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ETHNIC RELATIONS IN DAGHESTAN: SPECIAL FEATURES AND CURRENT PROBLEMS
Asiat BUTTAEVA
Ph.D. (Philos.), Assistant Professor at Daghestan State Institute of National Economy (Makhachkala, the Russian Federation)
Introduction
In recent years, problems relating to the state and development dynamics of ethnic relations, which have an effect on the sociopolitical and moral-psychological atmosphere in Russia, are becoming an increasingly frequent target of study. Resolving sociopolitical problems is particularly important in the context of the current instability in the Northern Caucasus.
For more than one decade now, ethnic relations have been playing an important role in the fate of the peoples living in the polycultural expanse of the Northern Caucasus. If historical development is viewed through the growing internal diversity of the social relations system as a whole, it can be seen that ethnic development and ethnic differentiation have always been the primary vector for determining the nature and direction of this development.1
1 See: S.G. Larchenko, Sotsialno-etnicheskie prot-
sessy v sistemnoi organizatsii i razvitii obshchestva, Au-
Many thinkers and politicians have tried to penetrate to the core of ethnic relations in search of optimal forms and ways to build them. Scientific discussions have been held on important problems relating to a substantive understanding of the culture of interrelations among the ethnicities (peoples) of Russia. Russian researchers continue to discuss issues relating to ethnic relations today; resolving them is extremely important for understanding Russia's future civilization-al development.
The interest of Russian intellectuals and politicians in ethnic relations in Russia (as well as in the North Caucasian republics) rose dramatically after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Westernizing reforms of the Yeltsin period. When the Soviet Union fell apart, the Northern Caucasus turned into a zone of conflict and in-
thor's dissertation for a Doctor's Degree in Philosophical Science, Novosibirsk, 2001, p. 22.
stability, which was largely related to the struggle of the region's peoples for independence. As we know, the Russian-Chechen conflict, which destabilized the entire Caucasus, was the acutest.
The corrupt way in which state property was divvied up caused further degradation and inefficiency of the Russian economy and also hampered the development of competition and the market economy, which led to flagrant social inequality. The political sphere was taken over by functionaries from the old system, bureaucrats, oligarchs, and downright criminals, who, despite the struggle among these different groups for power, were closely interrelated.2
This development of events led to ethnic problems that affected the essential matters of statehood and federalism, as well as the social self-awareness of Russian citizens, going beyond the interests of specialists and becoming part of the public consciousness.
Russian researchers who analyze ethnic and national relations within the framework of different approaches think that the civilizational sources
2 See: V. Puchachev, "Rossiyskoe gosudarstvo: popytka politologicheskogo audita," Vlast, No. 12, 1997, pp. 9-15; "Ekonomicheskie i sotsialnye peremeny: monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniia," Informatsionnyy biulleten, No. 4, 1997, p. 11.
of their national traditions provide serious grounds for marking out paths of development oriented toward the priority of spiritual, primarily religious, values. According to some researchers, in Russia "value references ... have always predominated over objective, which is why Western rationality is absent ... collectivity, including ethnicity (and not the Western national-state approach), is fundamental here, with unconditional predominance of world outlook over scientific-technological approaches."3
Russia is a country in the territory of which people from more than 150 ethnic and national minorities live, whereby, from the perspective of international law, their status is not questioned. At the same time, these different ethnic groups have been unable to restore their diversified forms of autonomy (national-territorial and national-cultural) and not all of them have equal opportunities for preserving and developing their languages, traditions, and cultures. The ambiguity of corresponding forms of state support and the absence of legislative acts ensuring the rights and interests of ethnonational minorities are having an indirect influence on the state of ethnic relations.
3 See: V.G. Fedotova, Khoroshee obshchestvo, Moscow, 2005, pp. 492-493.
The Northern Caucasus
Attempts to reveal the special features of the relations among the North Caucasian ethnicities go back into the distant past when there was mistrust and even blood feuds among them. Nor should we forget the mass repressions and deportation of entire North Caucasian peoples, which have become their genetic (and in part historical) memory. This has led to the formation of a certain ethnic archetype (or mistrust complex), one of the frequent manifestations of which is hostility toward the central government and its national policy.
