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THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
Beka CHEDIA
Ph.D. (Political Science), Head of Publishing Projects of the Tbilisi School of Political Studies (Tbilisi, Georgia).
CONFESSIONAL CONFLICTS IN GEORGIA AS LATENT INTERSTATE DIFFERENCES
Abstract
The article examines the interaction between politics and religion in Georgia and their influence on forming and implementing the country's domestic and
foreign policy. Special attention is given to the confessional differences that exist between Georgia and several of its neighboring countries.
Introduction
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, an ideological vacuum arose that needed to be filled. Religion became the new content of the spiritual and political guidelines of the former Union republics. Instead of portraits of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, civil servants decorated the walls of their offices with various religious attributes, icons, and so on.
The religious revival in the former Soviet Union largely coincided with the collapse of the communist ideology. Furthermore, religion gradually became a guiding vision in many countries of the former Soviet Union, including Georgia. It is worth noting that 20 years ago, religion was a mobiliz-
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ing factor in state-building in several post-Soviet countries. It is currently common procedure for some of the Caucasian countries and their neighbors to use the religious factor to achieve their political goals.
In 2011, religious disputes broke out in Georgia among several confessions; they not only aggravated the domestic political situation, but also had a negative impact on the country's relations with its regional neighbors. However, a closer look at this problem shows that it was related not so much to religion as to the differences that existed among the countries, right down to mutual territorial claims (although tacit).
In this context, the dispute between the Georgian and Armenian patriarchies serves as a good case in point. It is worth noting that these countries pursued a policy of fraternal relations at the state level, while the Churches were left to deal with their differences between themselves.
It should also be kept in mind that for some countries religion was a tool for achieving long-term political goals. So it becomes clear that any conflict between confessions, the adherents of which comprise the majority of the population, cannot help but affect the state; ignoring this problem could have extremely negative consequences.
Political Orthodoxy and the Conflict between Two Orthodox Countries
The term "political orthodoxy" is becoming increasingly popular in the Georgian political community. It implies using the Orthodox Church to achieve geopolitical goals. For example, Russia refers to the fact that both countries share the same faith to promote its foreign policy interests, in so doing applying "soft power" of sorts against Georgia.
In Georgia, the term "political orthodoxy" is used to designate a potential threat to its national security. It has become tantamount to the concept "political Islam" that exists in international politics.
It is worth noting that despite the aggravation in Georgian-Russian interstate relations, the Orthodox Churches of these two countries continue to cooperate. So we have an exceptional case where relations between the countries are much more balanced (although not cloudless) at the confessional than at the state level.
Although espousing the same faith as the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) has several differences (style of church architecture, use of Georgian polyphony, and so on). In this context, it seems appropriate to present an excerpt from a special letter sent in 1940 by Georgian Patriarch Kallistrat Tsintsadze to Secretary of the Georgian Central Committee of the Communist Party Kandid Charkviani: "The Georgian Orthodox Church is our oldest cultural institution. It has been a source of spirituality for our people, saved it from Tatarization and Russification, and preserved its own national image. Its dogmatic teaching does not differ from the Churches of other Orthodox nations, but over the centuries it has developed its own unique intonation of liturgical recital and singing and way of writing and performing church services, which is passed down from generation to generation orally, since, apart from a small amount of liturgical singing, everything mentioned above has not been put to music or written down. Not only has the Holy Synod of Russia not been engaged in such creative endeavors, but its enlighteners have even called the language of Giorgy Khutses and Shota Rustaveli the bark of dogs."1
Both during the Soviet era (despite the atheism prevalent in society) and the independent period, religion was a means of self-identification for the Georgians and an arena of anti-Soviet struggle.
1 National Manuscript Center of Georgia, Kallistrat Tsintsadze Foundation No. 77, Art 73.
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Despite the break in diplomatic relations between Georgia and Russia that occurred after the August 2008 war, Orthodoxy has increasingly become the main link binding these countries together, whereby the main paradox is that when they coexisted within the Soviet Union, it separated them.
However, the fact that Russia and Georgia share the same faith has a negative impact on the foreign policy preferences of the latter. Since it is a country striving to integrate into the Euro-Atlantic structures, Georgia's affiliation with the Orthodox world creates certain risks associated with the strengthening of the ROC, which is cooperating all the more closely with the Russian authorities. This is causing collisions between the Georgian authorities striving for the West and the GOC, which is criticizing alien values and inclining toward Russia. Today a "cold war" between the country's Church and Government is in full swing.
