension of sense-certainty (ibid, p. 52). Therefore, there is its own dialectics in every dimension of knowledge (and obviously their core would be the same), making dialectics a vital property. In the works by Hegel the same can be said about the words "truth" or "true" as he claims that even the truth has the ability to move. For example, Hegel operates such expressions as "the truth of sense-certainty" (ibid, 53), "the truth of perception" (ibid. 62, 63), "the truth of mind" (ibid, p. 81). At the same time the specific essence revealed by a specific movement of knowledge at each of its stages is the truth.
But to clarify the problem let us leave the great movement of knowledge, i.e. "the dialectics of the human" grasped by the mind, aside, and point at each specific "truth" and its restrictions on the intellectual steps of sense-certainty, perception and mind within the relations between "the thing" and "the consciousness".
1
As it has been mentioned, the truth specific for sense-certainty and its restrictions that present the relations between the world as it is and the direct "self", is the knowledge possessing all the richness of things being "here and now". But if we separate (isolate) them, then, to our surprise, they lose their richness, turning into nothing but the empty "existence". This cancellation leads to the fallout from the world filled with light, green, flowers and wine into the world of darkness. Surprised, we cancel it too, returning to singularity, i.e. to "here and now" without universality. Therefore,
the movement of knowledge within the dimension of sense-certainty draws nothing but a circle on a plain. This simple circular movement from pure singularity to empty universality and back to pure singularity makes a real impact on the idea of consciousness in the relations between "the thing" and "consciousness", including mind.
2
Unlike sense-certainty, the perception that occurs at the next stage presents more than just mediated knowledge, but also simple universality. It happens at the moment of "indication" and at the movement of the "thing" (ibid, p. 60). "Indication" means that the word "watch" refers to any watch. This is what pure universality is about. If sense-certainty presents singularity, then perception presents universality, but it is not the end. The perception goes further until it reaches the next dead-end. Perception of a thing is based on a simple integrity of "one", but leads to "differentiation" within this integrity, i.e. "numerous" properties are cognized in the "one". It is similar to that how Hegel pointed out that "one" thing, such as salt, has "numerous" properties. "Salt is white and tart and cubical and heavy etc." (ibid, p.61). All these properties mean that the plurality of the sense-certainty knowledge manifested in the singularity is now demonstrated in the dimension of universality (ibid), but they cannot mutually influence each other. Consequently, consideration of the thing within the dimension of perception does not go any further. As Hegel mentions, "the white makes no impact on the cubical and does not change it; neither of them influence the tart etc." (ibid, p.61-2). Another dead-end is found when there is an illusion that occurs along with perception. Hegel believes that if a thing is "true" in the dimension of perception, then consciousness is "variable and immaterial for itself", which may lead to illusions (ibid, p. 63). Moreover, speaking about the first
dead-end, Hegel points out that many aspects of the thing originate not from the thing, but from themselves, thereby "unfolding to us as seen by our eyes, absolutely different from the way they were expressed in language, etc." (ibid, p.65). So, it is also related to the second dead-end.
3
Now let us study the mind, considering the difference Hegel outlines between the mind and the reason. The action that starts the differentiation within the "one" of the thing begins in the dimension of perception, where differentiated properties were not related to each other. As an object of perception, a thing has some numerous properties which do not lead to the unfolding of such (see the example of salt). Getting over this situation, the mind learns how to correlate different properties to each other. Hegel studies such properties on the example of classical mechanic motion. It encompasses the "external manifestation" of force and the "force returned into itself from its external manifestation" (ibid, p.73). Frankly speaking, that is the action and counteraction of force. Though the force is divided into two components here, "the existence [of the two forces] is rather a pure establishment through something else", and therefore, we can recognize "every force due to another property" (ibid, p.76), but we cannot know more than that. It means that we find no opposition or negation as "these forces do not have any substances they could bear or preserve" (ibid, p. 76-7). Finally, the mind enters the phenomenon through the concept of force and starts to penetrate into the "inner nature" of the thing, at the same time limiting force to gravity, dissolving different laws of forces in the universal law of gravity, returning the mind from the singularity of the thing to its unconditional universality. As it has been said above, the empty universality is achieved through the abandonment of the singularity, which is typical for thinking
before entering the dimension of mind and later, within it. That is what Hegel referred to as "the word play" (ibid, p. 77).