Such manifestations of the ethnic mentality of the North Caucasian peoples are in no way entrenched stereotypes. However, it would not be right to wipe away the memory of unfair repressions, particularly since contradictory repercussions of these events are still being manifested in ethnic relations in the North Caucasian republics. Moreover, questions related to the specific ways this particular feature of ethnic mentality is influencing the entire range of social and political events in the region remain open.
The North Caucasian peoples, who have age-old ties with Russia, have maintained trade, cultural, and political relations with it for many centuries. When considering the relations between the Russian
and North Caucasian ethnicities, we need to keep in mind that paganism, Zoroastrianism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam peacefully coexisted for quite a long time in the Northern Caucasus and laid the foundation of the world outlook of the peoples living there.
The North Caucasian region has never been a mere sum of the ethnic groups populating it; it is a single historical-sociocultural community of peoples. The Northern Caucasus, which comprises seven ethno-titular republics (Adigey, Daghestan, Ingushetia, Chechnia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, and North Ossetia), two territories (Krasnodar and Stavropol), and one region (Rostov), is remarkable not only in the diversity of its peoples, cultures, and confessions, but also in the multitude of its latent and manifest hotbeds of ethnic conflict.
The social upheavals that have been going on in the Northern Caucasus over the past few years (the two Chechen wars and the armed incidents in Karachaevo-Cherkessia, Ingushetia, and Daghestan) have led to an abrupt rise in the number of refugees and aroused a wide response throughout Russia. Furthermore, such sociopolitical phenomena as terrorism and extremism are hiking up the overall tension in the country.
It is also worth noting that at the beginning of the 1990s, the striving for ethnonational revival and restoration of historical justice with respect to the peoples repressed and deported for ethnic reasons led to destabilization of the situation in the region. The new disruption of the situation that occurred at the end of the 1990s was instigated by the fact the specific economic and sociocultural interests of the ethnonational communities were ignored in many of the Russian regions.
Ethnic conflicts in the North Caucasian republics are mainly caused by the following: concentration of power in the hands of representatives of specific ethnicities; conflicts between the titular peoples and representatives of other peoples living in the territory; distancing of one national or ethnic group from the others; giving priority to one's own national values in detriment to the values of other ethnicities; problems relating to declaration of the language of one particular national or ethnic group as the state language; and infringing by one (titular) national group of the rights and sense of national dignity of other groups. There can be no doubt that overcoming all of the above-listed factors is an extremely complicated task that requires the most careful approach, scrupulous analysis of the smallest details, and a synthesized solution.
The numerous reasons for the emergence of conflict situations in the Northern Caucasus require that this problem be tackled by carrying out a conflict-study analysis of the tension; conducting a thorough examination of the factors characterizing the nature and specifics of ethnic conflicts in contemporary Russia as a whole, keeping in mind their historical, specific-evidential, and event-related characteristics; revealing the parameters and characteristic specifics of ethnic conflicts, their typology and particular features of development; and drawing up conflict management and deterrence techniques, which is probably the most important of all the above-listed items.
The existing problems must be resolved judiciously, keeping in mind not only the internal nature of the social conflicts, but also of all the factors, including geopolitical.
Each ethnic conflict, which has an essential and situational side, is based on objective reasons and incidental, subjective components. In other words, the nature of ethnic conflict is qualified as a complicated, contradictory amalgamation of essential (necessary, objective) and situational (incidental, subjective) components.
Ethnic relations in the Northern Caucasus must be evaluated proceeding from the fact that the Northern Caucasus is increasingly becoming a target of the geopolitical aspirations of different countries. The geopolitical situation in the Caucasus is in a state of flux; hotbeds of armed conflicts and military-political tension continue to exist there. The Armenian-Azerbaijani, Ossetian-Ingushetian, Georgian-Abkhazian, and Georgian-South Ossetian conflicts must be settled in order to strengthen the region's geopolitical integrity. Their unsettled state is having a serious impact on the socioeconomic situation in the Caucasus, the rates of the migration process, and the political situation as a whole.