Furthermore, the authorities are loath to directly accuse the Church of spreading pro-Russian sentiments, although the printed matter and electronic media they control are publishing more and more supposedly independent articles that denounce the GOC; latent tension is also felt in the social networks. Well-known public figures and active government supporters frequently post comments (at times very blatant) to photographs and video clips showing close cooperation between the ROC and the Kremlin. This places the Georgian Patriarchy, which cooperates with the ROC, in an uncomfortable position, to put it mildly.
More evidence of the tense situation was a statement made in 2011 by Catholicos-Patriarch of All Georgia Ilia II, in which he said in particular: "Very often what comes from the West is unacceptable for Orthodox Christians, so this is precisely why the Georgian people must protect the history, past, and traditions of their country."2
Moreover, Ilia II announced the following on the Ekho Moskvy radio station: "Georgia and Russia cannot remain enemies... Georgia still deeply respects Russia, its culture, history, and philosophy... I think that the Russian people also think kindly of Georgia. Recently, a representative of the Russian Orthodox Church said to me: 'We do not need Abkhazia.' I certainly hope the same does not apply to Georgia. Is it possible to replace Georgia with Abkhazia?"3
In Georgian political circles, on the contrary, the danger of political orthodoxy coming from Russia is being increasingly emphasized. According to the country's president, "The ROC has declared a crusade in order to restore the Soviet Union and it is very open about this, whereby it is aimed against Georgia's independence."4
Such fears are related to the fact that in 2011, Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Kirill called the collapse of the Soviet Union "the collapse of historical Russia;"5 moreover, his geopolitical project to form a Russian World presented in 2009 is also worth mentioning.6
The Patriarch called Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and partially Moldova the nucleus of the Russian World; he said the Russian culture and language were its other fulcrums. In his opinion, a Russian, Tatar, Ukrainian, and Georgian can belong to the Russian culture because it has imbibed the traditions of many peoples.
Patriarch Kirill also notes that the Russian culture is a phenomenon that is not limited to one state or one ethnicity and is not related to the interests of one state. Today it is very important to understand that the Russian World is not a tool of the Russian Federation's political influence. This organization has entirely different aims and different tasks.7 At the same time, the Patriarch pointed
2 [http://www.interpressnews.ge/ru/2010-05-25-09-34-46/34565-2011-11-10-12-22-31.html]; "Katolikos-Patriarkh gostit v Ruis-Urbnisskoi eparkhii," 10 November, 2011, available at: [http://www.apsny.ge/2011/soc/1320968377.php].
3 [http://echo.msk.ru/guests/790262-echo/], 8 July, 2011.
4 Statement by President Mikhail Saakashvili at a sitting of the Georgian government in Kutaisi, 22 November, 2011, available at [http://netgazeti.ge/].
5 [http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/russia/2011/11/111111_russian_patriarch.shtml].
6 Speech of His Most Holy Patriarch Kirill at the ceremonial opening of the 3rd Assembly of the Russian World, 3 November, 2009, available at [http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/928446.html].
7 Ibidem.
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out that the Russian World should be founded on a union "similar to the British Commonwealth of Nations or the commonwealth of French-speaking and Portuguese-speaking countries."
In turn, Catholicos-Patriarch Ilia II hopes that relations between Georgia and Russia will be restored. Confirmation of this are his following words: "We have always been close to each other and should remain that way... Rapprochement between Georgia and Russia occurred on the grounds of Orthodoxy. It is unnatural that we have raised the sword against each other. Therefore we should repent and forgive each other."
However, Ilia II's attempts to improve relations between the two states have not been crowned with success so far.
Spiritual Separatism
Spiritual separatism is another graphic example of how religion is being used to achieve political goals. The open military opposition between Georgia and Russia in August 2008 led to the spiritual clergy of Abkhazia and South Ossetia taking the side of their governments. Meanwhile, the Moscow Patriarchy repeatedly declared that it does not recognize the Orthodox Churches of Abkhazia and South Ossetia outside the canonical territory of the GOC.
Despite the fact that Georgians, Abkhazians, and Ossetians largely profess Christianity, there is also a confessional conflict among them that, in all likelihood, is directly tied to political orthodoxy.
For example, in contrast to the occupied Tskhinvali region, which belongs to the Vladikavkaz eparchy, Abkhazia decided to create its own Church. Abkhazia's self-proclaimed spiritual leader said that in 1943 the Abkhazian Church was forcibly joined to the Georgian and now "historical justice has been resorted." The GOC described Abkhazia's decision to secede from the GOC as the action of "a group of impostors," while Ilia II called for not taking such statements seriously.8
Abkhazia has always been an integral part of Georgia; correspondingly, there could not be an independent Church in its territory. The Tskhum-Abkhaz eparchy existed in the territory of the Abkhazian principality, but after the Russian Empire abolished the autocephaly of the Georgian church in 1811-1814, an end was put to its activity.
