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70
Khazar IBRAHIM
Ambassador, Head of the Mission of the Azerbaijan Republic to NATO
(Baku, Azerbaijan).
ARMENIA-AZERBAIJAN CONFLICT AND EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY
Abstract
Credibility, Commodities (mostly hydrocarbon), and Communications are three major elements that can affect Euro-
Atlantic security if the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict continues to simmer.
The views in the paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Government of Azerbaijan.
Euro-Atlantic security is best ensured through a combination of NATO's military might and the Euro-Atlantic community's value- and principles-based policies. The latter applies to NATO's approach to the conflict, thus enhancing its credibility. Any deviations from this principled position by NATO would seriously affect its interests in the Greater Caspian Region. NATO's latest strategic concept says, "All countries
are increasingly reliant on the vital communication, transport and transit routes on which international trade, energy security and prosperity depend." The Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict has the potential to disrupt the flow of strategic hydrocarbon commodities from the Caspian Sea to Europe and halt future energy projects. It could also cut off a crucial transportation route to and from Central Asia.
Introduction
Acronyms overload the Euro-Atlantic1 glossary. Widespread in the 1990s, C3 (command, control, communications) later evolved to incorporate new components. C3 is also a key acronym for the impact of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict on Euro-Atlantic security. Here it stands for Credibility (real, not perceived), Commodities (mostly hydrocarbon), and Communications (of a different type), with the potential to embrace new elements if the conflict continues to simmer.
Euro-Atlantic security is best ensured through a combination of NATO's military might and the Euro-Atlantic community's value- and principles-based policies. The latter applies to NATO's approach to the conflict, thus enhancing its credibility. Any deviations from this principled position by NATO would seriously affect its interests in the Greater Caspian Region.2
NATO's latest strategic concept says, "All countries are increasingly reliant on the vital communication, transport and transit routes on which international trade, energy security and prosperity depend."3 The Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict has the potential to disrupt the flow of strategic hydrocarbon commodities from the Caspian Sea to Europe and halt future energy projects. It could also cut off a crucial transportation route to and from Central Asia.
Credibility
Since gaining their independence, the countries of the former Soviet Union have been looking to the European and Euro-Atlantic institutions as powerhouses of justice. And Azerbaijan is no exception.
However, reality has proven to be somewhat different. Even though the OSCE has been the organization providing a framework for the conflict resolution, as a consensus institution (in which both Azerbaijan and Armenia are members) with no legally binding decisions or practical tools, it was unable to deliver results. The OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs have also failed to find a solution to the conflict so far, despite their almost two decades of work.
The Council of Europe has not been a framework, and some of its decisions have had no direct implementation mechanisms.
1 In this paper, "Euro-Atlantic" predominantly embraces NATO and to some extent the European Union. When "community" is added, it means the members only.
2 Here the term "Greater Caspian Region" includes all the former Soviet Central Asian republics, plus Afghanistan, as well as the countries of the Southern Caucasus, plus Turkey, Russia, and Iran.
3 "Strategic Concept for the Defense and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization," Para 13, Lisbon 2010, available at [http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf].
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The European Union and NATO possess more tools to assist conflict resolution,4 but the Southern Caucasus remains outside the targeted actions to this end. True, both the EU and NATO have decisions and documents clearly stating the principles to be applied in resolution of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict.
The 2012 NATO Chicago summit declaration reads:
"With our vision of a Euro-Atlantic area at peace, the persistence of protracted regional conflicts in the South Caucasus and the Republic of Moldova continues to be a matter of great concern for the Alliance. We welcome the constructive approach in the renewed dialogue on Transnistria in the 5+2 format, and encourage further efforts by all actors involved. With respect to all these conflicts, we urge all parties to engage constructively and with reinforced political will in peaceful conflict resolution, and to respect the current negotiation formats. We call on them all to avoid steps that undermine regional security and stability. We remain committed in our support of the territorial integrity, independence, and sovereignty of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the Republic of Moldova, and will also continue to support efforts towards a peaceful settlement of these regional conflicts, based upon these principles and the norms of international law, the United Nations Charter, and the Helsinki Final Act."5
The European Parliament's May 2010 resolution states:
"The European Parliament is seriously concerned that hundreds of thousands of refugees and IDPs who fled their homes during or in connection with the Nagorno-Karabakh war remain displaced and denied their rights, including the right to return, property rights and the right to personal security; calls on all parties to unambiguously and unconditionally recognize these rights, the need for their prompt realization and for a prompt solution to this problem that respects the principles of international law; demands, in this regard, the withdrawal of Armenian forces from all occupied territories of Azerbaijan, accompanied by deployment of international forces to be organized with respect of the U.N. Charter in order to provide the necessary security guarantees in a period of transition, which will ensure the security of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh and allow the displaced persons to return to their homes and further conflicts caused by homelessness to be prevented."6
But no tangible steps have been taken to translate the positions into tools that promote resolution of the conflict. Instead, some members of the Euro-Atlantic community made efforts to erode the principled position of both entities.