It stands to reason that ethnic relations in the Northern Caucasus are determined by the general principles for regulating the development of Russian society. In addition, the specificity of the laws governing the development of ethnic relations presumes the application of slightly different, generally available principles of regulation. Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that ethnic relations are an extremely complicated sphere requiring a systems approach that does not tolerate strict boundaries.
The sociocultural expanse of Russia and the North Caucasian region is unique in that it brings together such cultural traditions as the particular ethnic, the Russian-Soviet, and the Western paradigms. Moreover, the cultural traditions of the East are coming increasingly to the forefront, which is expressed in particular in the growing ideological influence of Islam manifested at times in some of the regional constituents in the form of religious and political radicalism and extremism.
Establishing harmonious ethnic relations based on consent and constructive interaction among the ethnic and national groups residing in such a diverse sociocultural expanse as the Northern Caucasus is an urgent task for the whole of Russian society.
Ethnic Russians comprise 82% of the Russian Federation's population; the other 18% is represented by more than 150 ethnonational communities. Achieving social harmony in ethnic relations is impossible without establishing real equality among the peoples regardless of their numerical size, confession, race, and cultural and civilizational characteristics.
According to M. Aliev, "imposing the form of state structure on one ethnicity by mechanically borrowing it from another that is at a different level of alternative development, has a different culture, religion, moral values, and national self-awareness, destroys this form's harmony with the ethnicity's everyday life."4
Despite the fact that the cultural codes of the Russian ethnicities differ greatly from each other, the everyday life of the different nationalities of the Russian Federation is determined by an all-Russia identity and constitutional regulations aimed at achieving political and spiritual-cultural unity and, in the long view, sociocultural communality of the country's population.
The 1993 Russian Federation Constitution recognizes the rights of numerically small peoples, including their "right to preserve their native language." Art 26 enforces free choice of language of communication, upbringing, education, and creativity; and Art 29 prohibits propaganda of social, racial, national, or linguistic precedence. The Federal Law on Combating Extremism adopted in 2002 is also worth mentioning in this respect.
However, the national-cultural autonomies (NCA) that act in compliance with the Law on National-Cultural Autonomy adopted in 1996 are the most graphic sign of a multicultural policy. The NCA were established in order to promote voluntary self-organization of ethnic groups aimed at preserving their uniqueness and enhancing their language, education, and national culture.
In the long run, a historically verified policy of ethnic and cultural tolerance will be the most acceptable alternative for Russia.
As the historical experience of ethnocultural and national development of the North Caucasian region shows, cultural pluralism of the population does not lead to social and political disintegration of society. The local ethnic and intercultural tolerance ethnic communities have managed to preserve by maintaining a certain amount of ethnocultural and territorial detachment has been an important prerequisite of social stability. "The new paradigm of ethnic policy presumes creating conditions for the full-fledged coexistence of peoples with different mentalities and belonging to different confessions but united by the common goal of preserving Russia as a single state with strong economic and spiritual potential," claims V. Zorin.5
4 See: M.G. Aliev, Soglasie. Sotsialno-filosofsky analiz, Moscow, 2001, p. 237.
5 V. Zorin, "Rossiysky islam: problemy i puti ikh resheniia," in: Islam na poroge tretego tysiacheletiia, Materials from a scientific conference and 2nd regional seminar "Rukhi miras"—Dukhovnoe nasledie, Medina, Nizhny Novgorod, 2002, pp. 5-6.
Daghestan
Among all the North Caucasian republics, Daghestan, which is situated at the crossroads of cultures, religions, and civilizations, has always occupied and continues to occupy an important strategic place on the border between the East and the West, the North and the South, Christianity and Islam. On the strength of its geographic location, natural resources, and specifics of internal development within the Russian Federation, Daghestan is increasingly becoming a magnet for the regional interests of the world powers and centers of geopolitical coalitions.