The autocephaly of the GOC was restored in 1917 and the Tskhum-Abkhaz eparchy fell under the jurisdiction of the Catholicos-Patriarch of Georgia. But the ROC did not recognize the autocephaly of the GOC until 1943; this decision of the Moscow Patriarch and members of the Holy Synod applied not only to the Tskhum-Abkhaz eparchy, but to the whole of the Georgian Church.
Not one of the 15 Orthodox Churches (including the Russian) recognizes the independence of the Abkhazian Church and, despite the appeals from members of the Abkhazian clergy, the position of the ROC in this issue remains unchanged. During the August 2008 war, Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Kirill, supporting the Kremlin's policy regarding Georgia, stated: "We bow our heads to the fighters who sacrificed their lives to protect the fraternal Ossetian people from aggression."
However, the ROC depends on the GOC in some issues; the matter particularly concerns the possible withdrawal of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) from the subordination of the Russian Patriarchy. If this happens, most of the Orthodox Churches, including the GOC, which enjoys great authority, would have to recognize the autocephaly of the UOC.
The Russian Patriarchy is worried that if the UOC becomes independent, it could lose its influence on Ukraine along with much of its congregation. This is why the Russian Patriarchy is trying to retain friendly relations with the GOC and is not willing to forfeit, because of the Abkhazians, the enormous number of believers in Ukraine who recognize only the ROC.
[http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/159465/], 17 September, 2009.
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No one in Georgia doubts that representatives of the Moscow Patriarchy are instigating the Abkhazians to engage in "spiritual separatism," but only the political leaders permit themselves to hint at this. As for the main spiritual figures, they prefer to classify the "spiritual separatism" of the Abkhazians as self-willed action.
Despite the August military conflict in South Ossetia, the ROC and GOC have confirmed their fraternal relations. For example, on 8 December, 2008, Ilia II performed the requiem at the grave of Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Alexy II in the Christ the Savior Church in Moscow; the service was held in Georgian. However, at the same time in Abkhazia, with the knowledge of the Moscow Patriarchy, the architecture of ancient Georgian churches is being changed (since 2008), and since Abkhazia has never had an ecclesiastical architectural style of its own, its churches are being made to look like Russian churches.
On 13 March, when congratulating Vladimir Putin on his election as Russian president, the Patriarch of Georgia did not fail to add that Georgia would definitely return Abkhazia and South Ossetia to its fold and expressed the hope that this would happen during Putin's presidency. The Georgian media and public began actively discussing the wisdom of this step on the patriarchy's part.
The Danger of Political Islam Penetrating the Country
Historically, Georgia is an Orthodox Christian country, but the representatives of other confessions also live there, among whom the largest religious community is represented by Muslims (both Shi'ites and Sunnites); approximately 300-400,000 people of the 4.5-million population confess Islam. There are also Muslims among the Georgians who live in the Ajaria region. According to the 2002 population census, there are 240,552 Orthodox believers and 115,161 Muslims in Ajaria, and a confessional conflict is unfolding precisely in this region, which borders on Turkey.
After official Ankara made a decision to return all Christian communities (Greeks, Armenians, Russians, and so on) their historical churches, the GOC expressed the desire to restore the semi-ruined Georgian churches in the territory of northeastern Turkey, where there are dozens of them.
Initially, the Georgian side claimed only a few churches that are particularly significant in the historical and cultural respect. The matter concerns the Georgian Orthodox churches of Oshki, Khandzta, Ishkhani, and Otkhta.
These monuments are historical symbols and are extremely important in reinforcing the Georgians' national self-consciousness. They are in territories that are considered the cradle of the czarist dynasty of Bagrationi and Georgian statehood and should not be destroyed. After all, they are not simply religious buildings, but evidence confirming the past existence of the Georgian state in northeastern Turkey. But instead of restoring these churches in its territory, Turkey proposed restoring three churches and building one mosque in Georgia. Meanwhile, according to international law, Turkey has pledged to unconditionally protect world cultural heritage monuments. In turn, the Georgian Patriarchy has repeatedly recommended that its country's government ask UNESCO for help.
