CC BY
39
CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS No. 3(39), 2006
[ REGIONAL POLITICS
AFGHANISTAN: SETTLEMENT STAGES AND AFTERMATH OF THE POST-CONFLICT SITUATION
Shoislam A KM ALOV
Ph.D. (Political Science), Deputy Rector, Tashkent Islamic Institute (Tashkent, Uzbekistan)
Afghanistan is living through a protracted stage of the so-called postwar settlement process and the growing threat of further deterioration. It has become obvious that the United States and its allies are unable to maintain stability in Afghanistan in the context of the mounting political tension around Iran and Pakistan.
An analysis of the current situation in Afghanistan must inevitably take into account two key events: President George W. Bush’s visit to Afghanistan and the London Donor Conference on Afghanistan. These events have determined the course of Washington’s and the world community’s Afghan policy and symbolize its evolution.
President George W. Bush’s Surprise Visit to Kabul
On 1 March, 2006, the U.S. president visited Kabul under conditions of the worsening military and political situation in Afghanistan.1 According to Western media, “the confidential stopover that
1 See: “Neob’iavlennyi vizit prezidenta SShA v Afghanistan, 2 marta 2006 goda,” Xinhua News Agency, Renmin ribao [http://russian.people.com.cn/].
lasted four hours” was part of the president’s planned visit to India and Pakistan. It was his first visit to Afghanistan since the launching of the U.S.-led counterterrorist operation. State Secretary Con-doleezza Rice accompanied the president.
The Washington administration did its best to conceal the visit; under the original plan, President Bush was to visit India and Pakistan first and then travel to Afghanistan. It seems that the mass anti-American demonstration in Delhi forced a change in the schedule.
Mounting resistance to the coalition, which has been going on in Afghanistan for the last 18 months, made the unprecedented security measures that accompanied the U.S. president inevitable. By the time Air Force One touched down, the air space over the Afghan capital and its region had been reliably blocked off. According to the official version, the president arrived in Afghanistan to support President Karzai and his administration, which “had recently been confronted with a new wave of violence raised by Taliban fighters and al-Qa‘eda terrorists.”2 To confirm its dedication to Washington’s security-related policy, Pakistan demonstratively launched large-scale military operations against the Taliban and al-Qa‘eda in North Waziristan while the American president was visiting the country.
During his stopover in Afghanistan, President George W. Bush met President Karzai for talks and visited the Bagram base to meet the American military stationed there. At a press conference in Kabul, he said that the American troops together with the Afghan and Pakistani military were still hunting the terrorist leaders. “It’s not a matter of if they are brought to justice, but when,” said the American president.
The worsening conditions in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan notwithstanding, President Bush pointed out with satisfaction: “We’re making progress in dismantling al-Qa‘eda.” He also said: “You are inspiring others” and expressed his appreciation of the significant changes that have taken place in Afghanistan under Hamid Karzai’s presidentship. President Bush went on to say: “It’s our country’s pleasure and honor to be involved in the future of this country.” America cherished freedom of the press, said the president, and it would like to see further democratization in Afghanistan.
President George W. Bush risked a lot by coming to Afghanistan to support President Karzai, who has recently been looking increasingly disoriented. The situation is going from bad to worse, even though the head of the White House repeats that Afghanistan has triumphed over terrorism. In fact, America’s mild refusal to set up a permanent military base in Afghanistan undermined the Kabul administration’s political vigor and confidence.
The visit was probably intended to demonstrate the United States’ “active involvement” in Afghanistan; it was made under pressure of the world community’s mounting criticism of America’s antiterrorist strategy. On top of this, the official circles in Kabul have been increasingly displeased about the imminent withdrawal of part of the American military contingent in Afghanistan.
The New, Post-Bonn Stage of Afghan Settlement
On 31 January-1 February, 2006, the donor states of Afghan settlement met in London for an international conference under the U.N.’s aegis. Chaired by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, U.K. Premier Tony Blair, and President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Hamid Karzai, the
2 “Bush verit, chto Ben Ladena poymaiut, 2 marta 2006 goda,” BBC [http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/].
conference discussed the post-Bonn stage of Afghan rehabilitation. The London meeting produced the Afghanistan Compact between the Afghan Government and the international community that formulated the principles and outlined the mechanisms of reconstruction and development of Afghanistan for 2006-2010. According to preliminary information, between 2006 and 2010, Afghanistan will receive $10.5 billion in foreign aid.