Zagir Arukhov, a well-known Daghestani researcher and former minister for national policy, information, and foreign relations of the Republic of Daghestan, has also turned repeatedly to this topic, writing in particular: "Historically, the republic's territory has always been in the center of geopolitical collisions instigated by the interests of adjacent regions and states. In this sense, Daghestan is a kind of Caucasian heartland, center, middle of the earth of the Caucasian region."6
The representatives of 102 nationalities reside and around 60 languages are spoken in Dagh-estan's polycultural space, whereby the structure of the specific characteristics of each nationality is unique. Religion acts as the common, unifying element and is one of the determining factors of sociopolitical and cultural life. However, in everyday life, many mountain dwellers adhere to the adat regulations (common law) inherent in their ethnoculture. More than 90% of Daghestan's population traditionally confesses Islam, while the other 10% follows Christianity and Judaism.
Religion has had an influence on the formation of ethnic relations and on the ethnocultural development of Daghestan's various nationalities for many centuries. Hegel wrote that "all the various peoples feel that it is in the religious consciousness they possess truth, and they have always regarded religion as constituting their true dignity and the Sabbath of their life."7
Daghestan, as a particular geohistorical phenomenon, is a unique example of loyal interaction among more than 30 indigenous ethnicities. It is one of the few places in the world where all the peoples living there coexist peacefully and have equal rights.
Local historiographers, from M. Rafi (14th century) to G. Alkadari (19th century), not only fail to mention ethnic conflicts, but also totally ignore the role of the national factor in the endless wars of the mountain peoples for independence and other historically important events in foreign and domestic political life.
Given the chronic shortage of land, multitude of ethnic formations, and belligerency of the mountain dwellers, it seems that ethnic conflicts would not only be inevitable, but also lamentably routine. In reality, however, there is ethnic tolerance; not one ethnicity of Daghestan has waged war against another. Not only philosophers and culture experts, but also many well-known figures of Russia have repeatedly spoken and written about this.
As for the national policy of post-Soviet Daghestan, it has been studied piecemeal and largely from the viewpoint of historical science and ethnology. So it appears expedient to analyze national policy in the context of ensuring ethnic consent in the country.
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the problems of ethnic policy and ethnic consent in Daghestan, which presumes the formation of new views on the history of the lowland communities that appeared during the time of Stalin's deportation of the Chechens. Moreover, issues relating to territorial division are becoming increasingly acute.
6 See: Z. Arukhov, "Geopolitichesky potentsial Daghestana i kliuchevye napravleniia ego realizatsii," in: Entopo-liticheskie issledovaniia na Severnom Kavkaze: sostoianie, problemy, perspektivy, Makhachkala, 2005, p. 17.
7 G.W.F. Hegel, Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, available at [http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/ hegel/works/re/introduction.htm].
At the beginning of the 1990s, passions flared up in earnest over problems relating to the rehabilitation of the repressed Chechen-Akkins, the deportation of some communities, the accommodation of refugees from the town of Novyy Uzen in the Guriev Region of the Kazakh S.S.R., and matters relating to the socioeconomic and cultural status of lowland residents who found themselves in the minority in their native land.
Owing to the introduction of restrictions on the movement of people and transport at the Russian-Azerbaijani border, the problem of disunited peoples (Lezghians, Avars, Rutuls, Tsakhurs, and Azeris) became particularly acute. Matters relating to the unification and resolution of the socioeconomic and cultural problems of the disunited Nogay ethnicity became extremely urgent. Moreover, the Russian-speaking population began leaving the republic in earnest.
Nevertheless, problems relating to the repressions against the Chechen-Akkins and the deportation of some Daghestani communities should be considered the main reason for the increasing escalation of ethnic tension.
