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Rauf GARAGOZOV 1 -------------------------------------------------------------
A leading research associate at the Institute of Strategic Studies of the Caucasus (Baku, Azerbaijan). For many years he worked in several scientific centers and universities in Moscow and Baku as a researcher, consultant, and lecturer. In 2002-2003, Fulbright visiting professor, Washington University in St. Louis (the U.S.). He contributed to many international conferences and symposiums. He has authored over 80 articles and books, the latest of which Metamorfozy kollektivnoy pamiaty v Rossii i na Tsentral'nom Kavkaze (Metamorphoses of the Collective Memory in Russia and the Central Caucasus) was published in Baku in 2005 by Nurlan Publishers.
AZERBAIJANI DILEMMA IN THE GLOBALIZATION AGE: “ADVANCE” TO EUROPE OR “RETREAT” TO ASIA?
Abstract
The author investigates some of the sociocultural dilemmas Azerbaijan is coping with as a European-oriented country of Islamic cultural-historical heritage. The author formulates the central dilemma of the day as: will the country continue moving toward “Europeanization” or will it turn back to its “true,” “Asian” norms and values? This is discussed in the context of debates about the “modernization” and “Westernization” conceptions. The author is convinced that the present course
of borrowing individual institutions and carrying out reforms in individual social segments is leading nowhere. It will merely waste human, material, financial, and moral capital and time. The author argues that many of the Western institutions and values (democratic institutions in particular) cannot be imported to a different cultural environment. He points out that society needs systemic changes and that the state should carry out policies tailored to the educational and cultural spheres.
He never lost hope that the time would come when our people would find happiness without copying others.1
Azerbaijan, which inherited the centuries-old culture of the Muslim East, on the one hand, and, being oriented toward Russia for the last two centuries, was exposed to the European cultural values as part of the Russian Empire and, later, of the Soviet Union, on the other, is grappling with fairly complicated sociocultural dilemmas.
At the turn of the 20th century, Azerbaijani society was living in a state of opposition or even clash between the local national identity and the czarist “Russification” policy, in the one
1 O. Pamuk, Chernaia kniga, Amphora Publishers, St. Petersburg, 2005, p. 76.
hand, and the supra-national Muslim identity, on the other.2 The Soviet “cultural revolution” of the 1920s-1930s created numerous dramatic social and cultural collisions, some of which were eventually and more or less successfully resolved. Azerbaijan’s newly found independence, however, did not deliver the nation from similar sociocultural problems—it gave rise to new, no less intense ones.
Today, in the age of globalization, Azerbaijan as an independent state must come to grips with a major sociocultural dilemma: either continue moving toward Europe and Europeanization, or go back to its “primordial,” “Asian,” so to speak, norms and values.
A superficial observer might not detect a dilemma: indeed, a dilemma is born by the “need to choose between two (normally equally unwelcome) options.”3 In our case, most of the nation and the country’s political elite hail the idea of adjusting Azeri society to Western norms and values. Azerbaijan is actively cooperating with numerous Western international organizations and is involved in various projects and reforms carried out, more or less successfully, under Western coaching. Still, the dilemma is a real one—it is related to the strategy according to which society will be reformed.
Like all other Soviet successor states, Azerbaijan must change its society. Practically all social groups have admitted this, yet the direction of these changes and their methods are giving rise to heated discussions.
All subtle differences aside, there are two extreme approaches to the issue that can conventionally be called “economic” and “humanitarian,” the poles attracting an entire range of opinions and ideas about reform.
Supporters of the former believe that economic reform should be treated as an absolute priority; they are convinced that other social spheres will develop under the impact of economic modernization. This approach, popular with all social groups, is likewise popular with the ruling political and economic elite.
Those who support the “humanitarian” approach believe that, to be successful, economic reform should be accompanied by deep-cutting social and democratic changes. They pin their hopes on introducing Western democratic institutions into the country to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms. This opinion comes from the opposition. It should be said that both groups treat the problem, or rather, dilemma, in a simplified way.
The “economists” tend to ignore the human factor. Meanwhile, economic reform cannot produce the desired results if it is not accompanied by efforts to change people’s mentality. Corruption, client-patron relations, and nepotism are but a few of the manifestations of the local mentality which seriously endanger society’s future development. It will not go on as “planned.”
The “humanitarian” position tends to treat the problem of planting the democratic institutions lightly; it tends to disregard its extremely complex nature. Indeed, the democratic institutions are a product of a very specific type of social development; they look well in the Western world and cannot be exported elsewhere. This is what has given rise to the dilemma discussed below.
Cultural “Predetermination” or Strategic Choice
The polemics outlined above suggest much broader discussions about “modernization” and “Westernization.” Some people insist that social modernization associated with economic growth and
2 Works by Azerbaijanian writers and public figures of the period—M. Akhundov, J. Mamedkulizade, M. Sabir, Uz. Gajibekov, N. Narimanov, and others—provide an idea about the dilemma’s intensity.