An analysis of the Bonn Process and the current situation in Afghanistan has demonstrated that the United States and its allies in the counterterrorist coalition are especially active in promoting the post-conflict rehabilitation of Afghanistan, probably because they are convinced that success in Afghanistan will “positively affect” their policies in the world, especially in Central and Southern Asia and in the Islamic countries.
For this reason, the West, whose presence in Afghanistan is absolutely legitimate, while the cabinet of President Karzai is obviously pro-Western, is realizing its long-term strategy under the U.N.’s aegis. Thus, on the eve of the conference, Tom Koenigs, Federal Government Commissioner for Human Rights Policy and Humanitarian Aid (shortly before that appointed U.N. Special Representative for Afghanistan), said that the country’s consistent stability required the international community’s long-term and reliable support. The Western generals, who at different times commanded the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, agree that the present situation in the country demands the continued presence of this military contingent for at least another 10 to 20 years.3
The West described the parliamentary election in Afghanistan, which completed the Bonn Process and created the country’s highest legislature, as a “great victory of the international community and the Afghan nation in promoting democracy in the Islamic world and in the region.” The London conference, attended by about 70 countries and international organizations, was aimed at consolidating the legitimacy of the “international presence” in Afghanistan. The final document drafted by Hamid Karzai’s administrationjointly with the Western experts working at the U.N. and the World Bank will make the “international presence” in Afghanistan legitimate.
The diverse political and other interests of the world’s largest states have added to the discrepancies in the international approaches to the Afghan problem. Some of them (Russia, China, and France, in particular) are very skeptical about the so-called Anglo-Saxon post-conflict rehabilitation strategy.
This will most probably affect the implementation of the London decisions. The RF delegation, for example, expressed its concern over the fact that “former warlords and other odious figures connected with the Taliban were elected to the parliament.” According to RF Foreign Ministry’s spokesman Mikhail Kamynin, “these conciliatory gestures will prove futile and will never force the Taliban to halt its anti-government activities.”4 He also pointed out that the noticeably smaller areas growing drug-bearing plants in Afghanistan, which the West regarded as an important achievement, “never affected the volume of drugs produced; drug-related incomes have even increased.” The Kremlin is convinced that the never-ending drug flow from Afghanistan is equally threatening Russia and the rest of the world.
I. Khokhlov of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences has pointed out: “When the ‘counterterrorist operation’ that overthrew the Taliban regime was launched in Afghanistan in October 2001, the country regained first place as producer of opium-based drugs, heroin in particular.”5 In 2002, the country produced 1,400 percent of raw opium
3 See: J. Kucera, “Counter-Insurgency in Afghanistan—Paving the Way to Peace,” Jane's Defense Weekly, 15 December, 2004.
4 “Interview M. Kamynina v sviazi s Londonskoy konferentsiey po Afghanistanu,” RIA “Novosti,” 27 January, 2006 [http://www.afghanistan.ru/doc.xhtml?id=5018].
5 I. Khokhlov, “Proizvodstvo opiynykh narkotikov (geroina) v Afghanistane: infrastruktura narkobiznesa” [http:// www.nationalsecurity.ru/library/00021/].
and, consequently, heroin and caught up with the mid-1990s volume when Afghan territory was covered by about 70 percent of the world’s opium poppy plantations. In 2001, it produced 185 tons; in 2002, 1,900-2,700 tons; in 2003, over 7,000 tons, or 87 percent of the world’s consumption and nearly 100 percent of Europe’s consumption; in 2004, 12,000 tons; the expected figure for 2006 being over 15,000 tons. (The discrepancy in the figures supplied by the United Nations Drug Control Program and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is negligible and caused by different methods of calculating the areas where opium poppy is grown and its yield per hectare.)
Different approaches are best illustrated by the way different countries treat the security-related issue, the “stumbling block” of the Afghan rehabilitation process. Russia, France, and China believe that the U.N. should remain the main coordinator of international efforts in Afghanistan. In London, Moscow, Paris, and Beijing argued that the U.N. Assistance Mission for Afghanistan should strengthen its leading role.
These countries obviously want the “international community” present in Afghanistan and Karzai’s pro-Western administration to remain accountable to the U.N. Security Council in which Russia, France, and China have equal rights with the U.S. and U.K. Today, only the ISAF peacekeeping forces are U.N.-accountable, while the contingents of the counterterrorist coalition are stationed on the strength of the “war on terror” as part of the Operation Enduring Freedom. If the “Three” manage to insist on their principles, the counterterrorist force in Afghanistan should be re-registered within the U.N. Security Council, but this time after consultations with Moscow, Paris, and Beijing.