4
Let us make several remarks concerning the interconnection between the two properties and the cancellation of these relations between the properties. "Left" can happen due to "right" and simultaneously, the latter can happen due to the first. But moving these properties around the plain we see how "left" can turn into "right". Even though the two properties make sense as relative properties in the same area, there is no other meaning arising from the "opposition" of the two. At the same time, it is everything the interdependence between the two properties may mean, as the properties are simple (and consequently, empty) concepts. The "opposition" between them is not a true opposition. It is a peculiarity of mind Hegel referred to as "common human sense" (ibid, p. 69). What is the point of view of reason superior to mind? Let us study it on the example of the "existing" and the "bearing". Just like "left" and "right", the "existing" and the "bearing" first find themselves in the relations of interdependence. If we see a creature as an ego, then I exist because I was the "bearing" before I was born, and because I also exist until I die when I become a different "bearing" in the memories of me kept by others. I exist in the time restricted by the two "bearings". This is cognition in mind. If we said, "I will die because I was born" or "I was born condemned to die", it would express another deeper thought that does not go beyond the boundary of mind. This is the "word play". Within the mind, the knowledge can see the "bearing" inside the "existing". At the same time, there is the "existing" inside the "bearing" (the integrity of being and not-being). From the point of view of substance and in the dimension of cells, my life can be illustrated as
follows. The genesis of an animal cell and the division of the cell always has an "apoptosis-cell" or the "programmed cell death" when the "dying cell" becomes more compact and gets engulfed by the surrounding cells (Lewin, Benjamin et al., 2007, p. 534). Let us find an analogue in the dimension of spirit. When I have a new idea, I can distinguish between the new idea and my old ones by comparing and contrasting them. When a new idea gets closer to the truth than the old one, we limit the scope of the old idea or we transform (cancel) it by modifying it. Therefore, we prepare it for the death. Therefore, the "existing" encompasses the "bearing".
5
But according to Hegel's idea, it takes a great leap from knowledge concerning "thing - consciousness" to the knowledge of "consciousness - consciousness" to reach the reason from the mind. Self-consciousness, the necessary medium for the human knowledge to penetrate into the "inner nature" of the thing, is developed in the process. As Hegel wrote, the "inner nature" of a phenomenon hides behind a "curtain". It leads to the dead-end in the immediate "thing - consciousness" relation, i.e. in the sense-certainty, perception and mind. We need to look behind the curtain to see "the inner nature in the inner nature" (ibid. p. 92). It means that it is the self-consciousness that is required.
V Development of Self-Consciousness
In "The Phenomenology of Spirit" all psychological and everything that originates from "sense-certainty", "perception", "mind", "self-consciousness", "reason", and "spirit", being the objects of this study, are investigated as flowing and evolving. For this reason we also need to consider the process of transition from self-consciousness in itself to the "free self-
consciousness". Hence, we need to unfold what happens in the process of transition from the ego as an immediate integrity, from the tautological ego encompassed in "I am I", from the vague cognized ego to free self-consciousness where an object moves around concepts.
From Hegel's point of view, at the moment of decay of the "one" as an immediate integrity a differentiation within a thing or an object occurs. Of course, it is not any differentiation that may occur, but it is the differentiation of properties found in an opposition with each other. As demonstrated in Chapter 7 of "Thinking and Speech", the differentiation of a linguistic form of a word and its meaningful contents with an associative connection between them is a static differentiation, where the initial bond between sound and meaning does not unfold any further. But if the opposition of two properties is allowed, the differentiation causes the difference in the inner speech where the decay of the linguistic form acts as a cause for the development of its meaningful contents. For self-consciousness such properties are "own" and "other".
It is demonstrated by the comparison of self-consciousness to consciousness before self-consciousness performed by Hegel. According to him, during the investigation of self-consciousness i.e. the new form of knowledge (knowledge of the self) in comparison with the previous form (knowledge of the "other") the last knowledge disappears, while the main properties of this knowledge are retained. Here the "simple independent existence for the consciousness" disappears (1807 // 2002, p. 93-94). Therefore, the knowledge of the other (knowledge on the level of feeling, perception, or mind) turns into the being for itself through the realization of the ego (development of self-consciousness). Hence, we can consider the basic differentiation arising in the self-consciousness to be the differentiation between the "own" and the "other".
The cognition of the way the "own" and the "other" penetrate into each other and find themselves in oppositions to each other is our main task. Let us consider this task, following the three postulates of Hegel: (a) immediate consideration of the undifferentiated ego, (b) transition from the immediate ego to the mediating ego, (c) reduplication of self-consciousness.
The cognition of one's own ego begins with the immediate cognition of the "pure undifferentiated ego" (p.98). This is the kind of cognition as "tautology of no movement: I means I" (p.94). This ego in a certain sense is a stable integrity. But the self-consciousness does not stop there and goes beyond "itself". The stable integrity presents only the initial point of self-consciousness. It is especially important to find what moves self-consciousness further.