3 Slovar inostrannykh slov, Russkiy iazyk Publishers, Moscow, 1988, p. 164.
prosperity, industrialization, urbanization, education for all, etc. will finally bring about cultural changes (“Westernization”). In this way society will be introduced to all the values of Western civilization, democratic institutions, rationality, pluralism, pragmatism, individualism, the rule of law, separation of secular and spiritual powers, etc.
Their opponents insist that modernization of traditional societies can be achieved without radical changes of society’s mental “matrix” formed by the “primordial” cultural values and norms.
In the final analysis, the discussions boil down to one key question: to what extent are traditional cultures and societies able to modernize themselves and effectively adjust themselves to new technologies and models while detached from the predominantly Western norms and values in the context of which these technologies and models took shape in the first place?
Opinions differ: some members of the academic community believe that modernization success depends on the type of culture any given society belongs to.4 Some countries and societies of Southeast Asia in the first place (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and others), while moving ahead along the road of modernization, have preserved their cultural traditions practically intact. There are other, mainly Muslim, states that, for cultural reasons, have encountered numerous problems along the same road, therefore they should radically reform their societies, that is, “become Western” in a certain sense.5
This suggests another question: to what extent can traditional cultures and values change under the impact of innovations, ideas, and practices coming from the West? According to American political scientist Samuel Huntington,6 most cultures cannot change their inner essence; they resist alien influence and live for centuries without changing. Samuel Huntington illustrated this using the example of Muslim societies that stubbornly reject Western influences and democratic changes. He wrote: “Islamic culture explains in large part the failure of democracy to emerge in much of the Muslim world. Developments in the postcommunist societies of Eastern Europe ... are shaped by their civili-zational identities. Those with Western Christian heritages are making progress toward economic development and democratic policies; the prospects for economic and political development in the Orthodox countries are uncertain; the prospects in the Muslim republics are bleak.”7 According to his logic, Azerbaijan “left to shift by itself’ would inevitably regain its place among the states of Islamic civilization, the future of which is “bleak.”
It should be said that his conception was justly criticized for exaggerating the cultural factor at the expense of other (economic and political) factors. The American author was also criticized for his oversimplified interpretation of cultures and civilizations as “homogeneous” units unable to readjust themselves and to move ahead together with time. If they do change, they do this according to their patterns and their “soul.”8
No matter what we think about Mr. Huntington’s culturological constructs, his assessment of the development prospects of Muslim societies and countries deserves attention, to say the least. He
4 See: W.E. Naff, “Reflections on the Question of ‘East & West’ from the Point of View of Japan,” Comparative Civilizations Review, No. 13/14, Fall 1985 & Spring 1986, p. 222; S.N. Eisenstadt, “Transformation of Social, Political, & Cultural Orders in Modernization,” American Sociological Review, No. 30, 1965, pp. 659-673; D.E. Ap-ter, “The Role of Traditionalism in the Political Modernization of Ghana and Uganda,” World Politics, No. 13, 1960, pp. 47-68.
5 See: D. Pipes, In the Path of God: Islam & Political Power, Basic Books, New York, 1983. D. Pipes identified the contradictions between the Islamic injunctions and certain economic issues—female labor, the right of possession, the law of descent, etc.—as the causes interfering with the Islamic countries’ modernization.
6 See: S.P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1997.
7 Ibid., p. 29.
8 D. Senghaas, The Clash within Civilizations, Routledge, London, 2002.
has correctly written that certain Islamic cultural communities wishing to follow the road of Westernization find it hard to imbibe Western norms and values. His opinion of Turkish society, in particular, should be taken into account: among the societies that have embarked on the road of Europeanization, it is the closest to Azerbaijan. Its experience is very important for us. Without going into the details of this complicated process, let us dwell on the following.