However, the authorities made concessions to Turkey, which aroused a wave of discontent among the Orthodox Christians of Georgia. Furthermore, Georgian society's greatest concerns are related to the fact that there are proposals to rebuild the Azizie mosque in the center of Batumi, which was erected in 1868 on the orders of Ottoman sultan Abdul-Aziz. It symbolized Turkish military might and testified to the presence of the Ottoman Empire in Ajaria. Orthodox Georgians are also annoyed by the fact that both the Turkish side and the Georgian authorities are calling building the mosque from scratch "restoration."
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Moreover, no knows exactly where in the city this mosque will be built; in the 1940s, it burned down and now another building stands in its place. The question of restoring the semi-destroyed mosque of Akhmed in Akhaltsikhe (close to the Turkish border) is also controversial.
Georgian society is precisely irritated by the fact that over the last 20 years, attention has been paid to the cultural monuments of all confessions. In Georgia, hundreds of mosques are not only being restored, but also built, which are not simply museum pieces, but active religious establishments. This is happening while dozens of ancient Georgian churches in Turkey are in a sorry state and no one is bothering to rescue them; with each passing year they are becoming more and more decrepit.
During the years of independence, approximately 300 mosques (Shi'ite and Sunnite) and other Islamic establishments have been opened in Georgia (not only in Ajaria, but also in other regions). Ten religious boardinghouses operate near Batumi that are financed by the Islamists of Turkey. Children of secondary school age from disadvantaged families living in the mountainous areas of Ajaria are taught at these learning establishments. They are taught the Islamic traditions and then usually sent to study at religious establishments in Turkey. Several dozen young people taught in Turkey have already returned to Ajaria; these newly-qualified religious figures preach Islam and try to popularize it among the local population.
Nevertheless, Orthodoxy is the time-honored religion of the Ajarian-Georgians. Society is very well aware that recruiting adolescents from disadvantaged families and teaching them Islam is fraught with the loss of national and cultural identity for the Georgians living in this region.
At the end of 2011, Catholicos-Patriarch of All Georgia Ilia II sent a letter to the prime minister of Turkey asking him to return at least a few churches.9 Moreover, the GOC thought the decision to built new mosques in Georgia in exchange for saving the semi-destroyed Georgian churches in Turkey to be unfair. The patriarchy suggested a compromise to solve the problem: keeping in mind that there are already hundreds of mosques in Georgia (primarily in Ajaria), it proposed restoring and opening only two of the four above-mentioned controversial churches in the territory of northeastern Turkey.
Ethnic Georgians live compactly in northeastern Turkey (which the Georgians call Tao-Klar-jeti), the precise number of whom is unknown; they all confess Islam. The restoration of Georgian churches in this territory is strictly of cultural-historical significance for Georgia. As for the newly-built mosques in Georgia, they are not simply museums and architectural monuments, but capable of becoming active religious centers in the future. It should be noted that these restored mosques will be a political symbol of Turkey's presence in Ajaria and other adjacent areas, where the growing economic and cultural influence of this country is felt as it is.
Recently, the Georgian authorities consented to the conditions put forward by the Turkish side without waiting for the reply to a letter sent by Ilia II, that is, circumventing the country's religious leaders. The authorities said they were willing to build mosques in Georgia in exchange for restoring the Orthodox churches in Turkey; this decision was reported by the media during the Patriarch's visit to Germany.
The situation was also aggravated by the fact that the Georgian authorities did not disclose the details of the preliminary agreement reached with Turkey, thus arousing immense displeasure in the GOC and among Orthodox believers.
Nevertheless, the country's authorities believe that the worries about spreading Turkish influence to Georgia by means of Islamic institutions are much too exaggerated. However, the wave of protest that arose in the country forced them to pacify society; the mosques were presented not as Turkish cultural heritage, but as the property of Georgian Muslims.
This rhetoric by the authorities had absolutely no effect on Georgian society. On 9 February, 2010, after verbally announcing a preliminary agreement between the governments of the two coun-
[http://www.ekhokavkaza.com/archive/news/20111023/3235/2759.html].?id=24368548], 23 October, 2011.
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tries, the Patriarchy of Georgia sent out a written statement and accused the authorities of holding separate talks with Turkey; furthermore, it unexpectedly changed its tactics. It demanded that a small church be restored and opened (at the expense of the Georgian Patriarchy) in the ancient Georgian episcopal town of Ardasheni situated in the territory of the present-day Turkish region of Rize. The Patriarchy announced that only after this would it be willing to discuss the restoration of mosques and churches in Turkey and Georgia. According to Ilia II, if the Turkish side rejects this proposal for one reason or another, "it will not be acceptable for us to build a symbol of a difficult period in Georgian history in Batumi under the pretext of saving Oshki and Ishkhani, that is, the Azizie mosque." He also noted that this mosque was built as a sign of Turkish dominance in Ajaria; it is not just a religious establishment, but a symbol of the Turkish occupation of Georgian territory.