At the London conference, Foreign Minister of Iran Manouchehr Mottaki suggested that the terms for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan should be agreed upon because, he argued, “instability and lack of security in the country are caused, to a great extent, by the foreign military presence on its territory.”
At the same time, the ISAF NATO-headed contingent acting under the U.N.’s aegis is engaged in purely peacekeeping activities and stays away from counterterrorist operations in which the troops of the counterterrorist coalition are mostly engaged. In this context, France, as a NATO member, objects to America’s desire to blend the ISAF peacekeeping forces and the troops of the counterterrorist coalition. In 2005, French Defense Minister Michele Alliot-Marie announced that her country was not engaged in hunting down Osama bin Laden—it was fulfilling the obligations it had shouldered in the Bonn and Tokyo processes.
American experts have pointed out that Beijing and Moscow, acting in the bilateral format and within the SCO, are putting political pressure on the Central Asian states to force them to minimize their military-technical support for the counterterrorist coalition in Afghanistan, in which neither Russia nor China are involved. A. Cohen of the Heritage Foundation has pointed out that the George W. Bush Administration underestimated the “negative factor” of the SCO, which called on the prompt withdrawal of NATO’s military contingents from the Central Asian countries.6 He added that as soon as the American units left the Khanabad base, Bishkek raised the rent for the Manas military base.7
The above, domestic pressure, and the heavy burden of two military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are forcing the United States to trim its military presence in these countries and try to convince its trans-Atlantic allies (the U.K., Germany, and Canada in particular) to increase their military contingents instead. London, which in May 2006 assumed command over ISAF, decided
6 See: A. Cohen, John J. Tkacik Jr., “Sino-Russian Military Maneuvers: A Threat to U.S. Interests in Eurasia,” 30 September, 2005 [http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/bg1883.cfm].
7 See also: “Kyrgyzstan predstavil SShA novye uslovia prebyvania aviabazy koalitsionnykh sil v Bishkeke, 2 fevralia 2006 goda, Moskva, 25 ianvaria,” Xinhuanet [http://www.russian.xinhuanet.com/russian].
to dispatch another 3,300 servicemen to Afghanistan; according to J. Reid, this will cost Great Britain 1 million pounds.8 To win the public over to its side, London announced that after he graduates from the military academy, the crown prince will join a unit to be dispatched either to Afghanistan or Iraq.
The donor states are not averse to exchanging their aid for economic and political dividends; they announced in London that they were prepared to donate large sums to Afghanistan’s rehabilitation. U.S. State Secretary Condoleezza Rice, for example, announced that in the coming year Washington intended to allocate $1.1 billion for this purpose; Premier Blair of Great Britain, in turn, made public his country’s intention to donate 500 million pounds (about $900 million) in the next three years.
Together with America and Germany, Russia intends to settle the problem of Afghanistan’s foreign debt within the normal Paris Club procedures. Deputy Finance Minister of Russia S. Storchak said in particular: “The Russian side estimates Afghanistan’s debt at about $10 billion and is prepared to annul it completely.”9
There is the opinion that by doing this Moscow hopes to convince Kabul to cooperate on Russia’s investments in the country’s postwar revival. Russia wants involvement in some of the infrastructure projects: development of oil and gas fields in the country’s north, in the Jowzjan Province, construction of an oil refinery in Hyraton (on the border with Uzbekistan), which will probably work on Kazakh and Turkmen oil; development of the huge copper deposits at Aynak to be funded jointly with China; and gold mining in Samti.
Russian companies also intend to restore and privatize two cement works in Puli-Humri and Jabal-us-Seraj, the country’s only works of this type. RAO UES and Tekhnopromeksport have already shown their interest in the Sarubi and Darunta hydropower stations. It has been said that “today Russia can allocate about $100 million in Afghanistan in the form of investments and easy loans.”