The answer can be found in the second definition, though it is a little abstract: "This immediacy is itself, however, thoroughgoing mediation; it has its being only cancelling the independent object, in other words it is Desire. The satisfaction of desire is indeed the reflexion of self-consciousness into itself, is the certainty which has passed into objective truth" (p.98). The phrase "this immediacy is itself, however, thoroughgoing mediation" means that during the cognition of the ego, the immediacy of the first cognitions or the immediate cognition of the ego begins acting as mediating. What does this mediation refer to, what does it mean? The transition to such mediation is needed, first of all, for the consciousness returned into itself and, therefore, to attract the contents of knowledge about the other. Therefore, at the establishment of self-consciousness, though the object is a negative element for self-consciousness, it returns into itself just like consciousness does (see p. 94). So, the first moment unfolding this mediation is the returning of consciousness from otherness to itself, the transition from the external thing
to the thing for the own. This is the end of pure knowledge of the other and the beginning of visible establishment of self-consciousness. But Hegel believes that this development happens in the tautological ego phase.
The second moment makes the self-consciousness move, and this moment is the "desire" and "reflexion" mentioned in the second part of the postulate (b) quoted above. Here it is important to remark the concept of "life". The meaning of Hegel's phrase "due to this reflection into itself it (the object - E.K.) becomes life" is, I believe, the fact that an external object becomes a thing, a being for itself, thereby making it alive and visible. Here self-consciousness begins to differentiate between its own and the existence (especially the object returned into itself), forming, therefore, the differentiated existence and being in the aspect of sense-certainty of perception, and also the "being reflected into itself" (ibid). Saying that the "object of immediate desire is something living" (ibid), Hegel indicates that the reason for it that the relation of mind to the "inner nature" of things, the inherent reality is the "distinguishing of what cannot be distinguished" (ibid). In this context and considering that the object of "The Phenomenology of Spirit" is the intellectual aspect of an individual, the "desire" by Hegel represents an intellectual need. Penetrating into the "inner nature" of thing, the mind comes to the conclusions both drawn from the outside and derived by formal logic. Therefore, we may think that the "desire" is the wish to go deeper into the "inner nature" of the thing, that it is the motivation of assisting the transition from the mind to the reason (if we characterize the future of the mind from the point of view of the "desire", then it is the universality within the "pushing everything away from itself").
If our investigation was complete at this point, the third postulate of the reduplication of self-consciousness would not be required.
The thing that used to be external returns into itself, becoming an internal object for thinking, becomes alive and begins to move. However, if we realized that the desire for life makes more profound thoughts move, then ego would remain static. Hegel tries to cover both the motion of all the "own", and the motion of the object in all the "own" that used to be "external". It means that he tries to understand how the "developing and one's own development" occur (ibid, p. 97). In this respect Hegel studies such dialectic concepts as the integrity of independent formations, integrity and differentiation, independence of the other and cancellation of the independence, opposition of self-consciousness and life, reformation of the ego and being for oneself, the genus and the single. But the most important point for us is that without self-consciousness a thing as a being for itself is not born; that the integrity and differentiation within the ego continue endlessly; that the form of knowledge becomes individual through the ego; that the own self-consciousness and the self-consciousness as the "other" originate from that form; that the "reduplication of self-consciousness" happens here. All these manifest themselves in interpenetration and the opposition of the "own" and the "other" in self-consciousness that occur in the consciousness returned back into itself (and also in the object returned into itself) due to the formation of self-consciousness.
Hegel personifies this logical conclusion as "reduplication of self-consciousness", thereby giving it a real definition. Personification refers to the relations of two individuals, i.e. an individual as the "own" (own self-consciousness) and an individual asthe"other"(other self-consciousness), though, of course, both individuals live within my own ego. As before the establishment of self-consciousness the perception and the mind force a person to abandon himself and see "himself in the other" (ibid, p.99), at the initial stage of the
self-consciousness establishment the "own" and the "other" compose an immediate integrity, recognizing each other when brought together (ibid, p. 101). Applying this to the intellectual development process we may understand that one learns the results of previous feelings, perception and mind, and starts providing them in systems within himself. But it is not so smooth. The two individuals (two self-consciousnesses) are opposite to each other as a Bondsman and a Lord; there occurs the "fear of the death, the absolute master" that is overcome later. Here one's own self-consciousness is seen as self-consciousness of a Bondsman. Hegel writes: "The truth of the independent consciousness is accordingly the consciousness of the bondsman. Being consciousness repressed within itself, it (bondage -E.K.) will enter into itself, and change round into real and true independence" (ibid, 101). Let us apply it to the intellectual process one more time. The truth that manifests itself "beyond itself" at first, is obviously the truth of the mind knowledge, as it is not the truth of self-consciousness. But this truth of the mind brings us to the "bondage", i.e. gets pushed away. This is how it usually happens: if one learns by understanding something, then he "pushes it away" in order to get over subjectivity. Indeed, it is a necessary process. The axis of the consciousness is in the external object. The consciousness returned into itself gets over the bondage and considers the knowledge of mind again from the axis within itself. In the process of this new consideration, it makes up the image of the world for itself, forming its own system of knowledge. When one masters his own logic and its own competence and reaches the "free self-consciousness" (ibid, p. 107), they are already in the phase that refers to the field of the reason. Hegel believes that this is when "thinking" begins to work more than ever, and the object starts moving in concepts, not in images or ideas. These are, first of all, the "concepts for oneself"
and "my concepts". According to Vygotsky, this is the self-consciousness as "consciousness of consciousness" (or to be more precise, the thing - consciousness - consciousness). But we should not take self-consciousness as meta-consciousness, for it presents only one side of the problem. We need to understand that the concept is my concept; therefore, the "consciousness of consciousness" is also individual.