Despite the displeasure of the GOC, in the summer of 2012, a mosque and the Rabat castle, supposedly built as early as the 9th century, were restored in Akhaltsikhe. This would have seemed to have put a final end to the arguments between the Georgian authorities and the GOC; however passions continue to fly.
The GOC has already warned the authorities that such actions could provoke unprecedented tension between Muslims and Christians, as well as create a multitude of internal problems. It is also worth noting that even the Georgian Muslims living in Ajaria are against building mosques under Turkey's supervision and funding.10
It should be noted that the GOC enjoys great popularity; the Patriarch is way ahead of all the political leaders in the ratings. According to a poll conducted by the American National Democratic Institute in September 2012, 91% of the 2,038 polled said that they trust the Georgian Patriarch most of all. According to the same survey, 61% of the respondents expressed trust in the president of Georgia.11
In this context, it is entirely understandable that the patriarchy's warnings could not help but worry the Georgian authorities. On 21 February, 2012, a governmental commission was set up for discussing issues envisaged by the Constitutional agreement between the Government and the Church. On 7 March, a working group for patronage over Georgian religious buildings, as well as for clarifying the origin and affiliation of churches joined this commission.
On 4 March, after the above-mentioned statement by Ilia II, a so-called cautionary church service was held in Batumi; this religious-political undertaking was an expression of protest of Orthodox believers against the agreement on building mosques in Georgia.
When a state-building strategy was drawn up in Georgia, it was kept in mind that political preferences and priorities may not coincide with the Orthodox faith. The first president of Georgia and former dissident Zviad Gamsakhurdia was a valiant fighter against Russia of the same faith. Despite the fact that the national-liberation movement has been unfolding against the background of Orthodoxy's revival, Gamsakhurdia popularized the idea of a free Caucasus. For example, he spoke of Islam as follows: "Peoples have been living together for many centuries in the Caucasus who have different religions and origin, but they are traditionally closely related to each other spiritually. The main argument of the adversaries of the Iberian-Caucasian peoples is the 'religious differences between the Georgians and North Caucasians.' It should be noted that these peoples are not characterized by religious fanaticism, Islamic fundamentalism, or extremism. They do not build relations with other countries and nations on the basis of religion. Moreover, in our age opposition between Islam and Christianity in the political sphere is not the same as it was during the time of the crusades. This kind of resistance has never been characteristic of the Caucasus, even in the Middle Ages. He who by harping on the religious factor tries to undermine our union, either does not understand the role of religion in human life and politics, or is doing this deliberately, with evil intention. Why do we forget
[http://www.argumenti.ge/?p=1039].
10
11 [http://www.ndi.org/files/Georgia-Aug-2012-Survey.pdf].
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that more than half of Georgians [in Turkey] confess the Muslim religion? What are we supposed to do—disown them?"12
The latest events around the building of mosques designated the boundary between political Islam and the Muslim religion as such. There are no confessional conflicts or Islamist political parties in Georgia; the prevailing worries are aroused not so much by fear of Islam, as by the increase in Turkey's political influence. For example, in the last two months, inscriptions such as "No to Islami-zation!" and "No to Turkization!" have been appearing with increasing frequency on the walls of buildings in Ajaria.
The Conflict That Emerged From the Political Shadows: The Armenian Patriarch in Georgia's Political Life
The Law on Registration of Religious Associations adopted by the Georgian Parliament in 2001 became the catalyst of a notorious political scandal and a hike in confessional tension; this event was preceded by public exposure of the Wikileaks materials. In 2009, the Patriarch of the Armenian Church sent the U.S. president a letter, which said in particular: "Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the situation in Georgia regarding the attitude toward religion has not changed. On the contrary, religious life, if we do not count the Georgian Orthodox Church, is very limited. Furthermore, religious and national minorities are under pressure and there is no tolerance toward them."13 The Armenian Patriarch also asked the U.S. president to put pressure on the Georgian government with respect to the Armenian Church acquiring a status and having property transferred to it.
The first sitting of the interdepartmental commission on drawing up a strategy for ensuring Armenia's religious security held on 29 September, 2011 in Erevan looks particularly interesting in this respect. The content of its discussion shows the attitude toward all other religions in Armenia; as Secretary of Armenia's National Security Council Artur Bagdasarian said, "ensuring religious security includes fighting infringements on the spiritual and cultural values of the Armenian people, creating the necessary conditions for the country's spiritual and cultural development, and strengthening the role of the Armenian Apostolic Church as the main bastion of protection of national identity."14 A fair question arises in light of the given quote: "Is it possible, after this, to accuse other countries of infringing on the rights of religious minorities?"