Speaking at the London conference, Foreign Minister of China Li Zhaoxing said that in 2006 China would give Afghanistan 80 million yuans (about $10 million) in the form of nonrefundable aid.10 He also announced that his country was prepared to help Afghanistan on a long-term basis and cooperate with it to the sides’ mutual advantage and development. The minister promised that in 2006 the larger part of the Afghan commodities exported to China would be exempt from customs dues. He also said that Beijing supported the efforts of its Afghan partners to oppose terrorism and intended to more actively help Afghanistan train its military and the police. The People’s Republic of China also supported the SCO efforts designed to create an anti-drug belt around Afghanistan and to step up its cooperation with neighbors in anti-drug efforts. China’s government encouraged Chinese investors involved in the Afghan infrastructure projects, energy production, and mining and transport in Afghanistan, said the Chinese foreign minister.
India, on its part, decided to allocate another $50 million to be invested in construction of the Afghan parliament building in Kabul; this will bring India’s financial aid to Afghanistan up to $600 million.
The Iranian foreign minister promised to help Afghanistan cope with its energy shortage as soon as the nuclear power station in Boucher was commissioned in 2007, probably in an effort to win the public of Afghanistan over to its side to gain another argument in its favor at the international talks on “Iran’s nuclear problem.”
S See: Velikobritania otpravit v Afghanistan dopolnitel’nye voennye sily, 2 fevralia 2006 goda, London [http:// www.russian.xinhuanet.com/russian].
9 “Rossia gotova uskorit’ reshenie problemy afghanskogo dolga, 2 fevralia 2006 goda, Moskva,” Xinhuanet [http:// www.russian.xinhuanet.com/russian].
10 See: “Kitai obeshchal Afghanistanu bezvozdmezdnuiu pomoshch v S0 mln yuaney, 2 fevralia 2006 goda,” Xinhua Agency [http://www.russian.xinhuanet.com/russian].
Kazakhstan volunteered to “supply the Afghan peasants with seeds of traditional crops, agricultural equipment, and mineral fertilizers to reduce the areas where opium poppy is grown.” Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan offered the international community their logistic support in Afghanistan’s postwar rehabilitation. Dushanbe believes that it might provide the north of Afghanistan with more energy and help to build highways. In this Tajikistan expects the cooperation and assistance of Iran, Russia, and America, as well as of international financial structures, the Aga Khan Fund in particular.
Ashghabad insists on its willingness to extend the potential of the border checkpoints to help deliver humanitarian aid to Afghanistan. It is doing its best to use the gas factor to become involved in post-conflict rehabilitation and to supply part of Afghanistan with electric power produced by gas turbine generators.
According to Turkmen experts, the country’s huge gas reserves allow it to play the most prominent role on the energy scene of Afghanistan and other states of the region. The trans-Afghan gas pipeline is another trump card Ashghabad is using to insist on its involvement in the postwar rehabilitation. Together with Kabul and Islamabad, Ashghabad is trying to enlist the cooperation of the West and international financial structures. Today Afghanistan and the adjacent areas are too unstable to set any dates. The issue is kept afloat for political purposes to be used in negotiations with Russia and other countries on alternative export routes of Central Asian gas.
It seems that the clash of geostrategic interests of the country’s leaders is developing into a hindrance that is slowing down postwar rehabilitation. For this reason, no stabilization in Afghanistan and around it can be forecast in the mid term: the conflict nature of the geostrategic confrontation is too obvious.
Meanwhile, relative stability in Afghanistan and continued international aid make Uzbekistan’s active involvement in postwar rehabilitation possible. If rationally organized this involvement would bring political and economic dividends. To strengthen its position in the unfolding rehabilitation process, Uzbekistan can and should attract the political and other resources of the SCO and EurAsEC. In particular, Tashkent can initiate cooperation between them and Kabul to make their members’ contribution to Afghanistan’s postwar rehabilitation more efficient.
Post-Conflict Situation is Worsening
On the whole, the military-political situation in Afghanistan remains unstable. The hostilities on its territory are damaging the infrastructure and causing long-term economic and social problems. The opposition is still armed and active elsewhere, especially in the well-guarded capital: acts of terror, abductions, and hostage-taking are normal occurrences which negatively affect the morale of the locals and foreigners involved in the rehabilitation process.
The economic collapse and lawlessness are driving the people into the ranks of extremists. In fact, the military operation of the United States and its allies did nothing to improve the situation: together with Iraq, the country remains the main source of fighter conscripts and a training base for all kinds of criminal groups and terrorist organizations, al Qa‘eda included.
The White House meanwhile continues issuing statements to the effect that starting in 2006 the United States plans to cut down its military contingents in Iraq and Afghanistan, which have scored success in ensuring domestic stability. However, most of the expert community is convinced that these statements are prompted by the political situation in Washington.