The Novolakskoe Problem
Let us turn to history. We know that after the compulsory deportation of Chechens and Ingush from the territory of the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R to Central Asia and Kazakhstan between 23 February and 9 March, 1944 (Operation Chechevitsa), many residents of mountainous Daghestan were forcibly settled in the freed up land. On 31 January, 1944, the Soviet State Defense Committee adopted Resolution No. 5073 on Abolishment of the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R. and Deportation of its population to Central Asia and Kazakhstan. After abolishment of the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R., four of its districts were transferred to the Daghestan A.S.S.R. and one to the North Ossetian A.S.S.R., while the Grozny Region was established in the rest of the territory. One of the government's aims was to preserve agriculture in these territories.
People were moved both to the lowland regions of Daghestan, where Chechens lived before they were deported, and to the territory of present-day Chechnia (primarily to those districts that were transferred to Daghestan during abolishment of the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R. in 1944). In terms of its drama, this resettlement can be compared with deportation of the Chechens itself, particularly if we keep in mind that the mountain dwellers found themselves in climatic conditions that were absolutely alien to them. To prevent the deportees from moving back to their native land, their homes were burned down or blown up. According to the data presented by M.-R.A. Ibrahimov, between March and August 1944, approximately one fifth of the entire population of mountainous Daghestan at that time (16,100 families from 21 mountainous districts) were moved to new places of residence; 144 population settlements were moved in full to new locations, and 110 partially. According to the archive data, the number of deported residents amounted to around 62,000 people. Avars and the ethnic groups related to them, as well as Darghins, Laks, and Kumyks, were forced to move.8
The second act of this drama began in 1957 when Nikita Khrushchev rehabilitated the peoples repressed during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, including the Chechens. The exiled Chechen-Akkins began to return to Daghestan, which led to the problem of their accommodation.
The rural residents dealt with this problem in different ways. Some Daghestanis moved to other population settlements of the restored Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R., primarily in the north of the
8 See: M.-R.A. Ibrahimov, "Deportatsii naseleniia Daghestana v 1941-1944 godakh," in: Iu. Aliev, A. Hajiev, Bespa-miatstvo smerti podobno, Makhachkala, 2010, pp. 5-21.
republic. For example, in 1957, some migrants from the Tsumada and Tsunta districts of Daghestan ended up at the Borozdinovskaia stanitsa of the Shelkovskoy district, which had been incorporated the same year into the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R. The Chechens were essentially unable to return to some of the places where Daghestanis had been deported in 1944; in 1957, the national composition of such territories did not change. The same thing happened with the Novolakskoe (previously Aukh) district of Daghestan, where Laks forced to migrate from more than 30 mountain villages lived from 1944.
And, finally, some Daghestanis returned to Daghestan from Chechnia, although they settled not only in the mountains, but also in the plains. The authorities of the Daghestani A.S.S.R. also made a decision to leave the Avars and Laks in the Akkin territory they occupied. The Akkins themselves were to settle in the Khasaviurt district right next to their former place of residence.
According to M. and Zh. Kurbanov, between June and 1 November, 1957, 11,884 families were moved from Chechnia to Daghestan; 7,502 of them to the plains, and 4,382 to the mountains. The other 1,908 families were resettled at the end of 1957-beginning of 1958. Those who were sent to the mountains went almost exclusively to their native districts. Migration to the plains mainly took place in two directions: to the Daghestani-Chechen border area and primarily to the Khasaviurt district (as of 1 November, 1957, 3,883 families of the 4,006 planned had been moved there), and to the coastal territories between Makhachkala and Derbent, mainly to the Kaiakent district (as of 1 November, 1957, 1,109 families had been sent to this district, which corresponded precisely to the figure given in the resettlement plan).
In some cases, the people who came from Chechnia were sent to live in villages where Kumyks and Nogays resided. This is what happened, for example, with the Darghins in Kostek (the Khasaviurt district) and Babaiurt (the Babaiurt district).9 However, it should be noted that more often than not new villages were established.