In mid-19th century, Turkish society became actively involved in the European orbit and experienced several radical transformations caused by the country’s adherence to Western values and institutions. The process acquired additional vigor when Kemal Ataturk, founder of the Turkish Republic, launched a purposeful process of modernization and Westernization. This was done resolutely and with a lot of determination. Samuel Huntington has the following to say about Kemal Ataturk’s approach: “This response is based on the assumptions that modernization is desirable and necessary, that the indigenous culture is incompatible with modernization and must be abandoned or abolished, and that society must fully Westernize.”9 He concluded that this strategy created a “torn country” and “cultural schizophrenia.”10
“Cultural schizophrenia” is an apt metaphor best illustrated by Orhan Pamuk in his Black Book.11 It tells the story of a Turkish handicraftsman, the first in the Ottoman Empire to make dummies only to become an object of rage of Sheikh ul Islam, who interpreted this as a sacrilege (“man is the creation of Allah; to perfectly imitate him means to emulate Allah Himself’). On his orders the dummies were removed from shop windows to reappear when the Turkish Republic replaced the Ottoman Empire and when another tide of Western influence created fashionable shops with windows dressed in Western style. The craftsman, who decided that his hour had finally come, very soon discovered that his dummies were not in demand. He made them to look like local people, but the clothes were designed for Europeans. The shop owners explained: “Our customers do not want coats they can see every day in the streets on mustachioed, bow-legged, and bony Turks. They want coats made in a far-away mysterious countries worn by new and handsome people. And when putting on such a coat, they expect to be transformed themselves. .The Turks no longer want to be Turks—they want to be someone else. They revolutionized their clothes, shaved off their beards, and even changed the alphabet. Shoppers do not shop for clothes—they shop for dreams. They buy the dream of becoming like those who wear European fashions.”12 This is the best description of “schizophrenic” duality of individual lives; it illustrates an important issue of identity and identification, as well as the role played by borrowing and imitation in the process of mastering alien experience and alien cultures.
The issue is not new: in the 1920s-1930s, Gokalp, a prominent Turkish philosopher and thinker, criticized the method of formal borrowing of Western institutions typical of the newly formed Turkish Republic.13
I. Fadeeva interpreted Gokalp’s ideas about Europeanization of Turkish society in the following way: “The Turks do not understand that traditions have their historic value; for this reason, they remain formalists and imitators. .By pressing forward to achieve quick success, the Turks perceive European civilization as the sum total of certain theoretical and practical formulas. Formal institutional borrowing has no future; it is not creative since discrete imitation cannot be glued together on a common foundation. Each of the new elements remains isolated from the rest and exists all by itself. It has no future.”14
9 S. Huntington, op. cit., p. 73.
10 Ibid., p. 154.
11 O. Pamuk, op. cit.
12 Ibid., p. 72.
13 See: Z. Gokalp, Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization, New York, 1959.
14 I.L. Fadeeva, Ot imperii k national’nomu gosudarstvu, Vostochnaia literatura Publishers, RAS, Moscow, 2001,
p. 127.
Gokalp believed that genuine social progress should rely on society’s own traditions: “Tradition is the true force behind motivation, which creates new development trends and sets new landmarks for public consciousness and being. This is the force that creates and develops itself and that gives life to borrowing in such a way that the alien elements blend into the new context; they cannot be separated or distorted as happens with primitive imitation. The nation’s memory is embodied in its traditions. Tradition creates continuity and adds harmony to the process of transformation of individual institutions. It binds them together.”15 In some cases, tradition fails to be the starting point of development: indeed, there are no traditions corresponding to the Western institutions and values related to democracy and human rights.
This is what I. Fadeeva had to say about the Turkish reforms: “For over one-and-a-half centuries all attempts at Westernization were spontaneous and unrelated either to each other or to what was done earlier. For this reason, the programs and principles proclaimed by the renovation movements were not systemic and rational enough... (italics mine.—R.G.) Westernization in the 1920s-1930s in Turkey produced results that none of the Muslim countries could emulate at that time. The country received national laws in the sphere of state administration, politics, economics, and law. The population of large cities completely adapted itself to European clothes and some of the elements of the European lifestyle, yet the nation failed to achieve one of the key elements of Western civilization—the priority of the individual in society (italics mine.—R.G.). The most impressive changes lack stability and a future if not supported by the human factor. It is very important, however, that the Turkish academic community has identified the problem and is actively discussing it.”16
The above singles out two main aspects typical of the Turkish reforms: their random and non-systemic nature and the failure to achieve “priority of the individual,” which are vitally important for the choice of reform program. The former relates to the “level of methods,” the latter to the “level of meaning” that identifies the reforms’ main aims and tasks. This level answers the question: Why should reform be carried out at all? The above suggests a reformulation of Azerbaijan’s dilemma.
The country has reached a bifurcation point: it can either go on with its mainly random borrowing of disjointed elements of Western models, norms, and values (something that is going on in the country), or it may prefer a development strategy based on a well-substantiated and detailed reform program with clear aims, tasks, and priorities.
The choice of road will send society either toward “Europeanization” or “back” to the large group of Asian communities with “bleak” (Huntington) development prospects. In other words, the prospects directly depend on the reformist strategy the state chooses. Random institutional borrowing and reform of individual social segments have no future—they will merely waste a lot of human, material, financial, moral, and time resources. The following will illustrate the above.