A superficial glance reveals no obvious disagreements between Georgia and Armenia at the state level. However, the Armenian media have long been making (albeit latently) territorial claims against Georgia; and the Armenian Church has essentially assumed the role of voicing them.
Since it occupies 20% of Azerbaijani territory, Armenia naturally cannot allow tension to escalate in its relations with Georgia. So the Armenian Church is moving to the forward line of the "Georgian Front." Furthermore, the rhetoric of the Armenian political elite sounds approximately as follows: "We are fraternal countries, while the Churches can work out their problems themselves;" such rhetoric, if nothing else, looks naive.
On 10-15 June, 2011, for the first time in 100 years, the Head of the Armenian Apostolic Church (AAC) made a patriarchic visit to Georgia and met with government representatives and the Patriarch
12 ]
13 [http://www.interpressnews.ge/ge/politika/177814-garegin-meore-baraq-obamas-saqarthveloshi-religiuri-umcireso
'■ Excerpts with Zviad Gamsakhurdia's statements from the book "Georgian Nation, Choose!" (in Georgian).
bebis-mdgomareobith-dainteresebas-sthkhovda.html].
14 [http://www.newsarmenia.ru/politics/20110929/42531285.html].
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of Georgia. During the meeting, the Armenian Patriarch demanded that a law be adopted regulating the registration of the AAC in Georgia and transferring property to it (the matter concerns several churches the Armenian Church has claim to). The Georgian Patriarch promised to assist in this matter, but only after a similar law was adopted in Armenia. The 10th-century Akhtala Monastery Complex is one of the Georgian Orthodox churches in Armenia that will be returned to the Patriarchy of Georgia if the law is adopted. It is situated in the historical Georgian region of Lore, which on the initiative of Georgian communist Sergo Orjonikidze was transferred to Armenia in the 1920s.
The architecture and wall paintings of the controversial Orthodox churches in Armenia testify to their Georgian origin, and it would be incorrect to declare that they belong to the Gregorian Church. In this respect, the idea has emerged in Armenia to create an Armenian-Chalcedon Church that will inherit the Georgian churches not only in Armenia, but also in Georgia. Moreover, the Armenian Church is also making claims to the Georgian churches in Turkey.15
The law the Armenian Patriarch mentioned was adopted immediately after his visit, circumventing the Georgian Patriarchy, regarding which the country's authorities received a thank you letter from Echmiadzin.
This event extremely aggravated the situation inside Georgia. On 11 July, 2011, the Holy Synod of the Georgian Patriarchy demanded that the country's government begin talks on the status and out-of-state property of the Georgian eparchies with the participation of religious figures. Furthermore, representatives of the Orthodox clergy noted the insistent need to step up state efforts to return Georgian national and spiritual monuments (the matter primarily concerns the Georgian churches in Armenia).
It is worth noting that for a long time after it gained its independence, the Georgian Patriarchy kept a low profile regarding the return of the Georgian Orthodox churches in the territory of other states to prevent its activity from running counter to state interests. However, after the AAC intensified its claims to churches in Georgia, it abandoned its "defensive policy." The GOC demanded that a parity agreement be entered that envisaged the transfer to the Armenian side of the above-mentioned churches in exchange for the return of Georgian cultic buildings. The Armenian clergy evidently did not expect this turn in events and could not accept it.
In this context, it is appropriate to recall the so-called march of Orthodox believers in Tbilisi held in 2011 immediately after the Georgian government adopted the law on registration of religious associations without taking into account the patriarchy's opinion. The fact that 100,000 people participated in this march demonstrated the extent of the patriarchy's influence on the country's population.
Moreover, the campaign, which was dubbed "anti-Armenian," became clear evidence of a latent conflict between Georgia and Armenia, but in no way between their Churches, as the governments of both countries tried to claim. In order to minimize the tension in the country, the Georgian authorities were forced post factum to clarify several provisions of the law they adopted.
The Wikileaks document publicized, which was dated 22 December, 2008, attracts special attention. It reflects issues that were discussed at the meeting between Catholicos-Patriarch Ilia II and the then U.S. Ambassador to Georgia John Taft. Ilia II told the ambassador that he had met with Catholicos of Armenia Garegin II at the funeral of Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Alexy II. Garegin II demanded transfer of the church of Norasheni located in Tbilisi. In response, Ilia II proposed creating a bilateral commission of academics, but Garegin II rejected this idea.