Therefore, one of the meanings of "free self-consciousness" by Hegel is the fact that the relations between subjectivity and objectivity (objectivity as avoidance of subjectivity) turns around, opening a new relation between them (from the objectivity of the mind to a deeper objectivity, for which we look into subjectivity).
(notes) An illustrated children's book "The Big Book of Philosophical Opposites" (2007 // 2011) written by French philosopher Oscar Brenifier, has been translated into many languages. It is a really popular and iconic book. One of its main features are the pictures used for argumentation instead of words. Of course, the book presents manifold philosophic concepts for children. Through communication it is possible to make a positive educational impact on a child. Its other feature is the clearness of presenting Hegel's philosophy. The books speaks of Integrity and Plurality, Finite and Infinite, Existence and External, Freedom and Necessity, Reason and Sense, Nature and Culture, Time and Eternity, I and Others, Body and Mind, Active and Passive, Objective and Subjective, Cause and Consequence. Each of the topics is consequently studied in the opposition and integrity.
The part of "objective and subjective" is quoted from this book.
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"When we are sad we claim the glass is half-empty; when we a happy we think it is half-full. We can measure the amount of water in the glass to say how much of water there is".
Together with that, when the scientists discovered that the Earth is round, that heavy objects still can fly, that diseases are caused by microbes, they were accused of spreading dangerous delusions or even of being crazy. When a musician or a poet expresses their feelings with music or poetry, the others feel that the subjective art expresses their own emotions, such as love, suffering, joy.
Therefore, to reach objectivity, sometimes it is required to leave all the subjective behind, and sometimes it takes to listen to it" (p. 72).
The example of the glass demonstrates the "cancellation of the subjective"; the example of the scientists, musicians and poets illustrates "listening to the subjective".
We can illustrate the example of the scientists with a modern event. For example, the discovery (creation) of one of the universal cells, or iPS-cell began with a (subjective) dream of Professor Yamanaka that a human can restore a cell just like a gecko can restore a cut finger. When the universal cell was found through cultivation of 4 cores in a cell of human skin, and when the existence of the cell was proved in multiple institutions all over the world, the Professor's dream became the objective truth. This is an exclusive example of the subjective, originated together with self-consciousness, providing reasonable knowledge of something new. Turning the subjective into the objective, penetration
into the "inner nature" of a thing are the base of the professor's discovery.
VI Connection with Spinoza's Pattern of Emotions Development
1
Before we look at how Spinoza's theory of emotions should be understood, we will simply write about "how Vygotsky read Spinoza".
(1) Vygotsky considers Spinoza's theory as an antithesis to the Cartesian theory. Critically analyzing Fischer's idea of continuity between Descartes and Spinoza, Vygotsky suggests that Spinoza, even in his early work "Short Treatise" examines the relation of ideas and emotions, which the Cartesian "organic theory of emotions" does not include, as if the "other side of the moon" (1933/1984, p.167). If we can consider one side of the history of philosophy as a wave of a thesis and an antithesis, then, as Hegel later put the antithesis to the Spinozist idea of substance turning this substance in the absolute idea, "so Spinoza in his time presented an antithesis in relation to Descartes, but a materialist antithesis" (1933/1984, p.170).
(2) Vygotsky grasps elements of the dialectic in Spinoza's theory, a vivid example of which is the idea of "free necessity" determined by the Spinozist definitions of God. The concepts of "freedom", "obligation" and «need» are defined as follows: "Such a thing is called free that exists only because of the necessity of its own nature and is determined to action by itself alone"; "Such a thing is called obliged that is determined to existence and action in accordance with the known and certain pattern" (Ethics, Part 1, Definition 7). Therefore, the freedom during the action appears out of its interior necessity. In this sense, "free necessity" is applicable only to God or nature as a whole.
This is the definition in the order of the substance, and in the order of the theory of knowledge, Spinoza wrote: "I believe freedom is not a free decision (decretum), but a free necessity (libera nécessitas) - (1999II, P.512, Letter 58). In the book about politics he also said: "... freedom ... does not eliminate the necessity of acting, but assumes it" (ibid, p.256, Politics, ch.2, p.11).