Non-Systemic Reform: Higher School is Put to the “Test”
In 1992, Azerbaijan made its first steps as a newly independent state eager to change: tests as a system of admission to higher educational institutions were one such early change. They replaced the
15 I.L. Fadeeva, Ot imperii k national’nomu gosudarstvu, Vostochnaia literatura Publishers, RAS, Moscow, 2001, p. 127.
16 Ibid., p. 141.
Soviet system of student admission under which the higher educational establishments selected their students themselves; the state resolved to bury the old subjective and corrupt system based on personal ties and bring educational standards closer to Western ones. Since that time, the project has already consumed a lot of human and financial resources, as well as the efforts of all sorts of international foundations, organizations, and institutions.17
The time that elapsed since 1992 allows us to assess at least some of the results: the reform neither remedied negative corroding practices, nor checked the downhill slide of education quality. There are objective reasons for this: the educational system cannot be isolated from social ills; it is a “mirror” reflecting the society that created the system in the first place.18 We have discovered that the hopes pinned on entrance tests were unjustified: there are too many corruption-related scandals around entrance exams, half-term examinations, and transfers of students from one institute to another. This is not the main evil, however.
The tests failed to stop disintegration of the country’s educational system; they even contributed to the process of reducing secondary education to cramming for tests.
The same applies to higher schools of learning: society was deprived of higher education not in form, but in essence. The 2005/6 entrance tests to post-graduate institutions confirmed this: most bachelors of art and science failed the fairly primitive tests. This, in turn, confirmed the old truth obvious to any objective observer: the absolute majority of students do not study—they merely go through the motions. We all know this. Why does this happen? The answers range from corruption among the lecturers and professors and shortage of highly qualified people to the absence of scientific and methodological literature; inadequate material and technical bases, etc.
The all-embracing answer is: the absolute majority of students are not ready to study at higher educational institutions! Universities, which, in turn, cannot get rid of students unable to master the program (this is confirmed by the very low share of expelled students and instructions by university administrations not to give failing grades), have become part of the secondary school system. Those precious few who can and want to study cannot do this: there are too many of those who do not want and cannot study and who create a fairly discouraging atmosphere.
What about the entrance tests? Indeed, the idea was to select the best and most able.
The test results say little or nothing about the individual’s ability to continue studying at higher schools; at best they indicate the level of the school leavers’ knowledge. Meanwhile, the dependence between the level of knowledge obtained at school and the ability to study at a higher learning establishment has not yet been proved.19 Higher school is not simply a continuation of secondary school; it offers a qualitatively different educational level and requires special abilities unconnected, totally or partially, with the level of knowledge received in secondary school.
Today, the heated debates of the abilities indispensable for higher school students have not yet produced any clear and unambiguous criteria.20 At the same time, there is a widely shared opinion that
17 For more information about the international structures involved in the project see: [URL: http:// www.tqdk.gov.az/].
18 See: Power and Ideology in Education, ed. by A.H. Halsey, J. Karabel, New York, 1977.
19 Special studies carried out in 1978 showed that school grades say little about a graduate’s potential as a student (in Germany, r = 0.30; in the U.S. r = 0.48 on average) (see: M. Amelang, “Der Hochschulzugang,” in: K.J. Kaluer, Handbuch der Padagogischen Diagnostik, Band 4, Schwann, Dusseldorf, 1978). For this reason, researchers conclude, school grades should not be taken as the only selection criterion (see: K. Ingenkamp, Pedagogicheskaia diagnostika, Ped-agogika Publishers, Moscow, 1991). The dependence between the intellectual level and the ability to master higher school programs looks more reliable. The coefficients vary, yet it is commonly believed that only those with an IQ higher than 110 or 115 can study at any type of higher school (see: M. Ratter, Pomoshch trudnym detiam, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1987, p. 43).
20 What is obvious is that students need fairly developed intellects. It is commonly believed that only those with an IQ higher than 110 or 115 can study at any type of higher school (see: M. Ratter, op. cit.). To select the best of the best, it would be much wiser to test the school leavers’ intellectual level rather than their knowledge of the school program. It
higher school students should be able to study independently.21 Back in 1810, outstanding German scientist and teacher W. Humboldt wrote that a student could be considered ready for university if he had learned enough from others to be able to study independently.22
In any case, the method that assesses the level of school knowledge (with the help of tests compiled by secondary school teachers based on the school curriculum) is practically useless for the purpose of selecting individuals ready and able to study at higher school. It is hard to find the predictors to be used to predict an individual’s ability to master the higher school program; all sorts of specialized scientific centers and institutions in the West have been working on this for several decades now without much success. The task has not yet been resolved, therefore West European and American universities employ methods of their own.
Many of the European universities (in Germany, the Netherlands, and elsewhere) enroll all those willing to enter; they are expected to prove their ability to study by passing half-term examinations. In France, the complicated school program helps select the best at the secondary school level by spreading pupils among schools and colleges of different types. America employs a different method, even though the system of tests is widely used in this country together with the grades on school-leaving certificates.23 The American educational system is very flexible. It consists of all types of colleges and universities for students with different levels of school knowledge; this gives poor school pupils the opportunity to continue their education at colleges.