The document said that Ilia II considers the best way to resolve the problem of the church of Norasheni is to turn it into a museum. According to Ilia II, the Catholicos of Armenia is trying to exacerbate this matter even more among his followers. He also told the ambassador that Garegin II's intolerant attitude was influenced by his allegiance to Russia, since his brother is a bishop in Moscow.16
15 See: "Vosstanovit' Armiano-khalkidonitskuiu tserkov v Armenii," Armenia Today, available at [http://armtoday. info/default.asp?Lang=_Ru&NewsID=47452].
16 [www.apsny.ge/2011/soc/1315533014.php], 8 September, 2011.
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Armenian society and media were extremely irritated both by Garegin II's visit to Georgia and by Ilia II's proposal regarding the return of the Georgian churches. The country's public thinks that "taking possession of the church today means making legal claims to territory tomorrow. The Georgians have chosen this way to make their demands."17 Armenian analysts are of the same opinion, saying that to avoid a possible threat to the interests of the country's national security, these churches cannot be returned to Georgia.
Here the following question arises: "Why should Georgia not see the demands to transfer some churches located in its territory to the Armenian Patriarchy as a potential threat to its national security?" After all, following the same logic, it can be presumed that Armenia will first take possession of the churches and then make claims to the territory in which they are situated.
It may be entirely legitimate to assert that these spiritual disputes have nothing in common with religion; "the root of evil" should be sought in interstate problems. In this case, the matter concerns in particular the latent contradictions associated with Armenia's territorial claims.
In 2010, during a visit to Armenia, the Georgian Foreign Minister was asked a question concerning the Georgian region of Javakheti, the name of which was mentioned in distorted form "Javakhk." There can be no doubt that this "mistake" conceals an attempt to give the Georgian region an Armenian-sounding name. The minister replied that there is no Javakhk region in Georgia, but there is Javakheti, thus arousing indignation in the Armenian media, which long continued to discuss his failure to give the correct rendition of the name. This reaction by the Armenian media is graphic confirmation of the fact that the thought has long matured in Armenian society of making territorial claims to Georgia.
Aggressive statements toward Georgia are also heard with increasing frequency from Armenian politicians, who state: "Erevan's policy of friendship with Georgia has a high price tag, this policy is costing us the loss of Javakhk."18 However, since Javakheti is an inalienable part of Georgia, it is not clear what loss is being referred to here. Shirak Torosian, a deputy of the ruling Republican Party of Armenia, goes on to say the following: "Georgia's impudence has reached the point where the time has come to change Armenia's policy toward this country."19
The AAC is one of the main destabilizing factors in the region; this is confirmed by the "accusatory" letter the Armenian Patriarch (who knew about the Georgian government's fear of being "reprimanded" by the U.S.) wrote to Barack Obama after his visit to Georgia.
Garegin II's letter encouraged an increase in anti-Armenian sentiments in Georgian society, the majority of which believes that "if Armenia makes claims to the historical Georgian territory of Javakheti, it is time for us to make claims to those territories that the communists took from the Georgians and gave to the Armenians in the 1920s." The matter concerns the historical Georgian region of Lore (the area of which is approximately equal to 2,500 sq. km), now situated in the north of Armenia.
In contrast to Georgia (where the Government and the Church compete with each other), in Armenia the state has great influence on the Church. For example, the tension that arose in 2001 between the Churches of the two countries did not appear without the silent consent of official Erevan. It is also worth noting that on 7-8 June, 2011, even before Garegin II's scandalous visit, the Armenian Foreign Minister visited Georgia.
Georgia is trying to maintain good neighborly relations with Armenia, but the church disputes are bringing the serious contradictions that exist between these two countries to the surface. The only solution to the situation might be Armenia's rejection of its territorial claims (by the Armenian church leaders) against Georgia. Despite the rhetoric of the Georgian authorities about fraternity and good neighborliness, Armenia figures only as a good neighbor in Georgia's national security conception; this is more evidence that all is not well between the two neighboring states.
17 "Vosstanovit' Armiano-khalkidonitskuiu tserkov v Armenii."
18 [http://www.georgiatimes.info/news/43891.html].
19 [http://armtoday.info/default.asp?Lang=_Ru&NewsID=32627&SectionID=0&RegionID=3&Date=03/15/2011& PagePosition=11].
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
Religious Boundaries vs. State Boundaries?
The confessional disputes existing around Georgia are directly associated with re-examination of the state borders. The current administrative-political borders of the post-Soviet states (a few of which have still not carried out their delimitation and demarcation) were established during Soviet times; from the legal perspective, they can provisionally be called state borders. The problem is that in many cases they do not coincide with the religious boundaries.