The steadily rising military spending on Iraq and Afghanistan and the number of killed and wounded among the American military have caused a barrage of criticism and increased the antiwar
sentiments back home, in America. According to the Pentagon, every month the country pays an average of $5.9 billion and $900 million to carry on the military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, respectively. There is information that the sum the United States has been spending on military operations since 9/11 will soon top $400 billion; by late 2007, it will reach $500 billion.
Recently the White House asked Congress to allocate an additional $75 billion for the continued operations in Iraq and Afghanistan (three times more than the sum needed to restore the areas damaged by Hurricane Katrina in 2004 of $19.8 billion).
In an effort to bring the situation under control, the White House decided to trim the American contingents stationed in these two countries. In order to more actively involve the human potential of the Afghan power-wielding structures, the United States is playing the main role in setting up a new army for Afghanistan and developing its military infrastructure. America is busy setting up light antiguerrilla forces strong enough to control the situation, but not strong enough to defend the country’s sovereignty: Washington plans to remain its guarantor for a long time to come.
On the whole, the Afghan security forces and the troops of the Internal Affairs Ministry are staffed with inadequately trained people and infected with corruption and opposition sentiments popular among the policemen. The army and police are losing many people to desertion.
The mounting wave of criticism of President George W. Bush’s counterterrorist policies has forced his administration to gradually cut down the number of American military in Iraq and Afghanistan to improve the Republican Party’s chances at the congressional election late in 2006. At the same time, a lot is being said about the local security forces of both countries being able to preserve stability on their own.
On 4 January, 2006, the president confirmed in the Pentagon that in 2006 the size of the American troops in Afghanistan would drop from 19,000 to 16,500 men; and in Iraq, from 17 to 15 brigades. This decision was based on information supplied by the American commanders in these countries.
The diminished size of the American troops in Afghanistan will be compensated for by the expected extension of the NATO contingent. In fact, the American leaders are convinced that NATO will be able to close the security gap left by the departing American troops. Washington plans to station, as before, the main part of its military contingent in the country’s southeastern corner, from which Taliban and al-Qa’eda fighters penetrate Afghanistan, even though it would rather replace its troops in this area with NATO forces as well. It has been unable to do this so far: the Afghan leaders strongly object to this on the grounds that the country’s political institutions and its security forces are not strong enough, while NATO is not always ready to fight. According to foreign analysts, as distinct from the Iraqis, the majority of Afghanistan’s population is still convinced that America’s military presence ensures the country’s security and testifies that the international community is remaining true to the task of Afghan rehabilitation. According to Afghani experts, NATO is perceived as an inadequate substitution for the American forces—the NATO units “are halfhearted and do not want to fight.” Most of the NATO members (with the exception of the U.K., Australia, and Canada) do not permit their military to be involved in operations against the fighters.
Moreover, NATO’s greater involvement in Afghanistan is not guaranteed: on 8 December, 2005, it announced the movement of6,000 military (including 4,000 Brits) to Southern Afghanistan, an area of the fighters’ greatest activity. The next day, however, this information was doubted on the strength of a Dutch statement that the 1,000-strong Dutch contingent would only be moved if the parliament approved it (the opposition parties in Holland were dead set against it).11
11 See: “Kofi Annan za napravalenie v Afghanistan voinskogo kontingenta Niderlandov, 2 fevralia 2006 goda_, Brius-sel, 30 ianvaria,” Xinhuanet [http://www.russian.xinhuanet.com/russian].
Local experts in Afghanistan do not exclude the possibility that the international coalition members will become even more hesitant to extend NATO’s presence in Afghanistan. They are convinced that the stepped up activities of the Taliban and al-Qa’eda in the last twelve months in the country’s southeast pursued precisely this goal. In 2005, their attacks killed about 1,500 Afghans and 90 Americans; since late 2005, the fighters have been using the suicide bomber tactics widely used by Islamic radicals in Iraq.
In an effort to somehow diminish its military presence in Afghanistan, the United States has stepped up its efforts to convince the allies to shoulder more responsibility for the settlement process. This is primarily addressed to Great Britain and Germany. The new German leaders, in particular, should demonstrate their loyalty to the trans-Atlantic partnership they themselves described as a priority.
By way of practical involvement in the America-led antiterrorist effort, the NATO Council decided to assume command of the ISAF as of 11 August, 2003.