Moreover, Vygotsky found "dialectical negation" in the words of Spinoza: "Even as light displays both itself and darkness, so is truth a standard both of itself and of falsity" (Ethics, Part 2, Prop. 43, Note). For example, at the beginning of his work "The Problem of Development in Structural Psychology. Critical Study", Vygotsky wrote: "In this work we want to study the problem of development in structural psychology. The objective of this study is to separate true
from false in this theory.......We will build our
research on what is true in this theory, and use it to reveal false positions it contains, while truth, in accordance with the great thought of Spinoza, illuminates both itself and delusion" (1934/1982, p. 238). Specifically, truth here is the principle of "structure" itself and "delusion" is an undeveloped nature of this structure, which cannot get the qualitative difference between instinct and intellectual actions of an animal and a human. Vygotsky wrote: "If we follow this principle, we should acknowledge that since the whole structure, the whole system of the human consciousness is different from the structure of the animal consciousness, identification of any partial element of this or that structure (intellectual operations) is impossible, while the meaning of this element becomes clear only in the light of the whole of which it is a part" (ibid, p.268). Simply speaking, the truth of determining parts by the structure reveals the delusion of identifying some parts of different structures. This understanding of the Spinozist idea allows to get all the positive ideas from the past and current theories.
(3) Vygotsky wrote about Spinoza's theory of proportions and modern psychoneurology as follows: "Consideration of Spinoza's theory about passions in the light of modern psychoneurology in fact cannot be equally a revision of the current state of the issue regarding the nature of emotions in the light of Spinoza's theory about passions" (1933 / 1984, p.101). Herewith, neuropsychiatric theories that Vygotsky mainly takes into account are: the theory of James-Lange as an organic theory of emotions, which considers physical condition to cause emotions, and Cannon-Bard's theory, indicating a double control of emotions through the thalamus and the cerebral cortex.
What theory of psychoneurology do the Spinozist definitions of emotions refer to? First of all, in terms of psychoneurology the definition is as follows: "By emotion I mean the modifications of the body (corporis affectiones), whereby the active power of the said body is increased or diminished, aided or constrained, and also the ideas of such modifications" (Ethics, Part 3, Definition 3). This definition can be also interpreted from the standpoint of the organic theory of emotions. However, in his early book 'Educational Psychology", Vygotsky tried to reveal the essence of emotions on the basis of the theory of James-Lange. Nevertheless, in his late manuscript "The Theory of Emotions", containing the results of neuropsychiatric study, Vygotsky again discusses the definition given above in terms of the theory of Cannon-Bard. From the point of view that emotions are the state of the body, one can also consider these states both as the cause of the emotions and their effect. Considering Cannon's factual study, Vygotsky began to incline to the interpretation in terms of the theory of Cannon-Bard. Vygotsky believed that Cannon's early research had "the experimental evidence of the dynamogenous influence of emotions lifting the individual to a higher level of activity" (1933/1984, p.101-2). This
study illustrates similar bodily reactions in case of different emotions, the same bodily reactions in case of emotional and unemotional experience, such as pain, choking, etc. (See 1933/1984, Chapter 3). This is sharp criticism of the organic theory of emotions.
Moreover, the theory of emotions that Spinoza mentions in his "Short Treatise" and also in "Ethics", is the theory of emotions stemming from the ideas that there is a link between thinking and emotions. Since in terms of psychoneurology such links should involve the cerebral cortex, the organic theory of emotions (in fact, peripheral theory) loses its force in relation to this problem. Therefore, James is not convincing considering the essence of "delicate emotions",» although he vividly describes and displays "crude emotions". Ideas of Jackson and Kretschmer referring to the control of the lower functions through the higher functions (if the control is weakened due to any reason, the lower functions appear independently), supports the theory of Cannon-Bard. Therefore, it allows us to explain both "delicate" and "crude emotions" in terms of psychoneurology.
(4) Therefore, Spinoza's theory trying to grasp not only the connection between the body and emotions, but also the link between thinking and emotions, is holistically covered by the theory of Cannon-Bard in terms of psychoneurology. Nevertheless, Vygotsky was not satisfied by this theory, while not all Spinoza's ideas are outlined by such psychoneurology. If there is a development from the lower to the higher functions in the field of emotions, we have to explain the turn of the development from the link body-emotions to the link thought-emotions, and moreover, from the emotions that make "thinking move in a certain direction" ( 1935/1983, p.249), to the emotions that move thinking. Vygotsky finds revelation of this issue in Spinoza's ideas.
Such revolution is based on the fact that the knowledge of emotions changes them. Vygotsky
wrote: "Spinoza was right saying that getting to know our affect changes it, and turns from a passive to an active state. When I think of things that are beyond me, they did not change, but when I think of affects, when I put them in a different relationship to my intelligence and other levels, it makes many changes in my mental life" (1930/1982, p.125-6). If we consider an external thing many times, it will never change, even though we come closer to its essence. But considering emotions can change them because it allows to consider emotions in the new system with intelligence.