To sum up, I can say that educational practices, on which the use of tests depends, vary from country to country. The tests, however, are but an element in the student selection system; their usefulness is limited to specific educational systems.
The above suggests several conclusions: first, tests as the only selection criterion unaccompanied by systemic changes in the educational system and society are useless, to say the least; they merely waste energy and money. Second, educational reforms should be based on a well-substantiated program of action that has specific aims and tasks in mind. They should start not “from below” (the testing procedure), but from identifying the key objectives. Which of them should be treated as such?
The answer is simple. An analysis of the Western educational models reveals that they share certain features obvious in the higher school, which make them different from Soviet and post-Soviet education practices. Higher school abroad is built around the teacher’s (professor’s or lecturer’s) personality on whom the entire system and the teaching process depend. It is on him that the future of higher school depends—he is expected to help his students develop the ability to think independently.
The very idea that any technical innovation (tests in our case) can replace a human being is wrong. Man cannot be excluded from the educational process—this was a step in the wrong direction. Meanwhile, everything done so far is leading there. All efforts to improve the tests or upgrade the educational process at universities (written exams instead of oral ones, points instead of grades, etc.) look naive and fairly useless.
Man should be placed in the center of the educational process—this is what should be done to reform education—otherwise we shall remain bogged down in formalism, profanity, low quality, corruption, etc., in short, the old evils that have already come to the fore in the new educational system.
This is but one example that illustrates the futility of borrowing technologies and models and the urgent need for a complex system of reforms. This fully applies to all other spheres of social life. From this it follows: Western innovations can and should be borrowed only when
will turn out that the number of young men with an intellectual level high enough to study at higher school is much smaller than the number of offered places.
21 See: Formirovanie uchebnoy deiatel’nosti studentov, ed. by V.Ia. Liaudis, Moscow University Press, Moscow, 1989.
22 See: Autorenkollektiv: Du undDein Studium, Berlin, 1970, p. 12.
23 To enter American colleges and universities, school leavers should present the following information: (a) a list of subjects studied in secondary school; (b) school grades; (c) admission tests, that is, SAT and ACT. Both are fairly general and are used to identify the ability to study at any college and university (see: K. Ingenkamp, op. cit.).
their contexts are fully grasped and understood. They should be correlated with our social context; social priorities, prospects, and landmarks of future development should be identified to suggest a strategy of moving toward the goals set. This is what should be done if we want to reform our society.
Social reforms according to Western patterns are much more complicated than it seems, even if the strategy and aims have been correctly formulated. All attempts to appropriate and develop alien values and achievements will run into obstacles and limitations that can conventionally be described as “situational” and “instrumental.”
“Situational” and “Instrumental” Obstacles
By “situational” obstacles I mean the factors that create chains of interconnected events—situ-ations—arising in society when it “meets” an innovation or a change. “Instrumental” factors can be described as instrumental resources and cultural instruments (language development level, conceptual apparatus, etc.) any given society has at its disposal as part of its culture. By way of illustration I shall present two stories here.
The former set of factors was brilliantly described in Orhan Pamuk’s My Name is Red,24 which tells the story of a Turkish sultan who orders, through his confidential servant, an illustrated book of stories to mark the one thousandth anniversary of Hegira.25
He wanted Western-style illustrations, in a manner that had already mastered perspective and the idea of portrait. The methods clashed with the canons of Oriental painting limited by Islamic injunctions or their interpretations by faithful theologians. For example, a dog could not be of the same size as the padishah; portraits of specific individuals were absolutely taboo. To avoid accusations of blasphemy several artists were invited to work separately: one of them was expected to draw a dog, another, trees, still another, a horse, etc. The process developed into a chain of intrigues and deaths; the book was never completed. This is an example of the fact that even the “most insignificant” things, such as the Western principles of painting, cannot be planted in the Muslim East without many problems, events, and situations that bury the project and discourage society’s interest in painting.
J.L. Borges’sAverroes’Search26 illustrates the instrumental factor by telling a story of how ibn Rushd, a 12th-century Arabian thinker (known in Europe as Averroes), tried to translate Aristotle’s Poetics into Arabic. In the process, he discovered that two words—“tragedy” and “comedy”—remained unclear to him because the Arabic lacked the corresponding categories.27 In other words, without an idea of theater, Averroes proved unable to grasp the meaning of these words. J.L. Borges said: “It came to my mind that Averroes, locked as he was within Islamic limits, was unable to understand the meaning of the words ‘tragedy’ and ‘comedy’.”28
24 See: O. Pamuk, Menia zovut krasny, Amphora Publishers, St. Petersburg, 2005.
25 Hegira (Arab. flight)—the Prophet’s move from Mecca to Medina in 622. The Muhammadan era dates from this year (see: Islam. Kratkiy spravochnik, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1983).