The third act of the drama related to the problem of restoring the Aukh district and resettlement (for the second time) of the Laks of the Novolakskoe district in other areas. Before the beginning of the 1980s, the Akkins were happy with the decision of the authorities of the Daghestani A.S.S.R. (according to which Avars and Laks continued living in the Akkin territories they occupied, while the Akkins themselves took up residence in the Khasaviurt district), but later they began exerting greater effort to return to their native land; systematic picketing of government buildings began, and in 1991 the Laks living in the Novolakskoe district were also the targets of direct violence. In response to the Chechens' actions, the Lak national movement emerged, aimed at consolidating the protest against the republic's authorities who had closed their eyes to the bloody drama in the Novolakskoe district.
On 12 May, 1991, the 3rd Congress of People's Deputies of Daghestan was convened, at which the question On Practical Measures for Executing the R.S.F.S.R. Law on Rehabilitation of the Repressed Peoples was raised. A decision was made to restore the Aukh district (but without the lands transferred in 1944 to the Kazbek district) and resettle the Laks of the Novolakskoe district in the areas to the north of Makhachkala and form a new Novolakskoe district there. For this purpose, a resolution On Allotting Land for the Newly Formed Novolakskoe District was adopted.
This gave rise to new tension associated with accommodation of the Novolakskoe population. In the difficult economic circumstances that existed in those years, moving to an undeveloped area was a highly risky affair. People did not want to leave their habitual places of residence; many did not like the new, not particularly fertile lands. The Daghestani authorities began to build a few settlements in the Novolakskoe, Kazbek, and Kumtorkalinsky districts of the republic; owing to the escalating
9 See: M.R. Kurbanov, Zh.M. Kurbanov, Narody Daghestana: istoriia deportatsii i repressy, Lotos, Makhachkala, 2009, pp. 234-235.
violence, the Laks agreed to take 8,500 hectares of salt marsh (this amount of land was three times smaller than the black soil area they previously occupied in the Novolakskoe district).10
From that time on, the Laks who resettled in the places of former residence of the Chechen-Aukhs were considered temporary residents, while the Chechen-Aukhs themselves were supposed to return to their historical homeland. Later there were plans to restore the Aukh district of Daghestan and settle the indigenous population there.
The difficult situation in the Novolakskoe, Kazbek, and Khasaviurt districts was caused by the change in regime and aggravated by ethnic clashes that became particularly bloody after the beginning of the first Chechen campaign in 1994, when the Chechen-Aukhs had no trouble acquiring weapons, since they practically lay around underfoot.
There was also acute enmity among nationalities at the mundane level. Every few months, clashes occurred among adolescents that escalated into mass fights on the borders of areas where Laks, Avars, and Chechens lived; there is a long list of people killed in these clashes.
The Daghestani authorities were extremely concerned about the situation created; the Novolak-skoe problem was repeatedly discussed at the highest level.
On 23 December, 2010, President of Daghestan Magomedali Magomedov met in Moscow with Russian Minister of Economic Development Elvira Nabiullina. During this meeting, the question of moving the Lak population of the Novolakskoe district to a new place of residence was also discussed.
During a meeting between Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and President of Daghestan Magomedali Magomedov held on 26 March, 2010 in Sochi, there was talk about allotting Daghestan additional financial aid intended in particular for funding the resettlement program of the Lak population of the Novolakskoe district.11
Other Ethnic Problems
Problems similar to the one that arose in the Novolakskoe district are also arising with respect to other nationalities. For example, the moods among the Kumyk population of the Khasaviurt district have become much more radical. The Chechens and Avars who moved there in recent decades were successful in commerce, grabbed key posts in state management bodies, and so occupied the most advantageous positions in the social structure, ensuring them material wealth and privileges. This did not leave much room for the Kumyk elite, and the fight over spheres of influence has intensified among individual national groups.
The land issue has also aggravated the contradictions between the Kumyks and Laks. The situation could lead to clashes capable of escalating into a civil war with the participation not only of Laks and Kumyks, but also of Avars, Chechens, and other national communities of Daghestan.