Nevertheless, here we discuss the positions of Spinoza that Vygotsky relies on. Probably, besides the already mentioned definition (Ethics, Part 3, Definition 3), he also takes into account the following Spinozist statements. That is to say, "as long as we do not worry about the affects contrary to our nature, until then we retain the ability to put the states of the body in order in accordance with the pattern of the mind (intellectus)" (Part 5, Prop. 10); "ideas of ideas of such modifications [of the body]" (Part 2, Prop. 22 Proof). Moreover, I suppose Vygotsky considers the following speech of Spinoza: "everyone has the power of clearly and distinctly understanding himself and his emotions, if not absolutely, at any rate in part" (Part 5, Prop. 4, Scholium); "one cannot invent any other remedy against affects that would be in our power, that would be better than their true understanding,
while......there is no other psychic ability but
the ability of thinking and generating adequate ideas» (ibid) . Here Spinoza considers the problem of self-consciousness, understanding of emotions as a part of this problem. Thus, what exists in the ideas of Spinoza, but is not present in the psychoneurological research, is the emergence of self-consciousness, which lifts "crude emotions" preserving human life to cultural "delicate emotions", moves lower
emotions to higher emotions, moving the link body-emotion to thought-emotion.
2
Moving from lower emotions to the highest emotions and the transformation of the link body-emotions to the link thought-emotions through self-consciousness (getting to know your emotions as a part of it) means the development of emotions, and especially the point of the turn. Thus, Vygotsky found the theory of emotions development in the theory of emotions of Spinoza.
When we consider Spinoza's theory of emotions from the point of view of development basing on Vygotsky's conclusions, we can determine five phases of emotions' development.
(1) The first phase is the emotion as "a modification of the body" (Ethics, Part 3, Definition 3). We consider it as the initial emotion within the range "conatus - appetite -desire", which is the state serving to "self-preservation" of the human. Spinoza wrote about it as follows.
This endeavour (for self-preservation -E.K.) when referred solely to the mind, is called will, when referred to the mind and body in conjunction it is called appetite (appetitus); it is, in fact, nothing else but man's essence, from the nature of which necessarily follow all those results which tend to its preservation; and which man has thus been determined to perform. Further, between appetite and desire (cupiditas) there is no difference, except that the term desire is generally applied to men, in so far as they are conscious of their appetite, and may accordingly be thus defined: desire is appetite with consciousness thereof (Ethics, Part 3, Prop. 9, Note).
As shown above, the definition of emotions as the state of the body can tolerate the theory of James-Lange. However, it seems to us that in the early period of his study Vygotsky approved the organic theory of emotions in the basis of Spinoza's definition of emotions, but later he reconsidered the idea and refused it (see the book "Teaching About Emotions", Ch. 9). Vygotsky also realized the ruin of the organic theory of emotions in terms psychoneurology because one concept of emotions as " the states of the body" cannot explain the development of emotions.
(2) The second phase is the emotion as "the idea of the modification of the body", which Spinoza wrote about in the definition 3 given above. In the words of Vygotsky, this emotion is "any affective impulse that puts it [thinking] in motion and under control". Taking into consideration the Spinozist definition of emotions, Vygotsky wrote as follows.
As our actions do not occur without a reason, and move in accordance with the known dynamic processes, needs and affective impulses, so our thinking is always motivated, always psychologically conditioned, always derived from some affective impulse, which puts it into motion and directs. Thinking that is dynamically unmotivated is as impossible as a groundless action. In this sense, even Spinoza determines the emotion capable of increasing or decreasing the ability of the body to act and makes thinking move in a certain direction (1935/1983, p. 249).
Vygotsky's phrase: "Spinoza defines the emotion anything that increases or decreases the ability of our body to act and makes thinking move in a certain direction", clearly takes into account the above definition 3 in Part 3 of the
book "Ethics". And the words: emotion "makes thinking move in a certain direction", seems to me, correspond to the Spinozist statement, "the idea of modifications of the body".
Here the above written words "in a particular direction" are important. As Spinoza stated that "modifications of the body, whereby the active power of the said body is increased or diminished, aided or constrained",i.e. the emotion "increases or decreases the ability of our mind to think, favours or restricts it" (Part 3 Prop.11), the directions in which the emotion moves the mind can be more than one. One direction is that the emotion breathes strength in thinking, and because of this thinking becomes deeper and more accurate. Nevertheless, the opposite direction is possible, when the emotion distracts thinking, and in this terms there is a delay of thinking. Spinoza considers the second direction as "bondage". Spinoza wrote in this regard: "Human infirmity in moderating and checking the emotions I name bondage: for, when a man is a prey to his emotions, he is not his own master, but lies at the mercy of fortune: so much so, that he is often compelled, while seeing that which is better for him, to follow that which is worse" (Part 4, Preface). It is here where the turn in the development of emotions is necessary for the further development of the man.