26 See: J.L. Borges, “Poiski Averroesa,” in: Proza raznykh let, Raduga Publishers, Moscow, 1989, pp. 155-160.
27 By way of commenting on this phenomenon of Arabian culture, G.E. von Grunebaum pointed out: “The Arabian critics failed to add the concepts of plot and action to the fairly rich conceptual system of Arabian culture... Fiction is presented as piece of information; invention, as a real case. This disinclination to surrender to the imagination, the desire to stay within the limits of the factual and real is close to the treatment of man Islam has been inculcating from the very beginning. Completely devoted to the idea of God’s omnipotence, the new faith insisted that He and He alone was the only Creator, while man was denied any creative ability lest he formulate a wrong idea of inborn qualities by merely confusing the concepts and, therefore, find a wrong place for man in relation to Allah” (Osnovnye cherty arabo-musul’manskoy kul’tury, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1981, pp. 180-181).
28 J.L. Borges, op. cit., p. 160.
The story contains an episode in which Averroes, fatigued by his translation efforts, went up to the window, through which he saw semi-naked boys imitating a muezzin. Significantly, he failed to realize that the meaning of two Greek terms was being presented to him. The author tells us that it is not only very hard to comprehend the meaning of something that is not present in one’s experience, but also that even if this experience exists, it is next to impossible to interpret it in the absence of ideas and corresponding concepts. In this case, the societies resolved to change themselves by making man their priority run against the problems created by an absence of traditions corresponding to the Western institutions and values related to democracy and human rights.
Understanding Man: the “Watershed” between the West and East
To illustrate the above let us discuss the problems created by human rights. This subject regularly surfaces at all discussions of the situation in Azerbaijan at all sorts of meetings between European and local politicians and observers. It has become clear that public opinion finds it hard to accept the “human rights” concept. The question is: why?
I would like to discuss the problem’s cultural, or “instrumental” aspects. Today, our society, or at least a large part of it, has failed to recognize human rights as a fundamental value, not only because society lacks political will, but also because people have no corresponding values (value categories) at their disposal to allow them to accept and understand this key democratic principle of the West.
I have already written that we should first understand how categories created in one socio-cul-tural-historical context could be transferred and adjusted to different contexts (the Azerbaijani context in our case). It would be useful to outline the context that gave rise to the human rights concept.
It is closely connected with or, rather, is based on the idea of man and the way Western culture understands man. A “person” is one of the key notions that affected the development of man-related categories in the West.29 This legal term borrowed from Roman law (cf. a legal person) looks at man as a vehicle of rights and obligations; this, in turn, made it possible to create and develop the human rights idea. This means that the idea of human rights that appeared in the West was created by two interacting factors—Roman law and Christianity.30
Roman law and Christianity determined Western society’s legal and moral practices, respectively. In fact, they are responsible for the emergence of the idea of man as a vehicle of rights and obligations and the related set of ideas: human rights-civil society-democracy. This idea of man is typical of Western culture.
Oriental Christianity (Orthodoxy) interprets the idea of man differently: there is no concept of “person” in its Western meaning. F. von Harlen has the following to say on this score: “By transferring the Occidental idea of person to the world outside the Occident, to the world of Christian Orthodoxy, for example, we shall receive the wrong results... Byzantium gave the world one ‘person’ only, namely, the emperor. Only he had rights.”31
Islamic civilization has its own idea of man and a different interpretation of “person:” in Muslim society it relates to the Muslim ummah rather than the individual.32 I. Fadeeva has written: “Traditional
29 See: R. Poole, Nation and Identity, Routledge, London, 1999.
30 F. von Harlen, “Istoriko-pravovye aspekty problemy Vostok-Zapad,” Voprosy filosofii, No. 7, 2002, pp. 27-51.
31 Ibid., p. 35.
32 Significantly, the very term “person” (shaqs, in Arabic) has a different meaning free from legal connotations typical of the Western term. According to the large explanatory dictionary of Arabic, the word “shaqs” means “any object
ideology and Muslim law this ideology shaped were based on a conviction of religious universalism; that only a religious community, rather than a person or individual can be the subject of law (property, constitutional, etc.). It is membership in this community that was regarded as a guarantee of property, personal, political, etc. rights, which inevitably infringed on the rights of the individual...”33
Significantly, the legal system of Muslim society “has not preserved the ‘legal person’ concept that existed in Roman law.”34 This created a chain of far-reaching effects. In particular, “embezzlement of public funds was not punished under the khad for stealing since the illegal action was aimed not against a legal agent independent of the embezzler: the latter, as any other Muslim, was a partial owner malAllah and, on the strength of this, a partial owner of stolen property.”35 It was even more important that Islam acquired specific judicial practice and an interpretation of man.