There are 42 eparchies in the Georgian Patriarchy. Five of them are in different corners of the world (in Europe, in Australia, in America, etc.); on the official website of the Georgian Patriarchy they are designated as "eparchies abroad." Some eparchies, which exist on paper, simultaneously encompass both part of Georgian territory and the adjacent areas of neighboring states. For example, the eparchy of Batumi and Lazeti in reality covers only the territory of Georgia (in particular, Ajaria). As for the region of Lazeti, it is in the territory of present-day Turkey. The eparchy of Akhaltsikhe and Tao-Klarjeti in reality covers only a few southern areas of Georgia (the Georgian historical region of Tao-Klarjeti is also in the territory of present-day Turkey). The above-mentioned "discrepancies" allow the GOC to believe that the church boundaries de jure do not coincide with the state boundaries. The GOC's tough position is evidently related to the fact that, without the support of the authorities of its country, it is assuming the main burden of the interconfessional disputes.
The creation of the Administration of Georgian Muslims (AGM) in 2011 headed by Jemal Bag-shadze, a Georgian from Ajaria, can be directly related to the question of incompatibility of the religious and state boundaries. This aroused the displeasure of the Administration of Caucasian Muslims (ACM), which perceived the event as a political act. Before establishment of the AGM, the citizens of Georgia who confessed Islam were subordinate to the ACM based in Baku. Most of Georgia's Muslims are ethnic Azeris, as well as some Georgians living in Ajaria.
It is worth noting that in 1996, at the request of the then president of the country Eduard Shevardnadze, a branch of the ACM was established in Georgia. It was headed by A. Aliev, a Georgian citizen and ethnic Azeri.
Head of the ACM sheikh Allahshukur Pashazadeh called the decision of official Tbilisi on the establishment of the AGM "incorrect" and expressed his regret that some of the Azeri officials in Georgia supported it; this also makes them responsible for all the consequences.20 So here we have a graphic example of how all religious problems are political in nature.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the Georgian government is not interfering in the activity of the Orthodox churches in Azerbaijan (in territories where ethnic Georgians live). Moreover, when there are strategic relations between states (as in the case of Georgia and Azerbaijan), confessional problems are resolved without difficulties.
Georgia has never made any territorial claims (openly or latently) against neighboring states. This only happened once when Georgia became part of the Soviet Union and cannot be perceived as a targeted policy or as an important historical fact.
However, strange as it may seem, Georgia was able to activate the religious factor at that time, whereby in a state where atheism reigned. The matter concerns Georgia's territorial claims against Turkey during Stalin's rule. On 14 December, 1945, the Georgian newspaper Kommunisti and on 20 December Pravda and Izvestia published a joint article by Georgian historians N. Berdzenishvi-li and S. Janashia titled "On Our Legal Claims to Turkey." Some time later, on 8 January, 1946, a letter was published in the Georgian newspaper Kommunisti in the rendition of the then Patriarch of
[http://lnka72.ru/Newsm/804-Saakashvili-vyvodit-musulman-Gruzii-iz-pod-vliyaniya-Azerbajjdzhana].
20
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
Georgia Kallistrat Tsintsadze devoted to the same topic21 (as noted above the ROC did not recognize the autocephaly of the GOC until 1943).
Conclusion
It is obvious that the countries of the region perceive religious security as an inalienable part of their national security. There is an obvious conflict among the states, but it is religious entities rather than the political elites that are involved in it.
Even now it can be asserted that the religious differences that affect Georgia and the Caucasian region as a whole are in no way of a strictly confessional nature. They only lay bare the real and more serious problems that exist between the countries of the region in hidden form; it is apparently very convenient to use priests as a cover, even though in some countries of the region religion acts as the official ideology, while in others it is the political underground.
It should be noted that religion is most effectively used for political aims in Russia, Turkey, and Armenia, since in these countries the dominating confessions enjoy strong support from the government. In Georgia, however, the Church and State are more rivals than allies.
The confessional disputes in the Caucasus require speedy settlement; any more serious conflict among the states of the region must be nipped in the bud. It is obvious that the time has come for the countries of this explosive region to admit that there are problems among them hidden under religious camouflage; they, like a gun hanging on the wall as decoration, could sooner or later "go bang."
21 See: Address of Catholicos-Patriarch of All Georgia Kallistrat to the vanguard of society and the leaders of the United Nations on the return of Georgian land from the Ottoman Empire, Kommunisti, 8 January, 1946 (in Georgian).