The reason for the Kumyk-Lak conflict can be divided into two parts: restoration of the Kum-torkalinsky district and recreation of the Novolakskoe district in new territory. Downsizing of the Makhachkala Urban District led to establishment of the Makhachkala Rural District, which was subsequently renamed the Kumtorkalinsky district. The Kumyks however were in favor of restoring the Kumtorkalinsky district within the 1935 borders. In turn, in order to implement the decisions of the
10 See: V. Trofimov-Trofimov (coordinator of the International Movement to Protect National Rights), "Laktsy i problemy pereseleniia," available at [http://www.gumilev-center.ru/?p=553].
11 See: T. Isaev, "V Daghestane programmu pereseleniia laktsev budet kurirovat novyy rukovoditel," available at [http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/179786/].
3rd Congress of People's Deputies of Daghestan of 23 July, 1991 On Formation of the Novolakskoe District, the Daghestani authorities were in favor of transferring this land to be used for population settlements in the newly created district.
Talks, for which both conflicting sides saw the need, saved the situation. The elders ofbothjamaats and members of the government participated in the negotiations.
At the beginning of the 1990s, a new breeding ground of tension, also related to the land issue, emerged in the Daghestani village of Kostek (the population of Stary (Old) Kostek comprises of Kumyks, while forced Darghin migrants live in Novy (New) Kostek) of the Khasaviurt district. In order to understand the reason for this far-from-easy conflict, we must turn to history once more.
In the spring of 1957, the Darghins who were deported during the war from the Levashi district to Chechen-Ingushetia were taken on the authorities' orders to Kostek. The Kumyks not only welcomed the Darghins, they helped them in every way they could to set up house.
The Darghins mainly engaged in free-range sheep breeding in the winter pastures, but in the 1960s, all the livestock was transferred to the farmsteads of the Kurakh district. Elimination of the enterprise the Darghins had engaged in from time immemorial meant they had to make their living doing seasonal work.
The conflict between the Darghins and the Kumyks arose when divvying up land plots. Despite the fact that the Kumyks owned the land, the Darghins thought their interests were being impinged on; the conflicting sides even opened fire on each other. The authorities had a hard time quelling the ethnic clashes; negotiations began, which put a halt to further escalation of the conflict.
The problem of the Nogay people12 was also related to rehabilitation of the Chechens and Ingush and to restoration of the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R. Decree No. 721/4 of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the R.S.F.S.R. of 9 January, 1957 made the Nogay, Kizliar, and Tarumovka districts parts of Daghestan, while the Shelkovskoy district became part of restored Chechen-Ingushetia and the Neftekumsk district part of the Stravropol Territory; this destroyed the integrity of the No-gays' ethnic territory. Sociopolitical discontent arose among the Nogays of the region, and in 1989, the Birlik (Unity) national movement was created. The activists of this movement repeatedly asked the authorities of the Stavropol Territory and Daghestan to raise the status of the Nogay territories to that of a national district.
Another problem is related to the consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Peoples who once lived in a unified ethnopolitical space found themselves divided by state borders; to one extent or another, the matter concerns the Rutuls, Tsakhurs, Avars, Lezghians, and Azeris.
Conclusion
The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the acute socioeconomic and political crisis that followed drastically aggravated the ethnic contradictions hidden deep in the bowels of Daghestani society related to the mistakes and blunders made in the past when resolving ethnic problems.
12 The Nogays are one of the Turkic-speaking peoples of the Northern Caucasus. There are a total of 90,000 of them in Russia and the CIS countries. The Nogays mainly live in the Nogay steppes; now it is divided by administrative-territorial borders among Daghestan, Chechnia, and the Stavropol Territory. There are 34,400 Nogays, or 37% of the entire Nogay population, living in Daghestan. The rural population of Nogays amounts to around 87% of all Nogays, who reside in four districts: the Nogay (82% of the district's population), Babaiurt (16%), Tarumovka (8%), and Kizliar (7.8%) (see: R.A. Ageeva, Kakogo my rodu-plemeni? Narody Rossii: imena i sudby, Reference Dictionary, Academia, Moscow, 2000, p. 9).