It is common knowledge that as distinct from judicial practices in the West, judicial practice in Muslim societies was not separated from religion. It was rooted in the Quran and Hadiths, which together form the basis of the Muslim religious law (Shar’Shari’a).”36 This interfered with the development of the legal categories needed for judicial practices, which, in turn, produced far-reaching results. The absence of a legal institution in the form of courts of justice and judicial practices, in particular, undoubtedly curbed individual development and damaged individual chances of being a free and independent agent.
Moral practices in the West and in the Muslim world, imposed by the corresponding religions, likewise differed; this also affected the way man was understood: each of the religions posed its own tasks on man, which determined the moral practices in these extremely different societies.
As distinct from “the West, which subjugated God to human intellect, thus limiting His omnipotence in a certain sense” (F. von Harlen), Islam clearly and insistently hails God, thus making man subordinate to Him.
G.E. Grunebaum has the following to say on this score: “If we travel from Western Christianity to Greek Christianity and further on to Islam we shall discover more optimistic ideas about human nature. Roman and Protestant Christianity tried to save man tainted by original sin by showing him the road to purity and salvation through Divine sacrifice represented by Christ. Despite man’s sinful nature and his inadequacy, relations between God and man are lawful. Man should see his predestination as following the law and cleanse himself before God. Greek Orthodoxy was less prone to ponder over the Fall and its effects. God created man in his image and likeness, which inevitably makes him noble; sin may taint, defame, and deprave him, yet it cannot destroy him altogether. Sin is akin to illness or loss of inner self, while redemption restores the original fullness of existence. This happens not so much thanks to Divine justice, as due to His boundless and eternal love. The confidence in His mercy ... in His love of man knows no bounds; repentance, confession of sins, and church services, rather than deeds, will provide Divine forgiveness joyfully given. Finally, Islam does not see in man any original sin or filth at all. It discerns in man weakness and, to an even greater extent, ignorance.
that is higher than others or is elevated.” The word is used to describe a man or woman, meaning that man is higher than the earth. The word “shakhasa” means “rise.” It is used, for example, in the expressions “shakhasa sakhmuqa,” that is, “your arrow flew up;” “shakhasa-l-basar” is said to describe eyes that rolled like those of a dead person’s (see: Ibn Man-zur, Lisan al-Arab, Vol. 7, DarIhyaalturath al-Arabi, Beirut, 1999, p. 51).
33 I.L. Fadeeva, op. cit., p. 175.
34 G.E. von Grunebaum, op. cit., p. 57.
35 Ibid., pp. 57-58 (reference to J. Schacht, Sociological Aspects of Islamic Law, Berkeley, 1963).
36 I.P. Petrushevskiy wrote in this respect: “The close connection between religion and law and the transfer of the judicial process into the hands of jurist-theologians are very specific features of the Muslim countries’ history. Even contracts of purchase, tenancy, lease of land, money borrowing, etc. were concluded with the help of qadi (Muslim judges). For this reason religion affected public and even everyday life in the Muslim countries to a much greater extent than in the Christian or Far Eastern countries, where public, criminal, and civil law was free of religious and Church influence and where law-making belonged to secular power. In Muslim countries, where law was rooted in the religious (eternal and immutable) principles, the faqihs (jurist-theologians.—R.K.) did their best to avoid changing the laws to keep them as close to the ideal of theocracy as possible” (Islam v Irane v VII-XV vekakh, Leningrad University Press, Leningrad, 1966, p. 147).
Since man is unable to choose the right path he should master and use the knowledge offered by the Revelation and the Holy Tradition to save himself. It is commonly believed that by entering into an agreement with God Adam gave Him rights over man; this predicts complete defeat of the recalcitrant. God may use His power to punish. At the same time, if an awareness of man’s complete nothingness in the face of his Creator plants in him fear of his predetermined fate, he should trust himself to God and His prophet and join the community of the faithful to neutralize ill forebodings.”37
According to G.E. von Grunebaum, Western Christianity sees “man’s main task in life as following laws and justifying himself before God,” Eastern Christianity (Orthodoxy) believes that “repentance, confession of sins, and church services” are enough, while Islam believes that it is enough to join the community of the faithful and follow the Quranic rituals.
We can say that Muslim moral and judicial practices that insist on the priority of the collective (Muslim ummah) created a watershed between Muslim and Western societies. Von Grunebaum has said in this connection: “Protection of man’s independence and freedom of his moral convictions had been a feature of ‘Latin’ humanism, which some time later forever separated Islam from the West. The East remained unwilling to adapt itself, even in the least obvious way, to Western patterns.”38 It should be added that the “watershed” has survived in various forms until our time. The question is: can the gap be bridged at all?
Bridging the Gap: Memory, Culture, Education
Being related to the fundamental change of ideas about man typical of a system cherishing traditional values, ideas, and customs, the task is much harder than merely carrying out economic, social, or political reforms.