In this paper I am not searching for a rationale behind these efforts, what I intend to argue is that without more consistency and assertive pursuit of the principles enshrined in the charters and documents of the Euro-Atlantic institutions, credibility will be at stake. The documents are also straightforward.
The PFP framework document states:
"They [the member states of the North Atlantic Alliance and the other states subscribing to this document] reaffirm their commitment to fulfill in good faith the obligations of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights; specifically, to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, to respect existing borders and to settle disputes by peaceful means."7
The EAPC Basic Document says:
4 Without undermining existing negotiation frameworks.
5 "CHICAGO SUMMIT DECLARATION," issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Chicago on 20 May, 2012, Para 47, available at [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/ SID-0D712E71-4E5BF186/natolive/official_texts_87593.htm].
6 The Need for an EU Strategy for the South Caucasus, European Parliament Resolution of 20 May 2010 (2009/ 2216(INI)), Para 8, available at [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do ?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2010-0193&language=EN].
7 PFP Framework Document, 10-11 January, 1994, Para 2, available at [http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/ c940110b.htm].
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"They [the member countries of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and participating countries of the Partnership for Peace] reaffirm their joint commitment to strengthen and extend peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, on the basis of the shared values and principles which underlie their cooperation, notably those set out in the Framework Document of the Partnership for Peace."8
Damaged credibility would definitely have geopolitical consequences. In this case, I am not presenting geopolitical considerations in a zero-sum context (even though it might be perceived as so). I am also far from implying the infamous Great Game rivalry here.
I am talking about interests.9 Most of the global players have stakes in the region. Some interests are in hydrocarbon resources, some in transportation routes, while others are in pure business. Azerbaijan is critical to that end. It links the region to Central Asia, possesses energy resources, and dominates regional business. President Ilham Aliev stated last year: "Azerbaijan is a leading state in regional affairs, a leading state in the South Caucasus. The Azerbaijani economy accounts for 83 percent of the South Caucasus economy. Our political initiatives play an important part in deepening the regional cooperation. Our standing in the world is strengthening."10
If credibility becomes an issue, other players will definitely have the upper hand. For the Euro-Atlantic community (and for any other player too), it is important to have a realistic assessment. "Dogma kills," was a saying of one of my favorite professors. "Perceptions mislead," I would add.
The Euro-Atlantic community might perceive that given its strong international stance, democratic societies, and economic power, it has the luxury of downgrading the risk. Historically, this is a commonplace practice for global players. But trends are different today, which can seriously aggravate the consequences. The international arena is becoming more crowded, democratic practices at home are not converted into democratic policies in foreign affairs, and economic powerhouses are emerging in Asia and Latin America at a time of serious financial crisis in Europe.
This situation can create fertile ground for a change in Azerbaijani public opinion vis-à-vis the Euro-Atlantic institutions, if perceptions trump realism on the part of the latter.
Commodities
Caspian energy resources significantly diversify European energy supplies. First came oil. Construction of the BTC pipeline11 was a milestone in the region's development and specifically in connecting it, both factually and psychologically, with Europe's economy and security. In an environment of increasing demand for energy with decreasing growth in oil production, the BTC pipeline brings much-needed energy resources to Europe at a critical time.12
This was followed by natural gas. The Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline delivers Caspian gas to Turkey, but even more of it is about to enter the European market. The committed volume comes
8 EAPC Basic Document, 30 May, 1997, Para 1, available at [http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-066e.htm].