(3) We have already pointed at the content of this turn. Simply put, it is the formation of self-consciousness and learning of their emotions as a part of this formation, which is the third phase of development of emotions. According to the abstract expression, these are "ideas of ideas of modifications [of the body]" (Part 2, Prop. 22 Proof).
(4) Therefore, in the fourth phase emotions after the turn appear, i.e. emotions, which are moved by thinking. Vygotsky wrote as follows in this regard.
The basis of Spinoza's theory is the following. He was a determinist and, unlike the Stoics, argued that man has power over emotions, that the mind can change the order and connection of passions and bring them into conformity with the order and links given in the mind. Spinoza expressed the true genetic relationship. Human emotions in the course of ontogenetic development get into relation with general sets and in respect to self-consciousness of the person and in relation of consciousness of reality (1930/1982, c.125).
As stated above, this fourth phase is well characterized by the following words of Vygotsky, "man has the power over emotions"; "The mind can change the order and connection of passions and bring them into conformity with the order and links given in the mind". In the "Short Treatise", Spinoza typically shows this feature as emotions derived from thinking. Nevertheless, we should note that if we have learned only this phase or the fifth phase, we would have made an intellectual understanding of emotions. It seems that the first phase without connections to other phases allows the theory of emotions of James -Lange. But when we understand the transition of the link "body - emotions" to the link "thought -emotions" and the development of emotions as a whole, Spinoza's theory of emotions appears to reject the organic theory of emotions and also on intellectual understanding.
(5) From emotions driven by the intelligence at the fourth phase we get to the fifth phase which is defined in accordance with the following proposition by Spinoza: "From this third kind of knowledge arises the highest possible mental acquiescence" (Ethics, Part 5, Prop. 27). To prove this proposition Spinoza wrote: "The highest virtue of the mind is to know God or to understand things by the third kind of knowledge" (Ethics,
Part 5, Prop. 27 Proof). Here we are talking about what God is for Spinoza, and what is the third kind of knowledge.
My interpretation of the first question is that God is a "free necessity" for Spinoza considering the substance as "god or nature". It is not a forced and fatal necessity, but also the necessity that liberates man.
Well, what is the third kind of knowledge? Spinoza identified the first kind of knowledge as "opinion" that is "knowledge through chaotic experience" and as "imagining" things when we remember a thing as a sign or a word, and through this memory we form a certain idea. He considers the second kind of knowledge as "reason (ratio)", that is, "common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things". Furthermore, he defines the third kind of knowledge as "intuitive knowledge". Specifically, he wrote: "This kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of the absolute essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things" (Part 2, Prop. 40, Note). At the same time, he wrote: "in proportion as we understand things more in this way, we better understand God" (Chapter 5, Prop. 25 Proof). The fact that in some attribute of God, for example, in the prospect of necessity, we get to know things, that through this the necessity itself becomes more precise and richer - it may be a feature of the third kind of knowledge.
Thus, we come to the final question: what do the following Spinoza's words mean: "higher emotional satisfaction, which can only be" or "the highest virtue of the mind"? I think they mean the freedom of man.
Returning to Spinoza's early work "Short Treatise", we can find the phrase: "the true freedom of man, which emerges from the fourth kind of knowledge" (1999I, p.8). This "fourth kind of knowledge" corresponds to the "third kind of knowledge" in the "Ethics", and this
way of learning preserves connection with God. Spinoza in his work "Short Treatise" identified the freedom of man as follows.
It [human freedom] is a strong existence that our mind gets due to the direct connection with God, so as to cause the ideas inside itself and actions outside itself consistent with its nature; and the actions should not be subject to any external causes, which could change or convert them (1999I, p.164).
Once again, let us emphasize that God in Spinoza's works is a free necessity, which speaking of "cognitive love of the mind for God" (Ethics, Part 5, Prop. 36), is no love without an attribute and not religious love; Spinoza considers this love as the third kind of knowledge. Thus, the freedom of man is "the highest emotional satisfaction" or "the highest virtue of the mind".
Herewith, we can learn the meaning of freedom contained in the words of Vygotsky, cited earlier in this article: "The emotion's concept is an active state; it is freedom", "Freedom: emotion in concept", "the great picture of personality development: the way to freedom". These words are understood immediately in the fifth phase of emotions. Nevertheless, we can understand that the phrase "ability to clearly and distinctly know themselves and their emotions (Chapter 5, Prop. 4, Note) it means the way to freedom in the development of personality, because Spinoza considers the "human infirmity in moderating and checking the emotions" as "bondage". Here we find the problem of identity in terms of emotions. And it coincides with Hegel's "free self-consciousness", defined in terms of intelligence.