I have already written that Islamic religion is intimately connected with many aspects of individual lives and tends to rigidly regiment man’s everyday conduct. Islam treats the individual in a formal way through the prism of the ummah and thus affects all sides of his life—the education system, his relations with other people, his attitude to power—to form what I called collective experience patterns in one of my earlier works.39
They are tenacious and stable and form an inalienable element, in our case, of the Muslim Azeri identity. There are certain Muslim Azeri identity patterns that may make it hard to accept some of the key Western ideas about man, viz. an obvious bias toward family values, loyalty to the authorities, devotion to traditions, formal and simplified ideas about human nature and motivations, etc. Such values as human independence and individuality and related human rights are perceived as secondary within these patterns, individuals do not regard them as a priority or even tend to ignore them.
Certain authors take these collective and individual patterns typical of Islamic societies as a sign that they are “unprepared” or “unable” to accept such values as democracy and human rights.40 Irrespective of whether this opinion is shared or not, we must admit that it would be hard to change these and similar patterns to introduce an idea of man typical of Western culture, as a free and independent agent acting according to his own will.41 Here we should answer the question: to what extent and how can the Muslim Azeri identity pattern be changed to become closer to democracy and individualism?
37 G.E. von Grunebaum, op. cit., pp. 101-102.
38 Ibid., p. 109.
39 See: R. Garagozov, Metamorfozy kollektivnoy pamiati v Rossii i na Tsentral’nom Kavkaze, Nurlan Publishers, Baku, 2005.
40 See: S. Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations, for example, abounds in similar statements.
41 There are authors who believe that the West arrived at this idea after a long, tortuous, and bloody historical journey (see: D. Senghaas, op. cit.)
It remains unclear whether the collective experience patterns can be changed and modified. It is important to point out here that even if it is possible to modify certain patterns, it depends on the choice (in its widest sense) society makes to meet the challenges of the contemporary world.42 The choice of an “identity project” is precisely such a choice; reforming Islam to adjust it to the contemporary social demands is also one such road.43 In any case, this task calls for huge cultural and educational efforts to shape and develop an Azeri identity that, by bringing together Eastern tolerance and the Western values of individuality, will be able to discover new value dimensions and depths of human nature.
Globalization has extended the range of norms, values, technologies, ideas, etc. that reach the East from the West. Obviously, however, Coke, McDonald’s, and other attributes of the consumer society will be more enthusiastically embraced than the ideas of civil society and human rights, despite their vital importance for society’s future. In other words, the external attributes of Western civilization are much more “importable” than categories that demand certain mental efforts. This is in fact what gives rise to “cultural schizophrenia,” which, according to Samuel Huntington, betrays itself in the disparity between the “inner” content (Asian) and the “external shell” (Western). This explains why it is important to develop culture and education that can plant habits of mental work and understanding which alone can help develop “inner content.” Any dialog between cultures and civilizations as well as the ability to accept and adjust alien experience can be established and formed only by developing one’s own culture.44 Development of collective memory should receive special attention: it preserves and passes on to successive generations the nation’s accumulated experience and traditions. To encourage national culture, the national elite should carry out adequate policies in the cultural and educational sphere.
In Azerbaijan the future of Europeanization will depend to the greatest extent on whether the country will “establish the priority of the individual in society,” and whether society will turn to man to make him the center of the reform. This cannot be achieved all by itself, yet the country’s future in the economic and other spheres depends on this achievement. What we need is a purposeful and systemic strategy of reform. This, in turn, gives rise to the question: to what extent society, the ruling circles, and international organizations are prepared to ponder over the dilemma and come to grips with it? Regrettably, Prof. Huntington’s forecasts seem to come true: Azerbaijan is rapidly moving toward the Third World as far as quality of life is concerned.45 We should never forget, however, that we are not culturally doomed (even if culture does affect social development)—we lack the correct strategy of reform of society and are burdened by “situational” and “instrumental” factors that interfere with the efforts to develop and realize this strategy. This, however, is the subject of another article.
42 See: R. Garagozov, op. cit.
43 See: R.R. Garagozov, “Azerbaijan and Islam in the Context of Globalization,” CaucasUS Context, No. 1, 2003, pp. 23-30.
44 Azerbaijan’s national music culture can serve as an apt example of the above. Very developed, it allowed outstanding composer Useir Gajibekov in the early 20th century and, later, other talented Azeri composers to master the European forms of musical experience and, by blending European and national traditions, to create a tradition of opera, ballet, and jazz culture, and other modern musical genres, absolutely unknown before in Azerbaijan.
45 According to the latest international ratings, Azerbaijan with 56 points according to the quality-of-life index is between 105th and 112th place out of 195 countries, next to Botswana, Ghana, Zambia, and others. Azerbaijan’s neigh-bors—Georgia with 60 points is between 80th and 83rd place, and Armenia with 62 points is between 67th and 71st place (see: [URL: [http://www.ilireland.com/il/qofl06/index.php#Azerbaijan]).