9 In the case of NATO or the EU, interests are both national (for bigger members and those with clear-cut involvement in the region) and institutional.
10 Speech by President Ilham Aliev at the Opening of the Heydar Aliev Center in Ujar, 30 October, 2011, available at [http://en.president.az/articles/3516/print].
11 The 1768-km-long Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline has been built to address export solutions for Azerbaijan. The pipeline crosses the territories of three countries—Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, starting from the Sangachal terminal in the Caspian Sea and ending at the Ceyhan terminal on the Turkish coast of the Mediterranean, from where ACG oil is delivered to the international markets (BP-Azerbaijan website).
12 See: S.E. Cornell, S.F. Starr, The Caucasus: A Challenge for Europe, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, 2006, p. 20.
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from Azerbaijan's Shah Deniz reserves stage 2,13 but potentially, the Eastern shore can also add its very significant resources.
Caspian gas is a game changer for the European Union, and one by one the barriers to its passage to the heart of Europe are coming down. But if Europe is to reap the full rewards of access to gas from the Caspian's eastern shores—from Turkmenistan and perhaps from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan too—then a sustained effort to translate concepts and proposals into physical transmission systems is needed. That is the challenge facing Günther Oettinger, the EU's new Energy Commissioner.14
Along with political efforts, as suggested, conflict resolution steps need to be taken too. The Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict has the potential both to impede or sabotage them. Geography defines the problem. Azerbaijan is the "cork in the bottle containing the riches of the Caspian Sea basin and Central Asia."15
The existing pipelines actually run a few kilometers away from Nagorno-Karabakh's [administrative] border—a comfortable shell distance from those interested in causing trouble.16
Even without eruption of a full-scale war, the status quo endangers the BTC significantly. Any "misfire" by Armenian troops from the occupied Azerbaijani territories could disrupt energy flow to the European market.
Moreover, modern warfare has many new non-lethal components, one of which is a cyberattack. Ironically, one of the major tasks for the contemporary critical energy infrastructure is cyberdefense, or cybersecurity, if taken in the larger context.
Cybersecurity is a serious and ongoing challenge for the energy sector. Cyber threats to energy delivery systems can impact national security, public safety, and the national economy.17
I would also add here that they can have a significant impact on the global or regional energy landscape, depending on the importance of the energy supply routes and demand in critical markets.
Communications
"Sitting in the middle of the Caucasus, on the shores of the landlocked Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan is a nexus of trade routes from Asia to Europe," says a recent CNN report.18
The building of a railroad connecting Kars in Turkey to Akhalkalaki in Georgia and the rehabilitation of the Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi rail line will connect Istanbul to the Caspian sea by rail. Together with the building of rail lines linking Kazakhstan to China, this creates a rail connection from Istanbul to China, making it possible to ship goods quickly and relatively inexpensively across Asia.19 Im-
13 The Shah Deniz field was discovered in 1999. It is one of the world's largest gas-condensate fields, with over 30 trillion cubic feet—1 trillion cubic meters—of gas in place. Shah Deniz Stage 2, or Full Field Development (FFD), is a giant project that will bring gas from Azerbaijan to Europe and Turkey. This will increase gas supply and energy security to European markets through the opening of the new southern gas corridor. The project is expected to add a further 16 billion cubic meters per year (bcm/yr) of gas production to the approximately 9 bcm/yr from Shah Deniz Stage 1. It is one of the largest gas development projects anywhere in the world (BP-Azerbaijan website).
14 See: J. Roberts, "Europe's Caspian Gas Policy to Be a Key for Energy Security," 2010, available at [http:// www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home_old/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/ArticleView/ArticleID/21667/language/en-US/EuropesCaspiangaspolicytobekeytoenergysecurity.aspx].
15 Zb. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, Basic Books, New York, 1997, p. 46.
16 See: F. Guarascio, "Caucasian 'Great Game' over Gas and Oil Remains Unresolved," 7 March, 2012, available at [http://www.publicserviceeurope.com/article/1609/caucasian-great-game-over-gas-and-oil-remains-unresolved].
17 See: "Roadmap to Achieve Energy Delivery Systems Cybersecurity," September 2011, p. 1, available at [http:// www.cyber.st.dhs.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Energy_Roadmap.pdf].