Its spokesmen did their best to defuse the decision’s obvious importance by saying that theoretically the peacekeeping operation in Afghanistan would be carried out very much as usual under the U.N.’s aegis and command of the volunteer states. The military uniforms of the Western peacekeepers bear neither the flag nor the emblem of the North Atlantic Alliance, which is only providing structure. However, Timur Shaymergenov, research associate of the department of foreign policy studies, the Kazakhstani Institute of Strategic Research (KISI), has concluded that the United States invited the NATO forces to Afghanistan to be able to concentrate on Iraq.12
This is the first time that NATO has been supervising an operation far away from its responsibility zone in a situation where the government that replaced the Taliban in Kabul is confronted with a crisis of confidence among the local people and mounting activity of the pro-Taliban forces. The headquarters of the coalition members are no longer changed on a six-month basis; the contingent is under the command of the NATO Allied Forces of Northern Europe. The commander of the armed forces in Kabul is appointed by the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO in Europe, while the coordinating center of the Afghan operation is stationed at NATO’s Allied Command Operations at Mons in Belgium.
It should be said that NATO sees conditions conducive to lasting peace and stability, in which a representative government will operate, as its final aim in Afghanistan. The ISAF is gradually promoting the required Afghan institutions, in particular, by its involvement in training the National Armed Forces and the police.
Neither the ISAF, nor NATO has the political situation under control—even though relative stability has been achieved. Positive developments notwithstanding, the military-political situation in Afghanistan remains responsive to all sorts of risks originating inside and outside the country. While tension is preserved, no one can say that NATO is playing a key role in achieving stability. Whether the country has embarked on a road leading to peace, domestic stability, and economic resurrection remains to be seen.
On the whole, the military-political situation in Uzbekistan is unpredictable. The protracted period of “postwar” settlement has already developed into a structural factor of regional instability. Unexpectedly, the political situation in the Middle East has changed: Ariel Sharon left the political scene; Ahmadinejad came to power in Tehran, Palestine brought HAMAS to power; and tension in Syria and Iran is mounting. All this adds to destabilization in Afghanistan. The military-political situation is worsening under the impact of the deteriorating relations between Iran and Israel, the recent notorious statements on Israel made by the Iranian president, his country’s nuclear problem, and the victory of HAMAS in Palestine. This inevitably affects America’s policy in Afghanistan.
12 See: T. Shaymergenov, “Sovremennye podkhody NATO k bor’be s mezhdunarodnym terrorizmom: afganskiy opyt,” Analytic, No. 6, 2005 (see also KIRI web-site, Archive (Security) 17 February, 2006).
President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov has pointed out: “The situation in Afghanistan clearly demonstrates that the conflicts and their aftermath have pushed the country back by decades.”13 He went on to say: “The military-political crisis in Afghanistan cannot but have a negative effect on regional stability in Central Asia as a whole and on Uzbekistan’s national security in particular.”14 “For example, the war in Afghanistan, which almost completely destroyed the country’s economy, which was underdeveloped at best of the times, today is the main obstacle to laying new transport communication routes to connect the Central Asians states with the ‘warm seas’ and allowing them join the system of world economic relations.”15 What is going on in Afghanistan at present “makes it possible to simulate potential transfer of terrorist activities beyond the country’s national borders... This is facilitated by the porous frontiers between the Central Asian states, while Afghanistan, its territory, and its borders have been turned into uncontrolled weapon stockpiles.”16
13 I. Karimov, Uzbekistan na poroge XXI veka: ugrozy bezopasnosti, usloviia i garantia progressa, Drofa Publishers, Moscow, 1997, p. 22.
14 Ibid., p. 25.
15 Ibid., p. 29.
16 Ibid., p. 31.
THE REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN IN THE REGIONAL DIMENSION
Vafo NIIATBEKOV
Independent analyst (Dushanbe, Tajikistan)
Khurshed DODIKHUDOEV
Chief Specialist, Center of Geopolitical Studies, Russian-Tajik Slavic University (Dushanbe, Tajikistan)
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the formation of the newly independent states in Central Asia have revived the rest of the world’s interest in this region. Its countries were viewed primarily through the prism of their relations with the leading world and regional nations, particularly with Russia, China, Iran, and Turkey, without giving interstate contacts in this region
their due attention. However, it is the regional problems of the Central Asian republics that have largely determined their foreign policy.
On the whole, a paradoxical situation is being observed in this sphere. We are witnesses to endless statements by the regional leaders about friendship, fraternity, and cooperation for the good of all the residents of Central Asia, on the