It is obvious that Daghestan continues to have problems and contradictions today that are raising social tension and aggravating ethnic relations, which are complicated anyway. A generalized and classified list of these problems looks as follows:
■ Problems of the state and legal status of peoples (the question of self-determination).
■ Ethnoterritorial problems relating to realization of the rights and interests of the repressed, deported, resettled, and disunited peoples.
■ Problems of national-territorial structure and changes in the status of territories.
■ Problems relating to the economic use of the plains and other territories that led to a change in ethnic composition, as well as infringement of the economic and political interests of the compactly residing population.
■ Problems relating to the linguistic and cultural development of the peoples.
■ Problems relating to preserving the habitat and economic activity of unique ethnicities.
■ Problems of socioeconomic inequality of regions and territories.
■ Problems relating to protecting the rights and interests of the Russian-speaking population.
■ Problems of uncontrolled migration and infringement of the rights of ethnic Caucasians in the Russian regions and the exodus of the Russian-speaking population from the North Caucasian republics.
■ Problems relating to the political status of the peoples and representation of the nationalities in governing bodies at the regional and federal levels.
■ Problems created by past and present blunders and errors in conducting national policy in the center and in the provinces.
■ Problems relating to reassessing the national and religious exclusivity and role of the spiritual and cultural heritage of individual ethnicities in the history of the region and country.
■ Problems created by the penetration of totalitarian and extremist sects into the religious milieu and politicization of religion.
Given the unfavorable socioeconomic environment and adverse development of the sociopolitical situation, and also in the event of outside interference, these and other problems could lead to ethnic conflicts that are difficult to resolve.
We should also take note of what we think is another very important circumstance: in recent years, the conflict situations existing in the Northern Caucasus, particularly in Chechnia and Daghestan, are being increasingly tagged as interreligious confrontation. There can be no doubt that mention of the Islamic factor both by the local ethnic elite and by countries interested in building up their influence in the region (Turkey, the U.S., and Saudi Arabia) is serving far-reaching political and geopolitical goals.
It must be admitted that ethnicities of different sociocultural types and confessional orientations are in active contact in the Northern Caucasus. Furthermore, Islam is being increasingly viewed as a specific mobilizing ideology, as the most important element of the new national self-conscience, and as grounds for creating independent state formations. This abruptly raises the significance of objective reflection of the cultural status of Islam in unity with the traditional foundations of national self-conscience, which is increasingly seen as the main reason for ethnic extremism not only in the Caucasus, but also in present-day Russia. But this is only the consequence of deeper processes caused by the critical socioeconomic state of the ethnicities.
When describing the present situation in ethnic relations in the Northern Caucasus, well-known Russian academic Igor Dobaev writes: "Society and the state in the South of Russia are facing the challenge of a new escalation in tension. The Chechen and Ossetian-Ingush conflicts cannot be considered ultimately settled and resolved; deep-seated changes are occurring in these ethnic groups that could again detonate the situation. New hotbeds of open ethnic opposition are appearing, and the most dangerous of them is in Daghestan. There is high potential for ethnic tension in Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, Adigey, and the Stavropol and Krasnodar Territories, that is, essentially throughout the whole of the Southern Federal District. And everywhere in these processes the Islamic factor is present, which actively interacts with national (nationalist) elements."13
At the same time, we must admit that, on the whole, the Islamic factor has not become the unifying ideology of the Muslim peoples of the Northern Caucasus. The integrating role of Islam, which gathers peoples of different tribes and different languages under its green banners, is nevertheless vast, and it is this religion that advances the important social slogan: "In Islam all people are brothers."
13 See: I.P. Dobaev, "Opasnost islamizatsii i etnizatsii obshchestva na Iuge Rossii," available at [http://www. rusk.ru| st.php?idar=20436].