Of course, intelligence and emotions have no direct logical parallelism. Because each of them has its own peculiarity in relation to development. The higher and the lower functions in the human
intelligence are related to the capture of the second by the first. However, as Vygotsky points out, the appearance of schizophrenia or aphasia gives autonomy to the lower functions dependent on the higher functions before the emergence of the disease. And then there are disintegration of conceptual thinking, secondary manifestation of complex thinking, variance of meaningful perception. But the higher and the lower layers of human emotions are not the same in the case with intelligence. The lower layers are easily shown without the disease, when there is some kind of an unusual situation: unknown condition, high alcohol intake, sudden life crisis, etc. That is, the phases of emotions do not form such a strict dependence as in case with the development of intelligence and alternately come to the first stage as if simultaneously detected. Cannon-Bard's theory shows these neurological reasons, and according to this theory, the lower layers relate to the self-preservation of life. This is a peculiar feature of these five phases unlike the phases of the intellectual development.
Conclusion: Self-Consciousness as a Salutation to the Second Birth of Man
The philosophical foundations of Vygotsky's theory are based on the mental development scheme by Hegel and the emotional development scheme by Spinoza. Given the above, we can see that these cross in the consciousness. If we briefly speak about the value of self-consciousness, which provides the two schemes and their intersection, self-consciousness is a salutation to the "second birth of man", of which Rousseau said as a poet with the power of intuition.
At the same time, it allows us to evaluate the modern psychological theories. For example, based on the theory of self-consciousness, how should we evaluate Piaget? He put the concept of "self" in the study of cognitive development
through the concept of "cognitive egocentrism" and "decentralization". If we call the argument based solely on one's own experiment cognitive egocentrism, if you call its collapse decentralization, these concepts by Piaget explain cognitive development up to12 years well. However, when considering the emotions only as the energy for learning, Piaget does not exceed the parallelism between the intellect and the emotions, the "bondage" of uncontrollable emotions, which Spinoza pointed at, is out of his viewpoint. Nevertheless, the main boundary in the theory of intellectual development Piaget is that he does not have a theory of self-consciousness, and so he cannot move from the mind to the reason, if we use the concepts of Hegel. Decentralization deprives subjectivity of the learning process. But immediately after the completion of decentralization, the "self" begins to form at the new stage - self-consciousness (according to Vygotsky, the crisis of 13 years takes place). The fact that one of those new formations is the subjective in a new form, which will lead us to the higher objective. In Piaget's theory there is no dynamics of decentralization and self-consciousness after the dynamics of cognitive centralization and decentralization in the ontogenetic development. In other words,
there is no dynamic motion between mind and reason, between the subjective and the objective. Thus, Piaget could not provide the second birth of man in his theory. This is an essential limit to the theory of Piaget.
However, Vygotsky's theory was also unfinished. In the 30s he passionately expanded the field of his studies. I think in the 30s Vygotsky developed his theory in three ways. That is, he not only developed (1) the theory of development through speech as mediation, but also (2) the theory of personality development (specifically speaking, age psychology, specific psychology and psychology of the drama of an individual), and (3) the theory of emotions development rooted in the unity of body and spirit, and psychological systems. However, since his life was not long, he could not write the axis connecting these paths. One of our goals in respect of such theory by Vygotsky is the exact description and understanding of the integrity of his theory. This is a very hard work, but given the above, we come to a certain conclusion that without relying on the "Phenomenology of Spirit" by Hegel and "Ethics" by Spinoza we cannot fully understand Vygotsky, his ideas about self-consciousness and conceptual thinking.
References
1. Hegel, G.F. (1807 // 2002), Phenomenology of Spirit // Translated by G. Shpet, Saint Petersburg, Nauka.
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Проблема самосознания и понятийного мышления в теории Выготского: в духе «Феноменологии духа» Гегеля и «Этики» Спинозы
Эйдзи Камия
Университет Киото-тачибана 34 Yamada-cho Oyake, Yamashina-ku, Kyoto 607-8175, Japan
В статье раскрывается, как философии Гегеля и Спинозы связаны с самой глубиной теории Л.С. Выготского (1896-1934), которая продолжает жить как одна из современных психологических теорий. Наша мотивация такого изучения заключается в том, чтобы обогатить теорию Выготского, находящуюся незаконченной из-за краткости его жизни. Иными словами, из философии Гегеля Выготский принял не только диалектический способ мышления, но идею самосознания как осознание понятия и произвольное мышление. В теории Спинозы же он рассмотрел психофизическую проблему об эмоциях и одновременно связи «эмоций - понятии - свободы», суть которых заключает в себе «познание о себе и о своих аффектах», или самосознание. Таким образом, исходя из идей Выготского, мы находим, что два крупных философа подлинно пересекаются в идее самосознания. Это начало в таком пути обогащения теории Выготского, которое идет не только от рождения сознания к самосознанию как второму рождению человека, но и обратно - от второго к первому рождению сознания.
Ключевые слова: самосознание, понятие, эмоции, развитие, диалектика. Научная специальность: 09.00.00 - философские науки.