18 "Azerbaijan's Oil Gateway," CNN, 13 October, 2011, available at [http://edition.cnn.com/video/#/video/busi-ness/2011/10/04/gateway-anderson-baku-oil.cnn?iref=allsearch].
19 See: T. Ziyadov, "The Kars-Akhalkalaki Railroad: A Missing Link Between Europe and Asia," Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 19 April, 2006, pp. 5-6; S.E. Cornell, S.F. Starr, op. cit.
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plementation of an international project to build the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) railway line and construct a railway line tunnel in the Bosporus, along with providing connection of the Trans-Europe and Trans-Asia railway networks and carrying freight and passengers directly through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, will serve to increase the transit potential of the regional countries.20
In fact, this railroad's importance goes well beyond trade and business activities. The ISAF21 countries have started to pull out of Afghanistan, so reverse transit is becoming a "hot" issue. Continuing supply of the remaining troops in Afghanistan also remains an important issue. Given the current closure of the Pakistani route, the only tangible alternative remains the northern direction, the so-called Northern Distribution Network (NDN).
The NDN itself comprises a southern route—starting at the Georgian port of Poti, going overland to the port of Baku, Azerbaijan, then by ferry to Aqtau, Kazakhstan, and on through Uzbekistan to Afghanistan—and a more heavily used northern route, traversing Latvia, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan.22
Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan reportedly are the main overflight, refueling, and landing routes for the U.S. and coalition troops bound for Afghanistan, and Azerbaijan also is a major land transport route for military fuel, food, and construction supplies. According to U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan Matthew Bryza, "virtually every U.S. soldier deployed to Afghanistan has flown over Azerbaijan. Moreover ... approximately half of all supplies that reach Afghanistan by routes other than Pakistan now transit Azerbaijan."23
The functioning BTK is likely to make the role of the NDN's southern direction even greater. If it (the U.S.) were to secure a transit agreement with Turkmenistan, the port of Turkmenbashi could be an additional destination for goods leaving Baku by ferry.24 After construction of a new seaport in Alat (Azerbaijan), the transit capacity (11.6 million tons per year) will be even higher.
"Baku's new seaport will be of regional importance and a very large logistics center established there. Cargo transportation from China and Central Asia to Europe will grow significantly," Akif Mustafaev said about the international transport program TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia).25
The Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict can affect strategic transportation routes in two ways.
■ First, as in the case of energy infrastructure, it can be disrupted by a direct hit, given its proximity to the line of contact between Armenian and Azerbaijani troops.
■ Second, the countries involved in transportation could avoid it for security reasons if a war breaks out.
Conclusion
Thus, for the sake of its strategic security interests, the Euro-Atlantic community should do more than just be a part of energy projects that have access to the transportation routes and are perceived as credible. It should step up every effort to solve a major obstacle—the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict.
20 See: "Baku-Tbilisi-Kars New Railway," State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan, available at [http://www. oilfund.az/en_US/layiheler/baki-tbilisi-qars-demir-yolu.asp].
21 The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is a NATO-led security mission in Afghanistan established by the U.N. Security Council on 20 December, 2001 by Resolution 1386 as envisaged by the Bonn Agreement.
22 See: "Northern Route Eases Supply to U.S. Forces in Afghanistan," IISS, available at [http://www.iiss.org/ EasySiteWeb/getresource.axd?AssetID=45813&type=full&servic].
23 Quoted from: J. Nichol, "Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests," CRS, 27 October, 2011, p. 5, available at [http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33453.pdf].
24 See: "Northern Route Eases Supply to U.S. Forces in Afghanistan."
25 "New Port could Open Gateway to a World," CNN, 2 February, 2012, available at [http://business.blogs. cnn.com/2012/02/02/azerbaijan-port-gateway].
Two major tools NATO has in this regard are: political influence and peacekeeping capabilities. Two (the U.S. and France) out of the three OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs mediating the conflict are NATO members. Their principled position on resolution of the conflict within the organization is a clear signal that they support the unanimous position of the international community, which is reflected in relevant documents of the United Nations and other organizations. Also, NATO has expertise in peacekeeping and some NATO members could commit themselves to a potential peacekeeping mission.
In short, the recipe is simple: the Euro-Atlantic community should be consistent in pushing for the values and principles enshrined in its own documents and act within its capabilities.
